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In recent decades, there have been signifi cant changes in the way corporate 
innovation is performed. They include changes in the innovation process, fl ex-
ibility to outsource innovation activities, and most importantly, the location 
of innovation. There are mainly two new trends: First, location of globally 
strategic R&D by the multinational corporations (MNCs) in some developing 
countries; second, more recently, some companies from the emerging econo-
mies have also started performing R&D to develop products and services for 
global markets. These trends are occurring in a dynamic business environment 
that consists of mutually reinforcing economic and technological changes. 
These trends have managerial implications for companies and policy implica-
tions for the emerging economies where such R&D is performed, as well as 
for the industrialized home countries of the companies. Further, innovative 
products and services resulting from R&D activities in emerging economies 
seem to better address the needs of consumers at the bottom-of-the-pyramid 
in other developing countries. 
Global Innovation in Emerging Economies examines the dynamics of 
the globalization processes and the emergence of new locations for innova-
tion and its implications. Exploring twenty in-depth case studies of MNCs, 
local companies, and research institutes/universities based in Brazil, China, 
India, and South Africa (the so-called BRICS Group), Prasada Reddy devel-
ops a conceptual framework of the evolution of globalization of corporate 
R&D. This unique books addresses many issues including the context for 
location of global R&D in emerging economies by MNCs and the driving 
forces behind this trend, performance of global R&D by companies from 
emerging economies, and national and corporate implications of these new 
trends for innovation systems.
Prasada Reddy is a faculty member at the Research Policy Institute, Lund 
University, Sweden. He also worked at the Centre for Entrepreneurship, 
University of Oslo, Norway. He has been a consultant to several multilat-
eral organizations. His broad areas of work include: foreign direct invest-
ments, industrialization, innovation, and intellectual property rights.
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Foreword
In the 1960s, the long-run outlook for economic development in even the 
most precocious de-colonized countries was grim, as observed through the 
prism of ‘dependency theory,’ which maintained that poor countries would 
always remain economically behind because of their inability to develop 
original technology. By the 1990s, the outlook had brightened somewhat, 
as technological capabilities in pockets of the developing world began to 
be examined through the lens of the ‘national innovation system,’ which 
acknowledged the steps being taken to develop local technological skills. 
Now, with Reddy’s book in the forefront, leading Third World countries are 
examined from the viewpoint of providing a new and fast-growing locale 
for R&D, the ultimate in economic development, for national investors as 
well as for multinational fi rms, whether in the form of R&D subsidiaries, 
joint ventures or subcontracting services.
One of the many virtues of Reddy’s book is its scholarly energy and the 
material it provides to ponder what the world is beginning to look like as 
this far-out stage in development is being reached.
What I infer from Reddy’s scholarship is that the world is not necessar-
ily becoming ‘universalist,’ with the multinational form of doing business 
spreading from North to South in a seamless web of collaboration and 
orderly competition in the R&D fi eld. Universalism is more or less the pic-
ture painted by the most eminent scholars of the 1950s-era MNCs to whom 
Reddy refers, notably Chris Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal. Yet during the 
catch-up period of “emerging multinationals from emerging economies” 
(as Ravi Ramamurti and Jitendra Singh term it), the de-colonized genera-
tion, owing to being latecomers, may spawn a new global business struc-
ture, and their narrowing of the gap is likely to be long and hard. Reddy 
reminds us that despite all the glamor, at least two-thirds of all R&D is still 
undertaken in the developed world, and only a small fraction of the top 500 
or 1,000 business enterprises are from the South, mostly national oil com-
panies and banks. Instead of MNCs from the South joining hands in R&D 
with those from the North with little organizational difference between 
them, the old 1950s(+) MNC model may not become universal in practice. 
The MNCs that originate from the North, with vast global networks and 
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less centrifugal force to optimize their home base, may have to compete in 
the markets of a growing number of countries that have their own fi rst-rate 
national fi rms. Country after country is likely to exhibit a very formidable 
set of national enterprises against which the MNC must compete, as fi rst 
seen in South Korea, then China, India, Brazil, Vietnam, South Africa. . . . 
These national privately owned enterprises (POEs) are smaller overall than 
the largest MNCs, but their corporate headquarters are formidable and 
fi ne-tuned. POEs globalize (witness Samsung and Tata), but their inter-
national networks are likely to be less far-fl ung than those of the MNC, 
and to enjoy more regional coherence, especially in Asia (Reddy provides 
an interesting chapter on the South-South dimension of innovation). The 
strong country model may constitute a challenge in the aggregate to the 
diffuse multinational model, at least during the decades-long (?) phase of 
catch-up.
As Reddy observes, the advantages of the MNC are enormous, including 
sheer size, fi rst-mover advantage and rich stocks of innovative skills. But if 
need be POEs can also keep their R&D costs down by outsourcing to lower-
wage countries, but their costs of doing business are likely to stabilize at a 
lower wage level for some time to come (presently, Reddy notes, the need to 
reduce labor costs accounts for more than 90 percent of outsourced R&D 
investment, which, in turn, is responsible for a large share of the total). 
The wage gap between the emerged and emerging economy may remain 
much wider, and the skill gap may become much narrower, than what the 
American multinational has encountered in Europe or even Japan. At pres-
ent, Third World multinationals can also leapfrog, and acquire new capa-
bilities overnight, if they can manage them well, by outward foreign direct 
investment, acquiring the plum assets of multinationals in fi nancial distress 
(such as the acquisition in 2009 by Saudi Arabia’s state-owned petrochemi-
cal company, SABIC, of GE’s chemical company in China, equipped with 
R&D facilities). Yet Reddy provides data that strongly suggest that the 
attention paid by POEs to their domestic base may remain intense, if only 
because their managers and engineers perceive the persistence in the North 
of a black and yellow ‘glass ceiling.’ Increasingly, the best people may return 
from wherever they studied to work at home.
The MNCs are locating R&D overseas, but Reddy aptly asks, is it ever at 
the world frontier? Isn’t Raymond Vernon’s product-cycle theory still cor-
rect in suggesting that a fi rm always retains its most developmental, non-
standardized operations at home? The tugging at the apron strings to break 
away nationally and decentralize R&D functions for cost reasons may be 
expected to be greater among MNCs than POEs, given different cost con-
ditions. Which model, in our generation, is better no one yet knows, but it 
is something worth thinking about.
Reddy gives us food for thought by providing us with a rich set of case 
studies of R&D in the ‘BICS’ (Brazil, India, China and South Africa). 
India is the MNCs’ favorite location, whereas the largest ‘foreign’ 
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investor in China is Taiwan (the company conducting the most advanced 
R&D is Nokia).
It is fun to read Reddy’s book because the information he generously 
provides is fresh. We must thank him for revealing to us the foundations of 
a new phenomenon.
Alice H. Amsden
Barton L. Weller Professor of Political Economy
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
Cambridge, Massachusetts
April 2010
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Preface
In the early 1990s I started working at the Research Policy Institute, where 
research work on internationalization of R&D was being led by Prof. Jon 
Sigurdson. At about the same time, research on the topic started picking up 
momentum worldwide. I was soon bitten by the bug, and a review of the 
scenario showed that almost all the research was focused on the industrial-
ized world. Having worked in India in the 1980s, I witnessed some multi-
national corporations (MNCs) locating their strategic R&D units in India 
in the mid-1980s. This made me curious as to whether the location of such 
units in a developing country was an evolutionary trend in the process of 
globalization of R&D. Questions that aroused my interest included: What 
were the driving forces? What types of technologies were being developed? 
What were the implications for the host country? A survey of the then exist-
ing literature did not help much as there were few studies dealing specifi -
cally with these issues.
My research started with case studies of the MNCs’ R&D units in India, 
and, based on the results, a questionnaire survey was carried out in 1997. 
The results showed that MNCs that located strategic R&D in India were 
mainly in the new science-based technologies, and they were doing so 
mainly to gain access to research personnel.
To validate my hypothesis that globalization of corporate R&D was 
evolving further to encompass more geographical areas outside the indus-
trialized world, it was necessary for me to develop a database of MNCs’ 
R&D activities in developing Asia and transition economies. Based on the 
research work over the years, I have developed an evolutionary framework 
of the globalization of corporate R&D dating back roughly to the 1960s, 
in terms of waves and the driving forces in each of these waves, the type of 
R&D located abroad in each wave and the potential implications for the 
host country.
The results of all this research, apart from partially appearing as articles 
in international academic journals, culminated in an integrated publica-
tion of a book titled Globalization of Corporate R & D: Implications 
for Innovation Systems in Host Countries, by Routledge in 2000. Since 
this publication, based on research in the 1990s, many developments of 
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revolutionary nature have taken place in terms of location innovation. For 
instance, the emergence of China in the global economy and then the pre-
diction of Goldman Sachs about the growth potential of Brazil, Russia, 
India and China (BRICs).
Because my research applies equally to both industrialized and develop-
ing worlds, I have received a number of invitations to address both of them 
(of course from different perspectives—one wanting to prevent R&D from 
moving away and the other wanting more R&D-related investments).
Since 2005, there has been a constant encouragement and pressure from 
my well-wishers to document and analyze the development that has taken 
place since my previous work in the late 1990s. Fortunately, the Interna-
tional Development Research Centre (IDRC), Canada, came forward to 
support my research, which culminates in the form of this book.
The book may well be deemed an extensive study of the process of glo-
balization of innovation, as it also integrates the evolving phenomenon that 
encompasses hitherto-unknown countries for such high-end activities and 
the potential implications of this phenomenon.
I hope readers will fi nd the book useful and interesting.
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1 Introduction
In recent decades, there have been signifi cant changes in the way corporate 
innovation activities are performed. They include changes in the innova-
tion process, fl exibility to outsource certain innovation activities and, by 
far the most important one, wider choice in the location of innovation. 
What caught the most attention of policymakers, academics and corporate 
management is the trend toward globalization of research and development 
(R&D) and thereby performance of innovation activities away from the 
home countries.
The main concerns relate to the two new trends: fi rst, the new trend of 
multinational corporations (MNCs) locating strategic innovation activities 
in some countries outside the industrialized world, which can be referred to 
as ‘emerging economies’; and second, since 2000, some companies from the 
emerging economies have started entering the global markets with innova-
tive products and services, developed through their own R&D. Both these 
new developments have managerial implications for companies and policy 
implications for the host countries (where such R&D is performed), as well 
as for the home countries of the companies.
1.1 GLOBALIZATION OF INNOVATION
Internationalization of innovation activities is not as recent a phenomenon 
as it is viewed to be. Since the 1960s, companies have been performing 
some sort of R&D outside their home countries for one reason or the other. 
In a study, Cantwell (1998) found that even as early as the 1930s, the larg-
est European and American companies performed about seven percent of 
their total R&D outside their home countries. But the magnitude, nature 
and scope of such overseas R&D in the past were limited. It was mainly 
undertaken either to facilitate technology transfer by adapting the parent’s 
technology to local operating conditions or to gain greater share of the 
local markets by developing products that meet the preferences of local 
customers better.
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MNCs started internationalizing their R&D on a larger scale in the 
1980s, and this became signifi cant in the 1990s. Foreign R&D expendi-
tures of US MNCs increased every year since 1994 and reached a record 
US$21 billion in 2002, accounting for 13.3 percent of those MNCs’ total 
R&D expenditure, an increase from 11.5 percent in 1994 (Morris 2005). In 
terms of employment, in 1999, 16 percent of the people employed in R&D 
by these MNCs were in foreign subsidiaries, up from 14 percent in 1994 
(UNCTAD 2005, p. 122).
However, there are wide differences in the degree of globalization of 
R&D between different industry groups. For instance, in the case of Japa-
nese MNCs, most of their overseas R&D units are in the electronic equip-
ment, pharmaceutical and automotive industries (Odagiri and Yasuda 
1996). In general, it is observed that technology-intensive industries, such 
as electronics, biotechnology, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, tend to inter-
nationalize their strategic R&D to a greater degree than other industries 
(Niosi 1999).
In the 1990s, the performance of R&D abroad by MNCs had not only 
increased substantially in quantitative terms, but the nature of such R&D 
had also undergone signifi cant qualitative change. The scope of work in 
overseas R&D units of MNCs has gone beyond adaptation tasks to encom-
pass innovation activities of strategic nature such as developing products for 
the global markets or even undertaking basic research to develop generic 
technologies (Reddy 1997).
The signifi cant increase in the overseas R&D activities of MNCs 
can be mainly attributed to the changes in MNCs’ strategies to attain 
global competitiveness. According to Pearce (1999, 157), the new strate-
gic approach involves recasting of the roles of individual subsidiaries and 
their intragroup interdependencies. The growing importance of overseas 
R&D units in MNCs’ strategies refl ects: “(i) an increasing involvement in 
product development rather than adaptation, (ii) an interdependent rather 
than dependent position in group technology programs, (iii) increased rel-
evance of supply-side infl uences (host country technology competencies, 
capacities and heritage), (iv) decline of centralizing forces on R&D (e.g., 
economies of scale, communication and co-ordination problems, concerns 
of knowledge security).”
Over the years, various methods of exploiting internationally dispersed 
innovation activities have been evolving. Bartlett and Ghoshal (1991) sug-
gested four different types of management structures: (i) center-for-global—
developing new products and processes in the home country for the global 
markets; (ii) local-for-local—developing products and processes indepen-
dently in each of the R&D units abroad for use in the local market of the 
subsidiary; (iii) locally linked—developing novel products and processes 
in each location for global exploitation; and (iv) globally linked—devel-
oping novelty through the collaboration of R&D units located in differ-
ent countries for exploitation in the global markets. Each type has specifi c 
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advantages and disadvantages, but all the four types could be adopted at 
the same time for different projects within the same MNC.
Similarly, Håkanson (1990) suggests that the organizational structure 
of MNCs for international R&D has undergone three evolutionary stages: 
the centralized hub, the decentralized federation and the integrated net-
work. Now, an emerging evolutionary framework considers the ‘organi-
zational learning’ by MNCs as the core explanation for globalization of 
R&D. This is refl ected in the MNCs locating their R&D units abroad 
closer to major centers of innovation, where reputed universities and R&D 
units of competitors exist. Learning takes place through closer interaction 
with major customers, suppliers and knowledge producers, such as univer-
sities (Niosi 1999).
Kuemmerle (1997, pp. 62–63) classifi es new overseas R&D sites on 
the basis of their primary objective, usually one of the two missions: (1) 
the ‘home-base-augmenting site,’ which is established in order to access 
knowledge from the local scientifi c community, creating new knowledge, 
and transferring it back to the company’s headquarters; (2) the ‘home-base-
exploiting site,’ which is established to support manufacturing facilities in 
foreign locations or to adapt standard products to the demand there. The 
main objective is to commercialize knowledge by transferring it from the 
company’s home base to the R&D unit abroad and from there to local 
manufacturing and marketing.
Zanfei (2000, p. 516) suggests that with regard to innovation activities, 
MNCs are in the process of adopting a new organization mode that is 
defi ned as a ‘double network.’.First, MNCs are increasingly characterized 
by the interconnection of a large number of internal units that are engaged 
in the company’s use and generation of knowledge. This is referred to as 
MNC’s ‘internal network.’ The traditional organizational model of trans-
fer of knowledge from center to periphery is giving way to a new model 
in which the units are not just absorbing knowledge generated elsewhere, 
but are also generating and circulating new knowledge and are linked to 
one another through cultural (values and languages) rather than hierarchi-
cal linkages. Second, units in the internal network tend to build ‘external 
networks’ with other fi rms and institutions outside the MNC’s network to 
increase the potential for use and generation of knowledge. Such coopera-
tive linkages are developed not only by the central units of MNCs but also 
by the decentralized units, which use such local external networks to gain 
access to local sources of information and application abilities.
According to Alcácer and Chung (2007, p. 761), often fi rms strategically 
choose to locate R&D activities in a given geographical area in order to 
benefi t from localized knowledge spillovers. Firms that locate operations in 
such areas while receiving knowledge would also become a source of spill-
overs through leakage of their own knowledge. So such fi rms are exposed 
to two competing constraints: (i) maximizing benefi ts from a location’s 
knowledge activities; and (ii) minimizing spillovers to competitors. There 
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are three potential knowledge sources in a given geographical area—in-
dustry, academia, and government. Foreign fi rms entering the host country 
for the fi rst time, on an average, are not interested in areas that have large 
government and industry technical activity. Less technologically advanced 
fi rms tend to locate in geographical areas with any level of academic activ-
ity and high levels of industrial innovative activities. On the other hand, 
fi rms that are technologically more advanced tend to favor locations with 
high level of academic activity and avoid geographical areas with any level 
of industrial activity. The academic and government sources produce more 
basic and less appropriable knowledge, which is less attractive to techno-
logically less advanced fi rms. Technologically more advanced fi rms have 
greater knowledge base and are better able to benefi t from spillovers from 
all sources.
The scope and level of technological activities carried out abroad by 
MNCs are determined by the national capabilities of both home and host 
countries. Cantwell and Janne (1999) propose that when MNCs based in 
countries with more advanced technological capabilities in a given industry 
relocate to less advanced countries in the same industry, they tend to ‘dif-
ferentiate their technological activities.’ On the other hand, when MNCs 
based in less advanced countries relocate R&D abroad, they tend to ‘spe-
cialize within the same areas of the parent company’ at home. They also 
suggest that the MNCs located in leading centers in a particular industry 
tend to build up specialization on the basis of the local technological capa-
bilities in host countries. At the same time, MNCs located in less advanced 
centers tend to draw more on their home-based capabilities, by replicating 
their home specialization abroad.
1.2 GLOBALIZATION OF R&D AND 
EMERGING ECONOMIES
Until the mid-1980s, the globalization of corporate R&D had been mainly 
limited to location of R&D units within the industrialized countries, where 
much of the R&D is still concentrated. Developing countries seldom fi gured 
as locations for innovation activities. According to Amsden et al. (2001, 
pp. 1–3), latecomer nations to industrialization differ among themselves in 
two key aspects: (1) the ownership of their leading manufacturing compa-
nies; and (2) the depth and breadth of their R&D. In countries where the 
dominant companies are nationally owned, as in China, India, Korea and 
Taiwan, the aggregate investments in R&D tend to be high. Conversely, 
in countries with high incidence of foreign ownership of companies, as in 
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, the aggregate investments in R&D tend to 
be low. Certain industries such as electrical and nonelectrical machinery, 
transportation equipment and chemicals are likely to be subject to ‘fi rst 
mover’ advantage. Therefore, if an MNC becomes the fi rst mover in such 
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an industry in an emerging economy, it may succeed in ‘crowding out’ the 
entry of national fi rms. Because MNCs conduct very little R&D in develop-
ing countries, local R&D in these dynamic industries is unlikely to occur. 
These countries will be dependent on the MNC for transfer of new technol-
ogies. Consequently, in these dynamic industries, emerging economies will 
not be able to earn ‘monopoly,’ ‘technological’ or ‘entrepreneurial’ rents 
due to their failure to acquire the skill base that is a prerequisite for earning 
such rents. According to Fagerberg (1994), technological innovations do 
not fl ow easily across economic actors or distances as the generation and 
application of innovations are closely tied to specifi c fi rms, networks and 
economic institutions.
Globalization of corporate R&D, however, continues to evolve as a phe-
nomenon, by encompassing more industrial sectors, as well as more geo-
graphical areas. Hitherto uncommon locations are attracting R&D-related 
foreign direct investments (FDI) by MNCs. Beginning in the mid-1980s, 
MNCs started locating strategic R&D units, perhaps on an experimental 
basis, in some developing countries, such as India. This strategic move by 
MNCs has been facilitated by the availability of large pools of scientifi -
cally and technically trained human resources, at substantially lower wages 
compared to their counterparts in industrialized countries, and an adequate 
infrastructure (Reddy 1993; Reddy and Sigurdson 1994).
This does not imply that a major proportion of corporate R&D is being 
relocated to emerging economies. More than two-thirds of the world’s 
industrial R&D is still being carried out in traditional locations within the 
industrialized world. However, the trend of locating innovation activities 
in emerging economies is likely to be strengthened as well as extended to 
more sectors.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, a large pool 
of scientists and engineers with specialist knowledge from Russia and East 
European countries entered the global market for talent. Around the same 
time, some developing countries, particularly Brazil, China, India and 
South Africa, started liberalizing their economies for trade and invest-
ments. These countries started attracting the attention of foreign investors 
and MNCs not only for their large and rapidly growing economies, but 
also because of their technological capabilities. These countries were seen 
as potential location for some innovation activities.
Furman and Hayes (2004) through an analysis of the US patent data 
show that the innovative productivity among the ‘follower’ countries is 
growing at a faster pace than is that of the industrialized countries. Over 
the last few decades, the difference in the relative innovative productivity 
of the most innovative countries (e.g., the US, Switzerland and Japan) and 
other innovative countries (e.g., Israel, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan) 
has declined, in terms of innovative output per capita. Although there is 
still a gap in absolute terms between the former and the latter, the gap is 
relatively narrower now than it was about a couple of decades ago. Based 
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on historical patterns in their innovative capacity levels, Furman and 
Hayes categorize countries into four groups: (1) leading innovator coun-
tries; (2) middle-tier innovator countries; (3) third-tier innovator countries; 
and (4) emerging innovator countries. The average innovative capacity in 
the ‘emerging innovator’ countries grew signifi cantly during 1978–1999 
from slightly higher than those of the third category of countries to levels 
that exceed those of the second category of countries. Although not on a 
par with the most innovative countries, emerging innovator countries as a 
group have surpassed a number of countries who historically had greater 
wealth and technology than them. This the authors attribute mainly to the 
“ever deepening investments in the drivers of national innovative capac-
ity, both by committing to innovation-enhancing policies and investing in 
physical and human capital” (p. 1331).
An Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) global survey in September 2004 
(EIU 2004) showed that companies are redistributing their innovation 
activities across the globe. About 70 percent of the companies surveyed 
had R&D activities abroad. Around 52 percent of the respondents reported 
that increasing their overseas R&D was a priority. Among the likely loca-
tions for R&D-related FDI, 30 percent of the respondents cited China, 29 
percent the US, followed by India at 28 percent. India is viewed to be a 
large recipient of global strategic R&D investments in the future. The EIU 
considers India a potential global ‘R&D hotspot.’ According to another 
survey by A. T. Kearney in 2007, India emerged as the second most likely 
destination for R&D-related FDI, behind China and just ahead of the US. 
More than 300 MNCs have already set up R&D centers in India, including 
over 125 Fortune 500 companies (Yoshida 2008, p. 3).
In 2005, INSEAD and Booz Allen Hamilton surveyed R&D managers in 
186 companies from 17 industrial sectors across 19 countries. The survey 
respondents together accounted for about 20 percent of the global corpo-
rate R&D expenditures (US$76 billion). Between 1975 and 2005, among 
the respondents, the share of R&D sites located outside the markets of their 
corporate headquarters has risen from 45 to 66 percent (Goldbrunner et 
al. 2006, pp. 1–2). The survey showed that the relative share of China and 
India among R&D sites has been increasing; the two countries together 
accounted for 3.4 percent of foreign sites of the respondents in 1990, and 
this increased to 13.9 percent by 2004. Over the same period, the pro-
portion of foreign R&D in the US fell from 19.6 percent to 15.9 percent, 
while in Western Europe it fell from 30.0 percent to 28.1 percent. In order 
to build an ‘optimally confi gured’ R&D network, the respondents plan 
to open new or scale up existing R&D sites over the next fi ve years, with 
22 percent of all new R&D sites going to China and 19 percent to India. 
This trend was common across all subsets within the sample (subsets: home 
country; highly dispersed versus less dispersed; users of complex versus 
noncomplex knowledge; and technology innovators versus the rest). The US 
also retained its attraction as an R&D location with 19 percent of the new 
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sites, but mainly in just three sectors, defense, chemicals and pharmaceuti-
cals. Only 13 percent of the new sites would be in Western Europe, closely 
followed by Eastern Europe with 12 percent. South America attracted a fi ve 
percent share of the new sites (Doz et al. 2006, pp. 4–5).
The survey also showed that the driving forces for location of innova-
tion activities are differentiated by region, suggesting that R&D location 
decisions seek to create a network of unique skills and capabilities across 
the globe. Future location of R&D units in the industrialized world will be 
based mainly on criteria relating to: ‘access to technology or research clus-
ters,’ ‘access to markets or customers’ and ‘access to qualifi ed workforce.’ 
The growth of foreign R&D units in the developing countries showed quite 
a different set of drivers: In all developing regions, access to ‘low cost skills 
base’ and ‘access to markets and customers’ are important factors for estab-
lishing new R&D sites. However, in India and Eastern Europe, companies 
are also attracted by the availability of highly qualifi ed human resources. 
“In China, the low cost skills base is paired with a need for market and 
customer access, which implies companies are focusing lower on the inno-
vation value chain in China than in India or Eastern Europe” (Doz et al. 
2006, pp. 5–6).
In terms of jobs created globally by inward FDI (including R&D-related 
FDI), a study by IBM’s PLI-Global Location Strategies service showed that 
in 2006 the top 15 locations for inward FDI accounted for 73 percent of 
jobs, a decrease from 85 percent in 2005, suggesting that MNCs are wid-
ening their search for investment opportunities for manufacturing, services 
and R&D. In 2006, inward FDI created a total of 900,000 manufacturing 
jobs worldwide, followed by 330,000 service jobs and 100,000 R&D jobs. 
India and China continue to lead in the total number of new manufacturing 
jobs created through inward FDI; however, Vietnam is rising rapidly. India 
attained the fi rst place in terms of manufacturing jobs created (126,000), 
displacing China. Vietnam doubled its total over the previous and tied with 
China at 100,000 jobs. Mexico and Eastern European countries have also 
benefi ted in terms of manufacturing jobs created. India attracted manu-
facturing particularly in the ICT and transportation equipment industries, 
whereas China and Vietnam were more successful in electronics. Mexico 
and Eastern Europe achieved higher than average on transportation equip-
ment jobs. With respect to jobs created by inward FDI in the services sector, 
India and the Philippines cornered the global shared services activity with 
32 percent and 16 percent of such jobs, respectively. Brazil has also emerged 
as a strong regional shared services location. India and China dominate the 
global ranking in terms of R&D jobs created through inward FDI, with 
54 percent and 12 percent, respectively. Other emerging economies such as 
Romania and Vietnam, however, are increasingly being seen as attractive 
locations for R&D-related FDI (IBM 2006).
Similarly, in a transition economy, according to data collected by Czech-
Invest, an agency of the Ministry of Industry & Trade of the Czech Republic, 
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in 2006, over 60 percent of the FDI in the Czech Republic announced by 
US companies are R&D-related in high-tech industries. Out of 16 invest-
ments projects of US companies in the Czech Republic, 12 are R&D and 
high-value-added services projects. They include Sun Microsystems’ devel-
opment and technology center, Microsoft’s center for mobile applications 
and Ingersoll-Rand’s research and training center. About 30 percent of the 
new projects and inquiries have been from small- and medium-sized enter-
prises (SMEs) based in Silicon Valley, seeking affordable engineering R&D 
talent and design services (Clarke, Electronics Supply & Manufacturing,
12/27/2006).1
Another sector, which is growing in terms of globalization of innovation 
activities, is the ‘engineering & technical services.’ A recent study by Booz 
Allen Hamilton and India’s National Association of Software and Service 
Companies (NASSCOM)—the fi rst study to assess the evolving global 
market for engineering and technical services—found that global sourc-
ing of innovation is growing rapidly in locations, such as India, China, 
Thailand and Brazil. According to the study, current global expenditure 
on outsourced (offshore) engineering is US$15 billion. By 2020, the fi gure 
is expected to be in the range of US$150 billion to US$225 billion, with 
growth occurring in emerging economies such as India, China and Russia. 
Presently, the need to reduce labor costs accounts for more than 90 percent 
of offshored (outsourced) innovation activity in emerging economies, but 
during the next 10 years this will be due to more strategic priorities: mar-
ket access, resource quality, increased productivity and expanded capacity 
(Dehoff and Sehgal 2007, p. 3).
Such R&D outsourcing to service providers abroad often involves joint 
work by one or more emerging economies as well as by industrialized 
countries. For instance, beginning in 1991, Boeing started subcontracting 
(outsourcing) R&D work to Russian scientists to take advantage of their 
knowledge and expertise in aerodynamic issues and new aviation alloys. 
Following its success, in 1998 Boeing opened an aeronautical engineering 
design center in Moscow. The center employs 800 Russian engineers and 
scientists, and the number is expected to go up to 1,500 over time. Boeing 
has contracts with major Russian aircraft manufacturers such as Ilyushin, 
Tupolev and Sukhoi, who, in turn, provide the engineers and scientists for 
Boeing’s different projects. By using French-made airplane design soft-
ware, the Russian engineers collaborate with Boeing company’s engineers 
in Seattle and Wichita in the US. For Boeing such outsourcing of R&D 
has become a necessity mainly due the substantial shortage of aeronauti-
cal engineers in the US. As a sign of growing linkages among the emerging 
economies, the Russian teams have further outsourced some elements of 
their work for Boeing to Hindustan Aeronautical Limited (HAL) in Ban-
galore, India, which specializes in digitizing airplane designs to make them 
easier to manufacture. Boeing has also outsourced design and manufacture 
of wings for its new 7E7 (since then changed to 787) aircraft to Mitsubishi 
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in Japan. Mitsubishi, in turn, outsources some of its work to Russian 
engineers whom Boeing is using for other parts of the plane. Such busi-
ness potential in providing R&D services is encouraging entrepreneurship 
among Russian engineers and scientists, who are leaving the large compa-
nies to set up their own design companies. Boeing is planning to buy shares 
in some of these start-ups (Friedman 2006, pp. 227–228).
As a further development, the aerospace giants Airbus and Boeing, 
who until recently were outsourcing only simple work like digitizing old 
hardcopy drawings, began to outsource more complex innovation activi-
ties to their Indian partners. These Indian partners now employ their own 
aerospace engineers, many of whom accumulated several years of experi-
ence in the Indian state-owned aviation sector. For instance, Airbus con-
tracted Infosys, an Indian IT company based in Bangalore, to design part 
of the wing of its double-decker plane A380. Airbus is also teamed up with 
another Indian IT company, Tata Consultancy Services, to build software 
for next-generation cockpits, which aims at replacing switches by touch 
screens. Airbus subcontracted a third Indian fi rm to design and build doors 
for its jet planes. In Boeing’s forthcoming 787 Dreamliner, two mission-
critical systems—one to avert airborne collisions and another allowing 
landing in zero visibility—are being developed and built largely by HCL 
Technologies, another Indian fi rm (Giridharadas 2007).
Following its successful experiments with outsourcing activities in India, 
in 2007, Airbus established its own R&D center, the Indian Airbus Engi-
neering Center in Bangalore. According to Airbus, Indian engineers at this 
high-tech center are involved in developing advanced modeling and simu-
lation, covering critical factors in the design and production of aircraft 
such as A380. The center started with 25 engineers, and within a year it 
expanded to 300. Together with employees of the suppliers of Airbus, the 
center now houses over 1,000 engineers and is expected to grow further in 
the future (Dikshit 2008).
This phenomenon is not confi ned to large MNCs alone; even the start-
ups in the US have caught onto the idea of locating some innovation activi-
ties in emerging economies. For instance, US venture capitalists estimate 
that anywhere from one-third to three-quarters of the software, chip and 
e-commerce start-ups that they invest in have Indian R&D teams from the 
start. In fact, the economics are so compelling that some venture capital-
ists demand that start-ups include Indian R&D in business plans from the 
beginning (Business Week 2003, pp. 42–45; Ernst 2006, pp. 10–11). This 
has led to new business models of innovation offshoring, involving foreign-
born engineers from Taiwan, China and India, who are based in the US, 
to emerge as increasingly important “offshoring brokers” (or outsourcing 
consultants). They provide important support for start-ups based in Sili-
con Valley. As an example, an Indian design engineer with a distinguished 
track record in leading US semiconductor fi rms founded a company, based 
both in California, and Ahmedabad, India. The company was founded to 
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work as an offshoring broker to the US semiconductor industry. It began by 
testing designs, but now has expanded to provide everything from concept 
design to the development of silicon intellectual properties (SIPs) (Ernst 
2006, pp. 10–11).
Globally distributed research teams across different cultural settings are 
able to exchange complex knowledge because the knowledge workers who 
share specialized skills (e.g., mixed signal chip design) tend to follow com-
mon rules and codes of exchanging knowledge. Members of such global 
research communities “will share more jargon and trust among each other 
than with any outsider within their present local communities. And even 
when meetings are required, their frequency will not necessarily be as high 
as to impose co-localization as a necessary requirement for belonging to the 
epistemic community” (Breschi and Lissoni 2001, p. 991).
Forms of Globalization of Corporate R&D in Emerging Economies
Globalization of corporate R&D is occurring in various forms. These 
include:
Establishment of wholly owned R&D subsidiaries;•
Establishment of joint venture R&D units with local or MNC •
partners;
Technology alliances with local or MNC partners in emerging •
economies;
Outsourcing of basic research components to local universities/•
research institutes abroad;
Outsourcing of parts of the innovation to local service providers;•
Outsourcing of complete innovation to service providers.•
1.3 GLOBAL INNOVATION BY COMPANIES 
BASED IN EMERGING ECONOMIES
The patterns of MNCs locating their global innovation activities in 
emerging economies and the local companies in host countries becom-
ing service providers are being accompanied by another new trend. The 
companies based in emerging economies traditionally competed in their 
own local markets by manufacturing products based on either adapted 
or locally improved technologies imported from abroad. In the cases 
where they exported such products, they mainly went to markets in other 
developing countries. Their customer base was also different from those 
of MNCs and other companies from the industrialized world. But since 
the beginning of 2000, some these emerging-economy companies started 
developing products and services for the global markets through their 
own R&D efforts. These innovative products tend to compete for the 
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same customer base of companies from industrialized countries across 
the globe: (i) either directly competing in the existing markets (e.g., mar-
kets for generic drugs); and/or (ii) entering the potential future markets 
for MNCs (e.g., in the third countries). This new phenomenon has not 
been studied much as yet.
For instance, a consumer using a scanner or a digital camera anywhere 
in the world today to convert documents into computer-readable and edit-
able texts is most likely to use software developed by Russian engineers. 
These devices made by leading manufacturers such as Xerox, Panasonic and 
Fujitsu contain ‘FineReader,’ an Optical Character Recognition technology 
developed by Russia’s ABBYY company (Radyuhin 2008, p. OP-ED 11).
According to Mathews (2006, pp. 6–7), some fi rms from the periph-
eral (developing) countries, particularly from the Asia Pacifi c region, have 
emerged as challengers to traditional MNCs. He calls them ‘dragon multi-
nationals.’ These are fi rms that started late and have overcome their disad-
vantages, such as low resource-base, skills, knowledge, lack of proximity to 
major markets and social capital that is to be found in regions like Silicon 
Valley, to emerge as industry leaders. They have succeeded mainly by lever-
aging their way into global markets through partnerships and joint ven-
tures. The globalization process also includes a countervailing pressure by 
the periphery on the center, as organizations in the periphery are ready to 
exploit the new opportunities generated by the creation of global markets. 
This is easier for them than the fi rms from the industrialized world that 
are burdened by existing attitudes that make them treat the world market 
as their own home market. Firms from emerging economies are also in a 
relatively better position to exploit certain home-based advantages, such as 
reserves of engineering talents available at substantially lower cost and low-
cost manufacturing infrastructure (Wong and Mathews 2004, p. 2).
Mathews (2006, 7–9) analyzes the entry of developing country fi rms 
into the global markets in terms of two waves: (1) the ‘fi rst wave’ of MNCs 
from developing countries, studied by researchers such as Kumar and 
McLeod (1981), Wells (1983) and Lall (1983), successfully competed in the 
international markets despite the obstacles and the diffi culties encountered 
in their home countries (such as market restrictions and export diffi cul-
ties). They were ‘pre-globalization’ success cases, when FDI fl ows were still 
small. (2) The ‘second wave’ of MNCs from developing countries repre-
sents a different phenomenon. The causes for the emergence of these MNCs 
can be found in pull factors that draw fi rms into global connections, rather 
than push factors that drove fi rms as stand-alone players in the fi rst wave. 
According to Yeung (2000, p. 12), the rise of second wave MNCs from 
developing countries “is less driven by cost per se, but more by a search 
for markets and technological innovations to compete successfully in the 
global economy.” These fi rms are infl uencing the shape of global market by 
creating new economic space using their own organizational and strategic 
innovations (Mathews 2006).
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Standard & Poor and Business Week developed an index that is made 
up of 25 of the most innovative listed companies around the globe, and 
the ‘Most Innovative Companies’ ranking is an annual survey prepared by 
Business Week in partnership with Boston Consulting Group. In its survey 
results for 2008, two Indian companies were ranked as being among the 25 
Most Innovative Companies around the globe: Tata Group (rank six) for 
its product innovations and Reliance Industries (rank 19) for its business 
models. This is the fi rst time any company from the emerging economies 
made the list (Business Week 2008).2
Apart from developing the world’s cheapest car, Tata Nano (by Tata 
Motors), which is considered highly innovative, the Tata Group is proving 
its innovativeness through its other Group companies as well. For instance, 
the Tata Consultancy Services (TCS), another of the Group’s companies, 
developed a software package, BioSuit, to facilitate drug discovery research 
that has become a success in the global market, particularly among the 
start-up biotech companies. Some of the Indian pharmaceutical compa-
nies such as Ranbaxy, Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories and Arabindo have started 
developing new chemical entities (NCEs), protected with international 
(including the US) patents, for diseases ranging from cancer, diabetes and 
obesity, which usually affl ict well-to-do patients. Until a few years ago, 
these companies were only known for their notorious ability to produce 
generic drugs through reverse engineering of patented knowledge held by 
the pharma MNCs.
Brazilian fi rms such as Embraer and Petrobras are well-known for their 
global innovations. By turning local engineering excellence into innovation 
on a global scale, Embraer has become the third-largest aircraft company, 
focusing on regional jets. Embraer has overtaken Canada’s Bombardier 
to become the world’s leading maker of regional jets through its innova-
tions that became superior substitutes to replace traditional, noisy turbo-
prop aircraft with sleeker, faster small jets. By 2006, over 95 percent of its 
US$3.8 billion sales were outside Brazil. It is one of Brazil’s biggest export-
ers that achieved its success by combining low-cost manufacturing with 
advanced R&D (The Economist 2008). Apart from such giants, even Bra-
zilian start-up companies are involved in global innovation. For instance, 
in 1999, FK Biotec became the fi rst Brazilian biotechnology company to 
receive venture capital for the development of its innovative technologies. 
FK Biotec, which develops, manufactures and markets immunodiagnostic 
kits, is presently involved with developing vaccines for cancer. The com-
pany is developing an experimental vaccine composed of cancer cells that 
work as medical treatment as they are capable of stimulating the immuno-
logical system to fi ght against cancer (WIPO case study).3
Similarly, China’s Huawei Technologies, a telecom network systems and 
solutions provider for both mobile and landline operators, and Lenovo, 
which bought IBM’s PC business and the Haier and Hisense Groups in 
domestic appliances and consumer electronics are rapidly increasing their 
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share of the global markets through innovative products combined with 
low-cost manufacturing. Huawei’s network products are now used by 35 of 
the world’s top 50 operators, with one billion users. In addition to several 
R&D centers in China, it has global R&D centers in Bangalore in India, 
Moscow in Russia, Stockholm in Sweden and Silicon Valley and Dallas in 
the US. By the end of 2007, Huawei has fi led 26,880 patent applications, of 
which 4,256 were already granted (www.huawei.com). One of the strate-
gies of the Chinese fi rms has been to leverage brands from local to global. 
For instance, Hisense, a US$3.3 billion consumer-electronics group, has 
turned its attention to the wider world with a product range that includes 
air conditioners, PCs and telecom equipment. It has production facilities in 
Algeria, Hungary, Iran, Pakistan and South Africa. It sells over 10 million 
TVs and three million air conditioners a year in more than 40 countries. The 
home country provides Hisense with a large market as well as a low-cost 
manufacturing base, to which it adds other competitive advantages such 
as stylish design and an internationally comparable R&D center. Another 
emerging economy company, Johnson Electric, based in Hong Kong, now 
manufactures mainly in China and designs and manufactures tiny electric 
motors for products such as cameras or cars. As an example, a BMW fi ve 
series has over 100 tiny motors (of less than one horsepower) to move the 
wing mirrors, adjust the seats and open the sunroof. Johnson manufactures 
three million of these motors a day, most of them for export. It now has 
manufacturing plants in America and Western Europe and R&D centers in 
Israel, Italy, Japan and America (The Economist 2008).
These are not the only global innovators among the companies from 
emerging economies. There are so many others. For instance, the Czech 
Republic’s Skoda Automobiles (now owned by Volkswagen of Germany) 
and Tatra Trucks, whose products were once sold among the communist 
countries, now are making strong inroads into the global markets, with 
stylish and reliable product, based on in-house R&D. Similarly, South 
African companies such as SAPPI, a paper and pulp manufacturer, and 
Sasol, an oil company, are known as innovative companies. For instance, 
Sasol’s technology to convert coal into gas and then gas into fuel is in 
great demand worldwide. Several countries, including India and even the 
Gulf countries like Qatar, are entering into partnerships with Sasol for 
these technologies.
Globalization process has certainly integrated some developing coun-
tries into the global innovation networks. However, this is also raising 
a concern among industrialized countries about losing competitiveness 
(including jobs) in knowledge-intensive industries. Recent studies in the 
fi eld of international trade suggest some shifting of relative compara-
tive advantages among trading partners. The study by Gomroy and Bau-
mol (2000) suggests that in a multicountry, multiproduct setting where 
the trade is based mostly on created comparative advantages and econ-
omies of scale, the terms of trade tend to shift among partners. The 
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productivity improvements that arise due to trade among some trading 
partners may be such that the conventional argument that free trade 
benefi ts all countries involved is not necessarily valid. On similar lines, 
Samuelson (2004), in his study, argued that productivity growth in trad-
ing partners (exporting countries) may sometimes ‘permanently harm’ 
the trading (importing) country.
Such fears are also refl ected in the debate about the emergence of Asian 
competitors. According to Ernst (2006, p. 5), some scholars underestimate 
China’s rise in the global economy by pointing out that China’s share of 
global GDP in 2005 was only 4.9 percent, and its exports accounted for 
only 7.3 percent of total global exports. However, whereas the aggregate 
data shows such a picture, the data on specifi c sectors such as the electron-
ics industry reveal a totally different scenario. Five Asian countries (China, 
South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Malaysia) together account for more 
than one-fourth of world electronics manufacturing output, with leading 
positions in global markets for digital consumer electronics, computers, 
mobile devices and high-precision components, such as semiconductors and 
displays. For example, in the semiconductor industry about 70 percent of 
output is now based in Asia. Furthermore, India has become a global export 
production base for software. Since 2004, China has displaced the US as 
the world’s largest exporter of electronic products, from its 10th position 
in 2000. Its export product mix has also changed from commodity-type 
appliances to digital consumer electronics and mobile telecom equipment.
According to Athreye and Cantwell (2007, p. 210), these concerns about 
the productivity growth in trading partners are also closely related to the 
technological catch-up of developing countries. Growth in productivity in 
developing country trading partners usually starts with transfer of technol-
ogy from abroad and then proceeds through investments by developing 
country fi rms in capability building in distinctive niche areas that refl ect 
the competitive advantages of those countries. The relationship between 
technological catch-up and their global integration varies with the develop-
mental levels of the countries: (i) in the initial stages of capability building, 
small fi rms tend to perform a more prominent independent entrepreneurial 
role. This initial technological catch-up relies more on indigenous learning 
activities and less on international links; and (ii) for countries with some 
basic capabilities, the recent rise in technology trade and the outsourcing 
of innovation-related activities that has followed the disintegration of value 
chains have opened up new opportunities. These countries are now able to 
create new niches for themselves in global technology development without 
relying on the existing trade and FDI regimes. However, their perspective 
still does not recognize that some emerging economies have gone beyond 
confi ning themselves to the ‘niche’ areas and are catching up with the 
MNCs in the mainstream areas of business.
Technologically more advanced countries seem to have greater con-
cerns regarding the knowledge outfl ows through globalization of R&D. 
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To address these issues, J. Singh (2007, pp. 765–766) analyzed the US 
patent data focusing on the 30 technologically advanced countries that 
together represent 99.5 percent of all patents fi led with the USPTO. His 
fi ndings suggest that knowledge actually fl ows in both directions, from 
foreign MNCs to host country organizations as well as from host coun-
try organizations to foreign MNCs. On an average, MNCs seem to gain 
more in terms of knowledge fl ows from the host country organizations 
than what fl ows out from MNCs to the host country. This asymme-
try in knowledge fl ows is refl ected not only in the aggregate picture, 
but also in the case of the large majority of the individual countries. 
In some countries such as the UK and Belgium, however, the two-way 
knowledge fl ows between MNC subsidiaries and host country organiza-
tions are almost symmetric. In the case of some other countries, such as 
Taiwan, South Korea, Sweden, Israel, Finland, Austria, Spain and Hong 
Kong, knowledge fl ows from foreign MNCs to host country organiza-
tions exceed knowledge infl ows to MNCs. The cross-sector differences 
within countries show that knowledge outfl ows are greater in sectors 
where the host country has relatively stronger technological capabilities. 
Analyzing the data on career histories of patent inventors, Singh indi-
cated that in countries with where MNCs have hired substantially more 
number of personnel from domestic organizations than they lost to them 
led to greater knowledge.
1.4 OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY
The objective of this study is to better understand the dynamics of the 
globalization processes and the emergence of new locations for innova-
tion and its implications. The study develops a conceptual framework 
of the evolution of globalization of corporate R&D (in terms of waves) 
and then addresses the following issues: (i) location of innovation activi-
ties in emerging economies by MNCs; (ii) the driving forces behind this 
new trend and the type of R&D being performed; (iii) performance of 
R&D by companies from emerging economies to develop products for 
the global markets; and (iv) implications of these new trends for the com-
panies, host countries and home countries of the companies. Whereas the 
study is carried out in a broader framework of globalization of R&D in 
general, the focus is on the emerging economies as locations for strategic 
innovation. For in-depth analysis of the factors underlying the phenom-
enon, the study focused on the following emerging economies: Brazil, 
China, India and South Africa.
Ever since Goldman Sachs, the global investment company, coined the 
term BRICs in 2003 to refer to development prospects of Brazil, Russia, 
India and China and their potential impact on the global economy, there 
has been a wide interest among researchers and policymakers worldwide 
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on the happenings in these countries. There is a concern in industrialized 
countries regarding the potential competition from these countries, while 
there is interest in the developing world about learning from the experi-
ences of BRIC countries. This study was initially planned as a study of 
global innovation activities in BRIC countries plus South Africa. But due 
to constraints of time, case studies of global innovation activities in Russia 
could not be included in this study.
While the term corporate research and development (R&D) encom-
passes everything from testing, adaptation, product development for local 
or regional or global markets to basic research, this study focuses only 
on innovation activities relating to product development for regional and 
global markets and corporate basic research. Adaptation and product 
development for the local market types of innovation activities are excluded 
from the study.
1.5 ORGANIZATION OF THE BOOK
This book is organized into 11 chapters. Chapter 2 discusses the global 
business environment and the conditions under which the new trends in 
globalization of corporate R&D are emerging, i.e., the context in which 
globalization of R&D has come to extend its scope to emerging economies, 
as well as the opportunities for companies from emerging economies to 
develop global products and services.
Chapter 3 seeks theoretical explanations for the developments described 
in Chapters 1 and 2. In the fi rst part of the chapter, the theories of interna-
tionalization of production are reviewed to better understand the global-
ization phenomenon in a broader perspective. In the second part, studies 
relating to internationalization of R&D are discussed in a historical per-
spective to bring out the changes in the driving forces over a period of time. 
In the third part, studies relating to systems of innovation are discussed in 
the context of globalization. The review also includes the analysis relat-
ing to the emergence of a new techno-economic paradigm and catching-up 
opportunities for latecomers, because the majority of the companies car-
rying out global R&D seem to be those dealing with new technologies. 
Furthermore, a conceptual framework has been developed for better under-
standing of the evolutionary process of globalization of corporate R&D 
and is set out in the last part of the chapter.
Chapter 4 provides an analysis of the innovation environment in emerg-
ing economies. The fi rst section presents an overview of the innovation 
environment in emerging economies in general. The second section offers 
a detailed analysis of the national systems of innovation in the case study 
countries (India, China, Brazil and South Africa). The objective of this chap-
ter is to highlight the aspects of the innovation environment in emerging 
economies that have the potential to support global innovation activities.
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Chapter 5 presents the global innovation activities in India through 
detailed case studies. These cases include the MNCs, the Indian compa-
nies involved in global innovation (including R&D service providers) and 
Indian research institutes.
Chapter 6 presents the global innovation activities in China through 
detailed case studies. These cases include the MNCs and the Chinese com-
panies involved in global innovation.
Chapter 7 presents the global innovation activities in Brazil through 
detailed case studies. These cases include the MNCs as well as the local 
research institutes involved in global innovation.
Chapter 8 presents the global innovation activities in South Africa 
through detailed case studies. These cases include the MNCs as well as the 
local research institutes and companies involved in global innovation.
Chapter 9 draws implications of location of global innovation in emerg-
ing economies for the innovation systems of the corporations, the host and 
the home countries of the companies. The chapter also draws policy impli-
cations for host and home countries.
Chapter 10 draws implications of global R&D capabilities in emerging 
economies for other developing countries and the potential for South-South 
cooperation in innovation.
Chapter 11 presents summary and conclusions with implications for the 
theories of international economics/business.
2 Global Business Environment
The globalization of corporate R&D by MNCs and the performance of 
global innovation by companies belonging to emerging economies are 
taking place in a rapidly changing business environment. Some of these 
changes are external to the companies but directly affect their internal 
operations, which in turn add to the volatility of the business environment. 
This dynamic background is analyzed under four subheadings: (1) global 
economic changes; (2) science and technology dynamics; (3) implications 
for corporate operations; and (4) corporate strategic responses to the busi-
ness environment, which, in turn, infl uence the business environment.
2.1 GLOBAL ECONOMIC CHANGES
Internationalization of business activities is a natural growth process for 
dynamic companies. The tendency for companies had traditionally been to 
initially enter into the neighboring markets within the region and then gradu-
ally expand to wider markets. Geographical proximity was considered a major 
determining factor in international trade. By the 1980s, international trade 
and investment policies were liberalized substantially mainly among indus-
trialized countries and a few Asian newly industrializing economies (NIEs). 
The economic success achieved by the NIEs, through liberal trade and export-
oriented development policies, enhanced the enthusiasm of other developing 
countries to adopt liberal economic policies. The collapse of the Soviet Union 
further accelerated this process. These efforts culminated in the formation of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) in January 1995. In a sense, with this 
development, a real global market for business has come to be established, 
with transparent and standardized regulations. This development, coupled 
with improved communication and transport infrastructures, has reduced the 
importance of ‘geographical proximity’ as a determining factor for interna-
tional trade and investments. Furthermore, the free trade agreements (FTAs) 
between regional blocks and countries, as well as the bilateral investment 
treaties (BITs), have strengthened the regulatory frameworks governing the 
international trade and investment fl ows among the signatory countries.
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In addition to the liberalization of macro policies on trade and invest-
ments, countries worldwide have also adopted better micro policies that 
directly affect the operations and value creation by companies in specifi c 
sectors. Some of the sector-specifi c policy changes that have a bearing on 
high-tech sectors include:
Enhanced intellectual property (IP) protection:•  with minimum global 
standards; a dispute settlement mechanism; extension of intellectual 
property rights (IPRs) to a greater variety of products, processes and 
services;
More liberal rules on FDI:•  permission for foreign investments across 
almost all sectors of the economy, including in private health care 
insurance; mergers and acquisitions (M&As), which are important 
for ICT, biomedical and fi nancial services companies;
Reform of regulations relating to health care products:•  standardiza-
tion of regulations to make them more transparent; permission for 
early phase clinical trials by foreign companies; adoption of global 
standards such as good manufacturing practice (GMP) and good 
clinical practice (GCP);
Similarity of health care needs:•  growing affl uence in emerging econo-
mies demands superior medical products; shift from hygiene-related 
profi le toward chronic and lifestyle-related diseases; with growing 
transport links and movement of people across regions local diseases 
are becoming global diseases requiring collective response from health 
authorities worldwide (e.g., emergence and spread of severe acute 
respiratory syndrome (SARS), avian fl u, swine fl u, tuberculosis);
Growing demand for sophisticated products in emerging econo-•
mies: growing income in emerging economies is promoting demand 
for sophisticated products and services, with advanced features, high 
quality, safety and reliability as prominent features. However, these 
consumers demand that all these features be delivered at lower prices 
than in the developed world. This requires not just adaptation of prod-
ucts from developed markets, but designing and developing totally 
new products for the emerging markets. The new business model calls 
for developing ‘Emerging Products for Emerging Markets.’
2.2 SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DYNAMICS
Since the early 1980s, a number of far-reaching changes have occurred 
in macro technological systems, which, in turn, are infl uencing the loca-
tion of innovation. One such change has been the emergence of new perva-
sive technologies, in particular, microelectronics, ICT, biotechnology and 
advanced materials, which are diffusing rapidly through the creation of 
new products, processes and services leading to productivity improvements 
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and new work practices.1 Innovation in these technologies requires inputs 
from a diverse range of scientifi c and technological disciplines.
According to Chesnais (1988a, pp. 509–510), there are two series of 
major driving forces explaining why present trends of international sourc-
ing of technology will not be easily reversed: The fi rst series of factors 
relates to the ‘global competition’. In all R&D-intensive industries, and in 
industries where scale economies are critical, competition now takes place: 
(a) between a relatively small number of large fi rms (e.g., oligopolistic); (b) 
in a geographical area that includes the respective home and host markets 
of rival MNCs, as well as third markets, within and outside OECD; and (c) 
through a wide range of means by which fi rms can gain access to technol-
ogy and markets, using a “variety of combinations between competition 
and cooperation” (p. 509). The second series of factors relates to contem-
porary developments in science and technology (S&T), where the general 
trend has been that: (a) basic scientifi c knowledge is playing an increas-
ingly crucial role in major technological advance; (b) many recent major 
innovations have occurred through cross-fertilization of different scientifi c 
disciplines; (c) technology has acquired stronger systemic features. These 
ongoing paradigmatic changes compel fi rms to increase in-house R&D, 
both at home and abroad, and also to acquire knowledge from other orga-
nizations, such as universities or fi rms.
In conjunction with the changes in macro techno-economic conditions, 
the conditions in the labor market for talented personnel have also been 
changing, with cost, quality and accessibility implications. The key driv-
ing force for globalization of R&D in recent years has been the increasing 
demand and competition for skilled scientists. The demand for scientists and 
engineers, and national disparities in the incentives offered to them, has led 
to reported shortages in several OECD countries as early as in the late 1980s 
(OECD 1988). The shortages of research personnel are compelling compa-
nies to widen their research networks in order to tap more geographically 
dispersed scientifi c talent (Doz 1987), such as Israel, Brazil and India.
A more recent study by OECD (2006) indicated that over the last 
decade the proportion of young people studying science and technology 
has been decreasing in many European countries. The fi gures relating to 
average annual change in the share of S&T students as a percentage of 
the total number of students during the 1993–2003 period show that in 
terms of percentage of S&T entrants, the decline ranges from about 0.5 
percent per annum in Denmark to about 1.5 percent in The Netherlands 
and France to nearly two percent in Portugal and Norway. The fi gures 
in terms of percentage of S&T graduates shows a decline of about one 
percent per annum in Portugal to about 2.5 percent in Germany and The 
Netherlands to over 5 percent in Denmark to about 7 percent in Poland.
Although this problem seems to be more acute in the case of European 
countries, almost all countries seem to face similar problems to one degree 
or the other. For instance, with the emergence of ICT industry and its 
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demand for personnel, young people in countries such as India (and China) 
are now showing more interest in ICT-related engineering subjects rather 
than pure sciences. In terms of tertiary enrollments in science and engineer-
ing, India has traditionally had a science/engineering ratio of 2.4, which 
is more in line with the Western education system (e.g., Ireland 1.2 and 
the USUS 1.3). On the other hand, East Asian countries have had a higher 
preference for engineering subjects, with China’s science/engineering ration 
being 0.3, Japan 0.2 and South Korea 0.3 (fi gures for 2005) (UNESCO 
database accessed in December 2008).
Conditions for research and access to resources for carrying out research 
vary around the world, and therefore, subject to costs involved, reloca-
tion of R&D may in the long run improve the competitive position of the 
company (Sigurdson 1990). These observations of MNCs’ behavior are 
also refl ected in the trends of locating R&D in some developing countries, 
which offer access to resources with required knowledge, at substantially 
lower costs compared to industrialized countries (Reddy 2000).
Furthermore, S&T dynamics facilitated division of the whole innovation 
process into modules (activities) and/or submodules (subactivities), enabling 
dispersed location of different activities/subactivities and performance of 
these tasks by different organizations. With the pervasive infl uence of new 
technologies and their integration into traditional products, this phenome-
non of divisibility of innovation process is now extended to even traditional 
industries such as the electrical and mechanical engineering industries.
2.2.1 Divisibility/Modularization of Innovation Processes
The emergence of new generic technologies is also affecting the operations 
of MNCs, fi rst, by increasing the need for global sourcing of technologies, 
and second, by facilitating such globalization of technology development 
activities. In new science-based technologies the R&D need not necessar-
ily be located in proximity to the manufacturing site or the market. This 
fl exibility of new technologies (delinking from manufacturing) allows the 
R&D to be performed in locations of proximity to pools of research per-
sonnel and knowledge centers (Reddy 1997).
Further technological developments facilitated division of the whole inno-
vation process into modules (activities) and/or submodules (subactivities), 
enabling dispersed location of different activities/subactivities and perfor-
mance of these tasks by different organizations. This divisibility of innovation 
processes, which has been mainly prevalent in new science-based technologies 
such as electronics and biotechnology, is now extended to even traditional 
industries such as the electrical and mechanical engineering industries.
This new dynamics of innovation is also affecting the industry struc-
ture. Previously, innovation process required large resources, long time 
periods and vast accumulation of knowledge, favoring large fi rms as they 
controlled the necessary resources. But, with the divisibility of innovation 
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processes, new innovative small fi rms specialized in particular modules/
parts of the innovation are emerging, and several of them are directly 
or indirectly (e.g., in niche markets) competing with the incumbent 
large fi rms.
In the economic literature, the theories of industrial organization, such 
as resource-based and dynamic capabilities approaches proposed by Pen-
rose (1995) and Chandler (1977) explained the rise of the large vertically 
integrated manufacturing fi rm and the performance of industrial R&D 
during the 20th century within the large manufacturing fi rms (Mowery, 
1983). However, the dynamics of S&T further led to a technological 
convergence in manufacturing processes, enabling specialist suppliers to 
emerge in specifi c areas of the value chain through signifi cant innovation 
activities of their own, including contract research, especially in materials 
analysis and testing, production of measurement and control instruments 
and computer-aided-design and manufacture (Landau and Rosenberg 
1992). In recent years, with the extension of technological convergence 
extending to product technology, vertical disintegration of value chain 
has gone beyond the manufacturing processes and into the development 
of components and subsystems for complex products. The large integrated 
fi rms that traditionally designed these products sought to increase their 
fl exibility and profi ts by relying on suppliers to deliver innovative com-
ponents/parts based on suppliers’ own R&D in technology areas that do 
not constitute the core competence of the contracting fi rms (Brusoni et 
al. 2001). More recently, the growing technological fl exibility to delink 
product design from production, the modularization of the production 
itself and the rapid growth of contract manufacturing in several high-
tech industries led to announcements of the emergence of a ‘new model 
of industrial organization’ based on modular production networks (Stur-
geon 2002; Langlois 2003).
Drug Discovery and Development Process
Conventional pharmaceutical industry is based on chemistry, with phar-
macology and clinical sciences as supporting tools for drug development. 
In recent years, the emergence of molecular biology and, in particular, 
of genomic sciences, is having a great infl uence on drug discovery. These 
developments also demand a wider knowledge base incorporating several 
disciplines, which is beyond the capacity of an individual company. Evolv-
ing technological development made the innovation process in biomedical 
technologies more modular and even submodular in character, enabling 
fi rms to outsource some activities or subactivities to other specialized fi rms 
and universities worldwide.
The drug discovery process starts with ‘target identifi cation’, i.e., iden-
tifying which molecule or protein in the body is responsible for causing a 
particular disease (considered to be a core competence). Next step is the 
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‘screening of a library of compounds’ against a molecular (or now pro-
tein) target to fi nd properties that may have the potential to be developed 
as a medicine for a disease. Due to the technological progress, this initial 
screening is presently carried out in tissue culture instead of in animals. 
A large number of hypothetical targets are incorporated into in vitro 
or cell-based assays and exposed to a variety of compounds represent-
ing numerous variations on a few chemical themes or, as in more recent 
times, fewer variations on a larger number of themes in high-throughput 
confi gurations (Drews 2000, p. 1962). In the second stage, this ‘lead 
compound’ is subjected to further tests in animals. These tests include 
the performance of the drug in animals (animal effi cacy), the absorption 
levels in the body and its effective delivery to the targeted tissue/molecule 
(bioavailability), poisonous content (toxicology), side effects (safety stud-
ies) and drug metabolism in the body and the duration of its stay in the 
body (pharmacokinetics). In the third stage, after successful completion 
of tests on animals, clinical trials on human beings are carried out ini-
tially on a small group of healthy volunteers to test its safety (phase I). 
Once the compound is proved to be safe in human beings, the effi cacy 
tests (to make sure that the drug does what it is supposed to do) are car-
ried out on a small group of patients (phase II) and then on larger groups 
of patients (phase III). The fi nal phase involves getting approval of the 
regulatory authorities. Drugs may even undergo postapproval (phase IV) 
trials to extend the range of conditions under which the drug can be used 
and/or to reformulate the drug to improve its effi ciency.
Until recently such a rigorous, lengthy and costly innovation process 
favored large companies. Therefore, successful pharmaceutical companies 
tended to be large, vertically integrated fi rms. They carried out everything 
from building up libraries of compounds to marketing the fi nal product 
themselves. In recent years, the tools of pharmaceutical innovation have 
been changing, eroding the advantage of the large companies (pharma-
ceutical giants) in drug discovery. Companies that specialize in individual 
stages of drug discovery, i.e., from creating libraries to obtaining regulatory 
approval, are fast emerging. As result, the large pharmaceutical companies 
are increasingly outsourcing parts of the innovation process.
Figure 2.1 indicates the emerging biopharmaceutical drug discovery 
process. The main difference from the previous pharmaceutical value chain 
is the emergence of innovative specialized small biotechnology fi rms with 
new technology platforms at every stage of the value chain, either as R&D 
service providers or technology sellers.
Once the target molecule is identifi ed, the libraries of compounds are 
screened to fi nd a suitable molecule that can bring about necessary chemical 
changes in the target. The success, to a large extent, depends on the size of 
the libraries. Previously only large pharmaceutical companies could afford 
these libraries of a few hundred thousand compounds. But, now the new tech-
nology, in the form of combinatorial chemistry (through microtiter plates),
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opened up new opportunities for smaller players. This technology treats all 
but the smallest organic molecules as consisting of modules, which can be put 
together in several different combinations, generating a large number of mole-
cules from a small number of modules. In the past a chemist could only create 
about 50 to 100 new compounds a year. Now, with combinatorial chemistry 
one can create about a couple of thousand new molecules a year, and the 
advanced versions of this technology even permit creation of up to 50,000 
new compounds a year.
Small companies such as AxyS Pharmaceuticals, US, which focuses on 
drugs that affect the action of protease enzymes, have been able to generate 
their own libraries with the help of combinatorial chemistry. AxyS created 
a library of about 200,000 compounds. Similarly, there are also specialist 
combinatorial chemistry fi rms offering on hire their libraries of compounds. 
For example, Pharmacopeia, US, is one such specialist company. Even the 
screening of these large libraries is now done through a new technology called 
high-throughput screening. This new technology allows screening of over one 
million compounds against a single target protein. In the emerging method of 
combinatorial chemistry, the reactions will take place in a silicon chip (rather 
than in the microtiter plates) through simulations on computers creating virtual 
laboratories. After the promising molecules and their structure are identifi ed 
through simulations, the chemists will perform the actual drug development 
activities. For instance, Agouron Vertex, US, designed, and launched, in 1997, 
the drug ‘Viracept,’ an HIV-protease inhibitor through this method, and the 
entire drug development process took only six years, which is about half the 
industry average (The Economist 1998, pp. 12–13).
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Figure 2.1 Drug discovery and development process.
Source: Adapted from Bowonder et al. (2003).
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After a lead compound is identifi ed, the animal tests will indicate the 
modifi cations to be made in the molecular structure. These preclinical tri-
als are not very expensive but are time-consuming. There are also other 
pressures on the companies to reduce the animal testing (e. g., animal pro-
tection groups). So new technologies are gradually emerging in this stage of 
the drug discovery process. A number of small outsourcing service provid-
ers have emerged in this stage of the drug discovery value chain.
Clinical trials are the next stage of drug discovery. This stage is the most 
expensive and time-consuming. Now, specialized contract research orga-
nizations (CROs) have emerged to perform this process. With regulations 
becoming tighter, the clinical trials are becoming diffi cult to handle for 
pharmaceutical companies themselves. For instance, up to the early 1990s, 
the number of trials required for approval in the USUS was 40; now the 
number is 60. Drug companies prefer to conduct simultaneous trials among 
a variety of ethnic groups of patients and in wider geographical areas. Quin-
tiles and Covance, both USUS-based MNCs, are well-known CROs special-
izing in clinical trials. What CROs do is basically effi cient management of 
the trials. For instance, Covance’s software helps in making decisions on 
the trials to be continued by gathering biochemical assay data from patients 
faster. It also helps in determining the number and the size of trials that will 
be needed to test the drug to an appropriate level of rigor.
Semiconductor Chip Design and Development Process
Chip design activities typically consist of routine functions (i.e., design 
implementation) and conceptualization through stages of design (i.e., system 
specifi cation). The design has become more complex “in terms of (1) the line-
width of process technology, measured in nanometers; (2) the use of analog 
and mixed-signal design, which are substantially more complex than digital 
design; (3) the share and type of system-level design, such as system-on-chip, 
system-in package, structured Application Specifi c Integrated Chips (ASICs); 
and (4) the number of gates used in these designs” (Ernst 2006, p. 24).
The semiconductor chip design process is becoming increasingly com-
plex, mainly due to two factors: (1) progress in manufacturing technology 
(miniaturization) has made it possible to fabricate millions of transistors 
on a single chip. This requires to be matched by signifi cant improvement 
in design productivity; and (2) the convergence of digital computing, com-
munication and consumer devices has increased the complexity of design 
process for electronic systems, which need to be increasingly smaller, faster, 
cheaper and more energy effi cient, but at the same time support growing 
multifunctionality. At the same time companies face pressures to speed up 
time-to-market due to rapidly shortening product life cycles (ITRS 2004).
The complexity for chip design itself basically arises from two sources: 
(1) silicon used on the chip; and (2) integration of the system. The ‘silicon 
complexity’ arises from the malfunctions that may result from the growing 
density of the circuit and the use of new materials or design architectures. 
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The ‘system complexity’ arises from the increasing number of functions 
that need to be integrated on the chip (e.g., smart phones). As a result of 
this growing design complexity, verifi cation of the design for yield and per-
formance becomes critical, accounting for about 60 to 70 percent of all 
system-on-chip hardware design, with cost and time implications (ITRS 
2002, pp. 82–83).
Until the mid-1980s, the system companies and the device manufactur-
ers carried out almost all their semiconductor chip design by themselves 
in-house. But, technological development since then resulted in vertical spe-
cialization enabling fi rms to disintegrate the design process into activities 
and subactivities and disperse it geographically (see Figure 2.2). Since the 
beginning of the 1990s, vertical specialization within design networks has 
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Figure 2.2 Chip design fl ow chart.
Source: Adapted from Ernst (2005b).
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transformed the semiconductor industry structure, just as in the case of the 
biomedical industry. Now the design of a typical system-on-chip requires 
interfaces with at least six types: system designers, silicon intellectual prop-
erty providers, software developers, verifi cation teams, electronic design 
automation tool vendors and foundry services (fabrication), who are geo-
graphically spread across the world (Ernst 2005a).
Product Design and Development Process in Engineering Industry
With the technological developments, the divisibility of innovation pro-
cess and geographically dispersed division of labor is not confi ned only 
to science-based technologies, but is now extended to even conventional 
industries that require long industrial experience and accumulated knowl-
edge, as they contain a large component of ‘tacit knowledge.’ Engineering 
services perform those functions that deal with or are related to the core 
engineering processes. There is a distinction between engineering functions 
and engineering service functions. For instance, an engineering function 
involves manufacturing of an auto engine, but a related engineering service 
function deals with the designing of that engine. At a broader level, the fol-
lowing steps are involved in engineering product design and development:
 1. Idea phase—Identifi cation of a problem or an idea (e.g., a new model 
automobile);
 2. Design phase—Analysis of the idea or problem and design of solu-
tions to meet the requirement, under certain guidelines;
 3. Test phase—Application of the design to a model test. This occurs 
frequently with the product design and development;
 4. Manufacturing phase—Supervision of the manufacturing processes 
or improvements to a plant, operating system;
 5. Product completion or production—Service provider may simply hand 
product over to the client (i.e., electrical device), may sell product (i.e., 
scientifi c instrument), may actually operate the product (i.e., power 
plant), or may teach the operation to the user (Simpson 2004).
Engineering design services are complex as they revolve around technical 
skills, domain expertise and good engineering judgment. A wide range of 
engineering services has been outsourced for many years, but most of these 
outsourcing assignments have been with onshore or near-shore partners/
vendors. Offshore outsourcing of engineering services, which are part of 
the innovation, is a relatively new phenomenon, and only a small subset of 
activities are currently being offshored, e.g., computer-aided-design (CAD) 
for a range of design-intensive industries; automobile and other product 
designing, testing and analysis of the products for various parameters and 
characteristics. In recent years, some service providers have begun to make 
a mark by successfully using the skill sets, tools and experience from IT 
software and services, to evolve from providing basic data conversion, 
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through 2D and 3D CAD/computer-aided-manufacturing (CAM)/comput-
er-aided-engineering (CAE) to advanced simulation, prototyping, testing, 
product design (engineering), process engineering, plant automation and 
asset management services.2
Some of the innovation activities and/or subactivities that are now being 
outsourced and/or offshored in aerospace and automotive industries are 
indicated below:
Aerospace
Aero structures:•  Concept to component solutions in areas like fuse-
lage, wing, empennage, vertical tail plane and stabilizers, secondary 
structures (doors, latches);
Aero engines and derivatives:•  Concept design to product realization 
and support for the entire life cycle of aero engines and derivatives 
including all major subsystems/accessories;
Aero systems:•  Offerings across the product life cycle for aero systems 
and various subsystems, including interiors, hydraulic systems, land-
ing gear, electrical systems and fuel systems;
Avionics:•  Complete system solutions across the spectrum of civil and 
military avionics for aerospace prime suppliers/OEM, defense majors, 
covering safety and mission-control software, hardware, fi rmware 
and electronics manufacturing;
Technical publication services:•  Technical writing, illustrations and 
animations based on aerospace domain knowledge and experience;
Radio frequency identifi cation (RFID):•  Solutions for effective supply 
chain management with real-time and accurate information.3
Automotive Industry
Automotive engineering design:•  Product design and development for 
Body-In-White (BIW), chassis, power train and driveline. Testing and 
analysis for thermal management, engine simulation, vehicle crash-
worthiness, fatigue and durability analysis, meshing, plastic design 
and mold design validation;
Automotive electronics and embedded systems:•  Vehicle electronics, 
diagnostics, safety and security for areas like On Board Diagnostics 
(OBD), emission certifi cation, air bag controls, seat belt controls and 
remote keyless entry systems; infotainment solutions for navigation, 
in-car entertainment and communication; communications protocols; 
verifi cation and validation;
Automotive shop fl oor services:•  Digital manufacturing services for 
power train, BIW, paint shop; control systems solutions for press, 
body shop, paint shop, assembly, material handling and production 
control;
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Automotive manufacturing solutions: Manufacturing Execution Sys-•
tem (MES); adaptive manufacturing;
Engineering IT for automotive industry:•  Knowledge-based Engineer-
ing (KBE); vehicle tracking system.
2.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR CORPORATE OPERATIONS
2.3.1 Global Competition
The fi rst and foremost impact of the global techno-economic changes, 
discussed earlier, on the corporate operations has been refl ected in the 
increased ‘global competition’ that companies are facing. Since the 1980s, 
global competition, in several industries, has been intensifying rapidly, 
mounting pressure on the profi tability and survival of the companies. The 
characteristic features of the internationalization process have been consid-
erably affected mainly due to two factors: the deregulation of economies 
both for FDI and portfolio investments; the emergence of new technologies 
that enabled as well as compelled moves toward increased globalization.
The ongoing processes of economic liberalization and technological 
changes, as Porter (1986) predicted, are leading to growing international 
competition and widespread globalization of industry scope:
Growing similarity of countries• . Countries are becoming simi-
lar in terms of availability of infrastructure, distribution channels 
and marketing approaches. Similar products and brands are being 
marketed worldwide, refl ecting the convergence of customer needs 
in different countries. The economic differences among developed 
countries and some emerging economies are narrowing in areas like 
income, factor costs and energy costs. Part of the reason for this 
development is the aggressiveness of MNCs in diffusing technolo-
gies around the world.
Falling trade barriers• . Successive rounds of international agreements 
resulting in the establishment of the WTO led to the lowering of 
tariff levels and other trade barriers. Regional economic groupings 
such as the European Union (EU), North American Free Trade Area 
(NAFTA) and Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) are 
also facilitating trade and other relations among different countries.
Emergence of new large-scale markets• . Traditionally the USUS has 
been the strategic market for global competition because of its large 
size. But with the liberalization of economies in countries such as 
China, India and Russia, they are emerging as huge markets with a 
number of implications. With these countries’ control of access to 
their markets, their domestic fi rms may become major global play-
ers. Therefore, gaining access to these markets may become a crucial 
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strategic factor in the future because of the scale economies it pro-
vides to the successful fi rm.
Technological restructuring• . Several industries have been signifi cantly 
affected by some technological revolutions, such as microelectronics, 
information systems and advanced new materials that are reshaping 
competition. These technological developments are redefi ning indus-
try structures and opening up unprecedented opportunities for shifts 
in industry leadership in international markets.
Emergence of new global competitors• . The forces leading to dramatic 
shifts in international competitive positions have resulted in some new 
fi rms, mainly from East Asia, establishing themselves as fully fl edged 
international competitors within the space of a decade. These new 
players have exploited the new competitive conditions and the cross-
cutting technological changes to leapfrog even well-established rivals. 
The intensity of competition has also risen, setting higher standards 
for success.
According to Levitt (1983), technological developments over the last few 
decades have combined to create a unifi ed marketplace in which companies 
must capture global-scale economies to remain competitive. He argued that 
the world’s needs and preferences had become homogenized, leading to 
the standardization of products, manufacturing and trade. If the artifi cial 
trade barriers were removed, the global reach would be greater.4
In many industries, radical technological innovations also brought 
changes in industry economics and allowed companies to develop and 
manufacture products on a global basis, e.g., quartz technology has trans-
formed watchmaking into a scale-intensive global industry. In some indus-
tries that were not affected by external forces of change, companies started 
attempting to achieve global economies, by rationalizing their product lines, 
standardizing parts and specializing their manufacturing operations. Such 
internal rationalization of operations led to a second wave of globalization 
in a range of industries such as automobiles, construction equipment and 
machine tools (Bartlett and Ghoshal 1991).
Over the past decade, such forces have also been increasing the need for 
worldwide learning and innovation. In a period of rapidly changing tech-
nology and shortening product life cycles, a company’s ability to develop 
and diffuse successful innovations has become a key competitive strength. 
Companies are increasingly recognizing the importance of internationally 
diversifi ed inputs into the R&D process.
Coupled with the convergence of consumer preferences worldwide, 
the diffusion of technology has signifi cantly infl uenced both the pace 
and the locus of innovation. No longer can U.S-based companies as-
sume, as they often did in the decades just after World War II, that 
their domestic environment provides them with the most sophisticated 
Global Business Environment 31
consumers and the most advanced technological capabilities, and thus 
the most innovative environment in the world. Today, the newest con-
sumer trend or market need can emerge in Australia or Italy, and the 
latest technologies may be located in Japan or Sweden. Companies 
see that they can gain competitive advantage by sensing needs in one 
country, responding with capabilities located in a second, and diffus-
ing the resulting innovation to markets around the globe. (Bartlett and 
Ghoshal 1991, p. 12)
Bhattacharya and Michael (2008), Boston Consulting Group, studied 
the rapidly developing economies (RDEs)-based companies that are ‘stay-
ing home’ and dominating their domestic markets by adopting innovative 
business models. The issue of how to compete with these innovative com-
panies in their own domestic markets has become a challenge for many of 
the global MNCs. For instance, in Brazil, TOTVS is the leader in enter-
prise resource planning (ERP) software and a signifi cant competitor to 
global leader SAP. Brazilian companies using TOTVS software also tend 
to use computers manufactured by Grupo Positivo, Brazil’s leading com-
puter manufacturer, which has a larger local market share than the MNCs 
Hewlett-Packard and Dell combined. Interestingly, 10 of the 50 companies 
on Boston Consulting Group (BCG)’s list cater to the poorer segments of 
the population that most companies tend ignore altogether. In this respect, 
companies from India lead the trend, demonstrating that companies can be 
profi table even while catering to the poorer market segments provided they 
use the right business model. For instance, Titan Industries produces more 
than seven million watches a year, and its number one seller, the Sonata 
brand, sells for less than $25, comes with a one-year warranty, and the 
watches are water-resistant. Titan’s success comes from understanding that 
just because people have limited purchasing power does not mean that they 
would like to sacrifi ce quality or style. Before Titan came into the market, 
the only watches that were available at the low end were of poor quality, 
without warranties and service networks. The Sonata brand is very popu-
lar, selling more than three million units a year. Titan also produces solid 
gold watches that sell for more than $1,000, and it also claims to have pro-
duced the world’s thinnest watch (Bhattacharya and Michael 2008, p. 13).
Prior to the 1980s, much of the internationalization of corporate R&D 
was confi ned to the industrialized countries, which have more or less simi-
lar technological strengths and cost structures. However, since the mid-
1980s, some MNCs started locating some of their globally strategic R&D 
outside the industrialized world. Developing countries such as India and 
Singapore and transition economies such as Russia and Hungary were the 
initial locations that attracted such R&D-related FDI. By the onset of the 
new millennium 2000, this development became an established trend, with 
MNCs locating strategic innovation activities in emerging economies that 
include India, China, Russia, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic. 
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Such relocation of R&D is taking place, not only through FDI, but also 
through technological alliances and outsourcing to companies and research 
institutes outside the industrialized world.
Friedman (2006) argues that the techno-economic forces have fl attened 
the earth or compressed the globe, leading to a blurred distinction between 
the developing and developed world, and compelling as well as enabling 
companies to access inputs for innovation from across the globe, includ-
ing the emerging economies. He identifi ed 10 such forces that emerged in 
progressive phases:
 1. The New Age of Creativity: When the Walls Came Down and the Win-
dows Went Up—End of the Cold War and Liberalization of Economies 
Worldwide;
 2. The New Age of Connectivity: When the Web Went Around and 
Netscape Went Public;
 3. Work Flow Software;
 4. Uploading: Harnessing the Power of Communities;
 5. Outsourcing: Y2K;
 6. Offshoring: Running with Gazelles, Eating with Lions;
 7. Supply-Chaining: Eating Sushi in Arkansas;
 8. Insourcing: What the Guys in Funny Brown Shorts Are Really Doing
 9. In-forming: Google, Yahoo!, MSN Web Search;
 10. The Steroids: Digital, Mobile, Personal and Virtual.
2.4 CORPORATE STRATEGIC RESPONSES
The changing pattern of global competition, coupled with rapid technologi-
cal changes leading to the shortening of product life cycles, placed innova-
tion as a key source of competitive strength. Companies are adopting a 
variety of strategies to attain this technological edge and thus maintain 
their competitiveness. As a result, MNCs are increasingly transcending 
national boundaries, not just in marketing and production activities, but 
also in R&D activities. R&D, the cornerstone of technological and thereby 
competitive strength of companies as well as nations, is becoming an inter-
national activity (Reddy 2000).
The conventional concept of ‘comparative advantage’ is viewed as a ris-
ing from differences in factor cost or quality among countries, leading to 
production in locations with advantages in a specifi c industry and export 
of these products to other countries. Hence, the comparative advantage is 
expected to be derived from the location where fi rms perform their activi-
ties. Unlike the conventional views that confi ne comparative advantage 
issues to production activities, the concept applies also to other activities 
in the value chain, such as R&D and distribution. Comparative advantage 
becomes specifi c to the activity and not the location of the entire value 
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chain. The manufacture of components may be located in Taiwan, software 
development may be located in India and basic R&D may be performed 
in the USUS. Such intrafi rm international specialization and arbitrage of 
activities are made possible by the growing ability to coordinate and con-
fi gure globally (Porter 1986).
In a parallel development, the R&D activities in new technologies are 
increasingly becoming science-based. In the generation of new technologies 
there is now a greater need for inputs from different disciplines of S&T. 
This requirement for innovation is compelling fi rms to source technologies, 
not only by geographically dispersing in-house R&D worldwide, but also 
externally from universities and other fi rms, both at home and abroad.5
In a study of Norwegian fi rms, Narula (2002) analyzed the propensity of 
fi rms to concentrate R&D activities at home or extend such activities abroad 
using the systems of innovation (SI) approach. According to him, the fi rm’s 
tendency to keep R&D in the home country, which he calls ‘R&D inertia,’ 
is linked to the structural inertia of the national systems of innovation (NSI), 
resulting in ‘systemic lock-in,’ which could pose challenges when the existing 
NSI may not be able to respond adequately when new discontinuous tech-
nologies emerge. Firms can use a ‘voice’ strategy in attempting to modify the 
appropriate institutions in the existing NSI or an ‘exit’ strategy by seeking 
alternative sources of innovation, which more closely fi t their needs (p. 795).
According to Cantwell (1992, p. 77), MNCs adopt an internationally 
integrated approach to technology development for two reasons: (1) to take 
advantage of the distinct features of innovations in different national inno-
vation systems and thus gain access to complementary technologies; (2) to 
gain access to new lines of innovation. The blurring of boundaries between 
different disciplines is compelling fi rms to access a broader technology base 
through an international strategy.
2.4.1 Rationalization of Global Corporate Structures
In the face of changing currents in the global competition, companies 
have been rationalizing their activities, including those of production and 
R&D activities. Prominent among such rationalization efforts has been the 
alteration of the earlier ‘multidomestic’ approach, in which MNCs estab-
lished subsidiaries that were more or less replicas of the parent but on a 
much smaller scale. These subsidiaries produced products mainly for the 
local markets in their respective host countries. Such subsidiaries mainly 
depended on the parent company for their technology requirements, which 
were in turn adapted to suit the local conditions. These subsidiaries pro-
duced most, if not all, of the product range of the parent. However, the sub-
sidiaries, being small in size, often had diffi culties in reaching the optimal 
scale of production (Pearce 1989).
According to Porter (1986, pp. 17–19), the pattern of global competition 
is different for different industries. In their competitive scope industries 
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fall into a spectrum from ‘multidomestic’ to ‘global.’ (1) In multidomestic 
industries, the competition occurs on a country-by-country basis. MNC 
makes a one-time transfer of know-how, which is adapted to the local con-
ditions. In multidomestic industry, MNC manages its international activi-
ties like a portfolio, because its strategy in a country is largely determined 
by the competitive conditions in that country. Therefore, each subsidiary 
is allowed substantial autonomy and control of all the important activities 
needed to do business in that industry. Industries in which this pattern of 
competition is prevalent include retailing, consumer packaged goods, dis-
tribution, fi nance and chemicals. (2) In global industry, on the other hand, 
a company’s competitive position in one country is signifi cantly affected by 
its position in other countries or vice versa. The global industry is a series 
of linked domestic industries in which the rivals compete with one another 
on a worldwide basis. In global industry, a company must fi nd ways to 
integrate its activities on a worldwide basis to capture the linkages among 
countries. In global competition a company has to perform some activities 
in each of the countries in which it competes. This type of competition is 
seen in industries that include commercial aircraft, TV sets, semiconduc-
tors and automobiles. Companies are increasingly moving away from the 
multidomestic approach toward a new approach in which each subsidiary 
forms an integral part of the global strategy, where subsidiaries are assigned 
specialized tasks in the activities planned and organized from the center.
Bartlett and Ghoshal (1991, pp. 48–53) also have a similar categorization 
of the organizational approaches of MNCs: ‘multinational,’ ‘international’ 
and ‘global.’ Companies are rapidly moving from all these approaches toward 
what they call a ‘transnational’ approach. In a transnational approach the 
strength of the confi guration comes from its fundamental characteristics: 
dispersion, specialization and interdependence. The ability to sense diverse 
market needs, technological trends and competitive actions remains cru-
cial, however, because such stimuli represent an important source of inno-
vation. A dispersed confi guration allows MNCs to capitalize on factor cost 
differentials. They not only have access to low-cost labor and materials, but 
also can tap into an international pool of increasingly scarce technological 
and managerial resources. By specializing operations and giving them a 
broader mandate, MNCs can capture minimum-scale effi ciencies and yet 
retain a dispersed structure. The viability of this approach has been greatly 
enhanced by the latest generation of technologies.
One version of a rationalized structure of an MNC is what Pearce (1989, 
pp. 119–121) calls ‘rationalized product subsidiary.’ In this type of struc-
ture, an individual subsidiary is assigned the task of producing only a part 
of the parent’s product line, which perhaps is not even relevant to the host 
country’s domestic market. Such output is mainly meant for export markets, 
whereas part of the local demand not catered to by the subsidiary’s pro-
duction will be met through imports from the company’s global network. 
Such specialization allows achievement of a greater level of effi ciency and 
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optimal scale economies. A common form of such a rationalized struc-
ture involves subsidiaries specializing in the production of specifi c compo-
nents or parts for fi nal products or executing a specifi c stage in a vertically 
integrated production process. R&D in rationalized product subsidiaries 
relates to the range of specialized products produced by the subsidiary. 
Such R&D being part of the global strategy, the results will be shared with 
the other partners in the network.
Another form of subsidiary that is emerging is what is termed ‘world 
product mandate subsidiary’ (Poynter and Rugman 1982; Bonin and Per-
ron 1986). In this form, the parent assigns exclusively to a subsidiary the 
entire responsibility for R&D and production activities for a particular 
product to be marketed worldwide, either by the affi liate itself or with the 
help of the parent’s global network. In other words the subsidiary becomes 
the international center for that product. In its product development activi-
ties, the subsidiary may also draw from the basic research of the group.
In their efforts to rationalize their global activities, MNCs are locating 
even higher-order activities such as R&D in some developing countries 
that have the required resources. Earlier location of such higher-order 
activities was confi ned to the industrialized countries (Reddy 1993). A 
truly global approach may require the company to locate production or 
R&D facilities in other countries to take advantage of lower wage rates, 
to gain market access or to take advantage of foreign technology (Porter 
1986). Apart from upgrading the operations of their affi liates in develop-
ing countries, in industries where R&D activities can be geographically 
de-linked from production activities, MNCs are also establishing stand-
alone R&D affi liates, subcontracting/outsourcing R&D to local fi rms or 
research institutes and sponsoring basic research in universities in develop-
ing countries (Reddy 1997).
The main factors providing economic justifi cations for enhanced R&D 
in developing economies today are: (1) the recognition that they are them-
selves growing markets for advanced products; and (2) their ability to pro-
duce advanced manufactured products for export in global markets. There 
are large reserves of scientists and engineers in the developing world. With 
the extensive facilities created by MNCs through FDI over the last decade, 
many S&T personnel in the developing world are exposed to the require-
ments for competitiveness in world trade (Fusfeld 1995).
In an effort to analyze the level of R&D performed in emerging economies 
and to gauge its distance from the world-frontier, Amsden and Tschang (2003) 
suggest a new classifi cation of R&D activities. It consists of two aspects: the 
actual types of R&D categories, and the complexity characteristics of those 
categories. They identifi ed fi ve types of R&D: pure science (uncover new sci-
entifi c principle); basic research (uncover new scientifi c principle, but with 
applications that are unknown or diffuse); applied research (transform, var-
iegate and reapply known concept for new application); exploratory develop-
ment (implement concept as engineered system); and advanced development 
36 Global Innovation in Emerging Economies
(reduce costs, uncertainties of manufacturing). According to them, in the case 
of industrialized countries who are at the world frontier, the core issue is how 
to make conceptual knowledge more market-oriented or how to move from 
pure science and basic research to more applied and developmental work. In 
contrast, the problem in developing countries is how to move from advanced 
or exploratory development, focused on manufacturability and material sub-
stitution, to the generation of at least a differentiated product through better 
design. Using cases from Singapore, Amsden and Tschang suggest that mov-
ing into applied research is a major hurdle for a latecomer to industrialization, 
as the techniques used in applied research tend to involve more science and 
engineering. Overcoming this hurdle is a major challenge to emerging econo-
mies wishing to integrate into global R&D networks.
In addition to rationalization of their internal operations, MNCs are 
also linking up with other fi rms/organizations for their innovation require-
ments through technology alliances.
2.4.2 Global Interorganizational Strategic Alliances
As part of the phenomenon of globalization of corporate R&D, interor-
ganizational technology cooperation is becoming an important element 
worldwide. Such cooperation or alliance exists not only between the fi rms, 
but also between the fi rms and academic establishments. Interfi rm cooper-
ation as such is not a new phenomenon. Joint ventures between fi rms have 
been in existence for many decades. However, since the 1980s the number 
and the variety of forms of interfi rm alliances grew signifi cantly.
Teece (1992, pp. 19–20) defi nes a strategic alliance as a web of agreements 
whereby two or more partners share the commitment to reach a common 
goal by pooling their resources together and coordinating their activities. 
A strategic alliance denotes some degree of strategic and operational coor-
dination. Such agreements take a variety of forms ranging from non-equity 
agreements associated with one-way or two-way licensing, through to joint 
venture agreements, equity participation or consortium. The activities range 
from pre-competitive, basic research agreements to competitive R&D and 
technology cooperation, manufacturing and marketing, i.e., covering the 
whole range of R&D to commercialization process (Chesnais 1988b).
According to Mytelka (1990), these interfi rm cooperative agreements 
in R&D are distinct from traditional modes of joint venture and licensing 
because these new forms of agreement (a) focus on knowledge production 
and sharing in contrast with one-way transfer of technology. Knowledge in 
this context includes R&D, design, engineering, marketing and manage-
ment capabilities. (b) There is little or no equity involvement by partici-
pants and (c) such partnerships are a part of the long-term strategy of the 
fi rms rather than an opportunistic response to short-term fi nancial gains.
Mowery (1992, p. 211) defi nes international collaborative venture as “inter-
fi rm collaboration in product development, manufacture, or marketing that 
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spans national boundaries, is not based on arm’s-length market transactions 
and includes substantial and continual contributions by partners of capital, 
technology, or other assets.” He distinguishes between four types of technolo-
gy-focused collaborative agreements: (1) those involving collaboration among 
fi rms in research alone; (2) those relating to the exchange of ‘proven’ tech-
nologies within a single product line or across multiple products, e.g., most 
widely in practice as cross-licensing in global microelectronics industry; (3) 
joint development of one or more products, e.g., common in commercial air-
craft and engines, telecommunications, microelectronics and biotechnology; 
(4) collaboration across different functions, with one fi rm providing a new 
product or process for marketing, manufacture or application in a foreign 
market by another.
According to Hagedoorn and Schakenraad (1989), the reasons for tech-
nology cooperation agreements between fi rms include: the extremely high 
costs and risks of R&D in high-tech industries; quick pre-emption strate-
gies on a world scale, even at the cost of loss of potential monopoly profi ts; 
technology transfer and complementarity; exploration of new markets and 
market niches; reducing the time lag between discovery and market intro-
duction; monitoring the evolution of technologies and opportunities.
Broadly speaking there are two schools of thought that analyze fi rm behav-
ior, competitive strategy and the inter-fi rm collaboration—(1) the ‘competitive 
forces’ (Porter 1980) analysis of fi rm strategy in which a fi rm’s performance 
is mainly dependent on the structure of the industry within which it operates, 
such as the fi ve forces: entry barriers, substitutes, bargaining power of sup-
pliers and buyers and intraindustry rivalry. The key determinants of a fi rm’s 
behavior, including its decision to form alliances with other fi rms are molded 
by the external forces rather than on the fi rm’s internal managerial, technical, 
marketing and other resources. (2) On the other hand, the ‘resource-based’ 
analysis of the fi rm treats the fi rm as a collection of ‘sticky and diffi cult-to-
imitate’ resources and capabilities. These resources may be physical, such as 
product designs and production processes, or intangible, such as brand equity. 
They include knowledge of specifi c markets or user needs, decision-making 
process or management systems and complex networks for marketing and dis-
tribution of products (Mowery et al. 1998, p. 508). The sale or acquisition of 
such resources through arm’s length market transactions is diffi cult to orga-
nize and vulnerable to high risks of failure (Teece 1982). In the resource-based 
framework interfi rm alliances are seen as mechanisms designed to combine 
the features of both markets and intrafi rm organization and thus facilitate 
fi rms’ access to these capabilities (Kogut 1988; Hamel 1991).
2.4.3 Outsourcing and/or Offshoring of R&D 
Activities to Emerging Economies
As companies seek sophisticated services of higher value from outside suppli-
ers either for cost or resource fl exibility and/or improving the time-to-market, 
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innovation has become a prime candidate for offshoring/outsourcing. Tradi-
tional theories of internationalization of business say that companies don’t 
outsource the core activities or competences that distinguish them from com-
petitors. But what constitute core activities or competences keep changing 
with technological progress and economic development. Consequently, inno-
vation activities are becoming global, with pockets of technological exper-
tise available at competitive costs in Asia, Eastern Europe and even Africa. 
Companies are reconfi guring their processes and ‘innovation footprint’ (the 
physical network of operations) to take advantage of such new opportunities 
(Dehoff and Sehgal 2007, p. 1).
Location of global R&D activities in emerging economies is facilitated 
by the following factors: fi rst, availability of large pools of qualifi ed sci-
entists and engineers in emerging economies. In comparison to industrial-
ized countries, the availability of research personnel in fi elds such as ICT, 
biotechnology and chemistry that are particularly relevant to the global-
izing companies is larger in emerging economies, mainly because quali-
fi ed personnel in these fi elds of expertise are employed in other sectors of 
the economy in the industrialized countries (Arora and Gambredela 2004). 
Conversely, even though there is a larger stock of scientists and engineers in 
the industrialized world, shortages are particularly prominent in the fast-
growing fi elds; Second, the divisibility of innovation process into activi-
ties and subactivities allows MNCs to offshore and/or outsource some 
innovation activities (core or noncore) to emerging economies. This allows 
companies not only to access much required research personnel at highly 
competitive costs, but also enables concentration on core or higher value-
added R&D activities at home (Reddy 2000). Third, innovation activities 
in science-based technologies do not seem to require long years of industrial 
experience. This is mainly because much of the required knowledge is codi-
fi ed. There is a shift from a ‘learning-by-doing’ type of paradigm toward 
a ‘learning-by-training’ paradigm. This is refl ected in young university 
graduates being employed as R&D personnel in science-based industries, 
whereas R&D employees in conventional industries such as engineering 
and electrical tend to be those with accumulated experience on the shop 
fl oor in manufacturing (tacit knowledge is greater). Consequently, science-
based industries facilitate qualifi ed personnel and companies from emerg-
ing economies to participate in global innovation activities; Last, emerging 
economies are also home to some of the internationally acclaimed universi-
ties and research institutes in terms of their research and publication activi-
ties. Therefore, companies, including MNCs, can not only recruit graduates 
from these universities, but also use these organizations for outsourcing of 
innovation activities.
Mathews (2006), with East Asian fi rms in perspective, argues that it 
is changes in the character of the world economy, particularly its glob-
ally interlinked character (what he calls the worldwide web for inter-fi rm 
connections) that are mainly responsible for driving the new patterns of 
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internationalization. Firms, particularly those that lack substantial resource 
base, are adapting the strategies of linkage and leverage. They are perfect 
strategies for latecomer and newcomer fi rms, and for SMEs, rather than 
for large incumbent fi rms. As newcomers and latecomers, these fi rms from 
emerging economies had to fi nd innovative ways to make space for them-
selves in markets that were already crowded with very capable fi rms. They 
did so through offering contract services, through licensing new technolo-
gies, to forming joint ventures and strategic alliances. It was through the 
implementation of these strategies that are “complementary” to the large 
incumbents that newcomers and latecomers were able to fi nd a place in the 
global economy. It is not on the basis of their existing strengths, but on the 
basis of their capacity to leverage resources from the strengths of others, 
through making international connections (Melin 1992). These interna-
tionalization strategies that were designed to enhance a fi rm’s resource-base 
rather than to exploit existing assets “represent a fundamental departure in 
thinking by fi rms about what ‘globalizing’ means and how it can be accom-
plished” (Mathews 2006, p. 14).
A study by Booz Allen and NASSCOM examined the market for out-
sourced engineering R&D services, i.e., product and component design, plant 
design, process engineering and plant maintenance and operations, across a 
number of sectors, such as automotive, aerospace, technology/telecommuni-
cations, utilities and construction and industrial machinery, which together 
accounted for the bulk of the global corporate R&D expenditures. Among 
the fi ndings of the study are (Dehoff and Sehgal 2007, pp. 3–4):
The growth in global spending on engineering services has two main •
driving forces: (i) the growing demand for increasingly complex con-
sumer and industrial products, particularly in India and China; (ii) 
the increased electronic and software content in everything from toys 
to airplanes that requires more offshored and/or outsourced engineer-
ing work.
The industrialized world is facing a severe shortage of S&T workers. •
Among the reasons for this are: an aging workforce due to prevailing 
demographic conditions; and fewer students in the USUS and Europe 
are choosing S&T professions.
China is producing far more technology workers than is the USUS •
(650,000 a year in China versus 220,000 in the USUS). India pro-
duces 95,000 graduates a year in electrical, information technology 
and computer-science engineering—the fi elds in highest demand—
while the USUS produces 85,000 a year. As the Booz Allen/NASS-
COM study estimated, there are as many as six million engineers 
available in emerging economies to take on R&D tasks of all sorts (28 
percent of them in India and 11 percent in China).
As the market expands, however, new entrants such as the Eastern •
European countries, South Africa, the Philippines and Vietnam are 
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expected to play an increasingly important role in catering to out-
sourcing markets.
The outsourced R&D activities performed today for aviation and •
automotive industries tend to be very basic (e.g., documentation, 
basic simulations and computer assisted design and engineering), but 
upstream activities such as composite structure design and thermo-
mechanical analysis for aerospace companies, could be commonly 
outsourced.
Such progression of offshoring and/or outsourcing of R&D activities 
to emerging economies is already being witnessed. For instance, a major 
automotive component MNC is aggressively expanding its network into 
China and India. At its R&D unit in Bangalore, India, 3,000 employees are 
working on high-end electronic control units, tools and diagnostics, and a 
second unit will be being opened in another city in India, by 2010, where 
6,000 employees will work on software and engineering. The importance 
of emerging economies for global innovation is refl ected in the US-based 
MNC, Cisco, getting the most USUS patents for new products developed at 
its Indian R&D operation of all the regions in its global network (Dehoff 
and Sehgal 2007, pp. 4–5).
Moreover, the markets are growing faster in emerging economies than 
in the industrialized world. Consumers in these markets tend to demand 
equally sophisticated products as their counterparts in the industrialized 
world, in terms of multifunctionality, but at much lower prices. This calls 
for newer business models than the traditional Western business mod-
els of creating value-addition without consideration of additional costs 
for innovative products. The Western business model, of ‘profi t-margin-
on-product,’ perhaps needs to be replaced by a ‘profi t-on-volume’ model. 
Emerging economies do require application of advanced S&T knowledge 
to design and develop products that have all the sophisticated features, but 
with cost-effectiveness, and this requires a paradigmatic change in Western 
management philosophy. Companies from emerging markets seem to bet-
ter understand this phenomenon (e.g., the Tata Nano car and the growing 
market share of Huawei in telecom networks). These are considered emerg-
ing products for the emerging markets. With successful deployment of such 
products, the companies from emerging economies may in the future also 
satisfy the hitherto-unsatisfi ed demand from the marginalized and low-
income consumers in the industrialized world, giving them the scale and 
profi t volumes to become MNCs by themselves in direct competition with 
the traditional MNCs.
3 Globalization of Innovation
A Conceptual Framework
Almost all the past studies on globalization of R&D relate to happenings 
within the industrialized world. Only a few studies (Reddy 1997 and 2000; 
UNCTAD 2005) have been carried out on the location of strategic R&D 
in developing countries by MNCs. Developing countries were considered 
to have a certain competitive advantage in manufacturing activities due to 
their low labor costs, but R&D continues to be viewed as being out of their 
capability. This study, on the other hand, deals with the new trend of locat-
ing strategic innovation activities in some developing countries, which are 
considered as emerging economies. Therefore it becomes relevant to begin 
by a brief review of some of the theories pertaining to internationalization 
of production. The reasons for this are twofold. First, internationalization 
of production is temporally and logically expected to take place prior to 
internationalization of R&D;1 Second, the involvement of developing coun-
tries in international production activities is far greater than their involve-
ment in international R&D activities. Hence, a few theories relating to 
internationalization of production are fi rst analyzed to see whether they 
could be integrated with those relating to R&D, to arrive at a broader 
framework of the process of globalization.
3.1 THEORIES OF INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PRODUCTION
In the 1960s several studies, beginning with Hymer’s doctoral dissertation, 
analyzing foreign direct investments (FDI) were carried out. These studies 
explained FDI as a natural growth process of an oligopolistic fi rm (i.e., an 
MNC) that has some sort of superior advantages (which the local fi rms do 
not possess) that could be used to gain access to overseas markets. These 
advantages more than compensate for the disadvantages that an MNC 
faces in a foreign market, vis-à-vis local fi rms. All fi rms are not equal in 
their ability to operate in an industry; some have considerable advantages 
in particular activities, and the possession of these advantages may cause 
these fi rms to have extensive international operations. Such advantages 
may be that a fi rm can acquire factors of production at a lower cost than 
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others can, or it may have knowledge or control of a more effi cient produc-
tion function or may have better distribution channels or a differentiated 
product. Of all these, ‘the knowledge or technological advantage’ over local 
fi rms is the most important (Hymer 1976).
Extending this argument further, other studies argued that imperfec-
tions in markets are important additional factors that ensure successful 
exploitation of their specifi c advantages through discriminatory pricing 
(Kindleberger 1969; Caves 1971; Horst 1978). In Caves’s (1971) model, 
fi rms expand abroad through horizontal and vertical extension or con-
glomerate diversifi cation. In ‘horizontal extension,’ a fi rm produces the 
same product in several countries. In ‘vertical integration’ across nations, 
the fi rm gets directly involved in other stages of the production process, 
(whether backward and/or forward stages), connected with the products 
it already produces. Other types of expansion abroad are called conglom-
erate diversifi cation, where a fi rm deals with a wide variety of products, 
even unrelated to one another. Horizontal expansion takes place because 
of the possession of a special asset, which once acquired by the fi rm can be 
utilized in additional activities at little or no cost. Firms resort to FDI to 
exploit these oligopolistic characteristics. The investments involving verti-
cal integration are motivated by the need to avoid oligopolistic uncertainty 
and the erection of barriers to the entry of new competitors. In his later 
work, Caves (1982) favored ‘transactional costs’ as an explanation for FDI. 
Vertical integration means internalization of the market for intermediate 
products for reasons of contracting costs and uncertainties. He extended 
his analysis of vertical integration investments to include those that involve 
‘sub-dividing production processes’ and ‘relocating the labor intensive’ 
processes abroad. It is transactional costs that determine the decisions 
regarding the allocation of different production processes between internal 
facilities and facilities abroad.
Combining these oligopolistic characteristics with the theory of inter-
national trade, Vernon (1966) proposed his ‘product life-cycle’ theory. In 
his product life cycle there are three stages—‘innovation,’ ‘growth’ and 
‘maturity’ of the product. In the innovation stage, the design of the product 
often changes, technology is not stable and the market is not familiar with 
the product. At this stage, countries with ‘abundant skilled labor’ would 
have an advantage in the production of these products. During the growth 
stage, sales of the product increase, a mass production system would be 
introduced, the industry attracts more entrants and competition among 
producers increases. In the fi nal maturity stage, technology and product 
parameters become standardized, while managerial skills and production 
costs become more important than innovative skills. Consequently, manu-
facturing usually shifts to countries with ‘low costs of production.’
Vernon (1974) further developed the link between location of produc-
tion, multinationality and oligopolistic structures. There are three stages of 
oligopoly: First is ‘innovation-based oligopoly,’ where the barriers to entry 
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arise from new technologies. Hence, the fi rst location of production of new 
products is likely to be the country where R&D takes place, usually the 
home country. The second stage is ‘mature oligopoly,’ where the barriers 
to entry are erected not by innovation, but by scale of production, trans-
portation or marketing. The search for equilibrium in the mature oligopo-
lies leads to geographical concentration of investment, which cannot be 
explained on the basis of comparative costs. In situations where economies 
of scale are not a strong enough barrier, oligopolistic equilibrium is main-
tained through cartels or product differentiation. The third stage, ‘senes-
cent oligopoly,’ is a situation where such strategies are not successful and 
the equilibrium is fragile, making the fi rm look for cost advantages.
The R&D implication of the product life cycle theory suggests location 
of an extensive centralized R&D in home countries. However, later stud-
ies showed that in some industries at least, the changes in the attitude of 
MNCs, both as a result of internal pressures from the well-established sub-
sidiaries and external environment in the form of inducements from the 
host country government, have led to the product cycle becoming ‘highly 
compressed’ (Giddy 1978, p. 92), leading to a program of near-simultane-
ous innovations in several major markets (Pearce 1989; Terpstra 1977). In 
a later paper, Vernon (1979) himself analyzed the applicability of the prod-
uct cycle model to the scenario of the late 1970s and 1980s and admitted to 
its shortcomings. He analyzed two main factors to arrive at his conclusions: 
(a) the degree of internationalization and diffusion of new products; (b) 
the changes in the European macro environment. As MNCs increasingly 
adopted a global approach, the spread of their operations increased, and 
the overall time lag between the introduction of a new product in the US 
and its diffusion into other locations decreased dramatically. By the late 
1970s, there were a number of changes in Europe’s macro environment, 
closing the gap between Europe and the US.
Dunning’s (1977) eclectic paradigm attempts to synthesize different the-
ories of international production in a general framework of analysis that 
accommodates both the trade and investment theories. There are three sets 
of factors, which enable internationalization of production. First is ‘own-
ership advantages,’ which are specifi c to a particular fi rm and enable it 
to exploit the investment opportunities abroad. There are three types of 
ownership advantages: (a) those that accrue from the ownership of propri-
etary or intangible assets and need not arise due to multinationality; (b) 
those that a subsidiary enjoys from belonging to an established large fi rm 
over the others producing in the same location; (c) those that accrue from 
multinationality. Second is ‘locational advantages,’ which are specifi c to a 
country and make it attractive to foreign investors. Third, ‘internalization 
advantages’ are benefi ts that are derived from internal markets and allow 
fi rms to bypass external markets and costs associated with them.
There are three conditions for FDI to take place. (1) The fi rm concerned 
must possess net ownership advantages vis-à-vis other fi rms serving the 
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same market. (2) The fi rm must perceive benefi ts from internalizing the 
use of its advantages rather than selling them in external markets, e.g., 
licensing. (3) The host country must offer locational advantages to be used 
in conjunction with those deriving from ownership and internalization. A 
country’s competitive position depends not only on its locational and own-
ership advantages, but also on the desire and ability of fi rms to internal-
ize the resulting advantages. The motivation for internalizing comes from 
the existence of market imperfections that confer special advantages to 
internal markets as opposed to external ones. Such market imperfections 
may be ‘structural’ (e.g., barriers to competition) and ‘cognitive’ (lack of 
knowledge on the part of seller as well as buyer about products and pro-
cesses). Differing policies among countries create incentives for internaliza-
tion across national boundaries, and internalization further helps fi rms to 
acquire and enhance those assets that give them an ownership advantage 
(Dunning 1977).
Dunning’s concepts of locational and ownership advantages can be 
applied to partially explain how R&D is internationalized. A country’s 
locational advantages, such as availability of large pools of S&T personnel 
and existence of reputed universities, may attract R&D-related FDI of par-
ticular types into the country. MNCs may combine these with their owner-
ship advantage of the ability to organize R&D through global networks. 
However, the model cannot be applied to explain other important factors 
such as why R&D needs to be internationalized, the changes in driving 
forces and the emergence of new techno-economic paradigm. Nor can it be 
applied to explain the differences in factors required and the driving forces 
for locating different types of R&D activities abroad (Reddy 2000).
In relation to the developing world, a country may have locational 
advantage in one factor, such as availability of trained personnel, but it 
may lack other advantages such as communication and infrastructural 
facilities. Therefore, even if a fi rm wants to internalize the advantage 
it fi nds in a location, the lack or inadequacy of complementary assets 
required may prevent it from doing so. Moreover, the eclectic paradigm 
is also based on market imperfections providing the primary motiva-
tion for MNCs’ operations abroad, whereas one of the major driving 
forces for internationalization of R&D seems to be the competition for 
accessing S&T resources. In internationalization of production a fi rm 
exploits an existing ownership advantage, whereas in internationaliza-
tion of R&D a fi rm attempts to create or acquire an ownership advan-
tage (Reddy 2000).
Mathews (2006, pp. 18–20), based on East Asian companies, whom 
he calls ‘dragon multinationals,’ proposes a complementary framework 
to Dunning’s paradigm, which is grounded in the present globalization 
(including the interfi rm strategic alliances as a mode of entry into global 
markets). According to him, a fi rm’s international expansion is driven by 
resource Linkage, Leverage and Learning (LLL):
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Linkage—The critical starting point for the latecomer fi rms is that it •
is focused not on their own advantages, but on the advantages that 
can be acquired externally from other organizations. Thus, a global 
market orientation from the beginning becomes a source of advan-
tage for these fi rms. A global market orientation carries higher risks 
and uncertainties than a conservative domestic market focus. In such 
situations, joint ventures and other forms of collaborative partner-
ship as a mode of entry into the foreign market become a crucial 
strategic option;
Leverage—Next, the focus of latecomer fi rms will be on the ways in •
which the links can be established with incumbents or other partners 
so that resources can be leveraged. These fi rms will be concerned with 
the issues of accessibility to such resources, with their imitability, or 
transferability or substitutability;
Learning—Repeated use of linkage and leverage processes results in •
improved performance of such operations by the fi rm (organizational 
learning). An entire region may learn to carry out the processes more 
effectively, as they master the intricacies of cluster development (or 
formation of more effective R&D alliances). The latter process may 
be termed ‘economic learning’ (Mathews 2003).
Theories of the internationalization of production offer only a partial 
explanation for the location of R&D abroad, because of their narrow treat-
ment of R&D as an exogenous factor that contributes to the oligopolistic 
advantages of the MNC. These theories do not provide satisfactory expla-
nations for the issues of globalization of R&D as a strategy in the organi-
zation of MNCs. However, the changes in the macro environment, which 
Vernon (1979) discussed, may be taken as the starting point in analyzing 
the driving forces behind the internationalization of R&D.
3.2 INTERNATIONALIZATION OF R&D—EARLY STUDIES
The early signs that MNCs might be performing some R&D abroad were 
indicated in the pioneering surveys of MNCs’ operations in some industri-
alized host countries. These survey studies include Dunning (1958) for the 
UK, Brash (1966) for Australia, Safarian (1966) for Canada and Stuben-
itsky (1970) for The Netherlands. In addition to these host country studies, 
the benchmark survey of US Direct Investment Abroad by the US Depart-
ment of Commerce in 1966 showed that US-based MNCs performed some 
R&D activities abroad (The US Tariff Commission 1973). An analysis of 
this data by Craemer (1976, pp. 2–3) revealed that 86 percent of the 500 
largest US manufacturers in 1966 incurred foreign R&D expenditures, 
which accounted for 97 percent of the total R&D expenditures abroad by 
US-based companies.
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MNCs tended to confi ne R&D activities to their home countries; how-
ever, when the necessity arose they performed abroad R&D related to 
adaptation or in a few cases product development for the local market. 
Even these limited R&D activities were mostly confi ned to industrialized 
countries and a few large developing countries. Such R&D was considered 
an additional and inevitable cost of technology transfer; hence a reduction 
of R&D costs was not a motive for locating R&D abroad. Studies in the 
late 1970s (Craemer 1976; Ronstadt 1977; and Behrman and Fischer 1980) 
confi rmed these practices.
Ronstadt’s (1977) survey of R&D abroad by seven US-based MNCs, 
which had 55 R&D units abroad in total, distinguished between four 
types of foreign R&D units: (1) Technology Transfer Units (TTUs); 
(2) Indigenous Technology Units (ITUs); (3) Global Technology Units 
(GTUs); and (4) Corporate Technology Units (CTUs). TTUs were closely 
linked to manufacturing units and were established when the product and 
process technologies needed to be adapted to the local conditions, and 
when there was a need for continuous support of technical services. This 
was more cost-effective than sending R&D missions from headquarters. 
ITUs were R&D units set up to develop new products for the local mar-
kets and were established when the subsidiary was able to identify locally 
distinctive opportunities and convince the parent company of its abil-
ity to implement such new product development. GTUs were established 
when a single product was envisaged for the global market. In such cases, 
the allocation of R&D tasks to foreign subsidiaries tended to depend on 
two infl uences: First, an MNC might allocate parts of the product range 
to a particular manufacturing subsidiary abroad; therefore, it might be 
benefi cial to carry out R&D relevant to that part of the product range in 
the same place. Second, developing a globally competitive product range 
may necessitate utilization of the resources available in the subsidiaries 
abroad by organizing a decentralized but integrated R&D program. The 
main function of a CTU was to generate new technologies of a long-term 
or exploratory nature exclusively for the parent company in order to pro-
tect the fi rm’s future competitive position. CTUs were often established 
abroad to recruit top scientists, who could not be relocated to the US on 
a long-term basis.2 Although four distinctive kinds of R&D units, each 
serving a purpose, were established abroad by the US-based MNCs, over 
time however, all the four types tended to depart from their original char-
acter and follow a common pattern of evolution with overlapping func-
tions. Ronstadt’s study showed that even the TTUs were concentrated in 
the industrialized countries. Only India, among the developing countries 
attracted two TTUs, because the host country had the potential for a 
large market with unique characteristics.
Behrman and Fischer (1980) surveyed 31 US and 17 European com-
panies during 1977–1978. They found that some MNCs located R&D 
facilities in the more advanced developing countries among which the 
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most important were Brazil, India and Mexico. However, MNCs’ R&D 
activities in these countries were limited to adaptations, local technical 
services (TTU type) and, in a few cases, product development for the 
local markets (ITU type). Most of the R&D performed abroad by MNCs 
was found to be applied R&D, and this varied signifi cantly depending 
on the market orientation. ‘Home market’ companies are those whose 
foreign subsidiaries mainly support the companies’ home market opera-
tions, either by supplying raw materials to the parent or manufacturing a 
particular component for it, or performing a specialized stage in a verti-
cally integrated production process. The nature of such activities limits 
the subsidiary level R&D to marginal product and process adaptations to 
suit local operating conditions. ‘Host market’ companies are those whose 
subsidiaries abroad are predominantly oriented to servicing the domes-
tic markets of the countries in which they operate. Such subsidiaries 
often need to adapt the products and processes to suit the local demand 
and conditions or sometimes even create distinctively new products for 
the local market. ‘World market’ companies integrate their subsidiar-
ies abroad into a centrally coordinated program to service standardized 
world markets. R&D in the subsidiaries of world market companies may 
similarly be assigned a specialized role in a centrally co-coordinated pro-
gram. Such R&D is often motivated by the availability of required scien-
tifi c and technical skills in the host country.
Burstall et al. (1981) link the evolution of an R&D center’s capability 
from a limited unit to that with a comprehensive research capacity to the 
scientifi c and industrial capacity of the host economy. They, in turn, relate 
this with the technological capacity of a foreign subsidiary moving from 
a ‘fi rst order capacity’ unit, which only receives and adapts research and 
technology, to a ‘second order capacity’ unit, which can develop and trans-
mit new technologies to other subsidiaries.
Another classifi cation of R&D laboratories abroad, which is comple-
mentary to Ronstadt’s classifi cation, was made by Hood and Young (1982): 
support laboratory (SL); locally integrated laboratory (LIL); and interna-
tional interdependent laboratory (IIL). The primary function of SL is to 
assist the production and marketing facilities in the host country through 
technical services and adaptation of products and processes to suit local 
conditions. The LIL also caters to the local markets and production by 
developing products that are more than marginal adaptations of the exist-
ing product range of the parent company. Its work is likely to be oriented to 
original development work rather than a fully independent creative process. 
The IIL is primarily geared toward the global R&D activity of the parent 
rather than toward the other activities of the parent in the host country. IIL 
undertakes the centrally assigned tasks in an R&D program, which may 
involve R&D units in several other locations.
With the relevance and the important characteristics of overseas R&D 
having been established by the pioneering studies discussed above, later 
48 Global Innovation in Emerging Economies
studies attempted to analyze the issue of the determinants of overseas R&D 
by using industry- or fi rm-level data. Among the determinants tested were 
economies of scale in R&D, the extent of overseas sales and production 
and R&D intensity and product characteristics.
Lall (1979) investigated the relationship between the US-based MNCs’ 
propensity to perform R&D abroad and the overall R&D intensity of their 
industries. In his view, the extent to which R&D can be shifted abroad 
depends on the ‘linkages’ between R&D and other activities. Research of 
a basic nature is not likely to have close links with other functional areas 
of a fi rm’s operations. On the other hand, the minor development work 
of adapting them to specifi c material and marketing needs in each manu-
facturing unit is closely linked with production but not with the strategic 
planning at headquarters. The need for development work varies between 
industries, being most prevalent in engineering industries where detailed 
design is an integral part of the production process. Because such adap-
tive R&D is likely to be carried out in the majority of subsidiaries, it may 
result in a high absolute value of foreign R&D, as well as high R&D in 
relation to sales, but not in a high propensity to perform overseas R&D. 
He also observed that R&D functions could be more easily ‘delinked’ in 
process industries than in engineering industries. In ‘process industries,’ 
there is little need to adapt the product to individual markets, there-
fore R&D in these industries is not drawn for market-related reasons. 
Therefore, in the process industries group, research intensity and the pro-
pensity to undertake foreign R&D are positively related. On the other 
hand, engineering industries require continuous interaction between all 
activities in the innovation process itself and between R&D and other 
functions such as procurement, production and marketing. This need for 
strong linkages between functions within the organization and the need 
for feedback from the users make R&D in engineering industries diffi cult 
to internationalize.
Another set of theories focuses on ‘supply-side’ requirements of R&D 
in order to fulfi ll its role as a factor in the competitive advantage of 
MNCs. The main issue of analysis has been the complexity of organiz-
ing R&D at multinational level compared with fi rms at national level, 
rather than the broader issue of the globalization process itself. The 
ability to tap into pools of S&T personnel and the attraction of low-
cost research bases have been considered key elements in this process. 
The importance of international recruitment of scarce S&T talent is not 
a new phenomenon (Liebenau 1984). Such moves by MNCs to tap the 
scientifi c talent on a global basis were seen as a refl ection of the wider 
process of a ‘new international division of labor’ (Frobel et al. 1980). 
In the late 1980s itself, MNCs were seen as seeking to exploit valuable 
supplies of scarce skilled labor as well as the much larger supplies of 
low-skilled and low-cost workers in the more general production pro-
cess (Schoenberger 1988). An additional factor on the supply side is the 
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MNCs’ attraction for low-cost but competent research capacity abroad 
(Howells 1990).
3.3 GLOBALIZATION OF R&D—STUDIES SINCE THE 1980s
The above studies provided valuable insights into the organization of over-
seas research activity. However, they were based on observations and trends 
of MNCs’ R&D in the 1970s and before. A number of major changes have 
been taking place since the 1980s in the nature and scope of R&D activi-
ties performed internationally by MNCs. This changing dynamics of R&D 
being performed abroad has given rise to concepts of ‘internationalization’ 
and ‘globalization.’ Different researchers use these concepts somewhat dif-
ferently. According to Petrella (1992), internationalization involves joint 
R&D between two or more fi rms from different countries; multination-
alization involves establishment of R&D activities by a fi rm in countries 
other than its home country; and globalization involves development of a 
global R&D strategy by the corporation both at the internal level (in-house 
R&D) and the external level (R&D alliances, mergers, acquisitions, uni-
versity contracts) in all R&D areas (basic, strategic, applied). Casson and 
Singh (1993) consider internationalization as an approach in which over-
seas R&D units are given a small and usually subordinate role in corporate 
research activity, whereas globalization involves a greater commitment to 
overseas R&D, based on systematic division of labor between laboratories 
in different countries. Internationalization is usually motivated by the need 
to support overseas production and marketing, whereas globalization is 
independent of such motives.
Selection of the location of R&D by MNCs depends on several crite-
ria. These include: proximity to a manufacturing site; availability of local 
universities and professionals; ability to build up a critical mass of local 
researchers (most important for global technological research); attractive-
ness of sources of technical excellence, e.g., universities, customers or sup-
pliers; and availability of excellent communication systems (De Meyer and 
Mizushima 1989). The choice of location of R&D also depends on the 
type of technology to be developed and the advantages of national scientifi c 
capacity. For instance, the UK has been attracting signifi cant R&D-related 
FDI in the pharmaceutical industry, because of the high-quality British sci-
ence in the life sciences and in chemistry. Similarly, Germany has been a cen-
ter for foreign R&D activities in the electrical engineering and electronics 
industries, refl ecting German excellence in these areas (Wortmann 1990). 
Even in the selection of low-cost locations, it is observed that MNCs fol-
lowed the same criteria. Although emerging economies are lagging behind 
the developed countries in industrialization, some of them have interna-
tionally reputed academic institutions. MNCs consider them to be almost 
on a par with the academic establishments in the industrialized world.
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Dörrenbächer and Wortmann (1991) analyzed the motives for interna-
tionalization of R&D on two different levels: First, if the R&D is per-
formed at the location that is most effi cient within the framework of the 
corporate R&D system, then it is regarded as ‘R&D-related motive.’ Sec-
ond, if the overseas R&D serves purposes not related to an improvement of 
the company’s R&D system, then it is considered ‘R&D-unrelated motive.’ 
There are basically two kinds of R&D-related motives: The fi rst type is 
the R&D that supports the local production. In such centers, technology 
transferred from the parent company to the subsidiary is adapted to local 
market and production requirements. The second type of R&D is aimed at 
the generation of new technologies that will be used by the entire company. 
In the context of R&D-unrelated motives, there could be requirements of 
national governments aiming at the preservation of R&D potential in their 
countries. Such motives also include improving the image of the company 
not only vis-à-vis the government or other customers, but to attract quali-
fi ed personnel who want to work for ‘interesting’ companies that provide 
career opportunities.
According to Håkanson (1992), based on the dominant motive for their 
establishment, foreign R&D units can be grouped into fi ve categories: (1) 
political factors, (2) production support, (3) market proximity, (4) monitor 
research, and (5) multimotive units. Except for the last one, each category 
of an R&D unit is predominantly associated with a specifi c type of estab-
lishment process: (a) acquisitions, (b) evolution of activities in greenfi eld 
subsidiaries, and (c) `direct placement´ of R&D units.
According to Granstrand et al. (1992), the reasons for internationaliza-
tion of R&D can be organized into two groups: (1) ‘demand-oriented’ fac-
tors, i.e., circumstances leading to establishment of R&D abroad to better 
serve the foreign national markets; and (2) ‘supply-oriented’ factors, refer-
ring to ‘characteristics in the local foreign environment that enhance the 
effi ciency of R&D by providing, for instance, access to technical expertise, 
perhaps at a lower cost than elsewhere or access to universities and other 
research establishments.
Bas and Sierra (2002), using a matrix of the fi rm’s strengths and weak-
nesses relating to its R&D-related FDI and the technological profi le of 
its home and host countries, classify four types of MNCs’ strategies with 
respect to globalization of R&D. Among them the ‘technology-seeking’ 
type of R&D-related FDI is aimed at compensating for the home country’s 
weaknesses in a given technical fi eld by locating R&D in a host country 
that has proven capabilities in that fi eld. Patel and Vega (1999) call such a 
strategy as ‘host-country-exploiting’ type of R&D-related FDI.
Whereas the globalization of R&D has become a necessity, the pri-
mary motives for such moves differ among companies. From the litera-
ture survey,3 the motives for location of R&D abroad can be summarized 
as follows: market-related (size, proximity and importance); technology-
related (to tap into foreign S&T resources); cost-related (to exploit cost 
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differentials); technology monitoring (to monitor new developments in sci-
ence and technology, competitors’ analysis); and non-R&D-related (pres-
sures by national governments, improving the company’s image). However, 
these motives are not mutually exclusive, and an MNC may locate R&D 
abroad for more than one motive (Reddy 2000).
Over time, technology-related motives are observed to have become 
more important than market-related motives (Cantwell 1992). The impetus 
for the globalization of R&D is increasingly being provided by the need for 
‘knowhow’ rather than ‘knowwhat’ to develop (Dunning 1992). In recent 
years, supply-related factors, i.e., the availability of highly skilled scientists 
and engineers, and a dynamic scientifi c infrastructure, have become more 
important for globalization of R&D than demand-related factors, i. e., the 
need for customer contact and market proximity to adapt products and 
processes (Håkanson 1992).
Tapping foreign S&T resources is the primary motive for establishing 
GTU and CTU types of R&D abroad. However, faced with the increas-
ing R&D intensiveness of technologies and decreasing profi ts, MNCs are 
increasingly concerned about reducing R&D costs. This has to be achieved 
without compromising the primary objective of generating new technolo-
gies and improving the innovativeness of the company. One way of achiev-
ing these twin objectives is to carry out R&D, at least some parts of it, in 
low-cost locations that have the required S&T capacity (Reddy and Sigur-
dson 1994). In the generation of new technologies, the innovative potential 
in the foreign host country does not necessarily have to be more advanced 
than the potential in the MNC’s home country, i.e., industrialized coun-
tries. Technology expertise can be complementary (Dörrenbächer and 
Wortmann 1991).
In the context of the changing dynamics of global R&D, analysis of 
these motives assumes greater importance. The type of R&D performed 
abroad is closely linked to the motives for globalization of R&D. The past 
research studies have neglected to take this key relationship into account. 
An analysis of the relationship between the type of R&D performed abroad 
and the driving forces (primary motives) for globalization of corporate 
R&D suggested that market-related motives lead mostly to the TTU, ITU 
and RTU types of R&D activities, whereas technology-related motives are 
more important for GTU and CTU activities, followed by the cost-related 
motives (Reddy 1997).
3.4 IMPACT ON HOST COUNTRIES
A few studies have been carried out on the impact of MNCs’ R&D activ-
ities on the host country. Whatever implications are suggested by these 
few studies, they tend to be postulated hypotheses. Whether the perfor-
mance of R&D by MNCs contributes to the enhancement or retardation 
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of independent technological capability of the host country remains a com-
plex issue and would depend on the innovation capacity of the host country 
and the nature of R&D carried out by the MNC.
According to Dunning (1992), there have been two opposing views 
regarding the impact of R&D in MNCs on the host countries. One view 
considers inward R&D-related FDI to be benefi cial to economic growth, 
as it brings in new technology and managerial skills, which in turn create 
indirect positive effects for the host country at a lower cost. These positive 
effects include technical support to local suppliers and customers, contract 
jobs from foreign R&D units to local R&D organizations and so on. The 
counterview argues that R&D activities by foreign fi rms tend to tap into 
unique local R&D resources with little or no benefi t to the host country. 
Concentrating on problems of little relevance to the local economy, they 
may be little more than disguised ‘braindrain,’ diverting scarce technical 
resources from more useful purposes.
However, in the context of developing countries, where the S&T 
resources are underutilized, the counterview may not hold much strength. 
The benefi ts are larger, while the costs involved may be marginal. In the 
case of developing host countries, the cost factor may be that such R&D 
activities may create islands of ‘high-tech enclaves’ with little diffusion of 
knowledge into the economy. But, knowledge and skills cannot be isolated 
over the long term. The mobility of researchers and the need for local pro-
curement of materials are bound to diffuse technologies throughout the 
economy. One of the most important benefi ts has been that global innova-
tion activities are promoting ‘entrepreneurship’ among young scientists and 
engineers in developing host countries (Reddy 2000).
In general an R&D subsidiary is expected to benefi t the host country in 
three ways: (a) by adapting products and processes to local conditions, it 
improves the effi ciency of the local manufacturing facilities. This, in turn, 
may benefi t the host country by increasing the size of output, employment 
and tax revenue, and the consumers would have access to products better 
suited to their requirements, perhaps at a lower price. (b) By assisting the 
local manufacturing subsidiary to introduce a new product, R&D may help 
improve the export performance of the subsidiary; (c) through its linkages 
with the local S&T community an R&D unit derives benefi t as well as con-
tributes to the widening of the scope of capabilities of local S&T resources 
(Pearce 1989).
While analyzing the implications for the host countries, it is important 
to consider the type of R&D being performed, as its direct and indirect 
effects on the host country vary. Each type of R&D unit displays distinctive 
linkages with the global intracorporate network and the local systems of 
innovation (SI). The local ties are virtually nonexistent for a TTU, whose 
main technology links are with the parent; somewhat strong for an ITU, 
which may to some extent draw on the local SI to develop products par-
ticularly designed for the local market; stronger for a GTU; and strongest 
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for a CTU. In these two types of R&D units, the primary motive being 
that of exploiting local sources of S&T that cannot be accessed easily from 
outside the country, strong local linkages are established (Westney 1988; 
Reddy 1997).
According to Granstrand et al. (1993), depending on the situation, glo-
balization of R&D may result in three kinds of scenarios: fi rst, situations 
that create positive-sum games for the MNCs, the home countries and the 
host countries; second, situations of zero-sum games; and last, situations 
of negative-sum games. If the national systems of innovation in both home 
and host countries are well developed and capable of reaping positive alloc-
ative effects, foreign R&D will result in positive externalities. If the host 
country’s system lacks such a capability in a particular industry, it could 
be built up by providing ‘infant innovation system protection.’ However, 
such a policy may not be effective in cases where FDI in that industry has 
already reached a signifi cant level. If a foreign fi rm acquires R&D resources 
in another country for less than its local opportunity cost and uses these 
resources to outcompete the local industry, there will be negative effects on 
the local economy. In order to increase the positive host country effects of 
global R&D activities, the interaction with local SI must be ensured.
3.5 SYSTEMS OF INNOVATION (SI)
The concept of ‘national systems of innovation’ (NSI), as an analytical 
tool, was fi rst used more or less independently and around the same time 
by Freeman (1987), Lundvall (1988) and Nelson (1988). Freeman (1987) 
used the concept in analyzing the success of Japan over the postwar period. 
He attributed Japan’s success to certain key and distinctive elements in its 
national system of innovation. He defi ned the concept as “the network of 
institutions in the public and private sectors whose activities and interac-
tions initiate, import, modify and diffuse new technologies” (p. 1).
Lundvall (1992, p. 12) defi nes the concept at two levels, where the 
narrow defi nition of an NSI includes the organizations and institutions 
involved in searching and exploring, such as R&D departments, techno-
logical institutes and universities. The broader defi nition encompasses “all 
parts and aspects of the economic structure and the institutional set-up 
affecting learning as well as searching and exploring—the production sys-
tem, the marketing system and the system of fi nance present themselves as 
sub-systems in which learning takes place.”
The view that an innovation system is confi ned to the national boundar-
ies, however, did not appeal to many scholars, and so they started to use the 
concept of ‘systems of innovation’ (SI) as an analytical tool to explain the 
developments at international, regional (subnational) and sectoral or tech-
nology levels. Freeman (1995) used the term ‘upper’ regions (‘triad’ and con-
tinental regions), and ‘nether’ regions (regional and local systems). Carlsson 
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and Stankiewicz (1995) used the term ‘technological systems’ approach 
to explain that innovation systems can be specifi c to particular technolo-
gies and/or sectors. A few scholars, however, argue that even in these cases 
where the particular technologies and sectors have their own dynamics, the 
national factors play an important role. As Nelson (1993, p. 518) puts it, 
“[I]f one focuses narrowly on what we have defi ned as ‘innovation systems’ 
these tend to be sectorally specifi c. But, if one broadens the focus the factors 
that make for commonality within a country come strongly into view, and 
these largely defi ne the factors that make for commonality across sectors 
within a country.” The existing institutional factors in a national system may 
facilitate or block innovation and growth in a particular sector of a national 
economy (Howells and Neary 1995, p. 245). Archibugi et al. (1999a) argue 
that the concepts of national (geographically limited) and technological sys-
tems (sectorally specifi c) should not be perceived as mutually exclusive. By 
integrating both concepts the broader SI can be analyzed.
The concept of NSI raises another issue, namely, the ‘globalization of 
innovation activities’ and how to reconcile one with the other. According to 
Archibugi et al. (1999b, pp. 534–535), the conceptual frameworks on SI and 
globalization have developed independently of each other. So they suggest 
an analysis of the technology dynamics that allows a better understand-
ing of the globalization process, as there is a mutually reinforcing interplay 
between the two. New technologies become channels for rapid diffusion of 
information relating to ‘best practices’ across geographically wider areas. 
At the same time, the process of generating new technologies and diffusing 
them has been further strengthened by the fl ows of people, products and 
capital. This implies that the technology-based innovation systems will be 
characterized by common technological regimes, irrespective of the geo-
graphical location in which the related production is carried out.
However, even in the context of globalization, the location-specifi c 
advantages continue to play an important role, as evidenced by the MNCs’ 
investment activities that are increasingly seeking to exploit the location-
specifi c advantages that are linked to certain regions or areas. The inter-
national distribution of technological and production activities is refl ecting 
more sectoral differentiation. Globalization is resulting in increased division 
of labor, with each country specializing in selected industries and resorting 
to international trade for others (Archibugi et al. 1999a).
In this study a broader interpretation of the term ‘innovation’ is adopted 
from Nelson and Rosenberg (1993, p. 4) “to encompass the processes by 
which fi rms master and get into practice product designs and manufac-
turing processes that are new them, if not to the universe or even to the 
nation.” Such a broader defi nition is more appropriate for this study for 
several reasons: First, the fi rms in emerging economies are often not at 
the forefront of the innovation in the sense of Schumpeterian innovator. 
They are mainly involved in improving products or processes. Second, the 
focus on innovation is strongly connected to the broader issue of achieving 
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economic growth. As some of the Asian developing countries have shown, 
it is not always necessary to be able to generate fundamentally new knowl-
edge in order to achieve higher economic performance. Third, the fi rst fi rm 
to bring new innovative products into the market may not be the fi rm that 
appropriates most economic rents from the innovation.4
Edquist (1997), in his review of literature on SI, analyzed that whereas 
there are several commonalties among different approaches, there is also a 
high degree of diversity among them. Among the core characteristics of the 
SI approach are—innovation and learning; holistic and interdisciplinary 
nature; natural inclusion of a historical perspective; differences between 
systems and nonoptimality; emphasis on interdependence and nonlinear-
ity; inclusion of product as well as organizational innovations; the central 
role of institutions; conceptually diffuse nature; and focus on conceptual 
constructs rather than on a theoretical framework.
Whatever may be the approach, as Mytelka (2000, p. 17) states, “A sys-
tem of innovation consists of a network of economic agents together with 
the institutions and policies that infl uence their innovative behavior and 
performance.” According to her, as an analytical framework it provides a 
better understanding of innovation as a process in which there is continu-
ous interaction among fi rms, support institutions and organizations. In the 
present global business environment the competition faced by fi rms is based 
more on innovation dynamics rather than on the static elements of relative 
comparative advantage. In order to meet such competition, new strategies 
and policies are required. “These will necessarily differ depending upon the 
knowledge base (competencies), habits and practices of the fi rms and the 
domestic institutional and the global competitive environments in which 
they are embedded” (p. 16).
According to Edquist (2005), organizations and institutions are the main 
components of SI. He defi nes ‘organizations’ as formal structures that are 
established for an explicit purpose. The important ones among them are 
fi rms, universities, venture capital funds and public agencies responsible for 
innovation policy, competition policy and regulation. The ‘institutions,’ on 
the other hand, refer to common habits, norms, routines, established prac-
tices, rules and laws that regulate the relations and interactions between 
individuals, groups and organizations. For instance, the patent laws and 
the rules and norms infl uencing the relations between universities and 
fi rms come under institutions. Furthermore, he states that an analysis of 
the SI must not only focus on its constituents, but also on ‘activities’ that 
take place in the systems. The activities are those factors that infl uence the 
development and diffusion of innovations. They are equivalent to deter-
minants of the innovation processes. A list of such main activities (which 
have subactivities under each of them) is categorized as: (i) the provision 
of knowledge inputs to the innovation process, (ii) demand-side activities, 
the (iii) provision of constituents of systems of innovation and (iv) support 
services for innovating fi rms.
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Furman and Hayes (2004) employ the term national ‘innovative capac-
ity’ “to describe a country’s potential—as both an economic and political 
entity—to produce a stream of commercially relevant innovations” (p. 1330). 
This term is organized “into three main elements: (1) a common pool of insti-
tutions, resource commitments and policies that support innovation, referred 
to as the common innovation infrastructure; (2) the particular innovation 
orientation of groups of interconnected national industrial clusters; and (3) 
the quality of linkages between the two” (p. 1335). The common innovation 
infrastructure provides resources for innovation throughout an economy, but 
it is the fi rms in specifi c industrial clusters that introduce and commercial-
ize specifi c innovations. Therefore, the innovative capacity of an economy 
depends on the degree to which a country’s industrial clusters support and 
compete on the basis of innovation. Based on the “diamond” framework 
developed by Porter (1990), Furman and Hayes note the importance of four 
key elements of the microeconomic environment: (i) the presence of high 
quality and specialized inputs; (ii) a context that encourages investment and 
intense local competition; (iii) pressure and insight drawn from sophisticated 
local demand; and (iv) the presence of a cluster of support industries. There 
is also opportunity for productivity-enhancing knowledge to spill over across 
industrial clusters. The extent to which the innovation potential “is trans-
lated into specifi c innovative outputs in a nation’s industrial cluster will be 
determined by the quality of linkages between these two areas. In the absence 
of strong linking mechanisms, upstream scientifi c and technical activity may 
spill over to other countries more quickly than opportunities can be exploited 
by domestic industries” (p. 1336).
3.6 NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND CATCHING-UP OPPORTUNITIES
Conventional wisdom states that the most viable point of entry into the 
industrialization process for developing countries to be in mature tech-
nologies because of low production costs and low skill requirements. But, 
according to Perez and Soete (1988), these are industries that have already 
exhausted their technological dynamism. Countries adopting this strategy 
may face the risk of getting caught in a low wage and low growth pattern. 
The ‘catching up’ process, on the other hand, involves acquiring the capac-
ity to improve upon the old and generate new technologies rather than 
simply being able to use them. Conventional theories perceived technology 
to be cumulative unidirectional process, and development was seen as a 
race along a fi xed track, where catching up depended on the ‘relative speed.’ 
While speed is an important and relevant aspect, history is full of examples 
of how successful overtaking has been mainly based on running in a new 
direction. In other words, a change in the techno-economic paradigm opens 
up new windows of opportunity for the latecomers to industrialization.
One of the main weaknesses of the product life cycle theory had been that 
it assumes that products are independent of one another. Every new product 
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is regarded as a radical innovation, and the successive improvements to it 
and to its production process are the incremental changes, which bring it to 
maturity. The next product is again a radical innovation following a similar 
evolutionary path. In practice, however, each product cycle develops within 
a broader family, which in turn is part of an even broader technological 
system. Successive products within a technological system are equivalent to 
incremental innovations to a product (Freeman and Perez 1988).
According to Perez and Soete (1988), the life cycles of the technology sys-
tems approach are more relevant for development strategies than that of the 
product life cycle approach, because the former facilitates the identifi cation of 
those families of products and processes that will provide better opportunities 
for learning and catching up, as conceptualized in the following phases:
Phase I (introduction), involves original design and engineering, 
with the product in focus. Therefore, the S&T knowledge required 
will be high, whereas relevant skills and investment required will 
be low. The level of locational advantages required may be high for 
successful introduction.
Phase II (rapid market growth), with the product development com-
pleted, the focus shifts to the production process and improvements 
to the product. Because the technological solution is already embod-
ied in both product and production equipment, the S&T knowledge 
required will be low, but the skills and investment required will be 
high. Locational and infrastructural economies generated by the inno-
vation itself would also grow, making them more easily available to 
the late entrants.
Phase III (productivity and fi rm’s growth), the focus will be on man-
aging the fi rm’s growth and capturing market share. Scaling up the 
plant and incremental innovations to improve productivity become 
important. The capital costs and management skills required can be 
very high. Entry at this stage for new entrants will be extremely dif-
fi cult. By then the S&T knowledge required will have become low. 
The importance of locational advantages will also be low.
Phase IV (maturity), the whole system is by now standardized and 
further investments in technological improvements result in dimin-
ishing returns. Firms would be willing to sell the technologies to oth-
ers. Firms and locations with low costs of production will become 
competitive, but fi xed investment costs will be high. The threshold of 
entry at this point is low, even though costs of entry could be high.
Phases I and IV are potential entry points for entrants, but with vastly 
different costs and requirements. But for the need for a high level of exter-
nalities and of S&T knowledge, entry into the new technologies is easier for 
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developing countries during Phase I, because of low capital and experience 
requirements. This partially explains the cases of some innovations in elec-
tronics and biotechnology occurring outside the industrialized countries. 
However, as the system evolves, it may require not only constant technolog-
ical effort, but also a growing fl ow of investment to generate synergies for 
self-sustained growth processes. This implies that, if a developing country 
has adequate reserves of well-qualifi ed university graduates, a window of 
opportunity opens for relatively independent entry into new products in a 
new technology system in its early phases (Perez and Soete 1988).
The technology systems, in turn, constitute the elements of a techno-eco-
nomic paradigm, which also evolves through different phases and is composed 
of a series of interrelated technology systems. Each new techno-economic par-
adigm requires, generates and diffuses new types of knowledge and skills and 
creates an environment for an easier entry into more products within these 
systems. Mature industries and products get redefi ned, new products and 
industries appear, giving rise to new technology systems based on ‘new types 
of knowledge, skills and new locational and infrastructural advantages.’ The 
fi rms and nations that are well-established leaders in old technology systems 
would fi nd it expensive to get rid of their experience and acquire new skills. 
But the new fi rms and latecomer countries, for whatever reason, acquire the 
new knowledge and skills more quickly. “That is why these periods of para-
digm change have historically allowed some countries to catch up and even 
surpass the previous leaders” (Perez and Soete 1988, p. 477).5
The emergence of new technologies has changed the rules of the game in 
global competition by transforming the industrial production system. Because 
of this change in the technological paradigm, no country or fi rm, however 
well-entrenched in the global markets, is certain of maintaining its competi-
tive lead. The threats posed to the MNCs by the emerging high-tech start-up 
fi rms in the electronics and biotechnology sectors are an evidence of this phe-
nomenon. For instance, Nokia of Finland, which was new to the business 
fi eld, emerged as the fi rst largest supplier of mobile telephones worldwide 
(Reddy 2000).
3.7 EVOLUTION OF GLOBALIZATION OF 
R&D—A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Studies that have been discussed in the previous sections have contributed 
to the better understanding of the determinants of internationalization 
R&D by MNCs. However, they also tended to analyze the subject from the 
perspective of the fi rm and the management of geographically dispersed 
R&D, rather than an integrated analysis of the process of globalization 
as a macro concept, the changing dynamics of the driving forces behind it 
and the type of R&D performed abroad and its implications. Moreover, all 
the research related to globalization of corporate R&D that has been car-
ried out so far pertains to the happenings within the industrialized world. 
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Developing countries were not considered as potential locations for carry-
ing out innovation activities. The academic research relating to globaliza-
tion of R&D did not recognize the changes in innovation environment in 
some of the developing countries (emerging economies). This study is an 
attempt to develop a conceptual framework in an integrated manner, for 
better understanding of the globalization processes relating to innovation.
Figure 3.1 shows the relationship between the actors involved in the phe-
nomenon of globalization of corporate R&D, i.e., MNCs, home countries 
and host countries. The quantity and quality of R&D performed abroad 
by an MNC, i.e., the degree of globalization, depend on the type and 
cost of knowledge available abroad that is complementary to the MNC’s 
operations, i.e., the degree of complementarity. The greater the degree 
of complementarity available abroad, the greater would be the degree of 
globalization. Similarly, the degree of integration of an MNC’s activities 
in a host country depends on the degree of complementarity provided by 
that country. The greater the degree of complementary knowledge or skills 
available in a host country that is specifi c to an MNC, the greater would be 
the degree of integration of that MNC’s operations in the host country. An 
MNC tends to locate R&D in countries that offer a knowledge base that 
is complementary to its home country’s knowledge base. This is mainly 
because home country still remains the main base for innovation activities, 
and an MNC by relocating its R&D either seeks to overcome shortages 
of specifi c inputs in the home country or expand its knowledge base into 
related activities. So the greater the degree of complementarity between the 
home and host countries, the greater would be the degree of globalization 
from home country and greater would be the degree of integration with the 
host country (Reddy 2000).
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Figure 3.1 Globalization of corporate R&D—actor network.
Source: P. Reddy (2000, p. 51).
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With the emergence of a new techno-economic paradigm discussed 
earlier, MNCs are fi nding that some countries outside the industrialized 
world are in a position to provide complementary knowledge at a competi-
tive cost. So such countries, which are called ‘emerging economies’ in this 
study, are now getting integrated into the global corporate R&D networks. 
It is refl ected in the technology fi elds in which MNCs are performing some 
of their strategic R&D in emerging economies, which are mainly in the 
technology areas belonging to the new techno-economic paradigm, i.e., 
microelectronics, biotechnology, software and so on.
Ronstadt (1977) classifi ed international corporate R&D activities into:
 1. Technology Transfer Units (TTUs)—to facilitate the transfer of par-
ent’s technology to subsidiary and to provide local technical services;
 2. Indigenous Technology Units (ITUs)—to develop new products for 
the local market, drawing on local technology;
 3. Global Technology Units (GTUs)—to develop new products and pro-
cesses for major world markets;
 4. Corporate Technology Units (CTUs)—to generate basic technology of 
a long-term or exploratory nature for use by the corporate parent.
According to Reddy and Sigurdson (1994), corporate R&D structure 
has also undertaken an additional function:
 5. Regional Technology Units (RTUs)—to developing products for the 
regional markets.
While markets worldwide are integrating in terms of standards and 
technologies, some regional clusters have also emerged. National markets 
in these regional clusters share some common features and needs for spe-
cialized products. Examples of this could be found in biotechnology—food 
processing (special types of food, taste and so on), pharmaceuticals (drugs 
for regional diseases) or agricultural pesticides—or in microelectronics—
(special software applications). To cater for such regional markets, MNCs 
have been establishing RTUs.
This study builds the analytical framework for globalization of R&D in 
terms of waves (phases). Such a framework helps in comprehensive under-
standing of globalization as a broader process, by analyzing the driving 
forces in each time period, the type of R&D located abroad and the potential 
impact on the host countries. Each wave represents a set of distinctive char-
acteristic features, yet reveals the continuation from one wave to the other 
(Reddy 2000).
The Beginnings of Internationalization of R&D—
First Wave Prior to the 1970s6
The number of fi rms performing R&D abroad in the 1960s and earlier was 
extremely small. Most of the R&D performed abroad prior to the 1970s 
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was that of TTUs. The driving force for internationalization of R&D dur-
ing this fi rst wave was to gain entry into a market abroad. This needed 
adaptation of the product and process technologies to local conditions and 
the need for continuous support of technical services. The establishment of 
TTUs was considered a more cost-effective way of dealing with technical 
problems than sending R&D missions from the headquarters. The catego-
ries of industries involved in this process were mostly mechanical, electrical 
and engineering, including automobile industries.
The Growth of International Corporate R&–D—
Second Wave in the 1970s
By the 1970s, fi rms had started performing R&D abroad in a signifi cant way. 
The main driving force was to increase the local market share abroad. This 
required increased sensitivity to local market differences to enhance competi-
tiveness and the fi rms’ general move toward world market orientation. This 
was refl ected in the fact that a large proportion of fi rms with R&D units 
abroad have gained them through acquisitions of companies abroad.7 More-
over, the host country governments started pressurizing the MNCs for more 
technology transfer by means of industrial policies defi ning the ‘local content 
requirements,’ ‘re-export commitments,’ ‘plant location requirements’ and so 
on. These driving forces triggered what can be considered the second wave of 
internationalization of R&D, with a characteristic difference from the earlier 
wave. ITU types of laboratories were set up to develop new and improved prod-
ucts for the local markets. This type of activity was predominant in branded 
packaged consumer goods, chemicals and allied products and so on.
From Internationalization to Globalization 
of R&D—Third Wave in the 1980s
A number of major changes have been taking place since the 1980s in the 
nature and scope of R&D undertaken abroad by MNCs. Increasingly higher-
order R&D, such as RTU, GTU and CTU types, had been located abroad 
in what can be regarded as the third wave of globalization of R&D. Such 
R&D abroad is carried out as a part of long-term corporate strategy and 
is often carried out through interorganizational collaboration. Hence, the 
change in the term from internationalization to globalization, refl ecting the 
characteristic differences from the earlier waves. The main driving forces for 
this phenomenon had been: fi rst, the increasingly globalized basis of competi-
tion, aided by the convergence of consumer preferences worldwide, creating 
a need for worldwide learning; second, the increasing science base of new 
technologies, necessitating multisourcing of technologies; third, the rational-
ization of MNCs’ operations, which assigned specifi c global roles to their 
subsidiaries abroad. These trends are visible mainly in the industries relating 
to microelectronics, pharmaceuticals, biotechnology and new materials. The 
improvement of ICT and the fl exibility of new science-based technologies, 
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which allow de-linking of R&D and manufacturing activities, vastly facili-
tated this globalization process.
The New Patterns of Globalization of 
R&D—Fourth Wave in the 1990s
The key driving forces for globalization of R&D in the 1990s have been the 
increasing demand for skilled scientists and the rising R&D costs. These 
forces are triggering the fourth wave of globalization of R&D, encompass-
ing non-OECD countries (emerging economies) as well. The mismatch 
between the outputs of universities and the needs of the industry is giving 
rise to shortages of research personnel throughout the industrialized world, 
especially in engineering fi elds related to electronics, automation and CAD/
CAM,8 compelling companies to widen their research networks in order to 
tap more geographically dispersed scientifi c talent. MNCs are also sensi-
tive to variations in the cost of R&D inputs from country to country.9 This 
move by MNCs is facilitated by the availability of large pools of S&T man-
power in these countries at substantially lower wages vis-à-vis the industri-
alized countries. The categories of industries involved are microelectronics, 
biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, chemicals and software.
The Evolving Patterns in Globalization of 
R&D—Fifth Wave in the 2000s
Since the 2000s, emerging economies have been witnessing rapid economic 
growth rates, increasing the incomes of their populations. Consumers in 
these markets are demanding more sophisticated products as the consum-
ers in the industrialized world, i.e., qualitative products that contain all the 
functionalities. But these consumers are not willing to pay high prices like 
their counterparts in the industrialized world. To meet this demand and 
derive economies of scale, MNCs need to substantially change their busi-
ness models, designing and developing products that are cost-effective, but 
contain all the functionalities (e.g., the new generation of low-cost mobile 
telephones). Such products are labeled by the industry as ‘Emerging Prod-
ucts for Emerging Markets.’ MNCs fi nd it necessary to locate R&D for 
such product development in the emerging economies themselves. These 
products are not meant just for local markets, but global markets, where 
such market segments exist. The category of industries involved includes 
both conventional and new technologies ranging from automobiles through 
ICT to biopharmaceuticals.
Figure 3.2 conceptualizes the evolutionary process of the globalization of 
corporate R&D. In each of the phases the driving forces acting on are catego-
rized as supply-side and demand-side forces. As a response to these driving 
forces, the type of R&D performed abroad by MNCs and corollary implica-
tions for the host country are indicated. In the 1960s, corporate R&D was 
mainly concentrated in the home countries. This was mainly because of the 
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‘stickiness’ of the R&D activities, such as the need for co-ordination of dif-
ferent functions and scale economies. These factors are categorized as the 
demand-side forces in the fi gure. These forces coupled with the supply-side 
forces such as technologically advanced and sophisticated home markets 
ensured that R&D activities remained in the home countries.
By the late 1960s, the situation changed, as can be noticed from the new 
demand- and supply-side forces. MNCs responded by locating the TTU type 
of R&D abroad. By the early 1970s, MNCs felt the need for expansion of their 
Demand-side forces : 
- need for coordination between 
manufacturing, R&D, finance &
marketing.
- R&D scale economies
Supply-side forces : 
- sophisticated & advanced home 
markets
- technologically advanced home 
economies
Corporate R&D in 
Home Countries
Demand-side forces : 
- need for tapping markets abroad 
- technology transfer abroad for 
cost-effective production
Supply-side forces : 
- large local markets 
- proximity to production facilities
Internationalization of 
production & R&D to adapt 
products and processes to
local conditions (TTU)
Internationalization of 
R&D to develop products 
exclusively for the local 
market abroad (ITU)
Host country effects : 
- products better suited to local 
needs and tastes 
- better use of local materials 
- potential linkages to local S&T 
system
Corporate R&D
Supply-side forces : 
- large and protected markets with 
unique characteristics 
- proximity to market & production
Demand-side forces : 
- to enhance market share in 
local market abroad 
- host government's policies
Host country effects : 
- products & processes better 
suited to local conditions 
- technical training of local staff
Internationalization of corporate R&D in the 1970s
Figure 3.2 Internationalization of corporate R&D in the 1960s and the 1970s.
Source: P. Reddy (2000, p. 54).
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overseas markets, and added to it the host country’s policies infl uenced MNCs 
to locate the ITU type of R&D abroad. As could be seen from the fi gure, the 
host country benefi ts are greater in ITU type of R&D than the TTU type.
Figure 3.3 suggests that by the time the 1980s arrived, the phenomenon 
was transformed from internationalization to globalization of corporate 
R&D. This is also the period when the pervasive effects of new technologies 
Internal forces : 
- rationalization of TNCs' operations 
leading to specialization of affiliates 
Globalization of R&D into industrialized 
countries to develop products for the 
regional/global markets and to carry out 
research in generic technologies 
(RTU/GTU and CTU)
Host country effects : 
- strong linkages with the local S&T 
system widening its capabilities 
- international specialization of S&T 
capabilities
Demand-side forces : 
- shortage of R&D personnel in 
industrialized countries 
- increasing demand for R&D 
personnel
- increasing R&D costs 
Supply-side forces : 
- availability of R&D personnel in 
some developing countries 
- low-level of wages of personnel 
- divisibility of R&D into core & non- 
core activities 
- changes in policy regimes, including 
IPR, in host countries
Globalization of some of 
the RTU/GTU and CTU types 
of R&D into some developing 
countries
Host country effects : 
- diffusion of knowledge into local 
S&T system through strong linkages 
with TNCs' global R&D network 
- inculcation of commercial culture 
among the scientific community 
- technology transfer and emergence 
of spin-off firms
External forces in business environment : 
- liberalization of economies worldwide 
- homogenization of consumer preferences 
worldwide
- emergence of regional markets 
- increasing global competition 
- science-base of new technologies
Supply-side forces : 
- improved information and communication 
technologies
- flexibility of new technologies that 
allows delinking of manufacturing and R&D 
- comparative advantages of host 
countries
Demand-side forces : 
- need for monitoring & learning the 
new trends worldwide 
- need for multi-sourcing of technology 
inputs
Figure 3.3 Globalization of corporate R&D in the 1980s and the 1990s.
Globalization of Innovation 65
(i.e., ICT, microelectronics, biotechnology and so on) began to be felt. So a 
new set of supply-side and demand-side forces started infl uencing MNCs’ 
operations. In addition, the changes in the general business environment 
started exerting external pressures, which necessitated rationalization of 
MNCs internal operations. In combination all these driving forces infl u-
enced globalization of corporate R&D. MNCs started performing their 
strategic R&D outside their home countries, but mainly within the indus-
trialized world.
By the mid-1980s, MNCs started feeling the need for expanding their 
R&D-intensive activities and thereby the need for tapping into larger pools 
of research personnel. Simultaneously the R&D costs started increasing sig-
nifi cantly. These forces made MNCs look for suitable R&D locations out-
side the industrialized world. Such a move was facilitated by the supply-side 
forces emanating from some developing countries (emerging economies).
4 Innovation Environment in 
Emerging Economies
This chapter provides an overview of the innovation environment in emerg-
ing economies. The discussion here does not focus on the structure of the 
innovation system as such, but on its dynamic aspects such as characteristic 
features, linkages, strengths, weaknesses and ongoing changes that pro-
vide a conducive environment for innovation. This chapter focuses only on 
developing countries that are emerging as locations for global innovation, 
particularly the countries chosen for this study.
Many emerging economies have an innovation environment character-
ized by dualism. In these countries, the industrial and education policies 
of the 1960s and 1970s have led to the emergence of an advanced segment 
that is small, but in terms of features and quality is comparable to the inno-
vation systems of some of the industrialized countries. The larger part of 
the S&T environment in these countries, however, remains highly underde-
veloped in comparison to the industrialized world. MNCs as well as some 
local companies are attempting to utilize this advanced segment for their 
innovation activities.
Goldman Sachs, the global investment fi rm, coined the term ‘BRIC 
countries’ in 2003 (Wilson and Purushothaman 2003), while analyzing the 
future potential of Brazil, Russia, India and China in the global economy. 
Since then these countries have attracted the attention of policymakers and 
investors worldwide. According to Goldman Sachs’s report, assuming that 
everything stays on course, in less than 40 years, the combined GDP of 
BRICs economies in US dollars terms could be larger than the combined 
GDP of G6 countries (US, Japan, UK, Germany, France and Italy—devel-
oped economies with GDP over US$1 trillion). The value of combined GDP 
of BRICs in 2003 was only about 15 percent of that of G6, but by 2025 it 
would be over half the size of the G6. The growth of BRICs is likely to slow 
signifi cantly toward the end of the period, with only India attaining growth 
rates signifi cantly above three percent by 2050. However, individuals in the 
BRICs would still be poorer on average than individuals in the G6 econo-
mies, with the exception of Russia and China, whose per capita incomes 
could be within the range of what the industrialized economies have now 
(about US$30,000 per capita).
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As early as 2009, the annual increase in spending by the BRICs econo-
mies in US dollars would be greater than that by the G6 economies and 
more than twice as much in US dollars terms as it is now. By 2025 the 
annual increase in US dollar spending by the BRICs would be two times 
that of G6, and by 2050 four times higher. Consequently, the relative 
importance of the BRICs economies as engines of new demand growth 
may increase dramatically. Higher growth may lead to higher returns and 
increased demand for capital in these economies, increasing the weight of 
the BRICs in investment portfolios sharply. Rising incomes in these econo-
mies is expected to increase the demand for different kinds of products 
because of changes in local spending patterns. Thus, this could become 
an important determinant of demand and pricing patterns for a range of 
commodities (as is being evidenced in the rising prices of oil, mineral and 
metals since 2007). For MNCs, in order to offset the slower growth in 
industrialized countries, investing and accessing the markets in emerging 
economies may become a critical strategy (Wilson and Purushothaman 
2003). The follow-up studies by Goldman Sachs (2007) indicate that the 
BRICs countries are on the predicted path of development.
4.1 INNOVATION POTENTIAL IN EMERGING 
ECONOMIES—AN OVERVIEW
During the course of their developmental efforts, many developing coun-
tries have considered S&T education as a priority area and built up large 
pools of such personnel. Among them some, including the large countries 
like Brazil. China and India, took to building up capabilities in basic sci-
ence as the starting point (mainly for defense-related reasons), from which 
they expected downstream activities of applied research, product design 
and development and manufacturing to fl ow smoothly. To their dismay, 
they have come to realize that the path from basic research to downstream 
activities is not an easy one and have failed to establish proper linkages 
between different stages of the S&T system. As a result, these countries 
now have large pools of highly qualifi ed scientists and engineers in theoreti-
cal sciences, whose knowledge and skills have not been fully exploited for 
economic growth. These scientifi c personnel are available for R&D work 
at substantially lower wages.
On the other hand, a few other developing countries such as Singa-
pore, South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong, which have been named 
the newly industrializing economies (NIEs), attempted to build up S&T 
capabilities by concentrating on downstream activities fi rst. As a result 
they have built up strong competencies in product design and manufac-
turing and have now started moving toward upstream activities of basic 
and applied research. To enable them to do so, these countries took up 
S&T education as a priority.
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However, globally R&D performance is still concentrated in a few 
industrialized countries. In 2002, global R&D expenditures totaled 
about US$813 billion. About one-third of this world total was incurred 
by the US, the largest country in terms of domestic R&D expenditures, 
and 45 percent of global total was accounted for by the two largest per-
formers of R&D, the US and Japan. Industrialized countries, generally 
represented by OECD Member countries, perform most of the world’s 
R&D, but in recent years, R&D expenditures have grown rapidly in sev-
eral developing countries. In 2004, Brazil spent an estimated US$14 bil-
lion on R&D. In 2000, India spent an estimated US$21 billion, making it 
the seventh-largest country in terms of R&D in that year, ahead of South 
Korea (UNESCO 2007). In 2000, China had the fourth-largest expen-
ditures on R&D (US$45 billion), following Germany’s US$52 billion. In 
2005, it is estimated that US$115 billion was spent on R&D by China, 
making it the third largest investor in R&D (NSB 2008, pp. 4–35).
Among the developing countries that have been pursuing conscious pol-
icies to build up S&T capabilities, countries in the Asian region have been 
at the forefront. According to the data compiled by the US National Sci-
ence Foundation (NSF 2007, p. 15), between 1991 and 1995, R&D in Asia 
(limited to Japan, China, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan) grew at an 
annual rate (7.9 percent), much faster than in the EU (3.4 percent) and in 
the US (3.3 percent). The quantum of R&D activity in Asia had surpassed 
that of the EU in 2002 and by 2003 was nearly 10 percent higher than the 
EU level. In 2003, the Asian R&D level was about 79 percent that of the 
US. China’s annual growth rate of R&D from 1995 to 2003 (20 percent) 
exceeded that of all these other R&D performers, followed by Singapore 
at 15 percent. R&D growth rate in Taiwan averaged 10 percent and in 
South Korea seven percent. The ratio of R&D to GDP in Asia has recently 
reached 1.92 in 2003, whereas the EU ratio was 1.81 and 2.68 in the US. 
Although China’s R&D to GDP ratio was the lowest among the fi ve Asian 
economies in 2003 (1.13), it has increased dramatically since 1995 and 
showed further growth in 2004 to 1.23 (NSF 2007, p. 19).
The growth in the Asian region’s S&T systems is being fueled by the 
huge investments in education, research institutions and infrastructure, 
which is refl ected in the creation of new sources of national competi-
tive advantage. The number of Asian-authored science and engineering 
(S&E) articles, including those from Japan, grew from 51,000 in 1988 
to 130,000 in 2003, approaching the EU’s 1988 output level of 135,000. 
Japan, with 25,600, and China, with 24,600, accounted for roughly 
equal shares of the rise in Asia’s article output from 1988 to 2003, South 
Korea and Taiwan together accounting for another 20,100 articles. The 
number of articles from India grew much less, from 8,900 to 12,800 
(NSF 2007, p. 21).
The S&E articles of Asia are more concentrated in the physical sci-
ences and engineering/technology than those of the EU and the US. In 
Innovation Environment in Emerging Economies 69
2003, 60 percent of the Asian-authored articles were in these fi elds, com-
pared with 40 percent of EU articles and 30 percent of US articles. The 
EU and the US have greater focus on life sciences. “Within Asia, the S&E 
portfolio is marked by several distinct patterns: relative stability in India, 
Japan, and Taiwan; sharply declining life sciences proportions in China 
and Singapore because of growth in the physical sciences and engineer-
ing; and expanding life sciences in South Korea” (NSF 2007, p. 23).
A study by Sir David King, the UK’s chief scientifi c adviser, published 
in Nature in July 2004, assessed national research performance of sev-
eral countries based on a range of criteria, including the share of the top 
one percent of highly cited publications. India was ranked 22nd, with a 
total of 77,201 publications between 1997 and 2001, of which only 205 
were in the top one percent of highly cited publications. In comparison, 
these fi gures for China and the UK were 375 and 4,381, respectively, in 
the top one percent. India was ranked at the very bottom of the study’s 
sample when citation achievements were analyzed in the context of 
national wealth measured by GDP (King 2004). Mashelkar (2006), using 
the same data, turned King’s paper around by analyzing the relationship 
between citations and GDP per capita, by which reckoning India came at 
the very top of the rankings (see Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3). King’s analysis 
showed India as a country performing well below its potential, whereas 
Mashelkar showed that India’s science is hugely successful for a country 
where most people are poor (Leadbeater and Wilsdon 2007, p. 14).











India 77,201 487 32
China 115,339 989 23
USA 1,265,808 36,006 7
Germany 318,286 24,051 3
UK 342,535 26,445 3
Japan 336,858 31,407 2
Canada 166,216 22,777 1
Italy 147,023 20,528 1
S. Korea 55,739 10,006 1
France 232,058 24,061 2
Source: Mashelkar (2006) based on data presented in King (2004).
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The Asian region’s innovation systems are deriving benefi ts also from the 
large infl ows of FDI, both in manufacturing and R&D. MNCs activities in 
the region, while utilizing the local S&T resources, are in turn generating 
benefi cial externalities. Between 1998 and 2002, foreign subsidiaries of 
US-based MNCs increased their R&D expenditures in Asia at an average 
annual rate of 28.6 percent, compared with 9.6 percent overall and 4.8 
percent in the EU. Japan’s share of US-based MNCs’ R&D expenditures in 











India 188,481 487 77
China 341,519 989 69
USA 10,850,549 36,006 60
UK 2,500,035 24,051 19
Germany 2,199,617 26,445 18
Japan 1,852,271 31,407 12
Canada 1,164,450 22,777 10
Italy 964,164 20,528 10
S. Korea 192,346 10,006 4
France 1,513,090 24,061 1
Source: Mashelkar (2006) based on data presented in King (2004)








1. USA 50,000 (est.) 36,006 1.389
2. Japan 36,889 31,407 1.175
3. India 444 487 0.913
4. China 724 989 0.732
5. Germany 12,960 24,051 0.539
6. S. Korea 4,246 10,006 0.424
7. France 4,906 24,061 0.204
8. Canada 4,368 22,777 0.192
Source: Mashelkar (2006) based on data presented in King (2004).
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Asia dropped from 74 percent in 1998 to 40 percent in 2002. R&D expen-
ditures of US-based MNCs in China witnessed a phenomenal growth, ris-
ing from US$7 million in 1994 to US$52 million in 1998 and US$646 
million in 2002. In comparison, their R&D-related FDI in India was more 
modest, rising from US$5 million in 1994 to US$80 million in 2002 (NSF 
2007, pp. 19–20).
In the Asia-Pacifi c region (which also includes Australia and New 
Zealand), the share for Japan in R&D expenditures of US-based MNCs 
decreased further to 35 percent in 2004, even though Japan remains the 
largest host of US-owned R&D in the region. In contrast, the shares of 
China and Singapore increased from 0.4 percent and 0.9 percent, respec-
tively, in 1994 to 12.6 percent and 14.4 percent, respectively, in 2004. Other 
countries with sizable shares within this region in 2004 include Australia 
(9.5 percent), Taiwan (7.4 percent), Malaysia (6.1 percent), and South Korea 
(5 percent). The subsidiaries located in India doubled their R&D expendi-
tures from US$81 million in 2003 to US$163 million in 2004, increasing 
India’s share within this region to 3.3 percent. “Brazil and Mexico have 
represented around 80% or more of R&D expenditures by US MNCs in 
Latin America since 1994. Finally, Israel and South Africa represent virtu-
ally all of the R&D expenditures by MNCs in their respective regions, over 
the same period” (NSB 2008, pp. 4–54).
In the 1990s, the number of S&E bachelor’s degrees rose signifi cantly in 
Asia, with China doubling the number of graduates from 1990 to 2002 and 
increases in other countries ranged from 40 percent to over 200 percent. At 
the level of doctoral degrees, which signify achievement at a high level of 
training and indicate the availability of human resources with the capac-
ity to generate innovations through advanced research, Asia conferred as 
many doctorates in S&E in 2001 (24,900) as the US during 2001–2003 
(26,000–27,000), with the EU (40,000–42,000 annually for 2001 to 2003) 
in the lead (NSF 2007, pp. 3–4).
In 1998, China produced only about 1,000 doctoral candidates in S&E, 
but by 2001, it conferred more than 8,000 S&E doctoral degrees, com-
pared with 7,400 in Japan and an estimated 5,400 in India. In 2003, China 
conferred 12,200 new S&E doctoral degrees. In the Asian region, among 
S&E doctoral degree recipients in 2001, the proportion of engineering doc-
torates was about 45 percent of the total, compared with 26 percent for the 
EU and 20 percent for the US (NSF 2007, p. 4). The only exception to this 
in Asia has been India, which consistently produced more doctoral degrees 
in sciences than in engineering fi elds. For instance, in 1989, out of all the 
S&E doctoral degrees (4,209), the engineering doctoral degrees were only 
586 (about 12 percent of total S&E doctoral degrees). Similarly, in 2003 
the total number of new S&E doctoral degrees awarded by India was 6,318 
of which 779 were awarded in engineering fi elds (about 12 percent). On 
the other hand, China awarded 12,238 doctoral degrees in S&E in 2003 
of which 6,573 (more than 50 percent) were awarded in engineering fi elds. 
72 Global Innovation in Emerging Economies
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan show a pattern similar to China (author, 
based on NSF 2007, p. 5).
Asian students also form the largest group among those pursuing studies 
abroad, particularly in the US. Between 1989 and 2003, foreign students 
were conferred nearly 40 percent of US S&E doctoral degrees, with Asians 
accounting for about 55 percent of this group. Among the Asian students, 
those from China constituted the largest number, with about 34,000 S&E 
doctorates from 1989 to 2003, followed by Taiwan with 14,800 and South 
Korea and India with about 14,500 each. These four economies accounted 
for nearly 90 percent of all Asian recipients of S&E doctorates in US (NSF 
2007, p. 6).
Asians also constitute a major proportion of the S&T workforce in the 
US, gaining valuable experience and many of them becoming conduits for 
technology transfer to their countries of origin. In 2000, 23 percent of S&E 
employees in the US were foreign born, and half of those employees came 
from Asia. The most prominent countries of origin for such workers in US 
S&E occupations in 2000 were India (4.9 percent) and China (3.1 percent). 
Doctoral degree holders from the two largest Asian countries (China and 
India) accounted for almost 14 percent of all employees with a doctoral 
degree in US S&E occupations in 2000, with China accounting for nearly 
nine percent of all US S&E doctorate holders and India fi ve percent. But, 
as of 2000, India remained the single largest source country for all degree 
levels combined (NSF 2007, pp. 10–12).
In terms of S&T capabilities in emerging economies, the building up 
of Brazilian and Indian national systems of innovation (NSI) occurred 
through the import substitution (IS) regime for industrialization. At least 
until the end of the 1980s, both were built within a relatively closed eco-
nomic environment, both at micro and macro levels. Although, they have 
many common characteristics in their industrial and trade policies and 
their NSI, Brazil and India also show some markedly different approaches. 
For instance, Brazil has always had relatively more liberal policies regard-
ing FDI and has been more open to MNCs than India. However, Brazil, 
instead of seeking transfer of technology or technological spillovers to 
local fi rms through FDI, was mainly driven by the objective of reduc-
ing import dependence (balance of payments issues). As a result, Brazil 
did not attract the best techniques available in the relevant industries of 
high and/or medium technologies. Until the early 1980s, the Brazilian 
and Indian governments targeted specifi c industries for promotion, by 
prioritizing basic and heavy industries, such as capital goods, chemicals 
and basic infrastructure, with state-owned sector playing a key role. Until 
the beginning of the 1990s, enterprises in India operated in a much more 
protected and restrictive environment than those in Brazil (Nassif 2007). 
For example, before 1990, the Indian import tariffs were 106 percent on 
agricultural products, 128 percent on manufacturing products and 128 
percent on the whole economy (Srinivasan 2001, p. 46). Correspondingly, 
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Brazil’s import tariffs were 17.0 percent, 69.7 percent and 39.6 percent, 
respectively (Nassif 2007, p. 5).
Table 4.4 provides data on the Brazilian and Indian exports of goods 
according to technological-intensity. An analysis by Nassif (2007, p. 24) 
indicates that Brazil has not taken the full advantage of technological 
changes and innovation opportunities since the late 1980s. Compared to 
the East Asian export performance, during 1989–2004, there has been a 
signifi cant reduction in the Brazilian labor-intensive manufacturing exports 
in the total exports. At the same time, this was not accompanied by any sig-
nifi cant increases in the manufacturing exports of medium and high tech-
nologies in the same period. However, Brazil’s export of primary products 
and manufacturing based on natural resources has been on the rise.
The data in the table also suggest that India’s export performance was not 
better than Brazil’s in the same period. The data show that India’s export 
of manufactured goods of high technology was less than that of Brazil 
(in percentage points). India seems to be better at exporting manufactured 
products of medium technology, which grew from 11.7 percent in 1989 to 
18.6 percent in 2004. A much better performance, however, has been the 
growth of Indian exports of commercial services, especially software. As 
per the Reserve Bank of India’s data, during the period 1990–2005, India’s 
exports of goods registered annual average growth rates of 10.76 percent 
in real terms. During this period, the Indian exports have increased from 
US$16,612 million to US$163,335 million, and exports of commercial 
services reached US$60,610 million in 2005, of which US$23,600 million 
(38.9 percent) were related to software services. The IT and software ser-
vices are usually classifi ed as being of either medium- or high-technology 
intensity, so one can conclude that the technological sophistication of the 
Table 4.4 Technological Intensity of Brazilian and Indian Exports (%) (1989–2004)
Product
Brazil India
1989 1994 1999 2004 1989 1994 1999 2004
Primary Products 11.16 10.78 11.07 13.77 6.72 5.20 5.05 4.43
Manufactured 97.89 88.08 88.73 85.31 93.14 94.66 94.78 95.37
- resource-based 32.78 34.61 36.05 34.65 19.54 17.82 13.93 21.72
- low-technology 28.05 25.22 20.84 19.29 57.41 59.33 61.77 49.71
- medium-technology 21.61 23.72 22.81 24.07 11.68 13.83 14.24 18.61
- high-technology 5.45 4.53 9.03 7.30 4.51 3.68 4.84 5.33
Other Transactions 0.95 1.14 0.20 0.92 0.14 0.14 0.17 0.20
Total Exports 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Comtrade, UNCTAD as Calculated by Nassif (2007, p. 24). Classifi cation is based on 
Lall (2000).
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Indian total export structure is much greater than what the data in Table 
4.4 suggest (Nassif 2007, p. 26).
4.1.1 Research Personnel in Emerging Economies
There are several reasons why MNCs locate R&D in emerging economies. 
The main reasons among them are: to gain access to scientifi c and technical 
personnel and to expand their market share in growing markets. The location 
of strategic R&D outside the industrialized world is mainly driven by the twin 
factors of the availability of research personnel and their costs (A. S. P. Reddy 
1993). For more than a couple of decades now, companies in industrialized 
countries have been fi nding it diffi cult to recruit qualifi ed personnel in critical 
numbers, at least in certain fi elds of science and engineering (e.g., molecu-
lar biology) for their R&D activities. Such shortages have become common 
across most countries in the industrialized world. This also pushes up the cost 
of recruiting the few available people in the home countries. For example, it 
has been estimated that the European Union will have a shortage of 700,000 
scientists and engineers to meet its target of spending three percent of GDP on 
R&D (the Lisbon Agenda) (Financial Times 2005).
Frost and Sullivan’s (2004) study of R&D in Asia, citing a response, 
says “one main reason for offshore outsourcing is that very often there 
isn’t enough talent in the company’s own home country . . . the personnel 
available for specifi c tasks does not have the suffi cient qualifi cations, where 
programmers and scientists from countries such as India do have the right 
qualifi cations and skills to match the outsourcers’ needs” (p. 8).
The location of global R&D in emerging economies is mainly because 
of the large countries (e.g., BRICs) that have large pools of qualifi ed man-
power. However, not all tertiary students in S&T in these countries may 
be suitable for global R&D activities. A McKinsey Global Institute’s 
(2005) analysis of the supply of skilled people in various emerging econo-
mies (including the new EU members) found that only a small propor-
tion of potential job candidates in ‘degree specifi c’ occupations (includes 
engineers, fi nance and accounting specialists, generalist professionals, life 
science researchers and quantitative analysts) were suitable for work in 
MNCs. The study, which was based on interviews with human resources 
managers in 83 MNCs, found large differences among the countries inves-
tigated. For example, while 50 percent of engineers in Poland and Hungary 
were suitable to be employed in MNCs, the corresponding fi gure for India 
was about 25 percent and for China and Russia only 10 percent. However, 
the report also reveals that the present supply of suitable engineers in low-
wage countries is equal to as much as three-quarters of the suitable engi-
neering talent pool in industrialized countries. This ratio is signifi cantly 
higher than the 44 percent share of low-wage countries in the total supply 
of suitable young professionals in industrialized countries. Furthermore, 
McKinsey predicts that by 2008 low-wage countries would have the same 
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number of suitable engineers as in industrialized countries (Farrell et al. 
2005). In addition, particularly from the R&D perspective, there are also 
a number of people returning to emerging economies, such as China, India 
and Russia, after studying and working for a few years in the West and 
other industrialized countries.
In the analysis of innovation environments of different countries, it is 
also important to consider the cost of accessing the S&T resources, partic-
ularly relevant when accessing resources for corporate R&D, which in turn 
depends on demand for and supply of qualifi ed people. Table 4.5 gives the 
annual cost of employing a semiconductor chip design engineer for selected 
countries. The data clearly show that the cost of these personnel is several 
times lower in developing countries. It is this cost differential that MNCs 
are attempting to exploit by performing R&D activities in emerging econo-
mies that have the required innovation environment.
4.1.2 Emerging Economies in High-tech Sectors
Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC) as a group are also making their 
presence felt even in the most science-intensive sectors such as the pharma-
ceutical and biotechnology industries. Their impact on the broadly defi ned 
biopharma sector has become one of the industry’s much discussed issues 
over the past few years. In the case of India and China, some analysts 
predict a shift toward offshoring of clinical and chemical development as 
well as production, whether it is drug substance or drug product, to these 
countries. In China, the policies have traditionally focused on basic build-
ing blocks and commodity types of active ingredients, which are manufac-
tured by a large number of state-owned plants for the domestic market, 
but the excess output is often sold through traders on the export markets 
Table 4.5 Annual Cost of Employing a Chip Design Engineer* (US$), 2002
Location Annual Cost






China (average across cities) 26,000
*Including salary, benefi ts, equipment, offi ce space and other infrastructure.
Source: Adapted from Ernst (2005b), whose data are based on PMC-Sierra, Inc. Burnaby, Canada 
(for Silicon Valley, Canada, Ireland, India) plus interviews (Taiwan, South Korea, China).
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at very low prices. Now the Chinese pharmaceutical fi ne chemicals (PFC) 
industry is increasingly moving toward more sophisticated segments such 
as ‘early-phase’ development services and ‘custom synthesis.’ China has 
already achieved a global leadership position in product groups such as 
beta-lactam antibiotics. Similarly, in India the original focus was on off-
patent active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) for the domestic market. 
Given the peculiarities of the Indian economic system, a myriad of small- 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) emerged, and several of them also 
produce the dosage-form pharmaceuticals. Gradually, the supply structure 
consolidated as some companies have been forced out because of intensive 
competition (the same API can be offered by 50—if not more—suppliers). 
Over the years, the Indian industry has responded to mounting competition 
from China by reducing emphasis on the basic building blocks and shifting 
instead to ‘custom synthesis’ and ‘early-phase’ development services (Polas-
tro and Tulcinsky 2004, p. 39).
Because of the capabilities of China and India there is growing inter-
est among Western customers and fi ne chemical producers. A survey by 
the consultancy fi rm Arthur D Little indicated that most pharma MNCs 
are planning to increase their share of outsourcing of fi ne chemicals from 
China and India to 20 to 30 percent by 2006–2007, compared to the fi gure 
of 5 to 10 percent in the early 2000s. Pharma MNCs are looking to source 
not just basic building blocks or generic APIs, but also ‘early phase’ devel-
opment services as well as more ‘advanced intermediates.’ For instance, 
companies such as Eli Lilly and Merck are offshoring part of their medici-
nal chemistry activities to India and China and entering into long-term 
contracts with local service providers. The general opinion has been that 
China and India are far more cost competitive than industrialized countries 
for fi ne chemicals. For instance, the full-time equivalents (FTEs), the rate 
at which early-phase development work is priced, are 30 to 40 percent of 
those prevailing in the West (Polastro and Tulcinsky 2004, pp. 39–40).
4.2 INDIA—INNOVATION ENVIRONMENT
India, like Brazil, has been one of the few developing countries that adopted 
a scientifi c policy as early as 1958. Since independence in 1947, through its 
fi ve-year development plans and import-substitution (IS) strategy, India has 
built up capabilities in a range of S&T fi elds. But IS strategy also implies 
no focused efforts on building up international competitiveness through 
leading-edge technologies in any specifi c fi eld. China also suffers from a 
similar paradox. In recent years, the policy focus has been on health-related 
technologies, biotechnology, electronics, computers, education, oceanogra-
phy and environment.
India’s NSI, like in most countries, consists of (a) universities and ‘insti-
tutes deemed to be universities’; (b) research institutes and laboratories 
Innovation Environment in Emerging Economies 77
managed by the central and state governments; (c) the industrial sector, 
both public and private enterprises. Each of the components has achieved 
building up signifi cant capabilities and successes; however, until the recent 
decade, the scientifi c potential has remained confi ned within the individual 
components, without linkages and knowledge fl ows among them. The uni-
versity system has been assigned the primary task of supplying theoretically 
trained manpower, whereas most of the research efforts have been con-
centrated in the national research institutes, without linkages to industry 
and economy. Industry, on the other hand, had been mostly dependent on 
imported technologies, with little inclination for development of propri-
etary technologies. The government had been more focused on regulat-
ing the economy rather then developing it. As a result, all the components 
of NSI, though performing their spheres of functions creditably, failed to 
appreciate their interdependence. The functioning and structure had been 
somewhat similar to that of the NSI in the former Soviet Union.
As Krishna (2001) pointed out, academic science enjoyed a position of 
higher esteem and commitment to the advancement of knowledge in the 
pre-independence period. But, the later periods lowered its position due to 
the low level of funding, infrastructure, status and support compared to 
the governmental agencies (i.e., national research institutes) that carried 
out the mission-oriented science. In the 1940s about 90 percent of scientifi c 
research related to advancement of knowledge and higher training at Ph.D. 
level was carried out in the universities. The rise of ‘governmental science’ 
and the decline of academic science after the independence in 1947 raised 
the question of how to organize the scientifi c research. The National Insti-
tute of Sciences (NIS) organized a symposium on this question in 1943. But 
in 1944 the A.V. Hill Report on ‘Scientifi c Research in India’ was submit-
ted to the colonial government. As it happened, the NIS symposium and 
the Hill Report presented two different ‘models’ of organizing science. The 
NIS preferred constituting a National Research Council (NRC) outside 
the direct control of government, and the Hill Report advocated different 
boards of scientifi c research directly under the control of the government. 
After independence, Nehru, the then prime minister of India, preferred 
Hill’s model.
The post-independence period began a phase of ‘policy for sciences.’ 
with the main emphasis on creating a basic infrastructure for S&T includ-
ing the expansion of the university system for the supply of required human 
resources. During this period the fi ve Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs) 
were planned, as centers-of-excellence. Major Mission Oriented Science 
Agencies (MOSA), such as the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and 
Council of Scientifi c and Industrial Research (CSIR), and Defense Research 
and Development Organization (DRDO), were either established or rap-
idly expanded during this period. “The locus of the scientifi c research base 
which was in the university and private academic settings shifted to these 
MOSA under the auspices of the government in the post-independence 
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period. Major scientifi c research institutions which were known for their 
contribution to academic excellence and in advancing scientifi c knowledge 
lost much of their eminence after 1947. Given the low-level budgetary 
support they could not sustain the earlier eminence” (Krishna 2001, pp. 
238–239).
4.2.1 University System
At the time of independence, India had only 20 universities, and by 1994 these 
had grown to 183 universities, with 7,513 colleges affi liated to these universi-
ties (DST 1994). In 2006, India had 229 universities, 96 deemed universities, 
13 institutions of national importance, 16,000 affi liated colleges, with a total 
of about 10 million enrolled students in them and teaching faculty strength 
of 457,000. Unlike in Europe, where even the undergraduate students go to 
the main university, in India affi liated colleges cater mainly to undergraduate 
students, under the supervision of the main university (e.g., common cur-
riculum setting and examinations/evaluation of the students). Except for a 
few national universities, the university system is under the jurisdiction of the 
state governments. Within the university system the notables are the Indian 
Institutes of Technology (IITs), with a curriculum focused on science and 
engineering. These institutes are funded by the central government, with suf-
fi ciently large budgets to buy modern equipment and recruit talented staff. As 
a result, they have attained high standards that are comparable to the techni-
cal universities in the industrialized countries. The nationwide stiff competi-
tion among students to enroll in the IITs enables the institutes to recruit the 
best talent. There were originally six IITs, located in Bombay, Delhi, Kanpur, 
Kharagpur, Chennai (Madras) and Guwahati. In 2006, two of the techni-
cal institutions, Banaras Hindu University (BHU) and Roorki Engineering 
College, have been converted into IITs. In 2008, eight more IITs have been 
established. Among the other important units within the university system 
for education and research, especially for S&T disciplines, are the IITs, the 
Indian Institute of Science (IISc), the regional engineering colleges (RECs), 
which are now renamed the National Institutes of Technology (NIT) and the 
central universities located in different regions of the country.
The IITs were established on the lines of the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT), US, and IIT graduates are trained to become engineer-
scientists, in contrast to the engineer-manger training style of other engi-
neering colleges. With the desire to be on a par with the best institutes 
in the West and to remain abreast of the latest in the fi eld of technology, 
the IITs devised their syllabi at a high level of sophistication. The faculty 
also comprised mostly people who were educated in the American univer-
sities, and this led to a situation of graduates getting acquainted with the 
kind of technology that was not well diffused in the country, since Indian 
industry had been operating in obsolete pre-Second World War technolo-
gies. However, IITs earned a good national and international reputation 
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for education. So when the IIT graduates applied for higher education, the 
universities abroad, especially in the US, offered them places, and after 
completion of their education they were offered jobs in universities and 
industry. Thus, most of them stayed on abroad. Those who returned found 
themselves unsuitable for Indian conditions, because they were trained to 
do advanced technological work, including designing, whereas the Indian 
industry required only maintenance personnel (Singh 1995).
However, with the changes in the Indian economy since 1990, Indian 
industry is realizing the importance developing modern technologies itself, 
and IIT graduates are fi nding better opportunities within the country. They 
are the most sought-after R&D personnel by the MNCs, who are setting up 
global R&D facilities in India. These new opportunities are to some extent 
arresting the brain drain from the IITs, and in a reversal of earlier brain drain, 
many IIT graduates who settled abroad for many years are also returning to 
India either as entrepreneurs or as representatives of the MNCs.
With respect to the larger part of the university system, however, the 
situation remains more or less the same as Long (1988) observed more than 
two decades ago:
The quality of India’s colleges and universities proper is exceedingly 
variable. The several major universities in large cities, most of which 
have a few nearby colleges directly associated with them, are of relatively 
high quality, and all are extensively involved in research and in graduate 
training of scientists and engineers. Their nearby associated colleges also 
tend to be of much above average quality. In stark contrast, the isolated 
colleges in small towns far from the urban areas can be virtually inca-
pable of giving adequate training in science or engineering. Often they 
have only the bare bones of laboratories and minimal scientifi c equip-
ment and library facilities. (Long 1988, p. 400).
In the evaluations of India’s R&D programs, the research activities of 
universities are generally not taken into account. This situation is similar 
to that of the US universities before the 1950s, i.e., before the government 
support for research in the universities became signifi cant. Even though the 
research activities of the US universities in science and engineering were 
substantial, they were not recognized explicitly in the budgetary provi-
sions. The university research was categorized under training of graduate 
students, and this has several disadvantages: fi rst, by not recognizing the 
research contributions that universities make, the university groups are less 
likely to be brought into collaboration with other research organizations; 
second, this makes it diffi cult to raise adequate funding for Indian universi-
ties, especially for library and research equipment; third, ‘it implicitly lends 
support to the feeling of many bright graduates of Indian colleges that they 
must go abroad to get a fi rst class training in science and engineering’ 
(Long 1988).
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According to Forbes (2003), the higher technical education (HTE) in 
India today faces at least three challenges: First, the last two decades have 
seen very rapid growth in private HTE institutions, with the number of 
engineering colleges and engineering enrollment growing at 20 percent a 
year. While they have contributed to India’s abundance of engineers in gen-
eral and software professionals in particular, there is a rising concern about 
the quality of their education; Second, select HTEs, such as the IITs, have 
provided a world-class technical education at the undergraduate level; how-
ever, as the Indian industry seeks to move up the value chain in technical 
competence, it increasingly needs graduate engineers with more advanced 
knowledge. This requires performance of research at HTEs, where they 
presently have a poor track record; Third, India was an early investor in sci-
entifi c research; most of its research is carried out in autonomous national 
research institutes. This is often justifi ed on the grounds of potential benefi ts 
to Indian industry, but in reality such research made very limited contribu-
tion to industrial development and competitiveness. The fact is that within 
Indian fi rms, the role of R&D covers a range of activities from indigenizing 
imported components to catching up with more advanced forms to improv-
ing existing products to providing low cost R&D contract research. The 
role of research itself has been very limited in industry in most countries, 
especially in an emerging economy like India. India’s real need for scientifi c 
research lies in using it as a means of producing better qualifi ed technical 
graduates. This requires combining public research with teaching in univer-
sities and not confi ning research to national research institutes.
4.2.2 National Research Institutes
The central government supports the largest proportion of national R&D 
efforts through its scientifi c agencies. Each of these agencies supports a num-
ber of R&D units. Most of them are primarily focused on development, but 
several of them are mainly involved in mission-oriented basic research. The 
Council for Scientifi c and Industrial Research (CSIR) was established in 
1942 as an autonomous body with responsibility for scientifi c and industrial 
research and development in India. It maintains a network of 40 national 
laboratories, two co-operative industrial research associations, and 80 exten-
sion or fi eld centers, totally accounting for about 10 percent of the central 
government’s expenditure on R&D. To facilitate the transfer of R&D results 
from the national R&D laboratories to industry, the National Research and 
Development Corporation (NRDC) was established in 1953 as a public sec-
tor corporation. Although, NRDC was seen as a vital link in the innovation 
chain, its success has been somewhat limited. Its comparative lack of success 
can be partly explained by the attitudes of Indian industry toward indigenous 
technologies and their preference for imported technologies (P. Reddy 2000).
In recent years S&T institutions in India have been strongly criticized for 
pursuing research that is of little relevance to industries and the economy. 
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Consequently, the Indian government through various measures is now 
encouraging scientists to work closely with industry. These measures 
include incentives such as bonuses and a share of royalties from products 
created through their research. While offering such incentives, the govern-
ment is also reducing its budgetary support to the research programs, com-
pelling institutions to fi nd alternative sources of funding. The government 
directive now compels CSIR laboratories to earn at least 33 percent of their 
budget from external sources (Reddy 2000).
By the mid-1990s, there have already been several cases of universities and 
research institutes having strong linkages with industry. For instance, the 
Department of Chemical Technology in Bombay University received about 
US$600,000 over fi ve years since 1990, mostly from domestic industry. Its 
faculty members have also been providing consultancy services to the industry. 
One-third of such consultancy earnings by its faculty go to the department. One 
of the faculty members of the department designed a novel gas-liquid reactor 
for catalytic hydrogenation, a process used to produce industrial chemicals. 
The demand for this reactor is surging because the savings from the catalyst it 
uses have covered the cost of the entire system in only three months. Similarly, 
the National Environmental Engineering Research Institute (NEERI), a part 
of the CSIR network, earned about 65 percent of its US$1.7 million annual 
budget by selling its products and services (Science 1995b).
To facilitate, promote and strengthen interaction between the research 
institutes under the CSIR and industry, in May 2006, the government of India 
announced several measures. These measures include permitting scientists of 
the research institutes under the CSIR to take up assignments in industrial 
units and a provision to permit the research institutes to form alliances with 
industry for knowledge generation in new areas of S&T. The scientists will 
now be given permission to take up assignments in companies without any 
break in their service at the research institute and to retain their seniority, 
position, housing quarters and other benefi ts provided by the CSIR.
As part of the new initiatives, CSIR will set up ‘technology incubation 
centers’ within the campuses of its research institutes. Innovators will be 
allowed to set up pilot plants for converting research fi ndings into useful 
commercial products. The fi rst of such technology incubation centers will 
be set up at the National Chemical Laboratory (NCL) and gradually within 
two years in at least 15 other research institutes. The entrepreneurs will be 
allowed to use the incubation centers for undertaking development work on 
research fi ndings from any organization and not just those emerging from 
the CSIR laboratories. The start-up companies can utilize the laboratory 
facilities and the help of the scientists at the research institutes. The aim of 
these new measures is to promote joint projects between the research insti-
tutes and the industry on topics at the cutting edge of technology.1
The CSIR also launched its New Millennium Indian Technology Leader-
ship Initiative Program to promote and strengthen collaboration between 
private companies, national research institutes and academia. At the end of 
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2006, the program had 37 ongoing projects covering a wide range of areas, 
with a total expenditure of INR 2,200 million (about US$50 million) over 
two to three years. The program involves 240 partners, with 175 in the 
public sector and 65 in the private sector (Frew et al. 2007).
During 1998–1999, the Indian Ministry of Science and Technology 
launched a novel program called ‘Technopreneur Promotion Program (TePP)’ 
to tap the innovative potential of Indian citizens. The program’s objective is 
to support individual innovators, particularly from informal knowledge sys-
tems, so as to enable them to become technology-based entrepreneurs (tech-
nopreneurs). The program provides fi nancial support to individual innovators 
and small ‘start-ups’ to convert an original idea or innovation into a working 
prototype or process. Since its inception, the TePP has supported more than 
115 projects, out of which about 50 projects have been completed and 25 
projects have been commercialized. The program has resulted in granting of 
Indian patents to more than 10 innovators and US patents to three innovators 
(Gupta and Dutta 2005, p. 2).
4.2.3 Industry Sector
It is generally considered that, until recently, Indian companies did not carry 
out much R&D. They mainly depended on transfer of technology from abroad 
and only where necessary carried out adaptation of imported technologies. 
However, the liberalization of the economy since the late 1980s increased the 
competition, compelling Indian companies to re-examine their R&D activi-
ties. Katrak (2002), however, had observed that even prior to the liberalization 
of the economy, a number of Indian companies had started to make and sell 
some products based on their own R&D efforts. These products have usually 
been additions to those in the company’s existing portfolio of products that 
were being made using standardized or imported know-how technologies. 
These companies have been multiproduct enterprises.
In a study, Kumar and Aggarwal (2005), using the database of the Center 
for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE), analyzed the determinants of R&D 
behavior of Indian companies during the 1990s in the light of the reforms of 
1991. Their analysis suggests that although the average level of investment on 
R&D has fallen, the increased competition spurred local fi rms to rational-
ize their R&D and make it more effective. R&D investments increased more 
than proportionally with the fi rm size after a certain threshold level. Local 
fi rms focused their R&D efforts mainly toward absorption of imported tech-
nology and toward aiding their outward expansion either by way of exports 
and/or FDI. MNC subsidiaries, on the other hand, concentrated on exploiting 
India’s strengths as an R&D location for their corporate use.
ICT Industry
Kumar and Joseph (2004) analyzed the factors that led to India building up 
signifi cant capabilities in the ICT industries. According to them the policies 
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initiated by the government have played a key role in facilitating India’s 
success in ICT. Among others, such initiatives included support for higher 
education in S&E disciplines, creation of an institutional infrastructure 
for S&T policy, establishment of centers-of-excellence and several other 
institutions for technology development, and setting up software technol-
ogy parks has been very helpful for ICT exports. A number of other stud-
ies (Arora et al. 2001; N. Singh 2003), however, argued that India’s ICT 
success has been a result of free market forces coinciding with a benign 
governmental neglect.
Kumar and Joseph (2004), however, also acknowledge the combination 
of governmental initiatives and private-sector entrepreneurialism for India’s 
success in ICT. For instance, from the governmental side, in terms of R&D 
capability building, the Department of Electronics (DoE) gave priority to 
the development of computer software by supporting research at different 
national research institutes and select universities since the early 1970s. 
These research programs have led to the building up of technological capa-
bilities and also provided experienced manpower for the rapid development 
of the industry. As an illustration, the Center for Development of Advanced 
Computing (C-DAC), set up by the government in the 1980s, has developed 
India’s fi rst supercomputer—‘Param’—and has also developed software for 
script for Indian languages. The government has also stimulated R&D by 
industry through tax and other incentives. At the same time, the industry 
associations, particularly the National Association of Software and Service 
Companies (NASSCOM), played an important role in projecting India’s 
image in the global ICT markets.
Biopharmaceutical Industry
Until the 1980s, the main demand for Indian companies in all categories 
came from the domestic market. The demand condition, particularly for 
the pharmaceutical industry, was to produce low-cost drugs within the 
quality standards set by the Indian drug control authorities. The Patent 
Act of 1972 that disallowed ‘product’ patents for drugs initiated a surge of 
innovation and entrepreneurship. Several private manufacturing companies 
emerged in the late 1970s, mainly started by former employees of the state-
owned pharmaceutical companies and some scientists from the national 
research institutes. With the emergence of small companies (over 20,000 
manufacturers) the market witnessed an intense competition. This led to 
further innovation in improving the processes to bring down the cost of 
production. Some large companies focused on innovations in selected ther-
apeutic areas and in manufacturing high-quality products. In the absence 
of competition from the MNCs (which left the market after the Patent Act 
of 1972), local companies built up their own ‘branded’ products in the 
Indian market.
The profi t margins were low; hence, companies had to build up volumes. 
In the 1980s, the large Indian companies started exporting to other Asian 
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countries and former communist-block countries, where similar market 
conditions prevailed. Many companies added manufacturing plants for 
producing active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) and started exporting 
APIs for generic drugs to the Western markets by the early 1990s. These 
manufacturing plants were upgraded to the standards applied in the regu-
lated markets (industrialized countries). By 2006, India had over 70 USF-
DA-approved manufacturing plants, the highest number outside the US. By 
the mid-1990s, technologically the large Indian pharma companies, such 
as Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories and Ranbaxy, attracted by the profi t margins, 
have achieved suffi cient capability to even improve on the original drugs, in 
terms of effi cacy and delivery systems. The revenues from these markets are 
now able to fi nance novel drug discovery research. Thus, for an industry 
whose origin was based on domestic demand and market conditions, the 
foreign market demand and conditions have become more important for 
innovation activities.
According to estimates, Indian fi rms spent a total of US$80 million on 
R&D in the year 2001, and approximately 90 percent of the Indian R&D 
investments come from the top 11 companies (Ernst & Young 2004, p. 13). 
There have been a few discoveries of new chemical entities (NCE), such as 
Dr. Reddy’s and Ranbaxy’s compounds that have been licensed to MNCs 
for further development. For instance, in June 2002, Ranbaxy licensed its 
NCE, codenamed Rbx-2258, for the treatment of benign prostate hyper-
plasia to Schwarz Pharma AG of Germany.2
Since the liberalization of the Indian economy got underway in the 
1990s, affl uence has increased. The middle class population is estimated 
to be around 150 million to 200 million. This segment of the popula-
tion has started to demand more sophisticated biomedical products and 
also suffers from similar diseases as its counterparts in the developed 
world. Added to it, the government had to change its patent regime to 
comply with the Agreement on TRIPS. Several MNCs that left India in 
the 1970s started coming back into the Indian market due to the changed 
business environment. The MNCs are, by their very nature, governed 
more by global demand and market conditions than by a national mar-
ket, where the profi t margins continue to be low. So they focused, at least 
initially, on utilizing the technological strengths of the Indian biomedical 
sector by locating R&D activities and outsourcing parts of innovation 
and manufacturing. This global demand opened up new business oppor-
tunities, such as contract and clinical research services and biometrics, 
for Indian companies.
Bioinformatics is a new area of opportunity for India. Given the inter-
national recognition of the technological strength of Indian information 
technology (IT) industry, particularly in computing and software, it is 
not surprising that this new area of opportunity has emerged. Here again 
the product segment is driven more by global demand rather than local 
demand. For instance, in 1998, AstraZeneca added a biometrics research 
Innovation Environment in Emerging Economies 85
unit to its existing R&D portfolio in India. Novartis and GlaxoSmithKline 
established biometrics centers in India.
Large Indian IT companies are also competing in the global markets 
with biometric products and services. For instance, at the BIO 2004 
Annual International Convention (June 2004) in San Francisco, the Tata 
Consultancy Services (TCS) announced launching of its Tata Bio-Suite, a 
portable, versatile software package for life sciences and drug discovery. 
It is a comprehensive suite of algorithms and computational methods that 
addresses all aspects of computational biology in drug discovery, ranging 
from sequence analysis and comparative genomics to structure-based drug 
design. Bio-Suite is aimed particularly at small- and medium-sized biotech 
discovery companies and academic groups.3
The rapidly growing economy, scientists and engineers returning from 
the industrialized countries and growing international reputation of India’s 
biopharmaceutical industry have started attracting global venture capi-
tal (VC) fi rms to India. International investment banks like the Bank of 
America and City Bank have started funding R&D projects in established 
and start-up Indian biomedical companies. APIDC Venture Capital Ltd. is 
India’s fi rst biotech-dedicated venture capital organization. Based on the 
recognized need for venture capital in India, the fi rst national VC fund for 
biotechnology was initiated as a joint venture between the Dynam Ven-
tureast Group and Andhra Pradesh Industrial Development Corporation 
(APIDC) in the early 1990s. Several national and international fi nancial 
institutions, including the International Finance Corporation (IFC), have 
invested in APIDC VCL. Realizing the fi nancial challenges faced by the 
small companies, in 2005, the government of India (Technology Develop-
ment Board—TDB of the Department of Science and Technology) has also 
established the Pharmaceutical Research and Development Support Fund 
(PRDSF) and the Drug Development Promotion Board (DDPB).
Apart from venture capital funding, some novel sources of funding inno-
vation have also emerged in India. For instance, in 2006, Glenmark Phar-
maceuticals entered into a royalty deal worth US$27 million with the Paul 
Capital Partners’ Royalty Fund, an international health care investment 
fund. The deal will fi nance the development of 16 dermatological products 
by Glenmark for the US market. Some Equity Fund organizations have also 
started fi nancing innovation activities in Indian biomedical companies.
In recent years, governments at the state level, particularly the Southern 
Indian States, have played an active role in fostering biotechnology indus-
try in their respective states, through public-private partnerships (PPP) in 
creating science parks. For instance, in partnership with the government of 
Andhra Pradesh State, the ICICI Bank has established the ‘ICICI Knowl-
edge Park’ in Hyderabad. The park occupies a 200-acre area provided by 
the state government as its equity. Aimed at the life sciences industry, ICICI 
built a mix of ready-to-use multitenanted modular wet laboratory blocks 
(innovation corridors) with in-built fl exibility around some common, shared 
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facilities and services, as well as developed land for customized R&D facili-
ties. Among its tenants are Pharmacopeia, and Albany Molecular Research 
Center, both US-based, and Helvetica Industries of Switzerland.
4.3 CHINA—INNOVATION ENVIRONMENT
China, like India, has built up signifi cant technological capabilities in a 
broad range of industrial sectors, but has no specifi c areas of international 
competitiveness derived through cutting-edge technological strength.
In a study Hu and Mathews (2008) studied China’s national innovation 
capacity (NIC) defi ned broadly “as the institutional potential of a country 
to sustain innovations.” Following Suarez-Villa (1990), they measured it 
in terms of China’s patenting rates in the US. According to them the East 
Asian countries have been increasing their patenting activities at USPTO 
in terms of average growth rates as well as in per capita terms. Taiwan is 
the third-highest per capita patenting economy in the world, and South 
Korea is in the fi fth place just behind Germany. China, a new player in the 
game, started from a low base and has been growing faster than others. 
China registered the highest growth rate over the period 2001 to 2005. 
The analysis also shows that China has a large reliance on universities as 
sources of innovative activity and on enterprises spun off from universities 
and academies. The public sector enterprises in China have so far played 
only a limited role in building China’s innovative capacity. Some of the 
most important fi ndings from these analyses include: the rapid rise of pat-
enting by the private sector after 2000; the evidence of greater effi ciency 
and impact of the patenting activity—whether measured by the falling cost 
of each patent, rising impact via forward citation or diminishing cycle time 
(fast turnover); and the rising level of linkage with the science base (i.e., ris-
ing level of citations by patents in the science literature).
The prominent role played by the public research organizations (PROs) in 
the chemical and petrochemical sector is particularly noticeable. Within the 
university system, Tsinghua University emerges as the dominant innovator. 
A few private-sector fi rms such as Huawei in telecom are also signifi cant 
patentees. Although foreign MNCs have been active in China since 1992, 
they did not participate in China’s innovation system until the beginning of 
the 2000s and were in the second place in 2005. Since 2003, China’s private 
enterprises overtook the PROs and other players to become China’s fore-
most patentees in the USPTO. The dramatic increase in innovative activity 
of private enterprise (or at least in patenting activity) may be partly due to 
the fact that many of the PROs have been transformed into private tech-
nology service enterprises by the government initiatives (NRCSTD 2003). 
China’s two most innovative telecommunications equipment companies, 
Huawei Technologies and ZTE (Zhongxing Telecom Equipment Corpora-
tion, have established intensive relationships with China’s PROs. Huawei 
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Technologies, which was established in 1988, rose to become the fourth-
largest patent applicant in the world under the WIPO’s Patent Cooperation 
Treaty (PCT) in 2007. In addition to its six overseas R&D centers, Huawei 
operates another six domestic R&D centers, and all the domestic centers 
work closely with restructured PROs, such as the Research Institute of 
Telecommunications Transmission, the China Academy of Telecommuni-
cation Research, Xi’an Electronic Engineering Institute and Beijing Design 
Institute. Similarly, ZTE, established in 1985, now has six R&D centers 
abroad and another eight located in China. The China centers work closely 
with about 50 local research institutions through a variety of R&D collab-
orative projects (Hu and Mathews 2008).
How did China achieve such rapid developments in S&T in such a short 
period of time? China has throughout its history given a great attention to 
S&T, which until the early 1980s remained completely within the govern-
ment domain. Now, even though the corporate sector conducts a major 
portion of R&D, most of the research-intensive companies are still state-
owned and maintain close links with the state sector (Sigurdson 2005). 
Since the early 1990s, China’s S&T system has been undergoing major 
changes. Among the changes are: (i) emphasis on the coordinated develop-
ment of S&T; (ii) increased efforts in R&D in applied science and tech-
nology; (iii) establishment of horizontal links between scientifi c research 
institutes, industries and local governments; (iv) acceleration of commer-
cialization of scientifi c research results; and (v) restructuring of the fund-
ing system to encourage research institutes to undertake R&D oriented 
towards economic development (Yuan 1995).
As a result of these changes, the S&T system is moving from bureaucrat-
ically controlled resource allocation to competitive research grants. In an 
effort to persuade scientists to make direct contributions to the economy, 
the government has reduced the operating budgets of the institutes of the 
Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) by 70 percent. At the same time, the 
government through the Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC), 
founded in 1985, is attempting to foster a competitive environment through 
an investigator-initiated grant system for research projects. NSFC is orga-
nized into six departments: math and physical sciences, chemical science, 
life science, earth science, materials and engineering science and informa-
tion science (Science 1993; Science 1995a).
In terms of the structure, mainly three organizations manage China’s 
S&T system: (1) The Chinese Academy of Science, similar to the National 
Science Foundation (NSF) in the US and the Royal Society in the UK, per-
forms an advisory role on science policy, apart from controlling numer-
ous research institutes of the government; (2) The Ministry of Science 
and Technology (MOST) is the central government department that 
directly coordinates all S&T activities. It formulates and launches pro-
grams to strengthen R&D and technology development. MOST is also 
the main source of funding for scientifi c activities across the country. 
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(3) The National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) also pro-
vides funds, mainly for peer-reviewed basic and applied research in the 
natural sciences (Forster 2006).
China’s NSI has some unique features. The most prominent among them 
are: fi rst, the series of major S&T programs, initiated and funded by the 
government, which provides the major thrust in terms of capability build-
ing and infrastructure; second, the program for setting standards for prod-
ucts and services in a range of technologies, which the companies wishing 
to operate in China have to adhere to. This program reduces dependence 
on foreign technologies and payment of licensing fees, while promoting 
innovation among domestic companies.
4.3.1 Science and Technology (S&T) Programs
Since the beginning of the reform period China has launched fi ve major 
S&T programs: The fi rst, called the Key Technologies R&D Program, 
was launched in 1982 to foster industrial development by concentrating 
resources on specifi c technologies that are needed for industrial upgrading. 
The program’s substance continues to evolve as the economy grows. It is 
currently focusing on information technologies and biotechnology (Sigur-
dson 2005). In 1984, the Chinese government initiated a program called 
‘State Key Laboratories.’ with an objective to strengthen a few laboratories 
for a breakthrough into the forefront of global science. There are 80 such 
laboratories managed by several ministries and they are achieving successes. 
For instance, the Beijing Electron Positron Collider (BEPC), a 5.8-Ge V 
ring, China’s fi rst high-energy particle accelerator, was built in just four 
years at a cost of only US$350 million. The laboratory gave a jump-start 
to China in many advanced technologies such as superconducting magnets 
and klystrons and electronics and has recorded the world’s best measure-
ment of the tau lepton mass. As spin-off benefi ts, BEPC has also developed 
several commercial products such as superconducting magnets for medical 
magnetic-resonance imaging machines and high-vacuum technology for 
integrated circuit manufacturing (Science 1993; Science 1995a).
The second program, called the Spark Program, was launched in 1986 
to develop the rural economy through S&T and to initiate technological 
upgrading in village-and-town enterprises (VTE). The program supports 
technical projects that utilize rural resources and appropriate technologies, 
with low investment requirements and early returns. The program also 
establishes demonstration zones to stimulate regional development and 
supports industries that derive their comparative advantage from regional 
resources. The Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) has the overall 
responsibility for the program, but much of its management is decentral-
ized to province, district and country levels. The Spark Program became a 
development model for many developing countries and international orga-
nizations (Sigurdson 2005; Walsh, 2003).
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The third program, called the High-Tech Research Development Pro-
gram (863), was launched in March 1987. The main missions of the pro-
gram have been to monitor the global trends in advanced technologies 
and propose corresponding national projects, in order to reduce the gap 
between China and industrialized economies in important areas and to 
achieve breakthroughs in areas where has China a competitive advantage. 
The program covers eight priority areas: biotechnology, information, 
automation, energy, advanced materials, marine, space and laser fi elds. 
China attributed its ability to join the international human genome-se-
quencing project to the capabilities developed during an earlier 863 proj-
ect (Sigurdson, 2005).
The fourth program, called the Torch Program, was launched in 1988 
with the specifi c objective of developing new-technology industries in 
China. This program includes a number of activities, apart from providing 
a legal and organizational environment for fostering high-tech industries: 
1) establishment of high-tech industrial development zones, where R&D 
results could be converted into successful industrial production; 2) estab-
lishment of service centers that support high technology development and 
attract and train talented people to raise the level of expertise and manage-
ment; and 3) establishment of torch projects in enterprises that could ven-
ture into new high-tech areas such as new materials, biological engineering, 
electronics and information, opto-electronics, energy saving and environ-
mental protection (Sigurdson 2005; Walsh 2003).
The fi fth program, which is relatively recent, is called the National Key 
Basic Research (973) Program and was launched in June 1997. It has been 
designed to stimulate research that would result in original innovations and 
to provide support for future technological development, with a perspective 
on 2010. The program has four major tasks: (1) conduct multidisciplinary 
research and provide scientifi c and theoretical foundations to solve impor-
tant scientifi c issues that China would face in the medium- and long-terms; 
(2) engage in explorative research to advance the knowledge front; (3) cul-
tivate outstanding scientists who have creative ability and can handle chal-
lenging research tasks; and (4) establish interdisciplinary research centers 
to carry out projects of high national priority. The projects covered by the 
program included material research on carbon nanotubes, the basic study 
of super-high-density, super-high-speed optical information storage and 
processing, and basic research into novel devices and novel processes such 
as system-on-chip (SOC) (Sigurdson 2005).
In addition, to the S&T programs, the institutional reforms also con-
tributed to the indigenous development of more advanced technologies. In 
1986, China established the National Natural Science Foundation (NSFC), 
on lines of the US’s NSF, to promote basic research in new and critical 
areas, to coordinate S&T research programs and to promote profession-
alism among the scientifi c community. Similarly, in 1992, the National 
Engineering Research Centers (NERCs) were created to promote applied 
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research and engineering in government-designated ‘pillar industries’ and 
other high-technology sectors. The main task of these centers is to convert 
the research results of the national research institutes into new and innova-
tive products, applying new management techniques (Walsh 2003).
In addition, the government has designated more than 150 ‘State Key 
Labs.’ with an aim to raise the standard of research and training in Chi-
na’s university and government-run research institutes. During the reform 
period, the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) has also undergone sig-
nifi cant institutional changes. CSA’s researchers faced funding hardships 
and incentive programs as did other state-run institutes. In response to the 
reduced funding, many of CAS’s departments and researchers have set up 
‘spin-off’ enterprises, some which became leading Chinese high-technol-
ogy companies, such as Legend (now renamed Lenovo), China’s leading 
personal computer manufacturer. More recently, CAS has launched a new 
and broader ‘Knowledge Innovation Program (KIP).’ with an overall goal 
to achieve a knowledge-based economy by 2010. In 2001, as part of the 
KIP, CAS launched the ‘Strategic Action Plan for S&T Innovation’ (SAPI) 
to further promote institutional reform, and an innovation-oriented cul-
ture at the Academy (Walsh 2003). In addition, as noted by Simon (2005), 
by encouraging foreign companies to establish R&D centers in China, the 
government consciously adopted a policy of using these companies as a 
catalyst for sparking innovative behavior throughout the economy.
4.3.2 Standards Setting Program
China’s industrial development has largely been driven by manufactur-
ing for exports based on abundant and cheap labor. Although most of the 
world’s consumer electronics products are being manufactured in China, 
they seldom carry a Chinese brand name or contain advanced technology 
of Chinese origin. In order to change this, regulation relating to standards 
has in recent years become a very important element of China’s technology 
strategy. China wishes to establish its own technological platforms, in as 
many areas as possible, in order to gain independence from foreign high-
tech companies and to drastically reduce the level of license fees paid to 
them (Sigurdson 2005, p. 17).
The market size of China is so large that it can easily set and impose 
new standards on technologies that will affect the rest of the world, and 
MNCs would want to be compatible with such a lucrative market (Forster 
2006). For example, in the mobile telephone sector, the intense competition 
between rival manufacturers, such as Nokia, Ericsson, Siemens and Motor-
ola, has resulted in these companies investing vast resources into R&D 
in China in the hope of participating in standards setting. Through such 
efforts, Nokia has been able to secure its position in the CDMA handset 
market and will further strengthen its market position by working closely 
with Chinese developers of CDMA technology (Simon 2005).
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China’s strategy follows the efforts in the West to have industries set 
standards for themselves, bypassing international organizations such as the 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU), which normally sets inter-
national standards in telecommunications area. Having the world’s larg-
est market status in almost any product and/or service (including mobile 
telecommunications), China feels that it is called upon to pay royalties on 
standards set by organizations in which it had no say nor role to play. Given 
its market size and technological competence, China sees itself as having 
the ability to set standards for its market and to avoid paying huge royalties 
to foreign companies. China can also collect licensing fees from the foreign 
companies that use Chinese standards. Recently, China has been successful 
in getting its own 3G standard for mobile telecommunications accepted 
as one of the three global standards by the International Telecommunica-
tions Union (ITU). It had the support of many developing countries that 
had no role in fi xing standards of GSM or CDMA technologies, but that 
are compelled to pay royalties for using products that incorporate these 
technologies.
The Chinese government is strongly supporting the development of vari-
ous industrial technology standards in a number of areas, including digital 
TV and the Chinese (WAPI) protocol for W-LAN. On January 1,, 2004, 
China announced that all products marketed in China, including those 
produced in the country and imported from abroad, must conform to the 
Chinese WAPI standards, as these involve both security and economic con-
cerns. Presently the majority of personal digital assistants (PDAs), notebook 
computers and mobile handsets have built-in WiFi, which is based on the 
original US standard, with US companies in the market leading position. 
The new Chinese standards would require an agreement with domestic 
Chinese companies, including ZTE and Huawei, which hold strong IPRs 
for this technology in China (Sigurdson 2005).
4.3.3 University System
As part of the efforts to propel China into a knowledge-based economy, the 
university system in particular, and education in general, has received great 
attention. The universities in China, just as in India, have, until recently, not 
been involved in advanced research. Moreover, graduate studies were only 
introduced after major reforms started in late 1970s. The annual enrollment 
of students in higher education institutions (HEIs) was less than 300,000 
in 1979, which amounted to about 1.5 percent of those entering secondary 
schools in the same year. However, the enrollment increased rapidly after 
1998 (with over one million new students), reached a total enrollment fi g-
ure of more than 9 million by 2002 and it continues to increase. More than 
one-third of all university students pursue engineering, and adding science 
students to this number, the share comes to about 40 percent. Chinese uni-
versities are expected to produce at least one million students every year in 
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the science and engineering fi elds, with a special focus on electronics. The 
number of students enrolling for postgraduate education has undergone 
a similar expansion from a total annual intake of about 10,000 in 1978 
to over 200,000 in 2002, with a total enrolment of 500,000. In addition, 
around 125,000 Chinese students were enrolled in postgraduate studies in 
foreign universities (Sigurdson 2005, p. 12).
In 1997 China decided to upgrade some of its universities and embarked 
on an ambitious reform plan that should bring a number of its universities 
into top global ranks in the 2000s, the National 211 Project (211 stands 
for the objective of bringing a number of Chinese universities into global 
one position in the 21st century). The selected 100 universities have been 
given special attention through favorable funding. Several universities were 
merged into more comprehensive units and were brought under the control 
of the Ministry of Education. With the reforms, for instance, the School 
of Sciences and School of Law and Liberal Arts of Tsinghua University 
were transferred to Beijing University, while the Engineering School of Bei-
jing University was transferred to Tsinghua University. As a result Beijing 
University became focused on social sciences, while Tsinghua became a 
technical university. The earlier reform in 1952 followed the Soviet model, 
and many ministries set up their own universities (e.g., Beijing University of 
Post and Telecommunications) (Sigurdson 2005).
The Chinese seem to have an obsession about the issue of commercializ-
ing university research. As a result, many universities are announcing new 
efforts aimed at fostering entrepreneurship, and new business ventures are 
emerging at an increasing rate. A number of incubators have been estab-
lished in the form of campus-based science parks (e.g., Beijing University 
Science Park—BUSP). For instance, in 2000, at the BUSP, 300 projects 
were evaluated, of which 30 were selected for incubation. Altogether, 400 
businesses currently have operations in the park, 80 percent of which are 
high-tech enterprises, although there is some skepticism about the high-
tech component of these enterprises. However, China’s universities have 
produced several well-known companies in the technology sector. For 
example, the Beijing University Founder Group Corporation, which was 
incorporated in 1986, now has total assets of about RMB6000 million, 
with shares in 17 other companies and a controlling stake in four listed 
companies. Its core business has diversifi ed from being a word-processing 
software development company into hardware, Internet-related products 
and systems integration (Sigurdson 2005, pp. 13–14).
According to Walsh (2003, pp. 82–84), the Chinese government and 
the universities play distinct but complementary roles in attracting foreign 
high-tech investments, particularly the R&D-related FDI. Foreign fi rms 
tend to partner with Chinese universities not only for their excellent ICT, 
engineering and science departments that provide qualifi ed personnel and 
perform contract research, but also because of universities’ close ties to 
certain Chinese government ministries. For instance, in the telecom sector, 
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this seems to be an important factor for at least some of the several tech-
nology transfer agreements and/or joint R&D programs that MNCs have 
entered into with the Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunication 
(BUPT).
The Chinese innovation system, however, refl ects several structural and 
organizational weaknesses. Some of these weaknesses are lack of innova-
tion, lack of cooperation among national research institutes, disregard for 
IPRs and unfamiliarity with the cultural norms of international science 
and weakness of English language abilities among scientists. The Chinese 
S&T system is also dominated by secrecy. This lack of openness leads to 
organizational rivalries draining the strength of the scientifi c system. It is 
also diffi cult to understand the way individual programs are undertaken 
and to obtain accurate and comprehensive pictures of many aspects of Chi-
nese R&D activities (Science 1995a). However, since then the picture has 
changed and is still evolving. Although China is making progress toward 
implementing an NSI, the civilian S&T sector continues to suffer from 
excessive bureaucracy, undermining top-level efforts to modernize the 
system. There is little coordination between the industry-based ministries 
and the Ministry of Science and Technology, which manages most of the 
S&T plans (Walsh 2003). Furthermore, in terms of innovation, the private 
enterprises play a very limited role. For a country of China’s size, innova-
tive start-up fi rms are not emerging in large numbers, suggesting a lack of 
entrepreneurship among scientists and engineers in China.
According to Xielin and White (2001), for China’s NSI to work effec-
tively, fi ve fundamental factors are required: R&D, implementation (manu-
facturing), end-use (customers), linkage (between actors in the S&T sector) 
and education. From the government perspective, the links for creating a 
national S&T network have been a priority since the beginning. The gov-
ernment monopolies over the transfer of resources between organizations 
have been dismantled in almost all fi elds. Institutions such as engineering 
centers, technology markets and productivity promotion centers have been 
put in place to channel activities between those that carry out R&D and 
those that manufacture.
4.4 BRAZIL—INNOVATION ENVIRONMENT
Brazil is a large country both in terms of area and population (175 million). 
For a country of this size, unlike India and China, Brazil did not build up 
capacities in a wide range of industries. Such a broad industrial base may 
not provide technological leadership in all areas, but helps in providing a 
sustainable base for economic activities and in creating employment for the 
semi-skilled population. Brazil, on the other hand, focused on certain areas 
(particularly natural resource-based and defense-related) and built up in-
depth technological capabilities and international competitiveness through 
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leading-edge technologies. This is a strategy usually adopted by smaller 
countries, particularly in Europe.
Brazil’s S&T policies originated in the 1950s with the creation of two 
government agencies: (1) CNPq (initially called the National Research 
Council and now known as the National Council for Scientifi c and Tech-
nological Development) for conducting research; and (2) CAPES (Coordi-
nation for the Training of Human Resources at the University Level) for 
training human resources. This strategy was based on the linear model 
of technological development that was prevalent after the Second World 
War, when the idea of research and development was conceived as two dis-
tinct activities (similar to the case of India). While this model proved useful 
in industrialized countries with strong infrastructure, in Brazil it resulted 
in poor communication between academia and industry. Consequently, it 
contributed to shaping, what has been called in 2002 by Eduardo Viotti, 
a ‘passive national learning system.’ This has been the experience of coun-
tries, particularly developing ones that do not perform innovation activities 
themselves, but rely mainly on copying or adapting innovations from else-
where (Morel et al. 2007, p. 180).
In 1990, the government changed its strategy for industrial develop-
ment. Acknowledging the inadequacies of the import-substitution model in 
developing an internationally competitive industrial sector, the government 
opted for a policy of opening up the market to foreign competition and thus 
compelling domestic companies to attain international levels of quality and 
effi ciency. Consequently, a number of technology and industrial policy pro-
grams were announced to support the industry, but they were not imple-
mented diligently and therefore had little impact. Even the most publicized 
Quality and Productivity Program (Programa Brasileira de Qualidade e 
Produtividada—PBQP) that pursued an innovative approach (mainly try-
ing to build a consciousness for quality issues within fi rms) had only a lim-
ited impact (PBQP 1992). Brazilian policymakers and researchers tend to 
attribute the limited effect of technology policy initiatives to the economic 
crisis in the 1990s that led to low investment by enterprises. However, the 
main reasons were in certain structural features of the Brazilian economy 
and the science system (e.g., fi scal incentives and university-industry links) 
(Meyer-Stamer 1995).
Since the beginning of 2000, however, Brazil’s research performance is 
improving rapidly. Brazilian scientists published 15,777 articles in indexed 
scientifi c journals in 2005, accounting for about 1.7 percent of the world’s 
production. This fi gure is almost three times as many as in the early 1990s, 
making Brazil the 17th-largest producer of scientifi c articles in the world. 
Brazil has shown academic excellence in many niche areas, including pho-
tonics, material science, biotechnology and tropical agriculture. There is, 
however, a great need for improvement, particularly in terms of converting 
knowledge into productivity gains in the enterprise sector. Brazil spends 
about one percent of GDP on R&D (including both public and private), 
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which is much lower than the OECD average of 2.2 percent of GDP. The 
number of triadic patents (i.e., patents fi led in the world’s three main pat-
ent offi ces) is comparatively low. Even the royalties and license fees paid 
to foreigners are low, partly refl ecting the economy’s relatively inward ori-
entation to business operations. Much of the published scientifi c research 
is generated in public universities. The number of scientifi c publications 
rose in conjunction with the increase in the number of Ph.D.s awarded 
every year, from 554 in 1981 to 8,856 in 2004. In spite of such a growing 
trend, Brazil still faces a shortage of higher education graduates, especially 
in engineering and science (Brito Cruz and de Mello 2006, pp. 5–11).
According to the Innovation survey (PINTEC) conducted by IBGE, the 
National Statistics Bureau, during 2001–2003, about one-third of Brazilian 
fi rms with at least 10 employees engaged in innovation activities, but only six 
percent of them were reported to have engaged in product-related R&D. The 
innovation rate has been rising relatively faster in sectors that are predomi-
nated by SMEs. For instance, in 2003, the motor vehicle and the transport 
equipment sectors accounted for 26 percent and 13 percent of total R&D 
expenditure, respectively (Brito Cruz and de Mello 2006, p. 13).
In order to address these weaknesses in NSI, Brazil adopted a new inno-
vation policy in 2003, known as PITCE (Politica Industrial, Tecnológica e 
de Comércio Exterior), which explicitly focuses on the promotion of R&D 
activities in the business sector and aims at better integration of innova-
tion into the industrial and trade policies. A legislation enacted in 2005 
introduced tax incentives for innovation as part of a broader package for 
reducing the tax burden on the business sector and facilitating the sharing 
of proceeds from IPRs between businesses and universities/research institu-
tions. This policy framework, however, needs to address the shortage of 
skills in the labor force, which is among the most important barriers to 
innovation in Brazil (Brito Cruz and de Mello 2006).
According to Meyer-Stamer (1995), Brazilian policymakers tend to see 
fi scal incentives as a key instrument of technology policy. From an eco-
nomic point of view, the justifi cation for fi scal incentives for R&D is rather 
closely linked to R (research) rather than to D (development). In industri-
alized countries, innovative behavior is a basic feature of any corporate 
competitive strategy, and this need not be stimulated by fi scal incentives 
(even though they exist in some countries). Companies fear not surviving 
in the market if they are not innovative. The major proportion of R&D 
expenditure of Brazilian companies is in development, but policymakers 
consider it normal to stimulate such product development efforts with fi scal 
incentives. On the other hand, fi scal incentives for R are more justifi ed than 
for D. Corporate research activities generate externalities, and these exter-
nalities are much larger than the direct benefi ts to the company. Therefore, 
incentives for R are a compensation for these externalities.
Brazil being a decentralized federation, the states play an important role 
in formulating S&T policies and in fi nancing R&D, although most support 
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comes from the federal government. Programs aimed at human resource 
development and academic research accounted for over two-thirds of fed-
eral spending on R&D in 2002. This included funding for the 52 federal 
higher-education institutions, CNPq and CAPES (the two federal postgrad-
uate research support agencies) and transfers to the Brazilian Agricultural 
Research Corporation (EMBRAPA). The states have their own S&T poli-
cies and support agencies, as well as higher education and research institu-
tions. According to the Brazilian Ministry of Science and Technology, the 
states accounted for about 35 percent of government spending on S&T in 
2003. The state of São Paulo has the largest state-level R&D support sys-
tem and is also the largest recipient of federal funds. Nevertheless, about 
two-thirds of public funding for R&D comes from state sources, including 
funding for three state universities, 19 research institutions and FAPESP 
(the state’s S&T support agency). The state of São Paulo is the second-
largest spender on R&D in Latin America, ahead of Mexico and Argentina 
(Brito Cruz and de Mello 2006, p. 6).
This growing number of scientists and engineers has enabled the launch-
ing of collaborative research programs that require a large number of 
researchers. For instance, the Genome Project, set up in São Paulo in part-
nership with the Citrus Producers’ Association (Fundecitrus), resulted in the 
DNA sequencing of a phytopathogenic bacterium, the Xylella fastidiosa.
This enabled Fundecitrus researchers to devise ways to protect orange trees 
from a disease (citrus variegated clorosis—CVC) that had been responsible 
for considerable economic loss in the past. This joint venture project also 
resulted in at least two spin-off companies in the fi eld of genomics and bio-
informatics (Brito Cruz and de Mello 2006).
EMBRAPA (The Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation) was 
established in 1973 to ‘develop solutions for the sustainable development 
of the country’s rural areas, focusing on agribusiness through the gener-
ation, adaptation and transfer of knowledge and technologies to benefi t 
Brazilian society.’ Under its control there are 37 research centers (includ-
ing three service units and 11 central divisions) and 2,221 researchers (53 
percent of them hold a Ph.D. or other doctoral degree). Most research 
centers carry out commodity-specifi c research, while some are involved in 
thematic research (e.g., environment, genetic resources and biotechnology, 
agrobiology, among others) and/regional issues. It also has two overseas 
laboratories located in France and the US. EMBRAPA plays a key role in 
technological upgrading in farming by developing techniques for biological 
and integrated control of harmful biological agents. It is also the coordina-
tor of the National System of Agricultural R&D, including federal- and 
state-level R&D institutions, universities and enterprise, which conduct 
collaborative R&D projects relevant to different regions of the country.
Similarly, there have been some successes even in the pharmaceutical 
sector. The number of graduates and education programs in disciplines rel-
evant to the pharmaceutical industry, particularly chemistry, has increased. 
Innovation Environment in Emerging Economies 97
Institutes such as the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (Fiocruz) in Rio de Janeiro 
and the Butantan Institute in São Paulo have become established produc-
ers of immunobiologicals and pharmaceuticals. Private companies such 
as Aché Laboratories, Cristália and Nortec Quimica are developing and 
launching new drugs and manufacturing synthetic ingredients of phar-
maceuticals. The recent policy and legal changes focus on generating new 
drugs to treat neglected diseases. For instance, the Department of Science 
and Technology, which was created as part of Brazil’s Ministry of Health 
in 2000, joined forces in 2006 with the Ministry of Science and Technology 
(through CNPq) to address six neglected diseases: dengue fever, Chagas’ 
disease, leprosy, malaria, tuberculosis and the various forms of leishmania-
sis (Morel et al. 2007).
Until recently, most Brazilian fi rms did not have R&D departments, as 
these fi rms did not confront challenges and opportunities that would have 
compelled them to invest in R&D or seek external research support. But 
this was only one reason for the clear separation between research and 
industry. Other reasons, according to Castro (1989), include:
The easy availability, particularly in the 1970s, of research funds from •
public sources, which gave the scientifi c community a lot of leverage 
to defi ne research priorities according to their personal interests;
The Ph.D.s returning from abroad brought with them the kind of •
research ideals that led to their striving for academic reputation rather 
than application of their research results. Often their research was 
also oriented toward the line of activity of their foreign alma mater 
rather than domestic priorities.
In order to promote the participation of scientists and engineers in the 
business sector, in 2005, the government announced a deductibility of 
50 percent of the spending on salaries paid to scientists from corporate 
income tax in order to motivate companies to recruit highly qualifi ed sci-
entists and engineers.
The patenting activity in Brazil is dominated by the government-controlled 
organization. Petrobras, the government-owned oil company, is Brazil’s most 
important holder of triadic patents among fi rms. Patenting by academic insti-
tutions is also gaining momentum. Successful among them include the Uni-
versity of Campinas (Unicamp) and the Federal University of Minas Gerais 
(UFMG), as well as the FAPESP in the state of São Paulo. Unicamp is the 
largest holder of domestic patents, followed by Petrobras. Unicamp’s innova-
tion agency, Inova, established in 2002, is involved in licensing the univer-
sity’s IPRs and generating revenue for the university. Most licenses tend to be 
exclusive, since the licensee participates in collaborative R&D with the uni-
versity. Licensing contracts were mainly in the areas of pharmaceuticals and 
phytotherapeutic agents, food processing and nanotechnology-incorporated 
products (Brito Cruz and de Mello 2006; www.inova.unicamp.br).
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A unique feature of the Brazilian NSI has been the incubator movement. 
It represents a new direction in Latin American science, technology and 
industrial policies by shifting the responsibility from central government, 
from where policies have traditionally originated, to multiple sources of 
initiative. The Brazilian incubator movement emerged in the wake of the 
collapse of the military regime and the renewal of civil society in the 1980s. 
The absence of centralized projects provided considerable leverage in apply-
ing the incubator concept to a range of activities with different aims. The 
concept of incubator allowed Brazil to formulate a less costly development 
model, which utilized the available academic, industrial and government 
resources. “Bottom-up initiatives from universities and municipal govern-
ments converged with lateral ones from industry groups, regional associa-
tions and state governments as well as top-down program from national 
government. An important innovation policy was created out of the sum of 
these initiatives from different sources” (Etzkowitz et al. 2005, p. 412).
The interactions among industry, university and government occur in 
the various types depending upon objectives of the incubator. Universities 
are the lead initiators in high-tech incubators, where the knowledge compo-
nent is high; industry takes the lead in the traditional incubators where the 
objective is to improve the organizational capabilities of fi rms; and govern-
ment in the social incubators where the objective is to provide employment. 
However, such distinction is blurred as each of the actors plays a role in all 
types of incubators. For instance, the industry provides fi nance to the high-
tech incubator, whereas the university provides training assistance in the 
social incubator (Etzkowitz et al. 2005).
This complexity in the nature of organizational infrastructure is con-
comitant with the devolution of powers from the national level to the local 
governments and the creation of new regional entities (Mustar and Laredo, 
20024). This transformation motivates universities, the industry and local 
governments to undertake collaborative innovation projects and increase 
the capacity of clusters by encouraging a broader set of ‘Local Productive 
Arrangements’ (Cassiolato et al. 2003).
The expertise gained in establishing high-tech fi rms in incubators has 
been applied to create organizational capabilities and employment in the 
‘favelas’ (slums). The fi rst Technological Incubator of Popular Cooperatives 
(ITCP) was established at the Graduate Engineering School (COPPE), Fed-
eral University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ), in 1995, as a cooperative of work-
ers from the Manguinhos favela. In order to recruit participants, the project 
utilized retired university support staff who were also favela residents. The 
university provided classrooms for meetings and technical support, where 
training is given in basic principles of cooperativism, management, basic 
education and legal status of the cooperative (Pereira, 19985).
According to Brito Cruz and de Mello (2006), Brazil’s NSI is complex 
and requires a strong coordination between federal and state-level agencies. 
Often state and federal policies and programs are designed and implemented 
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separately, resulting in overlapping institutional settings and fragmentation 
in funding. However, efforts are being made to promote effective coordina-
tion through the National Council of State Secretaries for Science, Tech-
nology and Innovation (CONSECTI) and the National Council of State 
Research Agencies (CONFAP), especially in the National Council for Sci-
ence and Technology (CCT). At the federal level, CCT, an advisory body to 
the presidency, has the policy coordination role, while the Ministry of Sci-
ence and Technology (MCT) acts as an executive body in association with 
the assistance of FINEP (MCT’s fi nancial support agency), CNPq (Coselho 
Nacional de Desenvolvimento Cientifi co e Tecnológico) and CGEE (Centro 
de Gestao e Estudos Estratégicos). The industrial policy is formulated by 
the Ministry of Development, Industry and Trade (MDIC) through CNDI 
(Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Industrial) and ABDI (Agéncia 
Brasileira de Desenvolvimento Industrial). “Coordination among these 
agencies is promoted by representation of MCT and MDIC in both CCT 
and CNDI. The sectoral funds are governed by MCT, with assistance of a 
technical secretariat. Each fund has a management committee and coordi-
nation is fostered through regular meetings that bring together the presi-
dents of these committees under the purview of the MCT” (p. 17).
The Brazilian innovation agency, FINEP, established under the MCT in 
1967, has been a key player in prioritizing technological innovation, funding 
innovative projects in the public and private sectors and forging ties between 
industry and the academia. Grants provided by FINEP, through the National 
Fund for Science and Technology, cover all aspects of ST&I development pro-
cess, have traditionally been granted to research institutions and nonprofi t 
organizations and have recently been made also available to private enter-
prises. In 2005, out of the 3,700 grant applications received through 26 calls 
for proposals, 1,021 projects were granted funding. FINEP, with fi nancial sup-
port from the Inter-American Development Bank’s (IDB) Multilateral Invest-
ment Fund (MIF), created the ‘Inovar Project’ in 2000. Inovar is a fi nancial 
mechanism to support small high-tech start-ups through venture capital funds. 
The project has since established 24 funds, half of which have been invested in 
by the MIF. FINEP has also created the ‘Inovar Seed Money Program’ (Inovar 
Semente) to facilitate availability of seed and early stage funds for small entre-
preneurs (IDB 2006).
As a private-sector initiative, the Intel Capital (of Intel Corp.), recog-
nizing the growing importance Brazil as a technology leader, has created 
a US$50 million venture capital fund to promote technology growth in 
Brazil. The fund is used to invest in companies that can benefi t from the 
rapid growth of technology in Brazil and to provide local businesses with 
capital to help nurture important technologies and products developed for 
local use. Such businesses include hardware, services (broadband infra-
structure and mobile wireless solutions using WiMAX technology, among 
other services), local content developers/providers, digital health solutions, 
IT service providers and software solutions. Intel Capital has been a leading 
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venture capital investor in Brazil since 1999, investing over US$35 million 
in 13 companies. In 2005, Intel Capital announced four local investments 
in Digitron, TelecomNet, Certsign and Neovia (Intel News Release 2006).
According to Cassiolato (2006), the Brazilian NSI refl ects the following 
weaknesses:
Weak competitive performance with signifi cant trade fragilities in all •
sectors of high added value and technological content;
Widespread loss of national ownership in many sectors, weakness •
and reduced size of Brazilian business groups;
Persistent fi nancial vulnerability of Brazilian-owned businesses result-•
ing from very high costs of capital and nonexistence of long-term 
fi nancing mechanisms.
4.5 SOUTH AFRICA—INNOVATION ENVIRONMENT
South Africa, with a population of 40 million, is a medium-sized country. 
Unlike India and China, South Africa did not build up capacities in a wide 
range of industries. But it focused on certain areas and built up advanced 
technological capabilities and international competitiveness in those indus-
tries. The reason for this partly lies in its history. During the apartheid 
regime, the S&T system mainly catered to only to a smaller section of the 
population (about fi ve million) and thus focused only in areas where it 
had a competitive advantage or in areas that were required for strategic 
purposes. Now, perhaps, South Africa needs to revise its S&T strategy. A 
broad industrial base may not provide technological leadership in all the 
areas, but helps in providing a sustainable base for economic activities and 
in creating employment for the semi-skilled population, which is perhaps 
essential for a country like South Africa.
The South African NSI, compared to many other developing countries, is 
relatively mature and more developed. It has a clear set of policies, a strong 
network of performing institutions and funding agencies and a relatively 
successful track record for innovation activities. However, over the last three 
decades, the NSI has fallen behind relative to its peer countries (such as South 
Korea, India and Brazil). There are several reasons for this: fi rst, under the 
apartheid regime, the NSI became fragmented and isolated. In certain spe-
cialized areas, however, internationally acclaimed technology development 
was undertaken (e.g., liquid fuels, atomic energy and military hardware), 
but these areas did not integrate with the competitive strengths of the larger 
economy. Second, apartheid policies resulted in a failure to develop the 
potential of the nation’s human resources. This failure has now become a 
critical weakness of NSI in its efforts to support the growing economy. The 
output of trained human resources is inadequate in meeting the increasing 
demand for well-qualifi ed scientists and engineers (NACI 2006a).
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After the new government was formed in 1994, it adopted a Reconstruc-
tion and Development Program (RDP) as its basic policy framework and 
identifi ed economic policy strategies across a wide range of issues and sec-
tors. By late 1995, however, there was general disappointment in the RDP’s 
limited growth and employment impact. Because of this and the foreign 
exchange crisis in 1996 that South Africa faced, the government announced 
a new macroeconomic policy, in June 1996, called ‘the Growth, Employ-
ment and Redistribution (GEAR) Strategy.’ This strategy focused on stabi-
lizing the foreign exchange market as well as achieving growth by raising 
both FDI and domestic investment through credible macroeconomic policy 
involving tighter fi scal and monetary policy. GEAR achieved many of its 
macroeconomic targets (such as containing fi scal defi cit), but it did not 
achieve the set targets of six percent annual growth and creation 500,000 
new jobs by 2001. The new Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for 
South Africa (ASGISA) Program of 2004 is intended to address this issue of 
growth with employment, with an objective of halving poverty and unem-
ployment by 2014, through an average economic growth rate of fi ve percent 
per annum over the 10-year horizon (NACI 2006a).
According to Marais (2000), the S&T activities in South Africa can be 
traced to ancient times and include pigment mining (4000 B.C.E.), mum-
mifi cation (dating to about 2,000 years ago), iron metallurgy (3rd to 4th
century C.E.) and gold mining and processing (12th century C.E.). But, in 
terms of formalized scientifi c efforts, the establishment of the Royal Obser-
vatory in the Cape Colony in 1820 marked a beginning, and the fi rst higher 
education institution (HEI), which later became the University of Cape 
Town, was founded in 1829. The fi rst offi cial initiative to support academic 
and industrial research dates to 1917, when the Industries Advisory Board 
was set up. The international response to the apartheid regime, which 
began in the 1960s, unwittingly helped in building up strong capabilities 
in certain areas. In response to the increasing isolation of the country, the 
South African government put a lot of efforts into both public and private 
S&T institutions to achieve self-suffi ciency in a small set of strategic areas, 
including energy, liquid fuels and defense. Consequently, South Africa built 
up a relatively strong military-industrial complex (e.g., atomic weapons, 
missiles and other military hardware), and the strengthening of Sasol (for 
liquid fuel production) and the Atomic Energy Corporation (for nuclear 
power), both of which received substantial government support over that 
period (NACI 2006a).
In an effort to undo the negative aspects of the apartheid regime, in 
1996 the White Paper on Science and Technology created the policy 
framework for an NSI. It consists of at least fi ve inter-related national 
sectors (each comprising a set of institutions with a common objective) 
and four interdependent functions, all of which operate within an inter-
national context.
The national sectors are as follows (DST 2004, p. XVI):
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The Department of Science and Technology (DST), which is respon-•
sible for overseeing the resourcing and management of public NSI 
institutions and has direct line management responsibility for S&T;
The Department of Education and Higher Education Institutions, •
the combined role of which is to provide a pool of high-level human 
resources and to generate new core knowledge;
The Departments of Trade and Industry, Minerals and Energy, Envi-•
ronmental Affairs and Tourism, Agriculture, Water Affairs and For-
estry, Health and other government departments, which both fund 
and perform R&D, focusing on a number of core public sector func-
tions such as agriculture, health, weather services, the promotion 
of innovation within industry, energy research and environmental 
management;
The business sector, including industry and state enterprises such as •
Eskom, where knowledge is transformed into innovation;
The nongovernmental organization (NGO) sector, which undertakes •
R&D principally in areas of high public interest (social or environ-
mental) or in the event of market failure.
The four S&T functions are:
Policy formulation and policy advice: DST, The Council on Higher •
Education and NACI are the key players;
Funding: The National Research Foundation, the Medical Research •
Council and so on;
Performance;•
International relations in S&T.•
National Advisory Council on Innovation (NACI)
As a follow-up action to the White Paper, the National Advisory Council 
on Innovation (NACI) was created by legislation in 1997 to advise the Min-
ister of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology on the role and contribution 
of science, mathematics, innovation and technology, including indigenous 
technologies, in promoting and achieving national objectives of:
Improving and sustaining the quality of life of all South Africans;•
Developing human resources for science and technology;•
Strengthening the country’s competitiveness in the international sphere.•
The scope of the work of Council is organized in terms of fi ve ‘strategic 
themes,’ each of which is a responsibility of a subcommittee of Council 
members. The subcommittees address critical themes within their domains 
and formulate advice aimed at improving the functioning of NSI. Subcom-
mittees are responsible to:
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Advise Council on important strategic issues on which advice should •
be generated;
Approve the scope and implementation of evidence gathering under •
that strategic theme;
Guide the drafting of any ministerial advice on the particular strate-•
gic theme.
Strategic Themes
Infrastructure for innovation promotion: the main causes for concern •
for the sustainability of minimum levels of innovation in developing 
economies have been the inadequate and obsolete physical infrastruc-
ture and low expenditure. Therefore, an important strategic focus of 
NACI is to provide advice on necessary dimensions and conditions 
defi ning an environment that would promote innovation.
Human capital and knowledge base: two of the key elements of any •
innovation system are human resources and knowledge. South Africa 
is especially vulnerable with regard to the provision and spread of 
its human resources and the challenges posed to its knowledge base 
by the dual nature of its economy. Therefore, NACI focuses on the 
parameters of an optimal human resource- and knowledge-base, 
including the optimal use of both.
Science, Technology and Innovation (STI) for competitiveness; the •
innovation efforts in South African industry are mainly related to 
adaptation of imported technologies, and industrial growth has not 
generated the desired number of new jobs. Hence, it is important for 
NACI to develop an understanding of the dynamics of innovation and 
competitiveness in industrial enterprises, with a view to identifying 
how these might be enhanced.
Social dimensions of innovation: it is recognized that the social pro-•
cesses underlying innovation and competitiveness and the social 
consequences of innovation and competitiveness are not suffi ciently 
understood and accounted for. Social factors (individual, communal, 
national) are facilitating and inhibiting the adoption of innovation 
in the second economy on the one hand and facilitating innovation 
generation in the fi rst economy on the other.
Position and role of NACI in the NSI: ensuring that NACI delivers on •
its mission in the best possible way, namely to advise the Minister of 
Science and Technology on issues relating to the NSI (NACI 2006b, pp. 
20–23).
In the early 1990s, as the apartheid state headed for dissolution, the 
government reduced the levels of expenditure on ‘technology missions’ 
and experienced a drop in the national R&D spending from 1.1 percent 
in 1990 to 0.7 percent of GDP in 1994. At the same time, due to global 
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uncertainties and other factors, the private sector also reduced its spending 
on R&D in South Africa. Unfortunately, the reduction in R&D spending 
occurred at a time when the NSI needed to expand to cope with the needs 
of 40 million people, as opposed to a mere fi ve million or so in the previous 
regime (DST 2004, p. XVI).
In 2002, the Cabinet accepted the National Research and Development 
Strategy as the basis for further strengthening of NSI. The Department of 
Science and Technology (DST) came into being on August 1, 2002 after its 
separation from Arts and Culture.
Technology Missions
Expansion of innovation activities required the establishment and fund-
ing of ‘technology missions.’ including the two key technology plat-
forms of the modern age: biotechnology and information technology. 
Two other missions are: technology for manufacturing, and technology 
for leveraging knowledge and technology platform, particularly to add 
value to the natural resources sector. Finally, we have established tech-
nology for poverty reduction (one of the key elements of this mission) 
to address one of scourges of our age. Seed fi nancing is being provided 
in the areas of advanced manufacturing and logistics and resource-
based industries such as mining and agriculture. (DST 2004, p. XVII)
In January 2002, the Cabinet Lekgotla (workshop) discussed the lack 
of strategic approach to the management of the state-funded portion of 
South Africa’s S&T system. Following this discussion and the National 
R&D Strategy adopted by the Cabinet in July 2002, the Cabinet in 2004 
approved detailed planning around a new governance framework. The new 
framework classifi es the technology-related activities supported by govern-
ment into three basic types:
 1. Early-stage or highly cross-sectoral generic technology or knowledge 
platforms and core human capital, for which the DST would take 
responsibility;
 2. Focused, sectoral and relatively mature technology domains, which 
would primarily be the responsibility of line departments, with DST 
assistance where required; and
 3. Standard technology-based services, for which the line departments 
would take the responsibility (DST 2004, p. XVII).
Among the technology missions announced by the DST, biotechnol-
ogy fi gures as a critical sector for research and commercialization. The 
National Biotechnology Strategy was initially published and fi nanced at a 
seed level in 2003–2004. Biotechnology “falls squarely within the national 
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innovation strategy, and is an example of one of the ‘niche’ industries iden-
tifi ed by government and the private sector as worth pursuing because of 
South Africa’s relative strengths in particular areas. Other such niche areas 
include: aerospace; astronomy; automotive production; mining engineer-
ing and prospecting; advanced manufacturing such as nanotechnologies; 
nuclear power and alternative energies; medical research into malaria, TB 
and HIV/AIDS; specialized pharmaceuticals; and medical technologies 
such as prostheses” (DST 2004, p. 68).
Following such prioritization of biotechnology, in 2003 the CSIR, 
through its Bio/Chemtek business unit, formed a public-private partnership 
with Bioventures to form Mbuyu Biotech, a black empowerment company. 
Mbuyu has been granted a worldwide license to further develop, demon-
strate and commercialize three CSIR-developed biotechnology manufac-
turing processes: The fi rst is a novel process to cater to the worldwide 
nutraceutical demand for natural -carotene, found in carrots, palm oil 
and fruits. The second process is the conversion of low-value aloe ferax 
resin found in the sap of the Cape Aloe ferax plant to high-value aloesin, 
commonly used in the cosmetics market; and the third is the development 
of a process for the production of the aroma compound I-menthol from 
low-value raw material (DST 2004, p. 91).
Similarly, in another project, the CSIR’s Bio/Chemtek business unit 
is launching a commercial mosquito repellent. CSIR developed a novel 
natural method for repelling mosquitoes, including species that carry 
malaria. The new product has resulted from the collaboration between 
Bio/Chemtek’s bioprospecting program and traditional healers that began 
in 1998. The repellent is derived from a plant whose leaves have long been 
hung inside houses to keep insects at bay. After being contacted by com-
munities in Mpumulanga province, the CSIR unit took the plant and iso-
lated, identifi ed and formulated its active ingredients. Tests by the South 
African Bureau of Standards (SABS) established that it was far more effec-
tive than other products in the market (nearly 100 percent effective com-
pared with about 40 percent for other repellents). The indigenous plant 
is being cultivated and distilled by community-owned businesses in three 
provinces to produce the active ingredient used in mosquito-repellent 
candles. Bio/Chemtek signed a benefi t-sharing agreement with traditional 
healers during 2003 that ensures future income and other benefi ts to com-
munities, as owners of the indigenous knowledge that led to the research 
(DST 2004, p. 99).
4.5.1 University System
The fi rst South African university was established in 1829. South African 
universities have had research as an integral mission since the early 20th
century, and today research remains an essential component of their activi-
ties. In the last few years, there has been a rationalization of this sector 
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through mergers between selected institutions, which has resulted in a total 
of 23 universities (from 36), four of which are classifi ed as universities of 
technology. It is estimated that the academic staff spend approximately 20 
percent of their time on R&D work. The higher education sector accounts 
for 23 percent of research expenditure and 33 percent of full-time equiva-
lent (FTE) human resources engaged in research. There are approximately 
50,000 postgraduate students enrolled at South African universities. In 
2003, higher education institutions (HEIs) produced some 3,500 publica-
tions (NACI 2006a, p. 32).
According to the Council on Higher Education (2004), the HEIs 
in South Africa are facing a number of challenges within the present 
system: First, in principle, universities are the main locations of funda-
mental and basic research and postgraduate education; universities of 
technology are associated with industry-specifi c applied research; and 
the public research institutions (PRIs) predominantly undertake national 
mission-oriented or strategic research, with a market-focused approach. 
However, this division of work is undergoing a transformation as fi nan-
cial constraints compel both universities and PRIs to seek private and 
international donor funds. Second, the higher education sector is the 
nexus of reorganization through mergers, with a reduction in the num-
ber of universities. At the same time, there has been a sharp growth in 
student numbers (from 522,658 in 1994 to almost 718,000 in 2003). 
Moreover, the higher education sector is a key player in addressing the 
goals of racial equity in the postapartheid era. The compound effect of 
these three forces is causing considerable stress on the productive capac-
ity of the system (NACI 2006a).
4.5.2 Public Research Institutions (PRIs)
There are currently 12 major PRIs, which are R&D performing institu-
tions. The fi rst and largest PRI, the Council for Scientifi c and Indus-
trial Research (CSIR), was established in 1945. The other PRIs are the 
Agricultural Research Council, the Human Sciences Research Council, 
Mintek (for mineral processing research), the Medical Research Council, 
the South African Bureau of Standards, South African Weather Services, 
the Council for Geoscience, the South African National Energy Research 
Institute, the South African National Biodiversity Institute, the Marine 
and Coastal Management division (a division of the Department of Envi-
ronmental Affairs and Tourism) and the Africa Institute of South Africa. 
In principle, the funding of the PRIs consists of a budgetary grant by the 
government (on average 50 percent of the total budget of the institution) 
and income generated through contract activities, which accounts for 
the rest of their budgets. The science councils account for 17.3 percent of 
total national expenditure on R&D and employ 23 percent of the total 
FTE R&D workforce (NACI 2006a, pp. 33–4).
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4.5.3 Business Sector
Unlike in other developing countries (including emerging economies), the 
business sector is the major performer of R&D in South Africa. In-house 
R&D in the business sector accounts for 58 percent of total national R&D 
performance and 45 percent of expenditure and 25 percent of all R&D 
workers employed. Within the business sector, manufacturing is the largest 
investor in R&D expenditure (44 percent of total business sector expen-
diture on R&D). In the past, certain segments of the business sector were 
strongly supported by government, particularly within certain strategic 
sectors, such as energy (Eskom, Atomic Energy Corporation and Sasol), 
defense (Armscor) and mining, but now much of this highly focused fund-
ing has been terminated (NACI 2006a, p. 34).
In South Africa, there are mainly three ways of supporting business 
R&D: (1) funding in direct support of R&D projects (the Innovation Fund, 
the Technology and Human Resources for Industry Program and the Bio-
technology Regional Innovation Centers); (2) funding for technology trans-
fer and similar initiatives (Godisa and Tshumisano trusts); and (3) indirect 
support through tax rebates (NACI 2006a).
The international success of Sasol, South Africa’s largest industrial 
company, in the past decade owes much to its innovative and competitive 
technologies in the energy and chemical sectors. Sasol was founded in the 
1950s as a strategic industry and entrusted with the task of supplying oil to 
a country that was becoming increasingly isolated by international disap-
proval of apartheid. As there were no known natural petroleum reserves in 
South Africa, Sasol adapted the pre-war German Fischer-Tropsch process 
for refi ning oil from coal. Sasol’s success with this innovative technology 
turned it into the world’s only mass producer of oil from coal. With the 
change in regime and liberalization of the economy, Sasol seized the oppor-
tunity to increase its exports, mainly petrochemicals produced from the 
now highly improved coal-to-oil process. Sasol has also gained interna-
tional recognition for developing its proprietary gas-to-liquids (GTL) tech-
nology for the production of new generation fuels and chemical feedstocks 
that can be derived by benefi ciating some of the world’s vast natural gas 
reserves. Two of Sasol’s most signifi cant advances since 1990 have been the 
new-generation Fischer-Tropsch technologies: the high-temperature Sasol 
Advanced Synthol (SAS) process; and the low-temperature Sasol Slurry 
Phase Distillate process (SPD process). The SPD process is a critical part 
of Sasol’s technology and has led to the development of high-quality, low-
emission gas-to-liquid diesel. The company now manages diverse explo-
ration, production, development, marketing and sales operations in more 
than 30 countries. Sasol is currently developing two joint venture gas-to-
liquid (GTL) plants based on its SPD process in Qatar and Nigeria. They 
are set to become the world’s fi rst commercial operator of GTL technology 
outside South Africa (DST 2004, pp. 10–11).
5 Global Innovation in India
India has now gained a reputation as a ‘global R&D hub’ for MNCs. Based 
on a global survey, the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) termed India an 
R&D ‘hotspot.’ EIU defi ned an R&D hotspot as “a place where companies 
can tap into existing networks of scientifi c and technical expertise; which 
has good links to academic research facilities; and provides an environment 
where innovation is supported and easy to commercialize” (EIU 2004).
Starting with the establishment of global R&D units by Texas Instru-
ments (TI) and Astra Research Center India in 1985, India has been attract-
ing R&D-related FDI. Companies like Motorola and Hewlett-Packard 
followed in the early 1990s. By the end of 1999, there were 196 global 
R&D units, including wholly owned units and technology alliances in India 
(Reddy 2000, pp. 97–99). A World Bank study estimated that by the end 
of 2007, there were about 370 R&D units set up by MNCs (World Bank 
2008). However, it is not clear how many of these units are involved in 
global product development and how many focus on an adaptation type of 
R&D. Nevertheless, the global innovation activities of MNCs are increas-
ing rapidly in India. Among the MNCs that set up global R&D facilities in 
India are: Caterpillar, Cisco Systems, DaimlerChrysler, DuPont, General 
Electric, IBM, Intel, Lucent, Microsoft, Oracle, Philips, SAP. GE’s John F. 
Welch Technology Center in India, with an investment of US$80 million 
and 1,600 researchers, is the company’s fi rst and largest R&D center out-
side the US.
According to TIFAC (2006), between 1998 and 2003, foreign compa-
nies have spent US$1.1 billion on R&D in India. Some highlights of MNCs’ 
global innovation activities in India include:
The German semiconductor fi rm Infi neon’s R&D center in Banga-•
lore carried out a signifi cant part of the design and development of 
the most densely populated processor for mobile phones. The chip, 
named ‘Maple,’ is the fi rst chip for mobile applications that has been 
developed using 65 nanometer technology. It contains 30 million 
transistors, enabling the mobile phone to perform many more func-
tions than presently possible, without extra battery power.1
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The Center for Excellence for Mobile Devices at the Microsoft India •
Development Center (MIDC) has developed ‘Microsoft Offi ce Com-
municator Mobile,’ a unique communications client integrating 
mobile applications with enterprise-grade, real-time communica-
tions tools.2
Intel unveiled its futuristic chip, called ‘single-chip cloud computer.’ It •
has 48 cores and has processing power 20 times higher than what is 
presently available. The chip was developed over a two-year period by 
a team of 40 engineers located in Intel’s global R&D centers in Banga-
lore, India; Hillsboro, New Jersey, US; and Braunschweig, Germany. 
All three centers contributed equally to the project. The Indian center 
has contributed in the areas of circuit and physical design, memory 
controller logic and the mesh interconnect network.3
China’s telecom major, Huawei Technologies, has R&D centers in •
Bangalore, New Delhi and Chennai in India. Huawei’s Indian R&D 
activities are in high-end telecommunications areas like voiceover 
Internet protocol (VoIP), 3G and Bluetooth. Its solutions cover areas 
like core layer, transmission layer and access layer. It develops prod-
ucts for fi xed networks, mobile networks and data communications. 
In terms of software outsourcing, Huawei has several partners in 
India, including Hughes Software Services, TataElxsi, Silicon Auto-
mation Systems, Mphasis-BFL, Encore and FutureSoft.4
MNCs conduct R&D in several different forms in India: (1) wholly 
owned stand-alone R&D units, reporting directly to the MNCs’ headquar-
ters; (2) joint venture R&D with Indian companies; (3) technology alliances 
with Indian companies, including outsourcing of R&D to Indian compa-
nies; and (4) research collaboration with Indian universities and national 
research institutes.
One of the unique features of the R&D environment in India is the emer-
gence of R&D service providers in a range of fi elds in India. Such ser-
vice providers include both foreign and local companies. Indian ICT and 
pharmaceutical R&D service providers have established their reputation 
as capable companies by mastering the delivery processes and are being 
assigned more high-end R&D activities by MNCs. In addition, Indian 
national research institutes are being sought after by MNCs for collabora-
tion in basic science research. While many MNCs collaborate with these 
institutes on specifi c short- and long-term projects, some MNCs have set up 
their own R&D centers within the campuses of these institutes.
Another new development is the innovation activities of large Indian 
companies, which started developing products for global markets on their 
own. Until recently, Indian companies performed very little research and 
depended on technology transfer from abroad or on copying off-patent 
products. Their turning into innovators for global products has implica-
tions for the national systems of innovation (NSI).
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The main reasons for location of R&D in India include: availability of 
a large pool of talented scientists and engineers, entrepreneurial traditions, 
existence of well-known universities and national research institutes, a 
large domestic market and substantially lower wages of research personnel 
compared to the industrialized countries (P. Reddy 1997). India’s pool of 
young university graduates (those with seven years or less of work experi-
ence) is estimated to be 14 million (1.5 times the size of China’s, almost 
twice that of the US), with an annual increase of 2.5 million new graduates 
(Farell et al. 2005). The number of professionals employed in the IT and 
IT-enabled services industry has increased from 51,000 in 1990 to about 
1.3 million in 2006 (NASSCOM 2006).
Through in-depth case studies of the innovation activities of MNCs, 
Indian companies (including R&D service providers) and Indian universi-
ties/research institutes, this chapter analyzes the global innovation activi-
ties in India.
5.1 MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS (MNCs)
Motorola
The telecom major Motorola (a US-based MNC) is an innovation-driven 
fi rm, with US$4.4 billion spent on R&D in 2007. Its worldwide patents 
granted numbered 22,978 at the end of 2007. At the end of 2004, Motor-
ola had major R&D centers (those with over 100 R&D staff) in 19 coun-
tries worldwide, including: two in North America, six in the initial EU-15 
countries, one each in Poland, Brazil, China, India, South Korea, Malaysia, 
Singapore and Russia. The fi rst overseas R&D centers of Motorola were 
opened in 1950 in Canada and the UK, followed by various other European 
locations in 1960. Motorola is one of the few MNCs that started conduct-
ing R&D in developing countries fairly early, with operations in Singa-
pore and Malaysia as early as in the 1970s. Most R&D centers concentrate 
on product development, mainly adaptation to local or regional markets, 
rather than on research. Research activities are mainly concentrated in the 
US, UK, Israel, India, China and Russia (UNCTAD 2005, p. 143).
R&D in India5
Motorola originally entered India in the 1980s to sell different components 
and radiophones. However, establishment of an R&D center in India by 
Motorola was unrelated to these marketing operations. In the late 1980s, 
Motorola had a core corporate group called ‘Software Engineering Group’ 
based in Chicago, Illinois, US. This group discussed the possibilities of set-
ting up a panglobal software R&D organization outside the US in order to 
access global talent. Following this at the end of 1991, a Global Software 
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R&D Center was established in India and later also in China. From the 
beginning, the center in Bangalore, India, was treated as a ‘High Maturity 
Software Process Organization,’ and was equipped to achieve CMM level 
fi ve, as per the process/capability maturity model devised by Carnegie Mel-
lon University, which ranks the capabilities of the software companies in 
terms of levels one to fi ve (fi ve being the highest).
In the beginning, because the center was a new concept within Motoro-
la’s global organization, only a few divisions, such as the land mobile and 
semiconductor product sectors, assigned some software development work 
to the center. In November 1993, the center decided to apply for a formal 
CMM assessment, and it was ranked as a level fi ve organization. It was a 
big achievement to reach that level within two years of its establishment, 
even before any of Motorola’s other R&D centers (including those in the US) 
achieved it. It became the fi rst commercial software company in the world 
to achieve this status. Prior to Motorola, other organizations that achieved 
CMM level fi ve were noncommercial organizations such as NASA, Boeing 
and Defense Labs in the US. This gave a worldwide visibility to the Indian 
center and created an interest in the global software industry.
Since then the center has grown from 150 people in 1993 to over 2,000 
people at the end of 2005 and 3,500 people at the end of 2007. By 2006 
Motorola’s R&D investment in India had become US$85 million in technol-
ogy and R&D, increasing from US$50 million in 2002.6 Motorola’s Global 
Software Group (GSG) in India actively fi les for patents. For instance, in 
2005 it fi led for 50 patents. In 2006, the number was expected to go up to 
70 to 80 patent fi lings.
The complexity of the R&D work undertaken has also increased sig-
nifi cantly as time progressed. The center, which began by developing test 
environments, test cases and test scripts, has moved to carrying out cutting-
edge technology software for mobile phones and wireless infrastructure 
equipment that are the core activities of Motorola. The company identifi ed 
India as a global technology development (R&D) base, which is refl ected in 
its scope and scale of operations in India. By 2007, its development centers 
in Bangalore and Hyderabad started working on core technology and soft-
ware development for the next-generation wireless infrastructure technolo-
gies and applications.7
Driving Forces
The major reasons for location of R&D in India by Motorola in 1990 
included:
Access to India’s proven best-in-class scientifi c and engineering talent •
was the primary motive.
Adequate supply of and access to domain expertise enable ramp-up of •
the teams more easily and quickly.
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Opportunity to work with internationally reputed research institutes •
and universities in India.
Exploiting cost differentials was another factor.•
In recent years, gaining access to local markets through locally suited •
innovative products has also become an important reason for expan-
sion of R&D as the economies of India and other emerging markets 
started growing rapidly.
In 2007, Motorola’s R&D in India was located in Bangalore (Motorola 
Labs, Global Software Group, Core Network Division) and Hyderabad 
(Global Software Group, Embedded Software Solutions), and its operations 
were divided into three businesses: Enterprise Mobility Solutions, Home 
& Network Mobility and Mobile Devices. The company’s focus areas 
included: mobile handsets, wireless infrastructure, managed and hosted 
services, broadband equipment (both wired and wireless), trunking and 
two-way radios, software development, applied R&D on media mobility/
convergence technologies.8
Mobile devices—R&D related to a range of products and services, •
including wireless handsets, cellular and wireless systems and inte-
grated software applications as well as a large complement of Blue-
tooth-enabled accessories.
Networks—R&D performed in two divisions: (1) Core Networks •
Division (CND); and (2) Embedded Communications Computing 
(ECC). Focus on new telecom switching technologies and products 
across CDMA and GSM/UMTS networks as well as driving seamless 
mobility enabling solutions and embedded computing capabilities for 
network servers. Motorola acquired the global operations of a com-
pany called Winforia and made it a part of its Core Networks Divi-
sion. The Indian unit predominantly develops software for networks. 
Motorola’s Network R&D centers are located in US (Schaumburg, 
Illinois), Paris (France), Tokyo (Japan) and Bangalore (India).
Broadband home solutions—R&D related to products that include •
digital video system solutions and interactive set-top boxes, voice 
and data modems for digital subscriber line and cable networks, and 
broadband access systems for cable and satellite television operators, 
wireline carriers and wireless service providers.
Global Software Group (GSG)—the oldest and largest international •
center for software R&D, the group conducts cutting-edge work for 
the entire range of Motorola’s products, including next-generation 
wireless and broadband technologies, software platforms and appli-
cation frameworks. The group’s mandate is to fi nd ways to make soft-
ware an integral part of Motorola’s tools or products or to separate 
unbundled software products. Today, nearly every Motorola GSM set 
has a GSM/GPRS signaling stack developed in India, and Motorola’s 
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Internet browser and multimedia-messaging system on 3G and GSM 
phones were conceived, engineered and delivered in India.
Motorola Laboratories—Motorola Labs (new name), set up in 1998 •
in the corporate headquarters, is a global team of scientists, research-
ers and technologists focused on inventing, developing and applying 
new architectures, technologies and applications to design the future 
of media mobility. In 2005, Motorola Labs consisted of research ‘cen-
ters of excellence’: Wireless Access; Networks and Systems; Human 
Interaction Research, Applications, Content and Services; Embedded 
Systems and Physical Sciences; and Physical Realization Research. 
The mandate of the lab in India, which was set up in 2005, was to 
engage in applied research in the areas of converged networks, auto-
nomic networking, enterprise applications and embedded systems 
and physical sciences (e.g., research on new materials). The R&D 
supports Motorola’s vision of media mobility: easy and uninterrupted 
access to information, entertainment, communication, monitoring 
and control.
Indian R&D mainly caters to the global needs of Motorola. For instance, 
a signifi cant percent of the software used in Motorola’s phones worldwide 
is designed and developed in India by the GSG. In recent years, the Indian 
R&D also started catering to the local market needs through indigeni-
zation of Motorola’s products and services. The local market for mobile 
phones has different segments ranging from the cheapest phones to the 
most expensive. Motorola started developing products for all segments, 
particularly the low end, which has market potential in emerging econo-
mies. The Indian R&D center contributes signifi cantly in this effort.
Corporate Innovation System and Knowledge Flows
Figure 5.1 depicts the corporate innovation system of Motorola India, both 
global intracorporate network and local external network, and associated 
knowledge fl ow between different actors.
In 2006 Motorola’s global software groups were located in 20 different 
countries, all working as a team, sharing expertise and capacities based on 
need and requirement. For instance, the Indian group had engineers work-
ing in Motorola’s R&D centers in China and Singapore. Similarly, Indian 
expertise was also used by other R&D units of Motorola. Synergy between 
different centers was achieved through division of work on the basis of 
availability of competence and market needs.
Motorola’s R&D centers actively collaborate with major research insti-
tutes and universities in India to develop best-in-class talent and skills. 
Such collaboration facilitates knowledge fl ows between the partners and 
enhances learning opportunities for participants. For instance, Motorola 
has had research collaboration with the Indian Institutes of Technologies 
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(IITs) as well as the Indian Institute of Science (IISc) on various topics 
related to mobile communications. Motorola has a postdoctoral fellowship 
at IIT-Bombay through the Motorola Foundation, US. In addition, Motor-
ola has joint R&D projects with several other leading academic institutions 
in India, including the Indian Institutes of Information Technology (IIIT) 
in Bangalore9 and Hyderabad, the Jawaharlal Nehru Center for Advanced 
Scientifi c Research (JNCASR), the Thyagaraja College of Engineering and 
the M. S. Ramaiah College of Engineering.
The strength of the relationships with local universities varies among dif-
ferent R&D Groups of Motorola, as the need for such external knowledge 
differs among different groups. The Global Software Group mainly works 
on the wireless domain, and Indian universities and research institutes had 
not done much research in this area in 2006. So the linkages with them 
did not extend to the entire domain. The wireless protocol R&D was very 
much carried out in-house. But for some components like digital signal pro-
cessing (DSP), Motorola collaborated with local universities. In 2006, the 
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Figure 5.1 Innovation system of Motorola India.
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(IISc), Bangalore, for developing new DSP algorithms. There was also col-
laboration with the Indian Institute of Technology (IIT), Kharagpur.
Motorola India has a special University Relations Program (as part of 
the Global Corporate Program), for which it has set up laboratories in 
local universities such as the Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, and 
the Regional Engineering College, Trichi. The aim of this program is to 
diffuse knowledge and expose the students to Motorola’s products. It also 
helps in getting some useful R&D-related work done by the students. For 
instance, Motorola has had an exchange program with the Birla Institute 
of Technology and Science (BITS), Pilani. At any given point of time there 
are about 40 to 50 students from various universities serving as interns at 
Motorola in Bangalore.
Motorola Laboratories, another division dealing with high-level R&D 
in applied research, works closely with Indian universities. For instance, it 
worked closely with the IIT, Bombay, on materials research. It also worked 
with several other universities through joint research projects and develop-
ing joint intellectual property (IP).
Motorola also actively works with local companies in its R&D activities. 
It has a subcontract program, where it contracts out some R&D activities. 
Engineers from a variety of Indian companies work on site together with 
Motorola’s teams.
Host County Implications
Motorola was among the pioneers in setting up global R&D in India. •
This developed interest among other MNCs to locate their own R&D 
in India.
This also brought a lot of expertise into the country and created new •
knowledge.
Mobility of people led to diffusion of knowledge into the wider econ-•
omy in the host country.
Promotion of entrepreneurship—Motorola opened up new market •
opportunities locally in terms of servicing local market needs. Several 
new companies emerged to develop and market add-on products and 
services based on Motorola technology platforms. Motorola also has 
a division called Motorola Ventures that invests in technology-based 
companies.
QuEST Global—(Formerly Quality Engineering 
and Software Technology—QuEST)
QuEST Global is a product-engineering design and solutions company 
incorporated in the US, with operations in the US, Europe, Japan and 
India. The company was founded in 1997 by two engineers who worked 
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for General Electric (GE) and Ford Motor Company. It started off its busi-
ness operations in the US by doing fi nite element analysis (FEA) for turbo-
machinery (steam turbines, gas turbines, hydro turbines and so on) in the 
power generation sector. Within a few months after incorporation, it set up 
an engineering center in India to provide offshore engineering support to 
the US center, so that it could handle bigger projects and also improve its 
profi t margins by taking advantage of the labor arbitrage between the US 
and India. QuEST then moved into the domain of aircraft engines, because 
an aircraft engine is essentially a gas turbine, and from there into the aero-
space domain. It also entered the oil and gas domain because of the related 
technologies.
Today, QuEST is one of the global development centers in mechanical 
engineering for MNCs like GE, Rolls Royce, United Technologies Corp 
(UTC), EADS/Airbus, Toshiba, and others. QuEST has a network of sales 
offi ces and engineering resources in the US, UK, Italy, France, Germany, 
Spain, Singapore, Japan and India. It has engineering centers in India (Ban-
galore and Belgaum), Italy (Florence), France (Toulouse), Germany (Ham-
burg), the US (East Hartford, Schenectady, Greenville, Houston, Cincinnati 
and Phoenix) and Japan (Yokohama). As of March 2010, QuEST has a 
global engineering team of about 1,700 engineers, of whom about 1,100 
are based in India, 350 in the US, 250 in Europe and 10 in Japan. Cur-
rently, around 50 percent of its revenues come from Europe, 45 percent 
from North America and the rest from the Asia-Pacifi c region.
In 2007, QuEST also ventured into manufacturing activities. It does pre-
cision machining and sheet-metalworking through QuEST Global Manu-
facturing, and it has a joint venture with Magellan Aerospace for aerospace 
special processing. It has thus combined design and manufacturing, mainly 
for the aerospace sector, but also for the automotive and other industrial 
sectors. It has even promoted the development of an aerospace supply chain 
cluster in Belgaum (Karnataka, India) through its 300-acre precision engi-
neering SEZ (special economic zone) there, namely QuEST Global SEZ.
QuEST helps customers in reducing product development costs, short-
ening product development lead times, extending engineering capacity, 
increasing product profi tability and extending product life, by providing 
support across the complete product life cycle from concept design and 
modeling through analyses, manufacturing engineering, prototyping, test-
ing, technical publication, instrumentation and controls, embedded sys-
tems development, manufacturing process planning, vendor management, 
in-house precision machining, sheet metal machining, special processing 
and supply chain cluster development..
QuEST’s capabilities are in the following core industries:
Aerospace industry—its solutions cover design, development, analy-•
sis, technical publications and manufacturing support services for 
components, subsystems and assemblies for commercial and military 
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aircraft and aero engines. It works in the domains of aero structures 
(fuselage, wing), aero systems and accessories (landing gear, actua-
tors, avionics and electronics and so on), aero testing and automation 
(ATEs, test rigs), aeronautics research and technology (fl ight physics 
and fl ight dynamic analyses) and customer services (aircraft interiors, 
AMM/CMM manuals and so on). QuEST provides complex services 
like aerospace fl uid systems analysis to this sector;
Automotive industry—it supports product development from concept •
evaluation and defi nition through design to complex services like 
crash analysis, problem resolution in areas like FEA (fi nite element 
analysis) and CFD (computational fl uid dynamics). In this domain, 
QuEST works in areas like power-train and engine performance, 
body in white modeling, next-generation braking systems, process 
development for complex assembly operations and so on;
Power generation industry—it provides design and development services •
of power generation equipment like steam/gas/hydro turbines, generators, 
balance of plant equipment and related accessories, in addition to high-
tech services like CFD analysis (internal fl ow) for gas turbines, design 
automation of components and subsystems. It also provides services in 
instrumentation and controls, substation automation and protection sys-
tems design, in related electrical as well as civil structural engineering. 
Turnkey solutions include project management, vendor development and 
fabrication in low-cost countries such as China and India;
Oil and gas industry—it mainly provides services for the downstream •
part of the industry (and related chemical, petrochemical plants) by 
providing plant design engineering (PDE) services. Its capabilities 
include process simulation, piping/3D modeling, mechanical equip-
ment design and engineering, civil structures engineering and so on;
Industrial products solutions—design and development of high preci-•
sion engineering systems ranging from fl uid control equipment such 
as valves for heating and ventilation products, hand-held devices, 
electric motors, industrial-fan industry.
QuEST’s customers include global majors such as GE, Rolls Royce, Pratt 
& Whitney, EADS/Airbus, Toshiba Industrial Power, Hitachi Power Sys-
tems, Technicas Reunidas and others.
Driving Forces
It is important to gain access to India’s vast talent pool in the fi elds of •
mechanical, embedded systems, electrical and electronics engineer-
ing. The size of the individual teams dedicated to customers can be 
ramped up and ramped down quickly and easily.
In the area of aerospace, Bangalore (where QuEST has its largest engi-•
neering center) is also the home of well-established national research 
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laboratories (National Aerospace Laboratories) and fi rms (Hindustan 
Aeronautics Ltd., Bharat Electronics Ltd.) and is where high-level 
research is undertaken (Indian Institute of Science). People employed 
in these organizations are well-trained and form a strong knowledge 
base in the domain.
Through ICT industry India has gained signifi cant experience in •
delivering outsourcing services and established proven outsourcing 
processes.
Cost differentials between the US and India are also important.•
Intellectual property protection in India is relatively strong.•
English language abilities are important.•
Beginning in 2008, many senior engineers born between 1945 and 1964 
(the generation that had the highest proportion of people taking up engi-
neering careers) with high levels of domain experience (e.g., aerospace) and 
engineering tools knowledge (e.g., computer-aided design (CAD) tools) are 
expected to retire globally. Subsequent generations took up other vocations 
(people born between 1965 and 1984 took up careers in service sectors like 
fi nance, sales and marketing and law, whereas the generation born between 
1985 and 2004 are taking up knowledge- and skills-oriented careers like 
IT and fashion design.) This is likely to create a shortage of engineering 
resources globally and hence a substantial increase in the outsourcing of 
product and process design and engineering activities by companies. MNCs 
will tend to retain the research and the early stages of product development 
(conceptualization) in-house, but are likely to outsource the next stages, i.e., 
detailed engineering, testing and so on. Given its human resources and other 
advantages, India will likely witness the next wave of outsourcing activities 
in the area of engineering design and manufacturing solutions. India is also 
globally competitive in the manufacture of low volume, high precision and 
complex engineering products (e.g., gear boxes for the aerospace industry).
In India engineering services are provided by three types of organizations:
 1. Captive units of product development companies, mainly MNCs—
Siemens, Honeywell, GE, and others;
 2. Large Indian IT service providers—TCS, HCL, Infosys, Wipro, 
Satyam Computers (now Mahindra Satyam), and others;
 3. Product engineering focused companies—QuEST Global, Infotech 
Enterprises (more focus on geographical information systems—GIS), 
and Geometric Software (focus on development of CAD products).
At Aero India 2007, QuEST announced a 50–50 joint venture with 
Magellan Aerospace Corporation, Canada, to set up India’s fi rst indepen-
dent processing facility for aerospace manufacturing. It will establish a key 
processing facility for aluminum, titanium and stainless steel alloys to meet 
the needs of aero structure and aero engine components.
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In the projects undertaken for clients by QuEST, the intellectual prop-
erty (IP) belongs to the client. But for the tools developed by QuEST (at 
its own cost and time) to conduct projects, the IP belongs to QuEST. For 
example, QuEST developed AutoDOE, a CAD-CAE tool for automatic 
design of experiments for analysis, and the IP for this product belongs to 
QuEST. About three to fi ve percent of QuEST’s engineers work on in-house 
R&D, like developing new tools, building new capabilities and so on.
Corporate Innovation System and Knowledge Flows
In its project work for clients, QuEST does not usually get help from or col-
laborate with any other organization, except in cases where it does not have 
in-house capacity, e.g., electronics manufacturing of PCBs. In such cases 
QuEST works with local companies. Local companies gain from such work, 
as QuEST provides them with the domain knowledge and other product-
related knowledge. QuEST also hires consultants who have retired from 
other organizations/companies and who bring with them very high domain 
knowledge and experience. QuEST has an in-house Technology Excellence 
Group (TEG), led by Ph.D.s, who come up with technology innovations, 
high-level capability and domain building initiatives, processes and tools 
and innovation activities.
QuEST, however, has other forms of collaboration with local universi-
ties. It has a CADAM (Center for Advanced Design and Manufacturing) 
program, under which it has developed courses in computer-aided design 
(CAD) and computer-aided engineering (CAE) tools, which are offered to 
students on a payment basis in six Indian universities. QuEST has developed 
the course content and provided the faculty. It helps engineering students in 
getting trained in these tools and becoming productive immediately after 
they graduate and take up jobs in the industry. QuEST also recruits the top 
15 to 25 percent of these students. The CADAM program helps QuEST 
ramp up engineering teams for customers rapidly.
As clients’ requirements, particularly in aerospace, are increas-
ing, QuEST also collaborates with institutes like the Indian Institute 
of Science (IISc) and the Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) Madras 
(Chennai). QuEST is now being asked by clients to develop complete sub-
systems, pushing the company up the value chain, which could require 
collaborating with Indian research institutes and sophisticated test facili-
ties in the future.
In terms of knowledge fl ows between the clients and QuEST, whereas 
QuEST gains domain and product knowledge, the client also gains knowl-
edge relating to product development processes and gains from the codifi -
cation of knowledge by QuEST. QuEST engineers interact with the client’s 
senior engineers who have a very high level of domain knowledge gained 
over many years of experience, and they codify what they learn from the 
client’s senior engineers. This documentation of knowledge is valuable to 
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the client, as it would otherwise go out of the organization when the senior 
engineers retire.
By working on various projects for clients, the expertise of QuEST’s 
personnel increases, which will enable QuEST to go up the value chain 
and undertake higher-end work. There is also an exchange of engineers 
between QuEST and the clients; for example, engineers from clients such 
as Rolls Royce spend some time at QuEST, and QuEST’s own engineers 
also spend time at clients’ premises. This helps in scoping a project, set-
ting standards and protocol. It also helps in better understanding each 
other’s organizational environment and requirements, leading to building 
of confi dence and trust.
QuEST also helps in standardization of engineering processes in organi-
zations where different standards, tools and processes are used in product 
development, as is usually found in conglomerates.
Because of QuEST Global’s manufacturing operations, there is an 
exchange of knowledge between the engineering and manufacturing teams, 
and QuEST Global’s engineers also take into account manufacturability 
when they do their design work. This helps in improving the product and 
reducing the costs of manufacturing.
Implications for Contractor’s Competitiveness
Through outsourcing a client gets cost-effective solutions and access •
to domain expertise;
Contracting fi rm gains access to talented human resources; this is •
particularly important because of the shortage of product develop-
ment engineers in home countries;
Productivity enhancement—in-house personnel of the outsourcing com-•
pany are domain experts, but not necessarily in applying CAD-CAE 
tools, whereas QuEST’s engineers gain expertise through their work 
on various products. So they gain better understanding of the tools and 
tool vendors. This also helps QuEST to come up with design automation 
solutions in some cases that lead to large productivity gains: reduced time 
frames—for instance, for a client QuEST reduced the design time of a 
turbine impeller from 96 hours to 15 hours, after developing a design 
automation tool for doing the task; reduced team size—in another case, 
the team size was reduced from 11 people to one person to achieve the 
same results, using a tool developed for the purpose.
Host Country Implications
The outsourcing services industry helps in broadening the skills •
base in the host country, in addition to providing employment to its 
engineers.
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Realizing the potential of market for product development services, •
several new companies are emerging in India, developing expertise in 
this area (i.e., demonstration effect on entrepreneurs).
In order to cater to these service providers, new vendors are also •
emerging, supplying CAD-CAE tools.
Product design and development contracts usually lead to manu-•
facturing, opening up opportunities for new precision engineering 
companies.
Home Country Implications
Cheaper cost of production through outsourcing helps in enhancing •
the competitiveness and helps in increasing the market size for the con-
tracting MNCs, resulting in higher revenues for the home countries.
Offshore outsourcing may also help in realizing the market potential •
abroad. For instance, an industrial equipment company from the US 
used QuEST’s services in India for developing a product for the West-
ern market, and later it realized that India itself is a large market for 
such products, but for lower-cost equipment. So this company started 
developing low-cost equipment for India and other emerging markets 
by using the same team from QuEST.
Outsourcing helps in redeploying engineers in the home country •
into developing new and more advanced products and higher val-




Natco pharma was established in 1984. The entrepreneur is a scientist with 
a Ph.D. in pharmacy and several years of work experience as a pharmacist in 
the US. The company started with the manufacture of injectables and dosage 
formulations (capsules), and in 1989 it also added the manufacture of active 
pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) to its portfolio by acquiring Dr. Karanth 
Pharma Labs in Hyderabad. Since then it has systematically carried out back-
ward integration.
Natco has an employee strength of 1,500 people, two formulations units, 
one API unit (USFDA approved in 2004), one R&D unit and one corpo-
rate offi ce. Since 2003, Natco went for branded marketing of its products, 
particularly in the case of its oncology products, and within a span of fi ve 
years it has achieved a signifi cant reputation in the market. Natco was one 
the pioneers in the country to introduce ‘timed release formulations’ (i.e., 
extended/controlled release mechanisms).
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Research and Development
Natco’s R&D focus is in the area of chemistry. Natco’s R&D center has 
100 scientists, with 12 Ph.D.s and the rest with M.Sc. qualifi cation. By the 
beginning of 2006, it had fi led about 100 patents under the PCT. Most of 
them are for process and formulation innovations, with nine fi led for new 
chemical entities (NCEs).
Prior to the WTO agreement in 1995, the R&D focus of Indian pharma-
ceutical companies was on process development. Few companies carried out 
drug discovery research. With the impending implementation of the TRIPS 
Agreement that provided product patents for drugs in India since 2005, com-
panies started shifting their R&D focus. Some companies have been more 
proactive in conducting drug discovery research and have developed NCEs.
Natco started drug discovery research in 2000, having had a long expe-
rience in process development research, with special strengths in oncology 
and antidepressants. This development work provided a better understand-
ing of the chemistry involved in these drugs, and Natco’s researchers devel-
oped strong competencies in these areas. As a consequence, when Natco 
embarked on discovery research it decided to focus on products in which 
it is relatively strong (e.g., oncology, fi ve types of anticancer drugs). The 
research teams developed ideas on how to improve the molecules, how 
to circumvent biological side effects, how to develop NCEs using the old 
chemical entities as a base. In other words, Natco adopted an evolutionary 
path rather than going for a discontinuous model.
Earlier Natco received the National Technology Award for its process 
innovation for the chronic myeloid leukemia—CMC drug, which reduced 
the price of this drug from INR 1,000 to INR 90. This was a totally new 
process for a compound whose patent belonged to an MNC. But because 
this was a pre-1995 compound, it did not enjoy product patent protection 
in India. To start with, Natco’s discovery research focused on developing 
a similar compound through what is called ‘molecular modifi cation’ or 
‘rational drug design.’ This method has been one of the pioneering innova-
tions in recent times in drug discovery process. Through this process, the 
molecular reactions on the target can be simulated on the computer, and 
this simulation helps in generating ideas about how to improve the com-
pound. Within two years, Natco developed two NCEs through molecular 
modifi cations, which showed greater potency than the existing drugs for 
leukemia. Some of the parameters for assessing an NCE are that it should 
lead to lesser dosage intake by the patient or reduce the cost of the com-
pound, or the bioavailability should be more or toxicity should be less.
Once the NCE is developed, it goes for screening in a test tube with liv-
ing cells (in-vitro screening), followed by animal testing (in-vivo testing). At 
the latter stage, companies usually require collaboration either because the 
company has no expertise in animal testing or because such facilities are not 
available in-house. Such facilities may be available in the country, but may 
not be accessible due to their proprietary nature (e.g., in-house facilities of 
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large competing companies). Moreover, there are strict regulations regard-
ing animal testing due to animal rights, and the tests should be certifi ed 
formally by the authorized agency that the animals are budgeted for, the 
toxicity of the compound must be reduced before introducing it into the 
animal, a minimal number of animals must be used and so on. The USFDA 
takes these into consideration before evaluating the investigational new drug 
(IND) and giving approval for proceeding to the next phase of drug discov-
ery, i.e., clinical trials. Natco signed an agreement with Temple University, 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, US, to test its NCEs. It is a one-time agreement 
to test 26 NCEs for Natco. The intellectual property rights (IPRs) belong to 
Natco, and Temple University provided only a fee-based service.
In addition to Temple University, Natco also has had collaborations with 
some contract research organizations (CROs) in the US in the area of biol-
ogy (early to fi nal stages). Natco’s strategy is to develop the NCEs in-house 
and outsource the rest of the stages up to IND fi ling.
Natco also has R&D collaborations with several Indian research insti-
tutes. They include:
Indian Institute of Chemical Technology (IICT), Hyderabad (which •
has animal house and toxicology divisions);
Nizam’s Institute of Medical Science (NIMS), Hyderabad (for clinical •
trials);
National Institute of Pharmaceutical Education and Research •
(NIPER), Chandigarh (need- and fee-based service);
National Institute of Toxicology, Pune (need- and fee-based service);•
University of Hyderabad (biology).•
Many companies start as chemistry-based companies and move on to 
biology. Natco carried out a SWOT analysis of the company and decided 
that its strength lies in chemical synthesis and not in biology. At this stage 
Natco does not want to invest in creating bio facilities or in recruiting biol-
ogists. So it collaborates with local universities in this area, especially the 
University of Hyderabad.
Natco’s synthetic chemistry strengths include: heterocyclic chemistry; 
metal hydride reagents—handling on commercial scale; organo metallic 
reagents—handling on commercial scale; catalytic hydrogenations; chiral 
synthesis; optical resolutions; commercial column and fl ash chromatogra-
phy. It is also exploring new fi elds like custom synthesis of protected amino 
acids, unnatural amino acids and peptides.
Contract R&D (Outsource) Service for MNCs
Natco also carries out contract R&D for MNCs. By 2006 six MNCs had 
outsourced some of their R&D work to Natco. The R&D carried out 
for MNCs is in the area of custom synthesis and manufacturing, but not 
in the discovery area. Custom synthesis involves developing a molecule 
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(intermediates) and a process to manufacture it in small volumes. As the 
drug development moves to the next stage, the volumes change, requiring 
changes in processes. Some of the molecules may be dropped completely, if 
the compound under development fails to act on the target.
Product development involves a number of steps, and some these steps are 
outsourced by MNCs. Through such outsourcing MNCs gain access to special-
ized knowledge in a cost-effective manner. The service provider’s strength may 
not be the focus of the MNC, so it is worthwhile to outsource such activities.
For reasons of confi dentiality, Natco does collaborate with other orga-
nizations in carrying out the subcontract R&D. Outsource R&D services 
account for about 15 percent of Natco’s total R&D activities.
Driving Forces for MNCs to Outsource R&D to India
To gain access to talent and human resources;•
To gain access to specialized knowledge;•
To take advantage of the cost differentials;•
Favorable government policies, including the IPRs regime in India.•
In terms of knowledge fl ows in outsourced R&D activities, there are 
basically two different types of contracts:
 1. The MNC provides the laboratory knowledge as it has already devel-
oped the molecule and requires R&D help in scaling up or further 
good manufacturing practice (GMP) validation. In such cases, some 
synthesis knowledge is passed on to the service provider. IPR belongs 
to the MNC. The knowledge fl ow from the service provider to the 
MNC is limited to scale-up processes and methodologies to do so;
 2. The MNC just indicates the type of molecule (structure) it requires 
and asks the service provider to develop it completely. In such cases 
the knowledge fl ow from the MNC is limited to certain standardiza-
tion issues. Knowledge fl ow from the service provider is more sub-
stantial, in terms of the structure of the molecule, ways to achieve it 
and processes to manufacture such molecule.
As they gain confi dence, MNCs are increasingly seeking to outsource 
more core activities such as early phase development and in some cases 
even the entire compound. In such cases, the knowledge fl ows will be much 
more substantial.
Host Country Implications
R&D outsourcing by MNCs to Indian companies/institutes is ben-•
efi cial to the country. R&D by MNCs creates competitive threats to 
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local companies, compelling them to perform R&D, and as a conse-
quence they foster an R&D culture in the host country.
The fear of MNCs’ R&D centers recruiting the cream of the local •
talent depriving the local companies of such talent is not such a big 
issue. Such things could happen even among Indian companies due to 
differences in salary and career growth opportunities.
Implications for Contractors’ Home Countries
In terms of home country effects, the implications are mixed. In drug •
discovery more than 20 activities need to be performed. It is diffi -
cult to fi nd expertise or some times it is not cost-effective to locate 
all activities in one country. So MNCs will continue to globalize 
R&D. However, some R&D activities have ‘stickiness’ and thus may 
not be easy to globalize (e.g., availability of sophisticated and costly 
equipment and instrumentation). Such activities will become the core 
activities of the company that will be performed in the home country. 
However, given techno-economic factors, the competitiveness of the 
MNCs will improve with outsourcing of some R&D activities.
Sai Life Sciences
Sai Life Sciences was established in 1999, as an R&D outsource service 
providing company. The entrepreneur did his Ph.D. in pharmacy (phar-
maco kinetics) in the US and later on did clinical work in a hospital in the 
US for several years. He returned to India in 1979 and until 1997 worked 
with an Indian pharmaceutical company, which manufactured active phar-
maceutical ingredients (APIs). In 1997, he started a marketing company 
called Sai Quest to source intermediates and APIs for pharmaceutical com-
panies. In 1998, a contract research organization (CRO) based in Chicago, 
Illinois, US, encouraged him to set up a laboratory to develop some chemi-
cals in India by promising to outsource R&D work to the laboratory. At the 
time, the concept of setting up a research laboratory as a business venture 
was new in India. So obtaining fi nancing from fi nancial institutions, which 
were not convinced of the business plan, was very diffi cult. However, with 
an initial investment of US$30,000 the laboratory was set up.
The fi rst project was a process development research work for a US-
based biotech company, obtained through the CRO based in Chicago on 
a subcontract basis. The value of the contract was US$60,000. A team 
of four scientists (one Ph.D. and three M.Sc. graduates), with an external 
consultant from a national research institute located in Hyderabad worked 
on the project successfully. The company made its fi rst profi t, which was 
reinvested. Since then the company has started growing rapidly.
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By 2006, Sai Life Sciences had grown to a staff strength of 300 people, 
with 225 scientifi c and technical staff (30 Ph.D.s, 180 M.Sc. degree hold-
ers). It has two R&D centers and two pilot plants. A number of eminent 
and experienced scientists who previously worked in the national research 
institutes joined the company or helped as external consultants. The com-
pany focuses exclusively on chemistry research.
Sai Life Sciences provides R&D services for foreign pharma MNCs and 
small biotech companies in the following areas:
Medicinal chemistry—preparation of building blocks/scaffolds in •
gram to kilogram quantity; developing new synthetic methods for 
novel scaffolds; focuses on libraries (typically 50 to 200 members); 
synthesis of standard reference compounds, intermediates and so on.
Process development—process/technology development for IND track •
and clinical compounds; route selection and optimization; analytical 
method development and validation; impurity profi ling and struc-
ture elucidation; stability studies; technology transfer to commercial 
manufacturing; C-GMP manufacturing from gram to kilogram to 
hundreds of kilograms levels; complete process documentation with 
batch-wise consistency.
Its services range from the early-stage research to process development 
(up to commercial) in chemistry. Sai Life Science plans to add radioactive 
chemistry (ADM spike) soon to its capabilities. The company also manu-
factures (cGMP) niche APIs in small volumes in its pilot plants. These APIs 
are diffi cult to manufacture in small volumes. MNCs usually assign such 
manufacturing as part of the contract for process development. Sai Life Sci-
ences can manufacture such APIs in the fi elds of oncology, ophthalmology 
and injectables.
Sai Life Sciences has a customer base of about 40 foreign companies, with 
80 percent of them based in the US and the rest in Europe and Japan. It has 
executed over 200 projects by 2006. Its customers now feel confi dent in the 
company and are assigning it development projects even in their core areas.
Driving Forces
Lower cost is the primary reason for outsourcing of R&D to India;•
Access to specialized skills and expertise is another important reason;•
Improvement in effi ciency (time to market) is another important rea-•
son; Outsourcing enables more effi cient utilization of resources in cus-
tomer’s laboratories by freeing them from some non-core activities.
Knowledge Flows and Learning
Outsourcing contracts facilitate two-way fl ow of knowledge between the 
service provider and the customers. In a typical contract, the customer 
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provides the knowledge relating to the compound that the customer already 
possesses or the research results it obtained or the chemistry relating to the 
compound. The service provider further builds on this knowledge from the 
customer and transfers the added knowledge to the customer.
According to Sai Life Sciences, the most important thing in the business 
of R&D services is to gain the confi dence and trust of the customer. For 
this reason, the company feels that R&D service providers cannot be both 
product innovators on their own and R&D service providers at the same 
time. The customers do not feel comfortable with an R&D service pro-
vider who could become a potential competitor. Sai focuses only on R&D 
services and does not intend to make its own products. It is a service-for-
fee business model. The customer specifi es a compound to be developed, 
including the process innovation to produce that compound. Although the 
intellectual property (IP) for such process innovation rests with the service 
provider, the customer does not pay any royalties or licensing fee for using 
that process. In effect all IP belongs to the customer.
Protection of the data is to a large extent built into the nature of the 
outsourcing contract and relationship. MNCs only specify the structure of 
the molecule/compound to be developed and do not disclose the details of 
the target or the disease against which it will be used. Therefore, the pos-
sibility of the service provider using such a compound to compete with the 
MNC is remote.
When executing an R&D project for a customer, almost all the work is 
carried out in-house by the service provider. There are practically no link-
ages with local organizations. This prevents leakage of information to third 
parties. Any such linkage with the local research institutes, if required, is 
formed only with the permission of the customer. Each project will have an 
advisory committee formed with the in-house researchers.
Host Country Implications
MNCs’ outsourced R&D brings in a lot of benefi ts to the country, apart 
from the creation of jobs for scientists and engineers. Such R&D activities 
result in the infl ow of new techniques and managerial processes into the 
country. Knowledge accumulation and training that accrue to the scientists 
during the process of executing the project are very important not only 
from the point of view of the R&D service provider, but also from the per-
spective of the larger NSI.
In order for this R&D service industry to thrive, the Indian government 
policies need to be changed in some respects. For instance, one of the major 
problems faced by the R&D laboratories in India is to get chemicals on 
time from abroad for medicinal chemistry work. Government policy should 
facilitate storage of such chemicals in bonded warehouses by chemical sup-
pliers and allow them to send the unused chemicals back without paying 
the duty. As per the present policy the duty needs to be paid within six 
months of import, irrespective of the usage of such chemicals.
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In the medium- to -long-term, this industry may witness a shortage of 
well-trained human resources. The growing R&D operations of MNCs 
and the local companies in India are increasing the demand for research 
personnel. This is likely to wipe out the cost advantage. In order to prosper, 
service providers must focus on quality and higher value-added activities. 
The government must focus on increasing and improving the S&T educa-
tion in India.
Avra Laboratories Private Limited
Avra Laboratories was established in 1995 by an academic scientist turned 
entrepreneur, who is a former director of the Indian Institute of Chemical 
Technologies (IICT), to cater to the process and product needs of phar-
maceutical companies. The entrepreneur is an internationally well-known 
scientist with a Ph.D. in medical chemistry. He did his postdoctoral in Har-
vard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, US, under the supervision of 
a Nobel laureate in chemistry. The entrepreneur’s work on the isolation, 
structure elucidation of natural products and synthesis of complex natural 
products is refl ected in 262 research papers and 30 patents and 109 students 
who have obtained their Ph.D. degrees in chemistry under the supervision 
of this scientist. The entrepreneur’s scientifi c achievements are several. The 
following story of Vinca rosea refl ects his achievements:
Vinca rosea—The Anti-tumor Agent
In the early 1970s, India was the largest exporter of dried leaves of Vinca 
rosea to the US. The US-based pharma MNC, Eli Lilly, had a virtual 
monopoly at the time in isolating vinblastine and vincristine, the two 
dimeric alkaloids widely used as anti-tumor agents. Even today, vincristine 
is the only drug for pediatric leukemia. Due to the poor quality of supplies 
from India, Eli Lilly started its own plantation in Houston, Texas, US, 
and encouraged cultivation of Vinca rosea in parts of Africa. As a result 
stocks of this plant piled up in India. Maharastra state was one of the larg-
est producers of the plant, and its government was keenly interested in the 
isolation and export of vinblastine and vincristine, but considered it as an 
insurmountable problem.
The founder of Avra, Dr. Rama Rao, who was a scientist at the National 
Chemical Laboratories (NCL) at the time, took up the challenge. He had 
just then returned from the US after spending two years as a postdoctoral 
associate in Prof. E. J. Corey’s group. With fi nancial support from the gov-
ernment of Maharastra, he began this work, which was at the time innova-
tive to India. Eli Lilly’s processes depended on tedious chromatography and 
therefore required huge investments and large teams. Alternative processes 
were considered as not feasible. The research program was initiated in 
1979, and within a year Dr. Rao and his small team came out with a simple 
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approach to isolating vinblastine from Vinca rosea completely unaided by 
chromatography. Using what could be described as ‘bare-foot technolo-
gies,’ the team optimized the process in the laboratory by extracting 10 
grams of vinblastineBP from 40 kilograms of dried Vinca rosea, which was 
converted to vincristine by oxidation with potassium permanganate. Find-
ing a superior process for the isolation of vinblastine and its conversion to 
vincristine was successfully accomplished within a year.
However, no Indian company came forward to undertake the commer-
cial production of vincristine, as the Indian market was not considered large 
enough to support its commercial production. Dr. Rao persuaded a forward-
looking Indian company, Cipla, to commercialize the innovation, not only for 
the domestic market, but also for the export markets (the fi rst time for an 
Indian pharma company to export its product). In 1983, Cipla successfully 
produced the fi rst batch of vincristine vials and sold them at a quarter of the 
price of imported vials. This project also became one of the important contrib-
utors to the entry of Indian pharma companies into international markets.
In 1995, Dr. Rao retired as the director of the Indian Institute of Chemi-
cal Technologies (IICT) and established his own company, Avra Labora-
tories Pvt. Ltd., which provides R&D outsourcing services to foreign and 
local biopharma companies. As the director of IICT, the entrepreneur had 
the opportunity to deliver lectures in many pharmaceutical companies in 
India and abroad, including the MNCs. This provided contact with poten-
tial customers. This was a time when contract R&D performance (out-
source service) by private companies was still new to India.
G. D. Searle and Company, a US-based company (now part of Pfi zer) gave 
the fi rst contract to develop a process for manufacturing a drug that was in 
Phase III development. Searle had also developed its own process for it, but 
wanted Avra to develop an independent alternative process. The advance 
of US$100,000 paid to Avra out of the total contract value of US$200,000 
became the seed money for the company. Avra’s process proved to be more 
effi cient than the one developed by Searle in-house. So Searle adopted this 
process and wanted Avra to build a pilot plant to produce 100 kilograms of 
this compound. The profi ts from this contract became the investment for 
setting up the laboratory and other infrastructure.
At the end of 2006, Avra’s infrastructure included: two R&D units, one 
pilot plant, one steroid plant and one production plant.
Avra’s R&D services include:
Research and development—early stage development of new com-•
pounds, where the focus is more on research than development. In 
some cases, Avra also developed its own products and licensed them 
to pharmaceutical companies (e.g., an antipregnancy drug);
Screening of compounds;•
Process development—the customer has a new molecule developed •
through medical chemistry and wants to procure this molecule in 
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small volumes. Avra takes up the molecule and develops a new pro-
cess for manufacturing it. As the drug under development by the cus-
tomer goes through different phases, the process also changes. Avra 
supports the customer through various phases of drug development.
Driving Forces
Access to talent is the primary motive for outsourcing R&D to India. •
India has established an international reputation for its capabilities 
in chemistry. MNCs and other foreign companies would like to gain 
access to such expertise and talent;
Cost of doing research in India is much lower than in the industrial-•
ized countries. In a period when drug discovery costs are soaring, it 
becomes cost effective to carry out R&D, at least some of it, in loca-
tions where the talent is available;
The Indian IT industry has already established a trust among inter-•
national clients in the ability of Indian companies to deliver R&D 
outsourcing services;
The changes in the Indian IP law in accordance with the WTO Agree-•
ment also provided confi dence among international customers on the 
issue of protection of data.
Host Country Implications
R&D outsourcing by MNCs exposes the scientists to new project manage-
ment skills, technologies and equipment. Furthermore, contact with foreign 
companies is also opening up new opportunities and is promoting more 
scientists to become entrepreneurs by themselves.
5.4 INDIAN NATIONAL RESEARCH INSTITUTES
Indian Institute of Chemical Technology (IICT)
The Council for Scientifi c and Industrial Research (CSIR) is the largest 
national research organization, which carries out research with a network 
of over 38 laboratories. CSIR has a workforce of over 25,000, including 
6,000 scientists and 2,500 Ph.D.s. It fi les over 250 patents applications and 
publishes more than 2,000 scientifi c papers annually. The CSIR network 
of laboratories undertakes basic as well as applied research and earns about 
20 percent of its revenues through contract research. The R&D services of 
CSIR laboratories are being utilized by several MNCs, including GE, Boe-
ing, DuPont, Akzo Chemicals and Novo Nordisk.10 The Indian Institute of 
Chemical Technology (IICT) belongs to the CSIR group.
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The Indian Institute of Chemical Technology (IICT) located in Hydera-
bad originated as the Central Laboratories for Scientifi c and Industrial 
Research (CLSIR), established in 1944 by the then government of Hydera-
bad state. In 1956, the Central Laboratories came under the aegis of CSIR 
and was renamed Regional Research Laboratory, Hyderabad (RRL-H). In 
1989, the RRL-H was rechristened the Indian Institute of Chemical Tech-
nology (IICT), recognizing the multidisciplinary activities and the exper-
tise developed by the institute in the fi eld of chemical technology.
Major areas of research at IICT are: natural products chemistry; drugs 
and intermediates; specialty and fi ne chemicals; fl uoro-organics; inorganic 
and physical chemistry (catalysis and material science); lipid sciences and 
technology; coal, gas and energy; chemical engineering; and mechanical 
design and engineering.
Vision
To become an innovative global R&D provider in the fi eld of chemi-•
cal sciences and technology with reference to industrial and specialty 
chemicals.
To be an institution of international excellence in basic research in •
organic chemistry and adjacent chemical and engineering sciences.
To establish balance between innovation and drug research in the •
institute’s thrust areas.
IICT houses the following centers of excellence—National Center for 
Mass Spectrometry; Nuclear Magnetic Resonance; X-Ray Diffraction; 
Molecular Modeling; Process Safety; Pharmacology; Bioengineering and 
Environmental Center; National Facility for Pheromone Research and 
Envis Center on Bioinformatics.
Selected R&D Capabilities of IICT
Natural products—expertise in the isolation and synthesis of bioac-•
tives especially in the pharma sector, natural products research with 
special emphasis on developing investigational new drugs (INDS) 
from herbal formulations. It activities include: development of new 
synthetic methodologies for novel scaffolds, hybrid natural products 
and combinatorial chemistry; phytochemistry; and new bioactive 
molecules, herbal drugs and standardization. Its clients in this area 
include: Glaxo SmithKline (UK), G. D. Searle (US), DuPont (US) and 
Arqule (US).
Agrochemicals—development of commercially viable and green •
technologies for market-driven products and organic intermedi-
ates. Its activities include: development of novel processes for com-
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mercially important pesticides; synthesis of new chemical entities; 
and isolation, characterization and activity profi ling of natural 
products.
Drugs and intermediates—development of new drugs for various diseases, 
with special emphasis on asthma, HIV, tuberculosis, cancer and tropi-
cal diseases like malaria; basic research in the area of synthetic organic 
chemistry, especially asymmetric synthesis, and total synthesis of natural 
products; and development of new designer molecules to supplement the 
traditional methods of fi nding bioactive molecules from nature. Compe-
tencies in the area include: synthesis of non-natural peptides, non-natural 
saccharides and other designer molecules; solid/solution phase organic syn-
thesis useful to make combinatorial libraries; synthetic route identifi cation/
process development of lead molecules; and synthesis of NCEs for their 
biological evaluation for lead generation. Foreign fi rms among its clients 
in this area include: Civenti (US), Smith Kline Beecham (UK), Cytomed/
Leukosite (US), Arqule (US) and DuPont (US).
Specialty and fi ne chemicals—IICT’s core competencies in this area •
include: industrial research leading to technology development and its 
transfer to sponsors; basic research in organic chemistry; development 
of processes and technologies for drugs and pharmaceuticals, organic 
intermediates, specialty chemicals and value added chemicals, drug 
discovery; biophotonics, supramolecular chemistry and molecular 
recognition; carbohydrate chemistry leading to synthesis of natural 
products, oligosaccharides and glycoconjugates.
Coal, gas and energy—value addition and better utilization of coal •
and gas; hydrogen energy technologies for fuel cell applications; 
energy -effi cient gas separation processes and gas purifi cation.
IICT employs over 200 scientists, 300 technical staff and 100 admin-
istrative staff. IICT’s scientists get an incentive in the form of 40 percent 
of the earnings from the IP when it is commercialized. IICT can carry out 
complete drug development, as well as process development methodology 
(e.g., automated synthesis). IICT develops the methodology on a laboratory 
scale, which customers scale up later.
The industry knows about the capabilities of IICT through its publi-
cations of about 400 papers per year and 40 to 50 patent fi lings a year. 
Furthermore former students of IICT are spread around the world, with 
many of them working for MNCs. Companies themselves approach IICT 
for their R&D requirements. Based on the performance of IICT, clients 
also refer its services to other companies. IICT has a continuous long-term 
relationship with four foreign pharma MNCs (i.e., whose project value is 
more than US$100,000/year/client). In any given year there are about 20 
foreign companies with R&D projects at IICT. Among the Indian fi rms 270 
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private sector fi rms and 23 government-owned companies have contracts 
with IICT. The total annual turnover of IICT is about US$250 million.
Driving Forces
The expertise and the facilities (instrumentation) available in IICT are •
the major reason for companies to outsource R&D to IICT.
Developing and screening a greater number and wider variety of •
compounds cost-effectively enhances the chances of success in drug 
development.
Cost differentials are not considered as a driving force, as IICT is not •
a low-cost service provider.
IICT differentiates its services from those provided by the private R&D 
service organizations in the following respects:
Generates new chemistry—projects with IICT involve generation •
of new chemistry (not well-known routes). The customer only pro-
vides a target and IICT develops cost-effective solutions. Projects 
with private R&D service providers mainly involve only conversion 
process, where often the customer provides the procedure and raw 
materials;
No commercial interest—IICT being an academic research institute, •
there is no threat of competing with the customer by copying its tech-
nologies. So customers feel more confi dent with IICT;
No small volume manufacturing—IICT does not take up projects •
involving small volume manufacturing, which are mainly cost-saving 
projects.
In order to protect the confi dentiality in its projects for the industry, 
IICT does not collaborate with other organizations. IICT also does not 
accept two customers for the same kind of R&D.
R&D projects for MNCs often generate new knowledge. When new 
chemistry is developed, the MNCs usually approve its publication by the 
IICT research team, without mentioning the sponsoring company’s name. 
Such projects have not resulted in any patents for IICT so far.
Knowledge Flows and Learning
Contract R&D projects for MNCs result in two-way knowledge fl ows. •
While the MNC customers get the knowledge relating to the new 
product or process, IICT also gains knowledge from MNCs. Until 
recently, India did not have much experience in developing new mol-
ecules. Working for MNCs helps in understanding the fi ner things of 
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R&D, e.g., how to look for a new molecule, why change a particular 
molecular structure and so on.
Scientists who are well equipped with basic science knowledge acquire •
knowledge relating to methodologies and techniques that transform 
scientifi c knowledge into a product or process development. IICT sci-
entists also get exposed to sophisticated and advanced equipment and 
facilities of MNCs, e.g., automation synthesis, HTPS and so on, an 
opportunity that might not have opened up otherwise.
There is an exchange of research personnel with MNCs’ customers. •
Teams from customers spend some time at IICT, and IICT’s scien-
tists spend some time at customer’s R&D laboratories abroad. For 
instance, in a project for a Swiss company, the customer has strong 
specialization in the fi eld of biology relating to diabetes and IICT is 
strong in chemistry. Through joint work, the Swiss team is gaining 
chemistry knowledge and IICT’s scientists are getting exposure to the 
Swiss company’s methodologies in biology.
IICT has international institutional R&D collaboration with France, Ger-
many and Japan. These projects are funded through bilateral agreements. 
The Department of Science and Technology, Government of India, and 
CSIR also have funds for collaborative projects with institutions abroad.
Host Country Implications
The location of R&D by MNCs is increasing the employment oppor-•
tunities for scientists. More important, through such R&D, Indian 
scientists are getting trained in product development methodologies 
and processes. Such knowledge, which is vital for economic develop-
ment, gets diffused through the mobility of scientists.
Outsourcing of R&D by MNCs is turning many scientists into •
entrepreneurs. As the number of compounds screened by the 
MNCs increases, the business opportunities for R&D service pro-
viders are increasingly motivating scientists to set up their own 
laboratories.
Indian Institute of Science (IISc)
The Indian Institute of Science (IISc) originated with the efforts of J. N. Tata 
(1839–1904), a pioneer industrialist, who planned to set up an institute to 
promote original investigations in all branches of learning and to utilize the 
research for the benefi t of India. The institute came into existence in 1911, 
with the fi rst batch of students admitted into the Departments of General 
and Applied Chemistry and Electrotechnology. The institute acquired a 
deemed university status in 1956.
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In the Indian context, the institute is unique in character, as it is neither 
a national laboratory, which concentrates solely on research and applied 
work, nor a conventional university, which concerns itself mainly with 
teaching. IISc is concerned both with research in frontier areas and educa-
tion in current technologically important areas. This is also the fi rst insti-
tute in the country to introduce innovative integrated Ph.D. programs in 
biological, chemical and physical sciences for science graduates.
In addition to engagements in formal education and research, the insti-
tute has been playing an active part in offering short-term courses to sci-
entists and technologists in service. The Continuing Education Program 
covers a wide range of topics, and over 1,500 working scientists and engi-
neers go through such courses every year. IISc also provides consultancy 
services, through its Center for Scientifi c and Industrial Consultancy, so 
that the know-how generated in the institute percolates to industries via 
industry-sponsored projects.
IISC has six divisions: Biological Sciences, Chemical Sciences, Electri-
cal Sciences, Information Sciences, Mechanical Sciences, and Physical and 
Mathematical Sciences. Outside the framework of divisions, it has the Center 
for Application of Science and Technology to Rural Areas, Center for Con-
tinuing Education, and Center for Scientifi c and Industrial Consultancy.
Some of the R&D areas in which IISc is active include: aerodynamics; 
artifi cial intelligence; atmospheric sciences; biological chemistry; biomedi-
cal signal processing; biotechnology; combustion chemistry; combustion 
and propulsion; composite structures; computational science; electrochem-
istry; electronic devices circuits and technology; fl uid dynamics; genetics; 
i. c. engines; mechatronics ergonomics; molecular cell biology; neural net-
works; protein engineering; signal processing; software architecture.
Since its inception, IISc has been actively interacting with the industry 
through individual contacts of its faculty members. This became formalized 
with the establishment of the Center for Scientifi c and Industrial Consultancy 
in 1975. The Society for Innovation and Discovery (SID), which is a part of 
IISc, actively promotes such collaboration. Through SID, several MNCs as 
well as Indian companies have located their corporate laboratories within 
the IISc campus to closely interact with the IISc faculty and researchers. SID, 
founded in 1991 and registered under the Society’s Act, has the mission to 
enable industries and business establishments to compete and prosper in 
the face of global competition by utilizing Indian innovations in S&T. SID 
undertakes R&D projects based on individual and/or joint proposals from 
the faculty and scientists of IISc in collaboration with industries, business 
establishments, national and international organizations.
SID’s contact with the industry is established in the following ways:
A faculty member has some contact (e.g., a consultancy) with the •
company and it subsequently leads to a larger project at IISc, spon-
sored by that company;
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SID presents itself to companies by making presentations of IISc’s •
capabilities;
Industry itself is aware of IISc’s capabilities through its publications •
and what it is doing with the industry;
IISc’s former students (alumni) have also been good ambassadors in •
spreading its reputation and its capabilities worldwide.
Driving Forces
Availability of expertise and talent is the reason for the industry (par-•
ticularly foreign fi rms) to approach IISc for R&D collaboration.
Cost is not a determining factor, as IISc does not accept projects that •
do not involve cutting-edge research and innovation. For instance, in 
2005, IISc turned down about US$20 million worth of projects, as 
they did not have a suffi cient research component.
SID focuses only on areas in which only IISc has the expertise. Other-•
wise, it will advise the client to approach another organization, which 
does that particular type of work.
SID started with individual consultancy work for companies. But the 
real interdisciplinary collaborative work in projects began in 1991, and 
actual projects started coming in since 1994. Faculty members, as in any 
other academic institution, are more interested in publications as they 
determine their career growth. So collaboration with industry has been 
evolving gradually. It takes time to understand an industry’s requirements 
and for industry itself to get convinced of IISc’s capabilities. Since 2003, 
there has been an explosive growth in collaborative projects with industry.
IISc, however, does not want too much industry-related work. Education 
and advanced research are its priority activities. A balance in activities is 
very important from IISc’s perspective. If a faculty member’s research and 
publications are relevant to an industry, but he is not aware of it, SID helps 
him in getting some monetary reward by linking up with the industry.
As a normal practice, a company wanting to engage the services of IISc 
approaches the SID, which in turn identifi es and allocates the work between 
relevant departments of IISc. When a client approaches SID, it makes a 
presentation of IISc and its capabilities. The company is also requested to 
make a presentation and identify the departments of IISc that the company 
would like to collaborate with and identify the faculty from the database 
of competencies provided by SID. The selected faculty starts understanding 
the needs of the company in one-on-one meetings, and the sponsoring com-
pany visits the laboratories of IISc to see what is going on there and to iden-
tify a program. SID takes the responsibility for implementing the program 
by providing the budget, receiving the money from the company, buying the 
necessary equipment and monitoring the progress of the program.
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Among the clients with whom IISc has R&D collaboration are: Micro-
soft, Motorola, Intel, Texas Instruments, Boeing, General Motors, DuPont, 
and Alcoa.
For instance, researchers at the IISc are collaborating with Boeing in 
nine projects that will contribute to building next-generation fl ights. To 
build these new fl ights, the IISc faculty has proposed the use of smart 
structures, application of lightweight materials such as nano materials, 
alloys and their composites. The designs will be tested in a virtual envi-
ronment that is being developed at IISc. Over 30 faculty members from 
various departments including aerospace, metallurgy, the Center for Prod-
uct Design and Manufacturing and civil engineering are involved in these 
projects. The areas of focus include developing fl aps for the aircraft that 
are fi tted with smart sensors so that they can direct wind currents better 
and use of aluminum alloys in high temperature areas as well as in land-
ing gear boxes. In 2005, Boeing signed a memorandum of understanding 
with IISc to collaborate in these projects. IISc is the only Asian institution 
that Boeing has tied up with for research and transfer of technology. Boe-
ing’s other partners include Carnegie Mellon, Stanford Engineering, MIT, 
Caltech, University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign, and University of 
Cambridge. Boeing is investing US$5 million a year on research at IISc 
for fi ve years.11
IISc also allows companies to set up their own R&D laboratories inside 
its premises by providing 2,000 to 4,000 square feet of space to each com-
pany. This is a unique concept not practiced by many universities or national 
research institutes in India. The company creates its own infrastructure 
and plans its own research. The stipulation is that the research conducted 
by the company in this R&D lab should be relevant to IISc’s research, and 
it should contract out some projects to IISc’s faculty. Research team of the 
company and IISc’s faculty spend time and use each other’s laboratories. 
In this way, IISc’s students also get to do projects in the company’s R&D 
lab, and many of them subsequently tend to be recruited by the company. 
Through this model, IISc feels that the talent available in pure sciences can 
join with industry to develop cutting-edge and complex technologies.
Among the companies that presently have R&D laboratories on IISc’s 
campus are: Cookson Electronics, US (research on nano technology); 
ViZiPhar Biosciences, Belgium; IMI, US (electronics); Tata Motors (auto-
motive), India; Cadila Pharmaceuticals Limited, India (biopharma); and 
Unichem Laboratories, India (Biosciences R&D Lab).
According to SID, the faculty of IISc cannot be expected to be bet-
ter than the company’s own R&D team in actual product development. 
But it has strength in certain areas of S&T that even the best of the 
companies may not have, e.g., research on advanced materials. The 
research facilities (equipment and instrumentation) available at IISc are 
of world class, and companies may not be in a position to invest in cre-
ating such facilities on their own. The research environment at IISc is 
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also completely different from that of the environment in industry. IISc’s 
environment enables companies to approach the problem from different 
perspectives, other than the approach that a company had taken until 
then, which might lead to innovative solutions. It is an ideal environment 
for discontinuous innovations.
IISc’s research teams working with industry get incentives in the form 
of monetary benefi ts, participation in conferences, travel grants, training 
abroad, equipment and operating costs, and so on.
Knowledge Flows and Learning
In collaborative work there is substantial knowledge fl ow both ways. The 
company gets access to the talent and knowledge available at IISc, and the 
scientists at IISc get exposed to the industrial requirement; this helps in 
changing the perspective with which scientists pursue their own research. 
Scientists get exposed to management techniques in project management. 
There is also an exchange program between the collaborating partners. 
IISc’s scientists visit and spend time at the client’s R&D centers abroad, 
and the client’s own teams come from abroad and spend time at IISc. For 
instance, this exchange is well established with General Motors. Scientists 
as well as students from IISc spend three months at GM’s R&D facilities 
in the US, and GM’s research teams from around the world spend some 
time at IISc.
Issues relating to intellectual property rights (IPRs) are gradually evolv-
ing at IISc. Initially there was no insistence on sharing of IPRs, but now 
IISc insists on sharing IPRs with the collaborating/sponsoring company 
getting the fi rst priority to use the IP. The company has to fi le for the pat-
ents and maintain them.
Host Country Implications
When research is done at the cutting-edge level and creates new IP, the sci-
entists in the country get exposed to doing such advanced research, which 
not only provides training opportunities, but also motivates them to do 
such advanced work on their own on other problems that would be benefi -
cial to the country.
R&D by MNCs also motivates and compels local companies to perform 
and enhance their own R&D activities. For instance, when General Motors 
set up its R&D center at IISc, the Indian automotive companies, such as 
Tata Motors, Mahindra & Mahindra, Ashok Leyland and TVS, started 
looking at IISc with special interest. Until foreign companies started work-
ing with IISc, local companies were not aware of the capabilities available 
at IISc, but now the Indian companies want to collaborate with IISc, either 
by locating their own R&D laboratories on the campus or through spon-
sorship of research projects.
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5.5 QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY12
A questionnaire survey was carried out in India by the author of this book 
in 1995 (P. Reddy 1997). Although the survey was carried out more than a 
decade ago, as the case studies in the present study reveal, the determining 
factors for location of global innovation in emerging economies remain the 
same. The survey was conducted among MNCs involved with new tech-
nologies as well as conventional technologies. The conventional industries 
category included: chemicals, pesticides, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, engi-
neering, hygiene and health care products and branded consumer goods. 
The new technologies category included: electronics (including ICT and 
software), biotechnology and solar energy companies.
The survey showed that the majority of R&D units performed technology 
transfer unit (TTU) and indigenous technology unit (ITU) types of R&D, 
i.e., adaptation of products and processes to local conditions and product 
development for the local market. This is more so in the case of conventional 
industries, where about 87.5 percent of the fi rms were involved in these two 
types of activities. On the other hand, only 25 percent of the new technolo-
gies fi rms reported carrying out TTU and ITU types of R&D. All the global 
technology unit (GTU) and corporate technology unit (CTU) types of R&D 
units belonged to new technologies fi rms, with 50 percent of new technolo-
gies fi rms carrying out GTU and 12.5 percent performing CTU types of 
R&D. This suggests that in new technologies there is less need for product 
or process adaptation to the local market. Similarly, the development of 
products exclusively for the local market (ITU type) by new technologies 
fi rms is also less, except in the case of biotechnology companies developing 
new plant varieties based on the local soil and weather conditions.
In terms of the driving forces for the establishment of R&D units in 
India, the availability of personnel was the main factor across all types of 
R&D and industries. As the data in Table 5.1 show, the weighted average 
rank of this motive was 4.12 across the industries and different types of 
R&D units. However, this factor was relatively more important in the case 
of new technologies (4.31) than in the case of the conventional technolo-
gies (3.93). The next most important motive for the new technologies units 
was the low costs of R&D, with a weightage of 3.25. On the other hand, 
the two most important motives for conventional industries were: to be in 
proximity to manufacturing facilities (4.56) and to be in proximity to the 
Indian market (4.06). The corresponding fi gures for these two factors in 
the case of new technology fi rms were 2.13 and 2.81, respectively, suggest-
ing that R&D in new technologies could be geographically delinked from 
manufacturing facilities. The shortages of S&T personnel in industrialized 
countries as a driving force for location of R&D in India did not seem to 
be an important factor, with a weightage of only 1.69 across all industries. 
However, it assumed relatively greater importance in the case of new tech-
nologies fi rms with a weightage of 2.38.
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Table 5.2 presents the type of R&D units and the main motives for their 
location in India. For TTUs, being in proximity to manufacturing facili-
ties had been the main driving force with a weightage of 4.78, followed 
by the motive to be in proximity to the Indian market, with a weightage 
of 4.33. For RTUs, the low-costs of R&D and proximity to the Indian 
market showed equal weightage of 4.50, closely followed by the proximity 
to manufacturing with 4.25. On the other hand, proximity to the Asian 
market as a motive had a weightage of only 3.25. This discrepancy might 
have been due to their reliance on the Indian market as the main base and 
then venturing into the regional market through adaptations.
The main driving force for establishing GTUs has been the availability of 
R&D personnel, with a weightage of 4.75. The next most important motive 
was the low costs of conducting R&D, mainly due to the lower-wages of per-
sonnel, with a weightage of 3.25. Being in proximity to the market or manu-
facturing did not seem to be important for locations of GTUs. For CTUs 
also, the availability of personnel was the most important motive for loca-
tion, with a weightage of 4.00. The next most important motive was stated 
to be the proximity to the region’s market, with a weightage of 3.00. This 
might have been due to the fact that some of the R&D being carried out by 
the CTUs in the survey involved developing potential biotechnology-based 
Table 5.1  Questionnaire Survey––The Driving Forces for Location of R&D in 






Availability of S&T personnel 3.93 4.31 4.12
Low-costs of R&D 2.88 3.25 3.06
Shortages of S&T personnel inhome 
countries
1.00 2.38 1.69
Proximity to manufacturing 4.56 2.13 3.34
Proximity to Indian market 4.06 2.81 3.44
Proximity to Asian market 2.06 2.38 2.22
Availability of raw materials 2.81 2.06 2.44
Government incentives 1.94 1.63 1.78
Corporate image building 2.94 1.89 2.41
Technology monitoring 3.06 2.44 2.75
Note: The respondents were asked to rank the motives for locating R&D in India as they 
perceive on a scale of 0 to 5, with 0 as not a motive at all and 5 as the most important motive. 
Since there may be more than one equally important motive, the respondents were given the 
freedom to assign the same value to more than one motive.
Source: Adapted from P. Reddy (1997, p. 1828).
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drugs and diagnostics for tropical or infectious diseases prevalent in the 
region. Therefore, proximity to the regional market might have been 
assigned a higher weightage.
The survey also revealed the linkages of different types of R&D units 
both within the corporate structure and external organizations. All the 
units were linked to the MNCs’ corporate R&D in their respective home 
countries. More than 80 percent of R&D units of the new technologies 
fi rms were also linked to the parent’s R&D units worldwide, whereas the 
fi gure was only 50 percent for the R&D units in conventional technolo-
gies. The CTUs were the most integrated into the global corporate R&D 
network of the MNCs, with 100 percent of them linked to parents’ R&D 
units worldwide. The corresponding fi gures for other types of units are: 
GTUs (87.5 percent), RTUs (75.0 percent), ITUs (55.6 percent) and TTUs 
(44.4 percent), indicating the relative integration of these different func-
tions within the corporate R&D structure. However, when viewed from 
the perspective of commercialization of R&D results within the host coun-
try, all the conventional industries were linked to manufacturing facilities 
in the host country, whereas only 50 percent of the new technologies units 
were (Reddy 1997, p. 1830).
In terms of external linkages, across all types of R&D units and technol-
ogies, only a few linkages with the local industry were reported. A partial 
Table 5.2 Questionnaire Survey––Type of R&D Unit and Driving Forces for Its 
Location (ascending order of weightage 0–5)
Driving force TTU ITU RTU GTU CTU
Availability of S&T personnel 4.00 3.78 4.00 4.75 4.00
Low-costs of R&D 2.78 2.67 4.50 3.25 2.50
Shortages of S&T personnel 
in home countries
1.33 1.11 2.25 2.25 2.50
Proximity to manufacturing 4.78 4.33 4.25 0.75 1.00
Proximity to Indian market 4.33 4.22 4.50 1.25 2.50
Proximity to Asian market 2.56 1.67 3.25 1.75 3.00
Availability of raw materials 2.33 3.44 3.50 0.88 2.50
Government incentives 2.00 2.33 1.50 1.13 2.00
Corporate image building 2.56 3.56 3.25 0.88 1.00
Technology monitoring 3.00 3.22 3.75 1.75 2.50
Note: The respondents were asked to rank the motives for locating R&D in India as they 
perceive on a scale of 0 to 5, with 0 as not a motive at all and 5 as the most important motive. 
Since there may be more than one equally important motive, the respondents were given the 
freedom to assign the same value to more than one motive.
Source: Adapted from P. Reddy (1997, p. 1829).
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explanation of this might be that MNCs’ R&D activities tend to be in high-
tech areas in which it might have been diffi cult to fi nd domestic fi rms that 
could complement those activities in a developing host country, particularly 
in the 1990s.
On the other hand, linkages with the local university system were 
reported to have been stronger. The conventional industries tended to rely 
more on the local academic system than did the new technologies fi rms. 
62.5 percent of the conventional industries reported having linkages with 
the local universities, whereas this only applied to 43.8 percent of the new 
technologies fi rms. 44.4 percent of the TTUs and ITUs also established 
linkages with local universities, a fi gure almost equivalent to 50 percent of 
the GTUs. This appears contradictory to conventional views. Part of the 
explanation for this may lie in the fact that TTUs and ITUs are not confi ned 
to their specifi c activities alone. It is possible that they had these linkages in 
the course of performing other types of R&D activities. Another explana-
tion could be that TTUs and ITUs, which were mostly in the conventional 
technologies, were established several years ago, prior to the liberalization 
of the Indian economy. At the time, due to import restrictions, these units 
had to carry out material substitution in products and therefore new pro-
cesses as well. These activities perhaps involved more than just tinkering 
with the parent’s technologies and had to rely on the local university system 
for support (Reddy 1997, pp. 1830–1831).
6 Global Innovation in China
R&D-related FDI infl ows into China have surged in recent years, accumu-
lating to about US$4 billion, and the number of registered R&D centers of 
foreign companies reached 700 by 2004. Although the fi rst R&D center of 
an MNC was set up in 1993, most of the known projects are of recent origin 
(established after China’s accession to the WTO in December 2001). While 
the majority of these centers focus on adaptation types of innovations, some 
perform innovative R&D that is closely integrated with MNCs’ global inno-
vation networks, targeting global markets (UNCTAD 2005, p. 141).
According to some scholars (Schwaag-Serger 2006; Walsh, 2003), it is 
diffi cult to accurately estimate R&D activities by foreign companies in 
China. The R&D staff strength of foreign companies in China only par-
tially refl ects the actual R&D activity, as many of them conduct R&D 
through cooperation with Chinese organizations, and this is not refl ected 
in the data. Moreover, foreign companies are offered signifi cant incentives 
(fi nancial and otherwise) to establish R&D units, sometimes making loca-
tion of a R&D unit a performance requirement for being allowed to manu-
facture or sell in China. One foreign company as quoted by Schwaag-Serger 
(2006, p. 244) said, “[T]he Chinese demanded [that we carry out R&D 
in China], so we hired a few engineers.” As a result, although some R&D 
units exist on paper, they do very little R&D.
According to Walsh (2003), the Chinese government encourages R&D-
related FDI, particularly in ICT-related industries, by offering a range of 
preferential policies that include tax rebates, loans and other incentives. 
As a result in this sector, foreign MNCs have established over 200 R&D 
centers, programs or labs in China between 1990 and 2002 (p. xiii). The 
preferential treatment and government incentives extended to foreign com-
panies for locating R&D may induce some of them to register their activi-
ties as R&D even though these activities may not otherwise be classifi ed 
as such. Companies may also establish R&D units to earn goodwill with 
Chinese authorities, as location of R&D is seen as evidence of a company’s 
long-term commitment to China (Gassman & Han 2004).
Although the Chinese Ministry of Commerce claimed that by late 2005 
there were more than 750 foreign-established or foreign-invested R&D 
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centers in China (MoC 2005), for the reasons mentioned above, the num-
ber of centers actually carrying out R&D of relevance to the company’s 
China or global operations is likely to be considerably smaller. According 
to von Zedtwitz’s (2004) estimation, there were 199 foreign R&D facilities 
in China at the beginning of 2004. Since then the number has increased 
rapidly, but there may not be more than 250 to 300 foreign R&D units 
currently. Almost all foreign companies that have R&D activities in China 
also have production and/or distribution facilities there. So it becomes even 
more diffi cult to assess how many of these companies are carrying out 
innovative global R&D. Schwaag-Serger (2006 pp. 244–245) examined 
and cross-referenced annual reports, company websites and news clippings 
and found a discrepancy. The R&D units declared as strategic by a com-
pany or by the Chinese press were not represented in that company’s list of 
global R&D centers, either on its home page or in its annual reports. After 
correcting for this discrepancy, she found approximately 30 MNCs that 
currently have up to 60 facilities performing global R&D in China.
Sun (2003 p. 150) classifi es the foreign R&D centers in China into two 
categories: (i) strategic; and (ii) tactical. Apart from the market potential, 
strategic R&D differs from tactical R&D in many aspects, such as the 
nature and scope of activity, requirements for the type of S&T person-
nel, communication patterns and even locations in the host country. For 
instance, strategic R&D focuses on global markets, with a time horizon of 
mid- and long-term and the type of R&D conducted being basic research. 
On the other hand, tactical R&D’s focus is on local and/or regional mar-
kets, with a short-term time horizon and the type of R&D being more 
development-oriented. In a later study, Sun et al. (2006) examined foreign 
R&D units located in Shanghai. Through interviews at 18 foreign R&D 
units, the study found that the majority of foreign R&D activities in China 
are of adaptive and tactical nature carried out to cater to the local market. 
However, there are also several strategic foreign R&D units engaged in 
projects for the global markets. The size of these strategic foreign R&D 
units varies signifi cantly, with the smallest one having only four employees 
and the largest one several hundreds. The sectors covered range from chem-
istry, electronics, life sciences and materials to ICT.
Companies that perform innovative R&D in China include Nokia, 
Microsoft, Ericsson, Intel and Motorola. For instance, Nokia relocated a 
substantial portion of its third-generation software development to Hang-
zhou, transferring technologies and people from the former competence 
center in Finland (von Zedtwitz 2004). Similarly, Microsoft China’s R&D 
activities form an important part in its global value chain. One of Micro-
soft’s six research labs worldwide, Microsoft Research Asia (MSR Asia), 
was established in 1998 in Beijing, with 170 researchers, and in late 2003, 
Microsoft opened its Advanced Technology Center (ATC) in the same 
location (Buderi 2005). “The lab and the technology centre are not only 
researching and developing products aimed at the Chinese market, but also 
Global Innovation in China 145
expect to be key technology transfer point for a host of new Microsoft’s 
products worldwide, such as web search and mobile technologies” (Schwaag-
Serger 2006, p.243).
There are several different forms in which foreign companies conduct 
R&D in China: (1) wholly owned stand-alone R&D units; (2) R&D activi-
ties in the company’s production units; (3) joint venture R&D with Chinese 
partners/organizations; and (4) collaborative research with Chinese research 
institutes and universities or institutes.
The driving forces for location of R&D in China are several (Schwaag-Serger 
2006; Sigurdson, 2005; von Zedtwitz 2004; Walsh, 2003). They include:
Availability of a large pool of talented human resources.•
Lower wages of research personnel compared to those in industrial-•
ized countries.
Gaining access to a large and rapidly growing domestic market. The •
desire to be close to the strategically important Chinese telecom mar-
ket motivated foreign telecom companies to locate R&D in China.
Supporting the local manufacturing activities through product and •
process development.
Capturing new technological opportunities through contact with •
China’s research programs.
As a response to political or institutional requirements such as incen-•
tives and location of R&D and technology transfer as a performance 
requirement. For instance, some national regulations may require for-
eign companies to set up R&D along with production facilities.
Domestic technical requirements and new standards set by the Chi-•
nese government are another important driving force for foreign com-
panies to locate R&D in China.
As Gassman & Han (2004) point out, perhaps the most important driv-
ing force for location of R&D in China by MNCs has been the perceived 
compulsion. Since China became open to FDI, it has pursued a policy that 
required foreign companies manufacturing or selling goods and services in 
China to transfer technology. Even though the Decision on Amendments to 
the Implementation Rules of the Law on Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises 
issued by the State Council in 2001 removed these requirements on foreign 
companies, in practice many of them feel pressured to locate R&D in China 
(Walsh 2003; Long 2005; Schwaag-Serger 2006).
Another important driving force for foreign companies to locate R&D in 
China has been the perceived need to tap the informal networks and infor-
mation sources for business success (the frequently mentioned ‘GuanXi’). 
Local R&D activities facilitate a company’s gaining access to and maintain-
ing informal networks with local universities and scientifi c communities, 
which play an important role in the policy arena. The Chinese economy is 
undergoing a transition from a planned to a market-based system, which 
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makes the changes in industrial regulations, legislation and policies very 
dynamic. Local R&D activities and proximity to the government would 
help MNCs to keep pace with changes in this dynamic policy environment 
(Schwaag-Serger 2006, p. 252).
In a research survey study, Ke Wen (2005) found three types of barriers 
for foreign R&D in China:
Barriers from policy environment—strong and bureaucratic govern-•
ment; import limitations; weak IPRs protection system; and diffi cul-
ties in traveling to Taiwan.
Barriers from local market—increasing operational costs; and imper-•
fect infrastructure.
Barriers relating to human resources—lack of innovative and experi-•
enced labor force; high employee mobility; and diffi culties in manag-
ing diversifi ed staff.
According to Walsh (2003, 2005), there have been several distinct stages 
of the evolution of foreign R&D in China: Phase 1 (late 1980s-mid-1990s), 
foreign R&D in China started with exploratory activities and forming of 
strategic partners with local research institutes/universities or joint ven-
ture partners in local manufacturing and marketing; Phase 2 (mid- to late 
1990s), the expansion phase of R&D activities took place. The activities/
forms included: contract R&D/outsourcing to local universities or fi rms, 
training centers and product development through localization and sys-
tems and standards integration; Phase 3 (late 1990s to early 2000s), the 
consolidation of the R&D activities through establishment of more cen-
tralized facilities, more advanced R&D objectives and closer relations with 
the parent company; Phase 4 (2003 to 2005+), a phase of explosive growth 
of foreign R&D in China, increasing infl ow of R&D-related investments, 
China and MNCs seeking new ways to exploit commercial R&D in China, 
cross-regional collaboration in R&D, with China serving as hub.
Taiwan is one of the largest sources of FDI for China. China is also 
a large manufacturing base for Taiwanese electronics fi rms. About two-
thirds of China’s electronics exports are attributable to Taiwanese fi rms. 
Chen (2004) conducted a study among Taiwanese fi rms about their 
global R&D activities, through a questionnaire survey in July 2000 that 
received 82 USble responses (a response rate of 13.67 percent), followed 
by detailed interviews with 21 of these fi rms or their Chinese subsidiar-
ies. The survey revealed that 39 out of the 82 respondents (47.56 percent) 
had located R&D in China, followed by 22 in the US, 13 in Japan, seven 
in Europe, three in South Korea, three in Singapore, three in India, and 
one in Israel. If only the respondents engaged in R&D are considered, the 
proportion of R&D units located in China rises to 67.24 percent, suggest-
ing that China had become the major offshore R&D location for these 
Taiwanese fi rms (p. 343).
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Based on the fi rm-level interviews, Chen (2004, pp. 345–346) identifi ed 
fi ve types of R&D units of Taiwanese fi rms in China. First, the product 
development is undertaken in Taiwan, while engineering support and man-
ufacturing-related R&D are conducted in China; second, some Taiwan-
ese fi rms outsource their software development activities to Chinese fi rms; 
third, Taiwanese fi rms have research collaboration with Chinese universi-
ties and/or research institutes; fourth, some Taiwanese fi rms conduct their 
upstream (core) R&D (or R&D for products at the developmental stage) 
in Taiwan, while their subsidiaries in China are assigned the downstream 
(non-core) R&D (or R&D for products at the mature stage); and fi nally, 
some Taiwanese fi rms carry out R&D in China for systems-related prod-
ucts, often modular products for the local market, such as handset moth-
erboards for communication systems, but carry out R&D for peripherals, 
such as handset motherboards, in Taiwan.
6.1 ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES OF FOREIGN 
CORPORATE R&D IN CHINA
Nokia’s R&D in China1
Much of Nokia’s R&D work is closely linked to technologies, business or 
products in China. A suffi cient proportion of work, however, focuses on 
global projects to ensure competence creation and also to utilize created 
competencies to contribute to local activities and utilize local researchers to 
study China-related topics, which are natural to do in China and diffi cult 
to do at other global facilities.
Driving Forces
China is the world’s largest mobile market as far as having the most •
subscribers and being the most dynamic;
China is a strategic country market for Nokia. China was Nokia’s •
second-largest market by 2004 and became the largest market by 
2005. Nokia is the number one supplier of handsets in China and the 
leading supplier of 3G systems in the greater China area.
China is one of the 12 global R&D bases of Nokia in the world. Chi-
nese R&D operations support both local and global markets. Nokia 
Research Center, Beijing, was established in 1998. It carries out long-term 
research projects and contributes to local business through accumulated 
expertise. About 30 percent of its staff hold Ph.D.s and 60 percent mas-
ter’s degrees, and 90 percent of the staff are Chinese nationals. It carries 
out research on: beyond 3G radio, core and IP networks and their per-
formance; multimedia technologies and applications (research on Asian 
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user interfaces), Chinese mobile applications and services; and technology 
exploration in China and other countries in the region. Researchers are 
encouraged to prepare inventions and scientifi c publications. On average, 
one patent application is fi led per researcher annually. Some of its achieve-
ments include the world’s fi rst WCDMA high speed uplink packet access 
(HSUPA) demonstration system. Beijing Product Creation (Beijing PC) 
was established in September 1999. The initial purpose was to expand 
Nokia’s capabilities to develop and localize terminal products for Nokia 
in China and Asia. Now it is a key R&D center in the global mobile phone 
business group. It designs, develops and delivers mobile devices for the 
global market as well as China-specifi c products. More than 40 percent of 
the globally shipped volume in the Mobile Phones Business Group comes 
from products designed and developed by Beijing PC.
Nokia has research cooperation with top-level Chinese universities. The 
cooperation takes various forms, including: funding for university research; 
research subcontracting; scholarships, fellowships, innovation funds, equip-
ment, sponsoring of conference participation and so on; joint national or 
European Union (EU) projects; academic information exchange; internship 
positions for Chinese students; and joint postdoctoral programs.
France Telecom’s R&D in China2
China is one of 16 locations of France Telecom’s R&D centers through-
out the world. It is a wholly owned subsidiary. The main focus is on 
research and innovation in telecom-related areas that are most dynamic 
and advanced in China. The center contributes to France Telecom’s global 
operations through innovative applications and services. The center has 70 
scientists and engineers.
Driving Forces
To gain access to the dynamic telecom market in China.•
To gain access to the large pool of human resources in China.•
France Telecom’s R&D in China is organized into six laboratories that 
work on: open source technology; IP network and services; wireless sys-
tems; multimedia and visual and audio systems; speech and language pro-
cessing; and innovative terminals. It has academic partnerships with local 
universities and research institutes as well as local companies. France Tele-
com also participates in European Union projects.
Lucent Bell Labs in China3
Lucent Technologies (China) is the holding company handling all Lucent’s 
businesses in China. In March 2000, Bell Labs Research was established 
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in Beijing, followed by Bell Labs China’s Wireless Laboratory in Beijing. In 
April 2002, the Lucent Mobility R&D Center was established in Beijing, 
followed by another center in Nanjing for 3G projects. The Lucent Mobility 
R&D Nanjing works on: 3G technology and product development; mobile 
switching (MSC, ECP, BSC) software development for Lucent’s global 3G 
products; and technical support for Lucent’s customers and business teams 
in China. The center has 300 in staff.
Driving Forces
China’s market potential—to be close to customers;•
Large supply of talented human resources available at a low cost;•
Manufacturing and sourcing activity in China—to be close to pro-•




Intel, a US-based MNC in the semiconductor business, has over 20,000 
R&D employees located in more than 30 countries. Intel’s R&D opera-
tions cover wholly owned R&D units, collaborations with universities/
research institutes, joint venture R&D with other fi rms and venture-cap-
ital investments in technology-intensive companies. Intel’s R&D invest-
ments in China, India and Russia are growing faster than elsewhere. 
These R&D investments are driven by the availability of an educated 
and skilled workforce with specifi c competencies in relevant areas in 
these countries to conduct key research in a variety of fi elds (UNCTAD 
2005, p. 132).
Intel China Research Center (ICRC) in Beijing was established in 1998 
to conduct applied research in the areas of human computer interface, 
computer architecture, future workloads and compilers and runtime. In 
early 2005, it had a staff of 75 researchers, most of whom hold a Ph.D. 
or an M.Sc., mainly from Chinese universities. The center’s innovations 
include: the open research compiler, developed jointly with the Chinese 
Academy of Sciences; audio visual speech recognition, a system using 
computer vision to assist speech recognition; and microphone array and 
audio signal processing technology. The Intel Design Center in Banga-
lore employs more than 800 employees for chip design and development 
of software solutions for the company. The Nizhniy Novgorod (Russia) 
Software Development Center employs around 340 scientists and engi-
neers for developing software tools and applications for Intel (UNCTAD 
2005, p. 132).
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Intel’s R&D in China
In 1985 Intel established a representative offi ce in China. But in terms of 
business operations, Intel established IADL in Shanghai in January 1994, 
and the Intel China Research Center in Beijing was announced in May 
1998. In January 2001, Intel established IXA Development Center in Bei-
jing. Intel now has more than 4,000 employees in total in China and sales 
offi ces in 14 cities in China.
The Mission of Intel’s R&D in China is ‘to establish world-class tech-
nology research & development and build ecosystem support for key 
technology initiatives to ensure Intel’s technology leadership position 
in PRC.’
Globally, Intel operates in fi ve business areas: Intel Capital Investments; 
Government Standards and Regulatory; Research and Technology Devel-
opment; Industry R&D Engagements; and Academic R&D Engagements. 
All fi ve areas have R&D presence in China. In addition, China is also host 
to a Corporate R&D Center (which does more research than development 
work) and a Manufacturing Technology R&D Center of Intel. All the 
R&D centers report to the headquarters of Intel and not to Intel China’s 
management.
Intel has an evolutionary framework for growth of R&D in China in a 
substantial and yet manageable way. This framework spanning 10 years 
envisages: ‘As R&D continues to grow & mature in PRC, it will develop 
deeper competencies and take on more local market infl uence.’ The Intel 
R&D Phased Development Model is based on competency/maturity and 
organization impact. Intel classifi es its R&D centers into a hierarchy that 
begins with lab extension (Level 1), progressing to competence center (Level 
2), progressing to fi nally reach the category of infl uential R&D center and 
technology leader (Level 3).
The salient features of lab extension (Level 1) and competency center 
(Level 2) are summarized in Table 6.1:
Table 6.1 Intel’s R&D Laboratories and Their Features
Lab Extension (Level 1) Competence Center (Level 2)
Core competencies under development Core competencies clearly established
Projects defi ned and led by US Labs Projects in core technology areas aligned 
with US Labs and locally led
Developing local strategy and technology 
focus
Labs agenda infl uenced by local strategy 
and focus
Limited local infl uence/R&D 
engagement
Coherent strategy for local infl uence/ 
R&D engagement
Source: Intel China Research Center (2005).
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R&D centers in China work on products for worldwide markets. It is 
important to note that all Intel products (semiconductors and other sili-
con products) are global products, with little or no localization require-
ments. Moreover, most of the manufacturers (local as well as MNCs) 
of the products that use Intel’s products as core components in their 
products (e.g., computers, consumer electronics and so on) are based in 
China, and these fi nal products are marketed both locally and globally. 
Therefore, the R&D work carried out in China can be considered as 
being related to worldwide products.
Nevertheless, different products will have different emphasis. For 
instance, in the Enterprise Group the work is more on systems and hard-
ware (large server systems), whereas in the Consumer Electronics Group 
the focus is more on software. In both cases, there may be local variations, 
and these need to be addressed locally in China. Sometimes, the work 
assigned to an affi liate differs from generally held views. For instance, India 
as a country is well-known for software development and China for hard-
ware, but, Intel’s R&D in India carries out a lot of hardware development 
(including IC design), and its R&D in China carries out substantial soft-
ware development work (particularly for local applications and Chinese-
language-related developments).
Different business units of Intel in China leverage different skill sets 
that are available locally. For instance, the focus of the Consumer Elec-
tronics Group is software development. In many consumer electronic 
products, the hardware element is fairly simple and standardized when 
compared to large servers. So Intel has a core hardware product devel-
oped in the US, but in consumer electronics, the software that runs these 
products requires a lot of localization, as there are large differences in the 
application USge models, interface language and so on. In the consumer 
electronics business, Intel’s R&D in China addresses these market-spe-
cifi c needs and requirements by focusing on software development, but 
not on hardware development. In addition to its in-house software team 
in China, Intel also works together with local independent software ven-
dors (ISV) in China.
In the servers business, there is a requirement for large hardware as well 
as large software components. Hardware is global and does not involve 
localization. Even with respect to software, enterprises that use the servers 
tend to use almost the same software packages, e.g., enterprise solutions 
such as those sold by IBM, Oracle and SAP around the world. There is not 
much localization involved in these software packages. However, the large 
servers are used for different applications in different businesses, and this 
usually requires different confi gurations. So there is a lot more differentia-
tion in the hardware required locally (different from localization), and such 
solutions could also be used worldwide if the confi guration suits the needs. 
China is a very big market with a complex system, and R&D to develop 
such solutions needs to be carried out in China.
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R&D teams in China predominantly work on worldwide products (70 
to 80 percent). This is the same with the hardware team in the Enterprise 
Group as well as the software team in the Consumer Electronics Group. 
Intel does not conduct any chip design activities in China.
Driving Forces
Local differentiation is the major driving force for location of R&D •
in China, but in practice such work constitutes only a part of the 
R&D work done in China. It is diffi cult for R&D teams in the US 
and other countries to understand the unique characteristics of the 
Chinese market. Therefore, local R&D is required to respond to local 
needs. Intel also keeps a close watch on the skills available in China 
to leverage them for global use. So location of R&D is not just driven 
by market considerations alone.
China is the second-largest market for Intel, after the US. Most of •
Intel’s customers, both local companies as well as MNCs, have manu-
facturing facilities in China. China and Taiwan together account for 
almost 70 percent of Intel’s global business.
Availability of the vast talent pool in China is another important con-•
sideration. China and other emerging economies such as Brazil, India 
and Russia have talented and well-educated scientists and engineers, 
whose skills are on a par with those in the industrialized world and 
could be utilized for corporate growth.
Cost differentials between China and other locations are also impor-•
tant, but not the most important factor.
Government relationship is another important factor. In China, as in •
most emerging economies, the government plays a large role in business/
industry both directly through state-owned enterprises and indirectly 
through policies. In order to do business in such economies, it is impor-
tant to understand the government perspective and to show a long-term 
commitment to the local economy by not just selling, but also by invest-
ing, transferring technology and leveraging local talent and so on.
Presently there are 1,200 engineers employed in R&D functions in China. 
Intel feels that it has reached the critical mass to carry out its planned 
growth in activities.
Corporate Innovation System and Knowledge Flows
Figure 6.1 depicts the corporate innovation system of Intel China Research 
Center and the associated knowledge fl ows among different actors. Intel 
R&D Center in China is strongly embedded into the global intracorporate 
R&D network of Intel as well as into a network of local external organiza-
tions in China.
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R&D centers in China work closely with the R&D units of Intel’s head-
quarters in the US by carrying out projects planned and assigned by the 
headquarters. R&D centers in China also collaborate with Intel’s global 
R&D centers located in other countries, such as India and Russia, depend-
ing on the needs of the product groups. There is a continuous fl ow of people 
between Intel’s headquarters and the centers in China, resulting in a con-
tinuous fl ow of knowledge among the centers in Intel’s global intracorpo-
rate R&D network.
Intel works closely with local fi rms, exchanging knowledge with them. 
For instance, Intel’s Consumer Electronics Group works with local soft-
ware vendors, whose software works on Intel’s hardware (e.g., Hanwang 
Technologies). In order to make sure that such software works perfectly, 
Intel passes on the knowledge relating to the hardware and also advises the 
local vendors on software development processes. Similarly, Intel works 
Intel USA 
Intel R&D, Russia 
Intel Global Network 
Intel R&D, India 
Intel China Research Center
Chinese software firms, 
OEMs & other vendors. 





Chinese universities, e.g., 





Figure 6.1 Innovation system of Intel China Research Center.
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with original equipment manufacturing (OEM) customers, who manufac-
ture PCs and servers, on how to differentiate their products from their 
competitors’ products. A lot of technical knowledge relating to processes, 
confi guration and product design is exchanged.
Intel has a strategic program to collaborate with the local universities 
in the countries in which it operates. Intel collaborates with local univer-
sities in China from a long-term perspective. Much of such collaboration 
is of an enabling nature, in the sense that it mainly sponsors research 
programs in the universities and the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS). 
Among the 30 or so Chinese universities with whom Intel has collabora-
tive linkages are: Tsinghua University, Beijing University, Shanghai Jao 
Tong University and Fudan Science and Technology University. By col-
laborating with universities, Intel gains access to the results of research in 
areas of its long-term interests. Collaboration also facilitates recruitment 
of talented new graduates.
Intel collaborates with the government as well. Standard setting by the 
Chinese government affects Intel, just as it affects many other MNCs, as all 
Intel’s products fall under the purview of standards and regulations. Most of 
Intel’s products are based on international standards, and the Chinese stan-
dards under development are somewhat different from those that are fol-
lowed globally. China, being new to the task of setting standards, requires 
international cooperation, and Intel sees itself as becoming a trusted adviser 
to the government in framing Chinese standards. It assists the government 
on various issues such as cellular communication, security and so on, even 
at the level of technical details. Through this process Intel encourages China 
to participate in the process of setting international standards, as too many 
standards around the world are not good for the industry.
In terms of promoting ‘intrapreneurship’ (and also entrepreneurship) 
Intel has an internal initiation to assess proposals submitted by its staff. 
After assessment, selected projects are provided with seed funding and even 
incubation for up to two years. Basically the project becomes an Intel spin-
off. But such spin-offs have not emerged in China so far.
Strengths of China in R&D Activities
The sheer intelligence of the engineers and scientists in China; the top •
one percent of talented people in China are interested in working for 
Intel given its global reputation;
Chinese students have a very strong foundation in basic education;•
Local innovations—some Chinese innovations have been very useful •
and technologically advanced, and these could be leveraged for local 
and global applications.
Until recently the Chinese people were bound by tradition. Presently •
technological change is taking place at an unexpectedly fast pace in 
China. So people are very excited about emerging technologies and 
their applications, e.g., mobile phone usage models in China. On 
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the other hand, in the industrialized world people have always been 
exposed to advanced technologies, and emerging technologies are not 
so exciting for them.
Weaknesses of China in R&D Activities
The education system is top-down driven. Students do not chose their •
topics for research, but work in projects directed by the professors. 
This dampens independent thinking and conceptualization.
At the individual level, there is a gap when compared to researchers •
in the industrialized world, in terms of understanding of the domain 
knowledge.
Host Country Implications
Intel has contributed substantially to the building up of PC industry •
in China by transferring technologies to Chinese companies such as 
Lenovo. Intel now has a joint venture R&D Center with Lenovo. PC 
industry is now a dominant sector in the Chinese economy.
Intel Capital, which invests in high-tech start-up companies, has a •
large presence in China. It invests several hundreds of million dollars 
every year in Chinese companies, not only nurturing the companies, 
but also creating an ecosystem.
Similarly, Intel also nurtures local talent. Working for Intel is a valued •
experience for many. Many former employees of Intel have now set 
up their own companies, and some have become professors in local 
universities. Through such mobility of its people, Intel is contributing 
to the diffusion of knowledge to the wider society. 
Home Country Implications
The emerging economies are quickly catching up with the industrial-•
ized countries in technological capabilities and have even surpassed 
them in market potential. Like emerging economies, the industrial-
ized countries should now put more efforts into fundamentals, such 
as strong basic education (not just in highly advanced research only) 
and infrastructure.
There are still a lot of skills available in a home country like the US, •
which are not available in a host country like China. So home coun-
tries still get the benefi t of accessing cheaper complementary skills, 
as well as increased demand for home country-based skills as the 
demand in the emerging countries increases for Intel’s products.
Hitachi (China) Research & Development Corporation
Hitachi, a Japan-based MNC, has its main R&D located in Japan. In addi-
tion, Hitachi has R&D centers in fi ve countries globally: the US, Europe 
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(France and the UK), Singapore and China. Among them the R&D center 
in China is the biggest with 80 engineers, including seven expatriates from 
Japan employed in R&D (50 in Beijing and 30 in Shanghai).
The Hitachi (China) Research and Development Corporation (HCR&D) 
was established in April 2005 as the fi rst R&D independent entity set up 
by Hitachi Ltd. The HCR&D originated from the R&D Center of Hitachi 
(China), which was founded in 2000 with three people, as the third for-
eign R&D center after the US and Europe. This R&D unit was operating 
under the Hitachi (China) Co., which is the business arm of Hitachi. It 
was felt that it would be easier to manage a central R&D operation as an 
independent unit to cater to several businesses of Hitachi in China. With 
the concept of ‘Contribution to Society by Technology,’ HCR&D’s main 
mission is to support the Hitachi business in China by creating brand 
new products and technology. Its research fi elds include: ICT, software 
engineering technology, digital television, energy-saving air condition-
ers, functional materials, medical image processing and speech synthesis. 
R&D conducted by HCR&D also includes products marketed worldwide 
by Hitachi.
The 11th Five year Plan of China aims to turn China from a country 
with manufacturing power to R&D power. To achieve this goal it has set 
up certain tasks that include: bringing up domestic innovative and original 
technologies; standardization of domestic technologies; and strengthening 
of competitive power with intellectual and brand power. Hitachi perceives 
that China needs international cooperation at different technology levels 
in achieving its goal: (1) standardization level; (2) technology level; and 
(3) product level. Hitachi would contribute to China and the worldwide 
market with innovative technologies by locating R&D activities in China. 
Such an approach would contribute toward China’s achieving its goals and 
also facilitate Hitachi’s market entry into China. By locating R&D, Hitachi 
intends to show its long-term commitment to the Chinese economy.
Driving Forces
Standardization of technologies/products—Chinese proprietary stan-•
dards are somewhat different from international standards in most 
cases and totally different in some cases. This requires location of 
R&D in China. For instance, the TV broadcasting system in China is 
different. At present, only Chinese companies can participate in the 
meetings relating to standardization.
The Hitachi Group has over 100 companies with operations in China. •
HCR&D caters to the technological needs of these companies.
Gaining access to talented human resources. Chinese universities have •
excellent staff and students, whom Hitachi utilizes for its R&D.
The cost differentials between Japan and China in terms of salaries of •
research personnel and other operational costs are also important.
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About 80 percent of the software outsourced from Japan is developed 
in China. China has an advantage over others in relation to the Japa-
nese language because of the similarity of the script (writing characters). 
HCR&D develops software for local application. An important char-
acteristic feature of HCR&D’s R&D in China is the collaboration with 
local universities.
By 2010, HCR&D aims to have a balance between different market ori-
entations in its activities as follows: local market orientation, global market 
orientation and service/development centers. Such global market-orientated 
R&D includes: HD video and blue ray disk, voice recognition and video 
processing. China’s R&D activities are closely linked to the R&D center in 
Japan, as the latter is also involved with the same work. The work is shared 
between the R&D units in Japan and China. For instance, in the devel-
opment of HD video and blue ray disk, HCR&D developed the software 
package for middleware and rapid prototyping.
R&D Field
ICT research—toward a ubiquitous network society, Hitachi’s •
research focuses on wireless, mobile and broadband network and its 
application technologies, covering next-generation mobile communi-
cation systems (3G/4G), broadband optical access network, radio and 
intelligent transportation system technologies;
Ubiquitous platform R&D—this is aimed at the digital consumer •
products in the Chinese market through R&D in key technologies 
and localization of Hitachi’s common worldwide platform to adapt to 
the Chinese technical standard. The technologies are related to digital 
TV and multimedia appliances;
Open system software technology R&D—In order to realize a com-•
mon open standard for the system environment, certain new tech-
nologies and solutions are required. The current research topics are 
mainly related to the worldwide activities of Hitachi, as well as the 
development of new business opportunities in China. Offshore soft-
ware development methodology and supporting environment; high 
reliability of open source software; IT mansion and fi nger vein authen-
tication; and web USbility research.
Home appliances development—this department is dedicated to the •
development of air conditioners for the world market, by focusing 
mainly on new air-conditioner designs, production of prototypes and 
performance testing;
Innovative systems and materials—in order to support the long and •
stable development of the Chinese economy, Hitachi has research 
cooperation with some well-known Chinese universities and 
research institutes in fi elds such as environment-friendly materi-
als, human interaction (Chinese language processing and speech 
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synthesis technologies), medical image processing (to achieve high 
speed and high accuracy); and system management technologies 
(Fudan-Hitachi Innovative Software Technology Joint Research 
Laboratory) to make a more secure and comfortable life for Chi-
nese people and people around the world.
Corporate Innovation Systems and Knowledge Flows
Figure 6.2 depicts the corporate innovation system of Hitachi China 
R&D. As the fi gure shows, HCR&D is strongly embedded into the Chi-
nese local innovation system through knowledge linkages with the local 
organizations.
Chinese universities have professors who are internationally well known 
for their expertise in the domain. Similarly, Chinese students are highly tal-
ented, and Hitachi utilizes them to develop new technologies. It is because 
of its collaboration with the local universities that HCR&D, with only 80 
in-house researchers, is able to conduct R&D in several fi elds. Whenever 
other business units of Hitachi would like to gain access to certain exper-
tise available in the local universities in China, HCR&D facilitates such 
collaboration.
Hitachi’s collaboration with Tsinghua University is the oldest, estab-
lished since 2001. HCR&D and Tsinghua University have established the 
Tsinghua-Hitachi Ubiquitous IT Joint Research Laboratory to conduct 
research on 3G/4G, wireless and broadcast communication convergence. 
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Figure 6.2 Innovation system of HCR&D (Hitachi China).
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fi elds, such as laser-processing technology, environment-friendly technol-
ogy and digital TV. In 2006 HCR&D and Tsinghua University signed an 
agreement on a framework for cooperation. Following this agreement, 
there has been cooperation in a range of research fi elds, as well as in dif-
fusion of knowledge through training programs and Hitachi’s series of 
technical lectures.
Similarly, HCR&D and Beijing University of Post and Telecommunications 
(BUPT) have set up the BUPT-Hitachi Joint Laboratory to conduct research 
on optical broadband access network technology. HCR&D and Fudan Uni-
versity have set up the Innovative Software Technology Joint Research Labo-
ratory to conduct research on system service and management. There is also 
cooperation in the fi eld of chemical materials. HCR&D and Shanghai Jiao 
Tong University carry out joint research on applications related to digital 
home appliances, functional materials and medical image processing.
Talented researchers are one of the critical resources of HCR&D. 
Hitachi attaches a high priority to the cultivation of these talents. Hitachi 
periodically sends researchers to Japan for further training or organizes 
various on-the-job-training and technical programs and seminars to 
improve the competence of the staff. It also provides Japanese and Chinese 
language training for technicians so as to improve their communication 
and research effi ciency. HCR&D invites famous experts from universities 
and research institutes to give professional lectures and organize training 
classes for the staff.
Host Country Implications
The Chinese have strong capabilities in the fi elds of middleware soft-•
ware and rapid prototyping software.
The Chinese economy is growing rapidly. But such growth occurs •
mainly in mature products. In order to thrive in the growing econ-
omy, the business model for companies would be to participate in 
such mature technologies. In terms of R&D, contribution can only be 
made in customizing these products for the Chinese market. The mar-
ket for totally new products and/or technologies such as environment-
friendly products, where R&D can make a signifi cant contribution, is 
still very small and not a commercially viable business in China. Such 
advanced and sophisticated markets demanding innovative products 
need to be developed in China.
In China, once the standardization is done, prototyping is done very •
quickly. But personnel do not seek to fi nd new things, refl ecting weak-
nesses in original and innovative thinking. However, this problem 
arises not from the lack of ability among students, but because the 
education system is tuned to a top-down approach.
Some MNCs, particularly those in high-tech areas, attract the best •
talents by offering them very high salaries. Therefore, the talents 
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available to the other businesses are not top ranking, but the next 
levels. This also leads to a high mobility rate (over 20 percent), dis-
rupting activities and adding to training costs.
6.3 CHINESE COMPANIES
Lenovo
Lenovo is a Chinese company dedicated to computer and related prod-
ucts: desktops, laptops, servers, and mobile phones. Lenovo emerged as 
an academic spinoff. It has a Six Sigma quality control. Main competitors 
for Lenovo in the Chinese market are Hewlett-Packard, Dell, Acer among 
MNCs and a number of local companies such as TCL. Lenovo faces the 
competition successfully with product differentiation. Lenovo competes 
by developing high-performing and more effi cient products, while lever-
aging the low-cost base. In May 2005 Lenovo acquired the Personal Com-
puting Division of IBM and became a leader in the global PC market, 
with approximately US$13 billion in annual revenue and products serv-
ing enterprises and consumers the worldwide. The deal brought IBM’s 
technology to Lenovo and helped it to have a market reach beyond China 
and Asia.
Lenovo, as it is known now, originated as the Legend Group in 1984, 
when 11 scientists from the Institute of Computer Technology of the Chi-
nese Academy of Sciences (CAS) established the company, with funding 
from CAS. In the beginning of 1985, as its fi rst business deal, Legend took 
over the responsibility of receiving, checking and maintaining IBM comput-
ers imported by CAS and training the staff of the CAS. Based on the origi-
nal concept developed by the Institute of Computer Technology, Legend 
developed the pioneering Legend Chinese Character Card that translated 
English operating software into Chinese characteristics and also achieved 
breakthroughs like PCs with one-button access to the Internet. Legend 
invested all its profi ts from servicing the IBM computers into the design, 
production and marketing of this card called ‘HanCard.’ “Subsequently, 
Legend became the largest supplier of personal computers in Chinese mar-
ket. In October 1994, Legend was registered as the fi rst civilian technology 
enterprise, and later in 1997 the company was reorganized into six groups 
under Legend Holding Co. in 1997” (Sigurdson 2005, p. 111).
To further signal this change in strategic approach and establish a brand 
name that could be extended to global markets, in 2003, “Legend changed 
its brand name to Lenovo, taking the ‘Le’ from Legend, a nod to its heri-
tage, and adding ‘novo,’ the Latin word for ‘new,’ to refl ect the spirit of 
innovation at the core of the company. The company’s name changed from 
Legend to Lenovo a year later. A gradual change of logo and name took 
place during 2003–2004 and the company became clearly known as Len-
ovo before its alliance with IBM” (Sigurdson 2005, p. 111).
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According to Wei and White (2004 p. 412), Lenovo adopted several key 
strategic approaches for growth: First, unlike the MNCs who sold older and 
slower model PCs, Lenovo offered PCs that contained the latest processors 
to Chinese customers. For instance, the MNCs were selling their older and 
slower 386-based PCs in China at higher prices, while marketing faster 486-
based PCs in the US. Lenovo, realizing the opportunity, quickly incorpo-
rated the latest Intel chips into its PCs and sold them in the Chinese market. 
This strategy contributed to Lenovo’s image-building as a fast and technol-
ogy-intensive producer and to reducing the stigma of lagging technology 
attached to local brands by Chinese consumers (Business Week 1999).
Second, in addition to offering the latest technology in its PCs, Lenovo 
started designing its PCs to appeal specifi cally to Chinese customers (Gold et 
al. 2001). The PCs marketed by MNCs were not adapted to suit the require-
ments of local customers. Lenovo, in contrast, started designing specifi c 
products for different market segments, such as banks, large enterprises 
and SMEs in the corporate sector, as well as for diverse individual customer 
groups. Such innovations included: Lenovo’s own operating system (LEOS)—
home PC that can be turned into an entertainment unit at home, by playing 
DVDs and MP3, viewing digital photos as well as TV, without the need for 
Windows OS; boot-easy technology—patented technology that reduces sys-
tem boot-up time by half; power- and thermo-easy technologies—automati-
cally adjust power voltage and protect the central processing unit (CPU); and 
touch-screen technology—browses the Internet through touching the screen 
instead of mouse or keyboard) (Wei and White 2004).
Third, Lenovo adopted a strategy of competing on the basis of price. For 
comparable products, Lenovo’s prices were about two-thirds of foreign-
made PCs (The Wall Street Journal 1997). Lenovo managed to do this by 
maintaining a lower cost structure, mainly due to the relocation of manu-
facturing activities to China by foreign component suppliers, such as Sea-
gate Technology for hard drives. This was quickly followed by the entry of 
a wave of Taiwanese fi rms into China from the mid-1990s providing access 
to supplies of components and peripherals of the same quality as those used 
by MNCs (Kraemer and Derick 2001).
Lenovo formally established a corporate-level R&D center with 200 
personnel in 1990. However, its R&D approach at the time refl ected the 
company’s origin from an academic institution. Its researchers were more 
interested in developing leading-edge technologies, such as large-scale ICs 
and digital switches, rather than working on business-related tasks. Real-
izing this mismatch between its strategic business needs and the interest 
of its corporate R&D center, Lenovo transferred the R&D personnel to 
business units, thereby establishing several business unit-level R&D centers 
that answered to the managers of business units (Wei and White 2004; 
Sigurdson 2005). “The close interaction among R&D, manufacturing and 
marketing functions enabled Lenovo to implement its two-pronged strategy 
of low-cost manufacturing and innovative products matching the Chinese 
market” (Wei and White 2004, pp. 413–414).
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In 2002, Legend’s supercomputer, the DeepComp 1800, made its debut. 
It was China’s fi rst computer with 1,000 GFLOP (fl oating point opera-
tions per second) and China’s fastest computer for civilian use, ranked 43rd
in the top-500 list of the world’s fastest computers. The same year Leg-
end announced a joint venture to enter the mobile handsets business. In 
November 2003, Lenovo successfully developed DeepComp 6800, which 
was ranked 14th on the global list. In 2003, Lenovo developed and intro-
duced an application technology, which heralded the important role Len-
ovo would play in the 3C era (computer, communications and consumer 
electronics). These and other market-leading personal computing products 
catapulted Legend to a leadership position in China for eight consecutive 
years with over 25 percent market share in 2004.
With the acquisition of IBM’s PC division, Lenovo located the executive 
headquarters in New York (US) with principal operations in Beijing (China) 
and North Carolina (US). The company employs more than 19,000 people 
worldwide. Lenovo’s global R&D centers in China, Japan and the US have 
produced some of the world’s most important advances in PC technology 
(including those from IBM) and introduced many industry fi rsts.
R&D Centers
China—Beijing 2 centers (Corporate R&D Center and BU R&D Cen-
ter); Shenzhen 2 centers (Development Lab and Advanced System Design 
Center); Shanghai (Notebook/Mobile Phone Development Center); 
Xiamen (Mobile Phone R&D Center); Chengdu (Branch of Corporate 
Research).
US—Research Triangle Park, Raleigh, North Carolina (basic and 
advanced research).
Japan—Kanagawa-ken, Yamato (R&D on Think Pad).
As Wei and White (2004, pp. 416–417) note, Lenovo adopted a two-tier 
R&D structure, on the lines of what it calls ‘technology for today’ and 
‘for tomorrow and the day after tomorrow.’ The fi rst tier, with the respon-
sibility for ‘today’s technology’ for PCs, is located within the IT Business 
Cluster that includes the server, notebook, consumer IT and commercial 
desktop and is supported by specifi c labs. For instance, the Desktop PC 
Development Center includes fi ve supporting labs that are responsible for 
parts and components, commercial systems, consumer systems, architec-
ture and standards and application software. The second tier is corpo-
rate-level R&D and includes four centers. The Lenovo Research Center is 
responsible for the development of future key technologies. Its focus is on 
developing the technologies, protocols and applications that will make it 
possible to fuse different information devices, including home appliances, 
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telecommunications and computers. The Software Design Center focuses 
on the development of applications software; the Industrial Design Center 
focuses on product appearance and attractiveness; and the Add-on Card 
Design Center develops motherboards and other parts and components to 
optimize the performance of Lenovo’s products. However, Lenovo needs to 
invest more in R&D to develop leading-edge technology, and yet it is dif-
fi cult for Lenovo to move up the value chain in the PC industry, which is 
dominated by major MNCs such as Intel and Microsoft.
According to an internal source in Lenovo, PC industry is a mature 
industry, where the innovations are mainly carried out by the component 
suppliers, such as Intel, Microsoft and motherboard suppliers. PC assem-
blers like Lenovo can only focus on developing new applications and/or 
design of the products (i.e., software). Therefore, the labs in China, in addi-
tion to software development, mainly focus on testing the performance of 
the products such as the battery life and radiation levels and on developing 
solutions to overcome performance related problems.
Corporate Innovation System and Knowledge Flows
Lenovo realizes that the rapidly changing technologies and the variety of 
knowledge inputs required in the PC industry require collaboration with 
other organizations. Therefore, it has formed alliances with a number of 
companies such as China Telecom, Computer Associates, D-Link, IBM, 
Motorola, National Semiconductor and Texas Instruments. In August 
2003, it established a joint venture R&D lab with Intel, the Lenovo-In-
tel Future Technology Advancement Center. This center is responsible for 
building reliable computation environments and key technologies for the 
next-generation Internet and for designing leading-edge products that unite 
computers and telecommunications.
Throughout, however, Lenovo maintained its special relationship with 
the Chinese University of Science and Technology that used to be an inte-
gral part of the CAS and on whose campus, the Legend Computer Company 
was initially founded. In addition, Legend established a number of relation-
ships with other universities. These included Tsinghua University, Shanghai 
Shuichan University, Shanghai Ligong (S&T) University and Xian Dianzi 
(Electronics) Jishu University. “In a Silicon Valley centre Legend employed 
some 20 people under the direction of the Quantum Design Institute (QDI) 
that was responsible for Legend motherboards and also had the function 
of technology watch and collecting intelligence on changes in motherboard 
design and production” (Sigurdson 2005, p. 113).
Hanwang Technologies Co. Ltd.
Hanwang, founded in 1998, is a leading company in China and a manufac-
turer of diverse intelligent pattern-recognition technologies and products. It 
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is a spinoff from the research on automation technologies that was carried 
out by the Institute for Automation Technologies, Chinese Academy of Sci-
ences (CAS), in the 1980s and 1990s. The research project was related only 
to handwriting recognition and was funded by the National Basic Science 
Foundation (Project A63). The researcher who established the company 
obtained a national patent on Chinese handwriting-recognition technol-
ogy. The company was originally founded with another name and changed 
its name to Hanwang Technologies Co. Ltd. in 1998. The same year, Han-
wang Production Co. Ltd. was also established.
R&D Capabilities
In 1998, Hanwang licensed its embedded Handwriting Recognition System 
to Microsoft for incorporation into Windows CE and Pocket PCs. Han-
wang is currently the leader in China’s domestic market for recognition-
technology products. About 90 percent of the mobile phones manufactured 
in China incorporate Hanwang’s writing-recognition technology, includ-
ing mobile phones manufactured by MNCs such as Nokia, Samsung and 
SonyEricsson. Compared to other languages, developing technologies for 
recognizing Chinese language characters is more complex. Since Hanwang 
has done it successfully, it has earned international recognition for its tech-
nologies. This complex technology can now be more easily applied to recog-
nize other languages around the world. Microsoft licensed this technology 
to incorporate it into its Windows CE operating system.
In 2000, Hanwang’s Handwriting Recognition Methodology and Sys-
tems won the fi rst prize of the Beijing State’s Science and Technology. In 
2002, Hanwang’s technology won the National Science and Technology 
Award. In 2006, Hanwang was awarded the title of ‘innovation enterprise’ 
by the Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology. In 2007, Hanwang’s 
product design for the Rollick 0504 graphics tablet won the Red Star Award 
for industry design (all national awards only).
In addition to handwriting-recognition technology products, Hanwang 
manufactures a number of products based on its recognition technologies. 
These products include fi ngerprint recognition, face recognition and sev-
eral communication-related products. Hanwang’s OCR technology won 
the second prize for National Science and Technology Progress. About 70 
percent of the scanners manufactured in China use Hanwang’s OCR tech-
nology. This technology facilitates transformation of picture-type fi les from 
scanning directly into document-type (Microsoft Word) fi les. This technol-
ogy has been further developed by Hanwang and applied in mobile phones. 
Hanwang’s software package in the mobile phone can take a picture of a 
document and directly convert it into a Word document.
Hanwang further developed a new technology for tablet-PCs, which 
allows drawing pictures and words directly on the screen. This technology 
is mainly used in drawing cartoons. In the area of these technologies, a 
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patent dispute arose between Wacom, a Japanese company, and Hanwang, 
with Wacom fi ling lawsuits in China and the US. Subsequently, both par-
ties entered into an agreement, settling the dispute.
The ‘core competence’ of Hanwang is the ‘recognizer’ fi eld. It has several 
patents in this area. Based on this core competence, Hanwang developed 
several application technologies and products. Hanwang develops two types 
of products: (1) embodied software—these packages are PC- or PDA-based 
and form part of the software packages supplied with or added to the PC 
or PDA; (2) embedded software—these software packages are embedded 
into the products (hardware) designed and manufactured by Hanwang to 
perform those specifi c functions, e.g., writing pad, scanner pad, scan pen, 
fi ngerprint recognizer, face recognizer and so on. Hanwang has its own 
factories manufacturing the hardware. Hanwang’s next priority is to work 
on human-machine interaction.
In terms of global competition, Hanwang thinks that it is better placed 
than others in the handwriting-recognition technologies. Chinese char-
acters are the most diffi cult to recognize. Hanwang managed to develop 
such complex technologies in the area of handwriting recognition. So Han-
wang’s technology can be applied more easily to other languages world-
wide; whereas competitors’ technologies can be applied only to certain 
scripts. Hanwang has different global competitors for different products/
technologies: Meng Tian (Taiwan) for handwriting recognition; Wacom 
(Japan) for electronic drawing technologies and pen; and Innonce (US) for 
face-recognition technologies.
Hanwang has 30 branches all around China, Korea, Hong Kong, the 
US and Germany. In total there are over 1,000 employees in the company, 
with 200 in R&D, 200 in sales and administration and 400 people in the 
factory. Its annual sales turnover is around US$50 million. It has about 300 
patents in China. Internationally, it has two patents each in the US, Japan 
and Germany. It also has two patents under PCT for new technologies.
Corporate Innovation Systems and Knowledge Flows
Figure 6.3 depicts Hanwang’s corporate innovation system and associ-
ated knowledge fl ows between Hanwang and its local and global external 
knowledge network.
Hanwang has a partnership with many MNCs in technology develop-
ment. Hanwang developed a software package jointly with Intel, using 
Intel’s platform (chip) to enable direct drawing on the screen of the EPC. 
The EPC is a micro PC developed by Oxus of Taiwan, which is suitable for 
drawing activities. But this micro PC has a keyboard for input. The joint 
Hanwang-Intel software package does away with the keyboard through 
direct input entry on the screen.
Similarly, E-Ink, a US company, developed a technology called E-Page, 
which looks like a page but has no input function (blank page). Using this 
166 Global Innovation in Emerging Economies
platform technology, Hanwang developed an application technology to 
directly impose (print) drawings and text on this e-page. The joint E-Ink-
Hanwang technology is incorporated into the e-book products of Sony-
Amazon and Samsung worldwide.
Hanwang also collaborates with local companies. For instance, Han-
wang has joint R&D in developing liquid crystal displays (LCDs) with Jing 
Dong Fang, the largest manufacturer of LCDs in China. The collaboration 
is in the areas of improving the functioning of LCDs and in the refi nement 
of manufacturing processes. Some US companies are also using these LCDs 
developed jointly by Hanwang-Jing Dong Fang.
Hanwang also collaborates with Chinese universities in R&D activities. 
It has links with the Institute of Automation Research, CAS, from which 
Hanwang originally emerged as a spinoff. It also has links with Tsinghua 
University. Links with these two academic institutions help Hanwang at the 
experimental level, e.g., proof of concept. Hanwang also provides intern-
ship opportunities to students from Chinese universities. For instance, stu-
dents from Beijing University regularly do their internship at Hanwang. 
They work Hanwang’s research projects during their internship.
Hanwang does not feel any diffi culties with the globalization. It has 
an advantage by being based in China as it can utilize the vast talent pool 
available in the country and gain access to the basic research results in 
Chinese universities, at costs that are comparatively very low. It derives its 
competitive advantage by leveraging the talent at low-costs.
However, it feels that Chinese market is not suitable for innovation-
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Figure 6.3 Innovation system of Hanwang Technologies (China).
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technologies do not pay royalties properly. For example, a mobile phone 
manufacturer may pay royalties for using Hanwang’s technology in 10 
phones, but actually uses them in 100 phones.
The biggest disadvantage with the global companies that license Han-
wang’s technologies is that they have a better bargaining ability. Because 
Hanwang is small in size compared to MNCs and is a company based in an 
emerging economy rather than in an industrialized country, it receives low 
licensing fees from the global companies. However, Hanwang feels that this 
disadvantage will disappear over time.
6.4 HOST COUNTRY IMPLICATIONS
According to Walsh (2003), from a strategic perspective, R&D-related FDI 
plays a critical role in China’s long-term S&T development goals. One of 
the main objectives of China’s scientifi c modernization is to fi ll the knowl-
edge gap in transforming the basic research results into tangible products 
and processes by learning from foreign fi rms, and foreign R&D centers 
are helping China to fi ll this critical knowledge gap through their applied 
research activities. Foreign R&D in China also provides direct benefi ts at 
the enterprise level. Through a combination of strategic alliances (including 
in R&D) with foreign fi rms, Chinese fi rms have developed more modern 
product lines and have progressively implemented innovative and globally 
focused business strategies. For instance, in computer software, Chinese 
enterprises, such as Founder, Red Flag, UFSoft, Neusoft, Kingdee and Top 
Group, are both partnering and competing with foreign high-tech MNCs 
such as Microsoft, Oracle, IBM and Sun Microsystems.
7 Global Innovation in Brazil
The Brazilian subsidiaries of MNCs conduct R&D, but much of their R&D 
is focused on adapting and developing products and technologies to the 
local market and in some cases to the regional markets in Latin America. 
In a study of the telecommunications sector, Galina and Bortoloti (2004) 
concluded that there was no substantial involvement of Brazilian subsidiar-
ies of MNCs in global product development (GPD). Both bibliometric and 
patent data suggested limited involvement of Brazilian subsidiaries in GPD 
in the telecom fi eld. But the case studies of foreign subsidiaries in Brazil, 
presented by the Ministry of Science and Technology (MCT 2000), show 
the presence of R&D relating to local product development as well as part-
nerships with national universities and research centers. These case studies 
also showed that the subsidiaries are more involved with local or regional 
adaptation of products already created elsewhere than with global product 
development. Other studies (e.g., Galina and Plonski 2002), however, show 
that Brazilian subsidiaries of MNCs are certainly involved in GPD at least 
in some specifi c product or technology niches.
Several of the subsidiaries of MNCs in the ICT sector that are invest-
ing in local R&D are recipients of incentives based on an incentive law. 
The Information Technology (IT) Law (Law 8249/1991, updated by Laws 
10.176/2001 and 10.664/2003) provides incentives to companies fulfi lling 
certain requirements. One of the requirements of the law is that in order to 
avail itself of government incentives, a company must invest at least fi ve per-
cent of its local sales in R&D activities locally, and part of this investment 
(around two percent of sales) must be invested in collaborative projects with 
Brazilian universities or research centers (Dias and Galina 2004, p. 10).
While the adaptation type of R&D dominates in subsidiaries of MNCs 
in Brazil, since the late 1990s some change has been noted in the strategies 
of some MNCs. Now Brazilian subsidiaries are being made a part of global 
R&D strategies, by upgrading their technological activities and giving them 
new R&D responsibilities (Costa 2005). This strategy is noticeable mainly 
in the auto parts and automotive industries and in the electronics industry. 
In these industries MNCs have even reversed the earlier decision to down-
size local R&D activities following the loss of local market share and have 
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increased their innovation activities in Brazil (Queiroz et al. 2003; Furtado 
et al. 2003). The pharmaceutical industry, on the other hand, displays a 
reverse pattern, with only few pharmaceutical MNCs conducting R&D in 
Brazil, despite the availability of local capabilities and public laboratories 
(Costa 2005; Furtado et al. 2003).
The product-related R&D activities of automobile manufacturers in 
Brazil have been concentrated mainly on platform adaptations to local 
conditions, so-called ‘tropicalization,’ and to some extent on the develop-
ment of local models or derivative vehicles from a global platform so as to 
suit local demand requirements. However, some major MNCs’ subsidiaries 
(GM, VW, Fiat, Ford) have accumulated design competencies locally and 
therefore are becoming partners to their headquarters in global product 
development. Subcompact cars are the mainstay of automobile manufac-
turers in Brazil. As a result, they have built up specialized competencies in 
the design of small and effi cient engines (up to 1,000 cc). The development 
of suspension modules is another competence of some of these manufactur-
ers (GM and VW) (Consoni and Quadros 2006).
Borini et al. (2005) classify foreign subsidiaries in emerging economies, 
particularly in Brazil, into: traditional subsidiaries (ST), subsidiaries with 
limited relevance (SRL) and strategically relevant subsidiaries (SRS); they 
studied the factors that determine the dynamics of subsidiaries’ role in 
MNCs. The traditional subsidiaries tend to be characterized by greater 
centralization of decisions and innovations in headquarters or regional cen-
ters. However, the Brazilian subsidiaries carry out small adaptations for the 
local market (e.g., automobile assemblers like Toyota and Renault). In a few 
cases STs may develop products meant exclusively for local markets. For 
instance, Ala, the powdered soap developed by Unilever Brazil, is a product 
aimed at the population with very low purchasing power mostly located in 
the northeast of Brazil.
The subsidiaries with limited relevance (SRL), particularly in emerging 
economies, are further categorized into: global platforms and specifi c cre-
ators. Typical examples of global platforms are the subsidiaries of automo-
bile MNCs in Brazil, electro-electronic platforms in Asia and ‘maquiladoras’ 
in Mexico. These subsidiaries mainly implement innovations coming from 
headquarters, but they are more integrated with global business networks 
and thus have better possibilities to play a strategic role (Borini et al. 2005). 
For instance, an automobile MNC may designate a certain subsidiary as a 
center (platform) for production of CKD (completely knocked down) and 
main components that will be exported to several countries (Consoni and 
Quadros 2003). The Brazilian subsidiary of AGCO is one of the largest 
manufacturers of agritools in the world, and it became the center for manu-
facture of tractors (previously located in England), as well as the global 
department of engineering for conventional harvesters (previously located 
in Denmark). The Brazilian subsidiary was assigned these tasks not just 
because of the lower costs of production, but mainly due to the effi ciency 
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of the entire production system. Global platforms thus emerge from the del-
egation of strategic responsibility by corporate headquarters. The second 
category of SRL is the specifi c creators. In this case, the subsidiaries carry 
out innovations for the local market, which, after the product is launched, 
may be introduced in markets abroad by other subsidiaries of the MNC, 
i.e., local-to-global process (Borini et al. 2005).
For strategically relevant subsidiaries (SRS), the innovation processes 
may follow local-to-global and/or global-to-global. These subsidiaries tend 
to have a high level of strategic competences and act in strategic markets. 
SRS may have global or regional responsibility for a product line or a busi-
ness area or for all the businesses of an MNC in a given geographical area, 
and usually they manage activities independent of headquarters (Birkin-
shaw and Morrison 1995). For instance, the Brazilian subsidiary of the 
UK-based MNC FOSECO is a typical example of local-to-global innova-
tion. The Brazilian subsidiary developed a foundry process that is of better 
quality and lower cost, mainly in an effort to overcome the local competi-
tion. The Brazilian subsidiary is now designated as one of the four centers 
of excellence of the company, the other centers being located in the US, 
Germany and Japan (Borini et al. 2005).
Using the Paep Innovation Survey I results, Costa and Queiroz (2002) 
analyzed the extent to which foreign MNCs stimulate Brazilian industry 
to evolve from its status of foreign-technology user toward a position as an 
original generator of knowledge on the international technological frontier 
(p. 1433). The authors defi ne innovation strictly as the generation of a world 
technological novelty, whereas the Paep defi nes it as encompassing both 
generation and use of knowledge. The authors developed “a third index, 
the ‘imitation’ index, which is computed using an unweighted average of 
the incremental change index and process change index. The hypothesis 
is that if a fi rm imitated a technology (making either a pure or a creative 
copy), it should previously have accumulated some capabilities in order to 
search for, acquire, assimilate, use, master and minor adaptations of the 
technology. In turn, the ‘systemic effort index’ is based on the proportion 
of R&D employees in the total number of employees in each category of 
fi rms and sector of activity. In addition to these proxies for functional-TCs 
[technological capabilities], two indices of meta-TCs are developed: the 
‘production chain linkage index’ and ‘S&T system linkage index,’ based 
on external sources of information for technological change. The latter is 
composed of information on two sources: universities and research institu-
tions” (p. 1438).
Considering the industrial sectors as a whole, foreign subsidiaries scored 
better than domestic fi rms on all indexes: 67 against 58 on imitation; 24 
against 21 on the productive chain linkage; nine versus eight on the S&T 
system linkage; and the sharpest difference, 20 versus six on the systemic 
effort index (p. 1438). Brazilian domestic fi rms performed relatively better 
in only four out of 16 sectors, two of them being traditional textiles and 
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leather products. The scores of foreign affi liates, in absolute terms, on the 
systemic effort index are considerably low, suggesting that their techno-




Motorola’s main business areas in Brazil are: mobile devices, networks and 
enterprise and broadband. At the end of 2006, the total number of employ-
ees in Motorola Brazil was 7,500, and its R&D staff had grown from 100 
in 2001 to over 350 engineers at the end of 2006.
Motorola has offi ces and manufacturing facilities in São Paulo and Jag-
uariuna. Between 1995 and 2006, the company had invested US$500 mil-
lion in manufacturing and US$225 million in R&D activities in Brazil. 
In 2005, Motorola Brazil exported products and services worth US$1.2 
billion, of which US$44 million was accounted for by R&D services. The 
Brazilian R&D Center is the largest of Motorola’s R&D units in Latin 
America. Motorola has software development centers in Argentina and 
Chile, but both these operations are much smaller in scale.
Jaguariuna is strategically located, with fi ve major Brazilian universities 
and several research institutions (the closest being the University of Campi-
nas) situated within a radius of 150 kilometers. Over 50,000 students are 
enrolled in higher education in the Campinas region alone. At Jaguariuna 
campus Motorola’s activities include:
Manufacturing (cellular devices, network products, radio and iDEN);
Distribution center;
Networks and enterprise sales and support;
FreeScale Semiconductor Technology Center (IC design);
Brazil R&D Center.
Driving Forces
Brazilian Informatics Law—In order to be eligible for certain govern-•
ment benefi ts and incentives, a company in the business of ICT has to 
manufacture locally and invest approximately fi ve percent of its rev-
enues from Brazilian sales in local R&D activities; a further certain 
percent of this amount (about two percent of the revenue) should be 
invested in joint projects with not-for-profi t organizations and uni-
versities. This law is applicable to both foreign and local companies. 
Initial R&D investments from Motorola in Brazil were motivated by 
this law.
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Strategic location—Brazil is a strategic location from the point of •
view of reaching the markets across the Latin American region.
Technology and research—Brazil is also home to some world-class •
universities and research institutes. These institutions are carrying 
out advanced research in areas of interest to Motorola.
Service infrastructure—Brazil has excellent infrastructural facilities •
to carry out R&D.
The FreeScale Semiconductor Technology Center is a spinoff company 
of Motorola, whose global semiconductor business was spun off into a 
new company. In 2006 the FreeScale Semiconductor Technology Center 
in Brazil had 130 development engineers working on designing ICs. It 
had no fabrication activities in Brazil. Its activities were completely ori-
ented to FreeScale’s global business.
Evolution of R&D Strategy
The Brazilian Informatics Law, viewed from a company perspective, 
imposes a cost on the company by inducing it to conduct R&D activi-
ties, which otherwise would not have been necessary for the company. 
Therefore, in order to meet the obligations under the law, most com-
panies tend make minimum efforts in terms of R&D. Several compa-
nies also classify normal operations as R&D activities. Between 1997 
and 2000 Motorola made minimal efforts in R&D to satisfy the legal 
requirements. During this period, it created a core R&D team, but not 
much R&D was carried out.
By 2001, Motorola Brazil realized that it could make more effective 
use of its R&D resources in Brazil and thus convert this cost element 
into an expense element. Motorola decided to make full USge of its 
talented human resources in Brazil, by not just confi ning them to local 
R&D issues, but by linking them to Motorola’s global R&D network. 
Following this new strategy, Motorola created three strategic approaches 
for its Brazilian R&D Center: (1) the Local Engineering Group; (2) the 
Core and Regional Support Group; and (3) the Worldwide Competi-
tiveness Group. By linking up the Brazilian R&D Center to its global 
R&D network, Motorola converted an obligation into an opportunity. 
Since 2001, the R&D focus at the center has changed, and projects have 
become more globally oriented. However, implementation of this stra-
tegic change has not been an easy task, as the Brazilian R&D center 
now has to compete with other R&D units of Motorola for projects 
on the basis of cost, quality and timely delivery. Most global projects 
involve developing a specifi c part of the value chain and collaborating 
with other R&D units.
Some of the R&D activities undertaken in Brazil have evolved into 
Global centers of excellence for Motorola, like the Messaging Center 
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of Excellence as well as the Brazil Test Center. These facilities do not 
exist in other centers in Motorola’s global network. Some local/regional 
characteristics addressed by the Brazilian center have also now become 
global characteristics.
Corporate Innovation System and Knowledge Flows
Figure 7.1 depicts Motorola Brazil’s corporate innovation system and asso-
ciated knowledge fl ows. As the fi gure shows, Motorola Brazil is strongly 
embedded into Motorola’s global intracorporate R&D network as well as 
Brazil’s local innovation system.
The Brazilian R&D Center is part of Motorola’s global intracorporate 
R&D network. On the directions from headquarters in the US, it works 
together with Motorola’s R&D centers in other countries. Within the net-
work, Brazilian operations are strongly tied to headquarters. When Motor-
ola started its R&D center in 1996 in Brazil, the pool of human resources 
with expertise in mobile phone and/or embedded software was limited, and 
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Figure 7.1 Innovation system of Motorola Brazil.
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Subsequently, the Brazilian center transferred development tools and 
simulators to different R&D units of Motorola across the globe. Using 
these tools, R&D units develop business solutions in specifi c areas of their 
competence (e.g., India for multimedia, Russia for Java solutions) and trans-
fer them to the Brazilian center, which in turn integrates them into whole 
software packages for GSM/CDMA, together with the team from US head-
quarters. Among others, within the intracorporate R&D network, the Bra-
zilian center works closely with headquarters in the US and global R&D 
centers in India, Russia, Italy, Australia, China and Singapore. Motorola 
Brazil’s R&D Center also has links with the standards and regulatory bod-
ies in the US and other countries.
The Brazilian R&D center of Motorola works very closely with three 
main external partners in Brazil: (1) ELDORADO—for development of 
tools, embedded software and related hardware, software integration and 
tests; (2) CESAR—a spinoff from university research, collaboration in the 
areas of enterprise solutions, server client and JAVA/end-to-end applica-
tions; and (3) Centro de Informática (CIN)—collaboration in developing 
testing solutions. Partnership with these three organizations helps Motor-
ola gain access to a broad skills base. For instance, in addition to the Bra-
zilian R&D center’s in-house staff of 350 engineers, 600 more engineers 
from partner organizations work on Motorola’s R&D activities, taking the 
effective researcher strength to 950. Motorola’s collaborative projects draw 
on the research strength of the partners.
Brazilian Informatics Law also requires companies to spend part of their 
R&D investments in collaborative projects with nonprofi t organizations, 
particularly those located in northeast Brazil. CESAR and CIN are located 
in northeast Brazil. In addition, Motorola also has research collaboration 
with a number of Brazilian universities and research institutes. In all the 
collaborative projects, the intellectual property (IP) belongs to Motorola.
By working with Motorola, many Brazilian universities have gained 
international recognition for their competencies. In addition to the Brazil-
ian center, other R&D units of Motorola’s global R&D network, as well 
as some of Motorola’s competitors, began engaging the research services 
of these universities. In collaborative projects, universities get benefi ts in 
terms of greater learning opportunities and specialist knowledge infl ows. 
Universities learn new management and process control techniques, prod-
uct development methodologies, transfer of technology and so on. For 
instance, a department in a university was using games as a teaching aid, 
and thus this department built up technical competence in developing elec-
tronic/computer-based games. A spinoff emerged from this department and 
was under incubation in CESAR’s campus. Motorola helped this company 
develop games for mobile phone platforms, which is a very complex task.
When Motorola set up its R&D center in Brazil, there were not many 
people with academic qualifi cations in the wireless domain. In 1999, 
Motorola linked up with 17 Brazilian universities to help in human 
resource development. Motorola helped these universities in the extension 
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of curriculum and provided faculty in teaching these new disciplines at the 
universities, particularly in the development of M.Sc. and Ph.D. programs 
in the domain. It also provided extra training and internships to students 
from Brazilian universities.
Motorola also has been investing in a nationwide training program for 
university students, called Software Residency. This training program’s 
aim is to fi ll the gap between what the universities teach (through their 
curricula) and corporate requirements (e.g., development and application 
of simulators, embedded software, confi guration management and so on). 
This program was launched by CIn in partnership with Motorola in Brazil 
in 2003, and since then several hundred students have been trained. Com-
panies, including Motorola, have recruited many of them. Motorola also 
provides facilities in-house to Ph.D. students from Brazilian universities on 
topics of mutual interest (e.g., Ph.D. in testing).
Host Country Implications
Motorola’s R&D activities in Brazil have attracted many companies, includ-
ing its competitors, who have located their own R&D centers in Brazil after 
closely observing Motorola. So in a sense Motorola is contributing to the 
creation of an ecosystem.
Rhodia
Rhodia is a France-based MNC in the business of specialty chemicals; 
it originally belonged to Rhone Pallonc, a pharmaceutical and chemical 
MNC. In 1999, Rhone Pallonc split into two companies: (1) the life sci-
ences business merged with Hoechst and later became Aventis; and (2) the 
chemicals business became an independent company and became Rhodia 
Worldwide. But, in Brazil the company was always known as Rhodia since 
its inception more than 90 years ago. Rhodia is a Brazilian name, and it 
was later adopted as the global corporate name.
Rhodia has business and manufacturing operations in Asia, Europe, 
North America and Latin America. Its worldwide turnover is about 5 bil-
lion. It develops and manufactures specialty chemicals such as polymers, 
polyamides, silica, solvents, phenol and other chemical products.
Rhodia’s management structure is organized into two sectors:
Enterprises—all the production, sales and marketing operations come •
under this sector;
Functions—R&D, human resources and legal services come under •
this sector. These functions come directly under the parent company’s 
headquarters and are divided into four zones, Asia, Europe, North 
America and Latin America. The manufacturing plants also have 
R&D laboratories attached to them to solve immediate problems as 
well as to develop some products. But they report to the regional R&D 
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function manager and not the enterprise manager. For example, the 
R&D labs attached to the manufacturing plants in Venezuela do not 
report to the head of enterprise in Venezuela, but report directly to the 
zonal R&D head in Brazil.
Rhodia has fi ve R&D centers worldwide: two in France, and one each 
in Brazil, China and the US. Together these fi ve R&D centers constitute a 
global network, work together on many projects and support one another. 
The main focus of these R&D centers is to develop and offer customized 
products to the customers in the region.
Driving Force
Rhodia’s strategy is to be in proximity to the market in order to understand 
the market needs and develop suitable products for customers. Rhodia also 
feels that it is important to employ local/regional people in R&D functions 
to better understand the market. Hence, Rhodia has been conducting R&D 
in Brazil since the early 1970s.
Rhodia Brazil has 120 researchers, accounting for about 10 percent of 
Rhodia’s global R&D workforce. About 18 percent of the 120 have Ph.D. 
degrees, 11 percent master’s degrees and the rest bachelors in engineering, 
chemistry and pharmacology. It has a turnover of 15 percent among the 
R&D personnel. In addition, at any given point in time, Rhodia has over 
30 students from Brazilian universities working in its laboratories. They 
are mostly Ph.D. students or postdocs working on their theses. In 2006, 
Rhodia Brazil fi led for seven patents under the PCT. The Brazilian R&D 
center has a Documentation Center that carries out literature survey and 
fi les for patents.
In the regional market Rhodia has several competitors, but they are differ-
ent for different product groups. For instance, its major competitors include 
DuPont (plastics), Oxiteno (Brazilian company), Dow Chemicals and Shell 
(solvents) and BASF (silica). These companies are competitors in certain prod-
uct categories as well as customers in some other product categories.
The Brazilian R&D center does not carry out basic research. It mainly 
carries out applications and adaptations of products for the regional/local 
market. For instance, in some products like shampoos and soaps, the 
Brazilian market has unique characteristics that are different from other 
regions. Brazilian consumers prefer more foam. This requires changes in 
the chemical formulation of shampoos and soaps, and some new raw mate-
rial needs to be developed. Sometimes chemicals used in a product devel-
oped in another region may not be available locally in Brazil or in the 
Latin American region, which requires R&D on material substitution with 
locally available raw materials (adaptation of the formula).
Rhodia has some specialist competencies and facilities in Brazil that it 
does not have in other R&D centers. In such cases, the Brazilian center car-
ries out R&D on worldwide products. Similarly, there are some products 
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that are manufactured in Brazil, but corresponding specialist laboratories 
do not exist in Brazil. So the product development R&D takes place else-
where in the network.
Rhodia also has two manufacturing plants in Brazil, one for textile 
chemicals and the other for engineering plastics. These two plants have 
R&D units attached to them for product development as well as production 
support. These R&D units report to the head of the Brazilian R&D center 
and not to the business managers of the plants.
Over the years, some products developed for the Brazilian market have 
become worldwide products. For instance, Brazil has a large leather indus-
try, which uses large amounts of chemicals in leather processing, raising 
environmental concerns. Rhodia Brazil has developed a line of ecologically 
friendly products based on organic materials for treating leather. These 
products are now being manufactured and sold in Asia and other regions 
that have a leather industry.
Corporate Innovation System and Knowledge Flows
Figure 7.2 depicts the corporate innovation system of Rhodia Brazil. As the 
fi gure shows, Rhodia Brazil is strongly integrated with its global intracor-
porate R&D network as well as with Brazil’s local innovation and produc-
tion system.
Rhodia France 
Rhodia USA Rhodia China 
Rhodia Brazil 
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Figure 7.2 Innovation system of Rhodia Brazil.
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Rhodia works very closely with the customer in developing products. 
Such interaction opens up learning opportunities and facilitates exchange 
of knowledge. For instance, in one project, the customer, the largest shoe 
manufacturer in Brazil, approached Rhodia for jointly developing a prod-
uct. The project involved developing a tolerant-free formulation for the glue 
that is used in attaching the shoe parts. There are several types of glues 
based on a solvent called ‘tolerin.’ But glues based on tolerin faced prob-
lems in Brazil because of its smell, which is considered harmful to children 
wearing shoes. So the Brazilian government banned the use of glues made 
of tolerin. Rhodia and the customer developed a new formula based on a 
new solvent. Rhodia gained deep knowledge about the shoe manufacturing 
process, which is an important industry that uses Rhodia’s products. The 
customer gained knowledge relating to chemicals and their bonding.
Rhodia’s R&D center in Brazil also has an analytical laboratory with 
specialized equipment. It can test whether any of Rhodia’s products are 
giving problems to its customers, based on the sample provided by the 
customer.
The interaction between different R&D centers of Rhodia takes place in 
several different forms:
 1. Independent projects—in these projects, the Brazilian unit or another 
R&D center works together with customer partners and when a solu-
tion is found or a new chemical is developed, the knowledge/technol-
ogy is passed on to other R&D units. For instance, the R&D center in 
China developed special silica for shoes that can convert rubber into 
a transparent form (e.g., transparent shoe soles). This technology was 
passed on to Brazil, where it is now manufactured for Latin American 
customers.
 2. Joint R&D projects—in these projects, part of the work is carried 
out in Brazil and the rest in another R&D center in the network. For 
instance, Brazilian and Chinese R&D centers jointly developed the 
low-density polyethylene for shoe soles.
 3. Worldwide database—all the R&D units in Rhodia’s global R&D 
network share this database. This database contains information on 
completed and ongoing projects, technologies/competencies available 
in each of the centers and so on.
Latin American and Asian regions have many common industries, such 
as leather and shoe manufacturing. These industries are not large in Europe 
and North America. So the Brazilian R&D works closely with the Asian 
region (R&D center in China) in product development.
Rhodia has research linkages with several Brazilian universities, most 
strongly with the University of Campinas (Unicamp), which is located just fi ve 
kilometers away. Rhodia allows students pursuing Ph.D. or master’s degrees 
at Brazilian universities, particularly Unicamp, to use its laboratories. The 
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students can work partly or entirely on their theses at Rhodia’s laboratories. 
The only conditions are that the subject must be of interest to Rhodia, and 
before the thesis is published Rhodia should vet it. Students have access to a 
lot material/information in the laboratory, and Rhodia would like to protect 
confi dential information that affects its competitiveness.
There are several types of association with the universities:
 1. A student’s topic may require the use of Rhodia’s laboratories and 
access to Rhodia’s knowledge. The student and the professor approach 
Rhodia to permit the student to work in Rhodia’s laboratories. In this 
case Rhodia does not provide any fi nancial support.
 2. Rhodia itself may be interested in working on a particular topic and 
approaches the professor in the subject. The professor assigns either 
a Ph.D. or a master’s level student to work on the issue. In this case, 
Rhodia pays the student to carry out the work and the professor for 
supervising the work. The professor makes regular visits to Rhodia’s 
lab to monitor the project.
 3. Sometimes the government supports projects in special areas (e.g., 
nanotechnology), so that companies like Rhodia can apply for fi nanc-
ing to the government (usually together with a university), in which 
case the professor assembles a team of students with master’s and 
Ph.D. level competencies. The government provides only part of the 
funding. Rhodia provides the laboratory facilities, pays for the sup-
plies, materials and equipment, and the government provides scholar-
ships to the students.
Rhodia also has research collaboration with another university in Federal 
do Rio Grande do Sul. It is located in the southern part of Brazil, so that it 
is diffi cult for the university’s researchers to visit Rhodia often. In this case, 
Rhodia pays the student and the professor to carry out the work at the univer-
sity premises itself. Rhodia’s experts visit the university once in three months 
to monitor the progress of the work. This project was initiated by Rhodia.
Usually Rhodia identifi es a project idea that may be of use for it in the 
future. Rhodia discusses the idea with the university professor. The university 
in turn analyzes the technical feasibility of the project. If the project is techni-
cally feasible to be implemented, then an agreement is signed. Universities tend 
to be slow in implementing projects, so that Rhodia enters into collaboration 
with universities only on projects that may be required in the long-term.
Rhodia feels that research collaboration with universities is mutu-
ally benefi cial to both parties in terms of knowledge fl ows and learning 
opportunities:
A university may have the specialized knowledge that Rhodia does •
not possess in-house, and through collaboration Rhodia gains access 
to such knowledge.
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University researchers are dedicated to work on that specifi c project, •
whereas Rhodia’s in-house researchers work on several projects at the 
same time. Such focused efforts and dedication allow deeper analysis 
of the project and the possibility of fi nding qualitative solutions.
By working with university students, Rhodia can also identify tal-•
ent for recruitment. Often a candidate may have an excellent profi le, 
but may turn out to be too theoretical in approach and not suitable 
for commercial R&D. But long-term joint projects help in identifying 
the right talent and also in training the student to industrial require-
ments. Rhodia can also observe whether the student is adaptable.
Universities gain access to fi nance, raw materials and equipment by •
collaborating with the industry.
In an R&D value chain, universities possess knowledge relating to the •
early activities (e.g., chemical rules, data analysis and so on). They do 
not have much knowledge on downstream activities like pilot scale 
development and scaling up of production, which in turn have impli-
cations for the entire value chain. By collaborating with the industry, 
universities have opportunities to gain such knowledge.
Universities also gain knowledge relating to project management, cost •
over-runs, delivery schedules, as well as market conditions and so on.
Host Country Implications
Rhodia has no problem recruiting chemical engineers or organic chemistry 
graduates. Brazil has no shortage of such people. But in certain special-
ized areas like personal care products, the company is fi nding diffi culty 
in recruiting researchers. This is partly because there are many companies 
dedicated to the personal care business in this region. This business con-
stitutes only a small portion of Rhodia’s product portfolio. From a career 
point of view a specialist researcher would prefer to work in a company 
that is dedicated to personal care business. So, Rhodia recruits nonspecial-
ist graduates and trains them in Italy or the US, but then it faces a high 
turnover rate among these recruits.
Rhodia makes use of the Brazilian natural resources in developing 
products. As early as in the 1940s, Rhodia developed chemistry based 
on sugarcane alcohol. This sugarcane used to come from the northern 
Brazil. But during World War II, the Germans cut off communication 
between the north and south of Brazil. So Rhodia bought a sugarcane 
farm (the location of the present R&D center) in the Campinas region, 
extracted alcohol from sugarcane and sent it to São Paulo for conversion 
into chemicals. Even today, Rhodia has several products that are based 
on sugarcane alcohol. Besides alcohol, Rhodia presently has a research 
program on ‘glycerol,’ which is a product of biodiesel. Rhodia is inter-
ested in the chemistry of glycerol to develop new chemicals from it for the 
future market.
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Siemens
Siemens is an MNC based in Germany; the company is active in engineer-
ing, electrical and electronics businesses. Its business areas include: auto-
mation and control; information and communications; transportation; 
medical equipment; power; lighting and others. Siemens is an innovation-
driven company. In 2005, 75 percent of its sales revenues came from prod-
ucts that were fi ve years old or younger, 19 percent from products that were 
six to 10 years old and six percent from products that were more than 10 
years old. The same fi gures in 1985 were 55 percent, 29 percent and 16 per-
cent, respectively. In 2005, Siemens spent €5.2 billion on R&D worldwide. 
It has 47,000 R&D employees (of which 30,000 are software engineers) in 
150 R&D locations spread over 30 countries worldwide. In 2005, Siemens 
generated 8,800 invention disclosures (of which 5,700 patent fi lings were 
made) and in total had 53,000 active patents.
Siemens spends 95 percent of its R&D investment in: operating groups, 
regional units, subsidiaries and associated companies, for development of 
products, systems and manufacturing processes. The remaining fi ve per-
cent of R&D investments are made in Siemens’s Corporate Technology 
Units, located in Germany (Berlin, Munich, Erlangen), the US (Berkeley, 
Princeton), the UK (Romsey), Japan (Tokyo), Russia (St. Petersburg, Mos-
cow), China (Beijing, Shanghai) and India (Bangalore). These Corporate 
Technology Units are focused on research, technology development and 
consulting.
Siemens’s Innovation Strategy:
Comprehensive visions: ‘Pictures of the Future’;•
Deep knowledge about customers’ businesses and processes;•
Technology leadership;•
Strong patent portfolio/strong player in standards;•
Use of synergy/platforms;•
R&D presence in leading markets;•
Optimized innovation processes;•
Cooperation with topnotch universities;•
Strong innovation culture, network of excellent people.•
Siemens Brazil
Siemens entered Brazil as early as 1867; with the supply and installation of 
a telegraphic line between Rio de Janeiro and the state of Rio Grande do 
Sul. In 1905, it founded the Cia Brazileira de Eletrecidade Siemens-Schuck-
ert-werke in Rio de Janeiro. In 2005 Siemens celebrated 100 years of opera-
tions in Brazil. In the same year the net sales from Brazilian operations 
amounted to R$ 6,609 million of which exports accounted for R$ 1,064 
million. During that year Siemens spent R$ 136.5 million on R&D 
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operations in Brazil (about two percent of sales). Its R&D investments have 
been growing rapidly every year from R$ 68.0 million in 2002 to 79.6 mil-
lion in 2003 to 108.3 million in 2004 to 136.5 million in 2005.
During the fi nancial year 2005, Siemens employed a total of 577 people 
in R&D and engineering activities in Brazil (six percent of the total employ-
ees in Brazil). In addition, Siemens collaborated with a number of partners 
in Brazil (about 20), and 493 people from these partners also worked on 
Siemens’s Brazil’s R&D activities.
Siemens Brazil has a broad portfolio of products, solutions and services 
for infrastructure. It consisted of six business areas:
 1. Information and communications—communications; Siemens Busi-
ness Services.
 2. Automation and control—automation and drives; industrial solutions 
and services; Siemens Building Technologies.
 3. Power—power generation; power transmission and distribution.
 4. Transportation—transportation systems; Siemens VDO Automotive.
 5. Medical—medical solutions.
 6. Lighting—OSRAM.
Siemens’s R&D centers in Brazil are located in:
Curitiba—enterprise communications and carrier communications.•
Jundiai—high voltage transformers; medium voltage panels; and •
industrial turbines.
Guarulhos—automotive electronics.•
São Paulo—automation and control.•
Rio de Janeiro—information and management systems.•
Canoas—residential outlets and switches; and sensors.•
Brazilian R&D units also export their technology. Such exports include 
software and worldwide platforms. These exports could be both a part of 
the value chain of a product or the complete product. For instance, Brazil 
has Siemens’s Global Center of Competence in the PABX product category. 
This center is responsible for the entire product range and the complete 
value chain (world product mandate).
Brazil is the headquarters for two centers of business and 26 compe-
tence centers, responsible for 26 technologies worldwide. The main focus 
of Brazilian R&D centers, however, is product development for the local 
and regional markets and adaptation of products developed elsewhere. The 
local product development is aimed at fi lling the gaps between local needs 
and the company’s global product portfolio, so that local market opportu-
nities are captured (e.g., equipment in automation and control). However, 
with changing technologies and globalization such local opportunities are 
becoming weaker in recent times.
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Corporate Innovation System and Knowledge Flows
In terms of the global intracorporate network, there does not seem to be 
a close integration of the Brazilian R&D units with the rest of Siemens’s 
global R&D network, although the decisions regarding the portfolio of 
R&D projects to be undertaken by the Brazilian units are usually decided 
centrally at the corporate level. This could be partly because internally the 
R&D centers located in over 30 countries compete with one another for 
projects. The Brazilian center perhaps loses out on relative costs and the 
availability of people. However, Brazil has a lot of strengths such as simi-
larity to European culture, openness to different cultures and the popula-
tion’s well-recognized skills and competencies.
Siemens has research collaboration with a number of Brazilian organiza-
tions. Among them are: the University of São Paulo (USP), the University of 
Campinas (UNICAMP), CESAR and INST. ATLANTICO.
Siemens Brazil is very open to accepting and integrating new technol-
ogies and ideas that originate in Brazil. Toward identifying these, it has 
started a ‘Technology Portal,’ where universities and research institutes 
can advertise their competencies, the infrastructure available to carry out 
research in that area and the way in which the university/research institute 
would like to collaborate with Siemens. Siemens’s experts analyze these 
online expressions of interest, and, if they are found interesting, the experts 
approach the teams. This is an innovative idea to mine local competencies. 
It also helps Siemens in monitoring technology developments and gaining 
knowledge relating to topics of interest.
Host Country Implications
In terms of implications for the host countries, Siemens had earlier tried to 
foster entrepreneurship among its employees by promoting spinoffs. But it 
did not succeed for several reasons including: employees were not prepared 
to be entrepreneurs; changes in the marketplace were faster than expected; 
and the Brazilian market became unpredictable with liberalization and 
competition from lower-cost countries. Siemens, however, is continually 
looking to foster entrepreneurship in Brazil by seeking investment oppor-
tunities in innovation-based startup companies that may be working on 
technologies of future interest for Siemens.
7.2 BRAZILIAN NATIONAL RESEARCH INSTITUTES
Centro De Pesquisas Renato Archer (CenPRA)
CenPRA is a national research institution under the Ministry of Science 
and Technology (MCT). It is located at Campinas in São Paulo state. It has 
230 researchers and 12 laboratories.
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CenPRA’s operations cover fi ve technological areas in which it is involved 
in technological development, consulting, advisory, technological viability 
demonstration and services, performed through specifi c product and pro-
cesses innovation projects:
Information technology product and process qualifi cation.•
Information technology product and prototype engineering.•
Special research projects.•
Infrastructure, environment and socio-economic systems.•
Cooperative network.•
CenPRA’s technological focus includes: software products evalua-
tion; hardware systems design; electronic products analysis and quali-
fi cation; software process assessment and improvement; robotics and 
computational vision; product development; distributed systems soft-
ware; electronic assembling and packaging; enterprise management; 
information displays; micro systems; network technologies; and infor-
mation security.
CenPRA provides technological services such as: capillary and fl at 
cells prototyping; electronic devices; systems design, prototyping and 
validation; display repair; display design, prototyping and validation; 
electronic systems and devices qualifi cation, reliability, characterization 
and failure analysis; IC and electronic systems assembling and packaging 
in ceramic capsules, COB, SMT; microsystems prototyping and charac-
terization; PCB and PCBA qualifi cation; photolithographic masks; rapid 
prototyping in medical applications and mechanical parts; SAW devices 
prototyping; software process assessment and improvement (CMMI and 
ISO/IEC 15504-SPICE); and software product evaluation.
Contract R&D
CenPRA has been collaborating with MNCs like Hewlett-Packard (HP) 
since 1999. Its collaboration with HP started with a project to set up a 
software test lab at CenPRA. This test lab was set up to test the image 
(display) in computers (e.g., problem translation, drivers and so on) man-
ufactured by HP. Earlier CenPRA had developed a methodology to test 
computer software. The image test searches for software errors in the 
computers and fi xes them. HP, which manufactures computers, wanted 
to utilize the R&D services of CenPRA. This lab tests products that are 
marketed in the Latin American region and Mexico.
Driving Forces
The main driving force for HP to enter into research collaboration •
was the Brazilian Informatics Law, which requires a company to 
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undertake collaborative research projects with local research insti-
tutes in order to receive incentives.
The government regulations also require testing and certifi cation of •
electronics products by an authorized institute. HP preferred working 
with CenPRA, perhaps because it is under the Ministry.
Having worked together on some projects, HP recognized the techno-•
logical competence available at CenPRA and started using its R&D 
services for HP’s worldwide products.
It is also cost-effective for HP to utilize the services of CenPRA.•
As a sign of HP’s growing confi dence in CenPRA’s capabilities, the two 
partners are working on a more research-intensive project on display tech-
nologies. Presently, there are plasma and LCD technologies. HP and Cen-
PRA are working on a new display technology called ‘nano crystal emission 
display’ (NCED). The project involves developing and testing the new display 
technology. The new technology allows manufacture of large-sized displays. 
CenPRA is responsible for developing the software, microelectronics and 
automation. CenPRA has strong technological competencies in this area. HP 
plans to incorporate these displays in its new range of printers.
In joint projects, CenPRA demands joint holding (50 percent) of intel-
lectual property (IP).
CenPRA being a government institution, the facilities of the testing lab 
are open to other companies also. Because HP is the joint holder of the IP, 
it does not pay any fee, but other companies using the facilities have to pay 
a fee. However, in practice, HP also may not want to reveal its confi dential 
data to other companies. So for the time being only HP is using the facilities 
of the testing lab.
Knowledge Flows and Learning
In the case of setting up of a test lab, the learning opportunities are limited. 
CenPRA had already developed a proven methodology, and HP wanted 
to use it. However, the methodology used needed to be fi ne-tuned to suit 
different categories of computers. About four times a year, two to three 
researchers from CenPRA were sent to HP’s headquarters in the US for 
training on the new line of computers that were to be tested. CenPRA thus 
had the opportunity to gain knowledge relating to computer hardware, 
technology evolution and market trends. Such knowledge helps in updating 
CenPRA’s testing methodology as well as in transferring such knowledge to 
other areas of its operations. In addition, these joint projects also provided 
opportunities to learn new project management techniques to ensure timely 
deliveries. CenPRA has worked with other companies such as Motorola 
and Ericsson in testing components and in developing prototypes.
In the joint project to develop display technologies, the learning oppor-
tunities were much more extensive as the project involved carrying out 
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more research. There are also other teams of HP located in different coun-
tries working on similar technologies, so that there was a lot of exchange 
of knowledge. HP also placed its own expert at CenPRA to work on this 
project. Research collaboration with MNCs also helps CenPRA in getting 
more fi nances, which help it in restructuring some laboratories, buying new 
equipment and so on.
CenPRA also collaborates with other research institutes in Brazil. For 
instance, testing methodology was developed together with another Brazil-
ian research institute, ATLANTICO.
Although there are no spinoffs from CenPRA, during the years it 
had developed a large pool of highly qualifi ed workforce. Many young 
researchers have found jobs with new companies, contributing to diffusion 
of knowledge.
Host Country Implications
R&D activities of foreign companies are good for the host country because 
they bring new research activities and knowledge relating to product devel-
opment. Emerging economies like Brazil gain both directly and indirectly 
from such activities. The most important thing is that the host country 
should absorb such new knowledge and apply it elsewhere for economic 
development.
Centro De Pesquisa E Desenvolvimento 
Em Telecomunicacóes (CPqD)
CPqD was established in 1976 as part of the industrialization efforts of 
the Brazilian government during the 1960s and the 1970s. The then ruling 
military government focused on infrastructure sectors such as roads and 
telecommunications to integrate the country. State-owned companies were 
to lead in strategic industries like steel, oil, electricity and telecom. Since 
its inception, CPqD’s evolution has been closely tied to the telecom sectoral 
(now broadly ICT) policy of the Brazilian government. Today CPqD has 
1,200 staff working in six technological areas.
Until 1962, permissions for companies wishing to provide telecommuni-
cations services in Brazil were issued by federal, state and municipal govern-
ments, independent of one another. As a consequence, telecommunications 
grew in a disorderly manner, with few technical or operational regulations. 
At that time, there were about 1,000 telephone companies operating in Bra-
zil, and interconnectivity between them was usually a major problem. This 
situation required an urgent reform, particularly focusing on standard-
ization in technical and operational domains. In 1962, a federal law, the 
Brazilian Telecommunications Act (Federal Law No. 4117), was approved 
to regulate all services related to telecommunications, including several 
aspects of radio and television broadcasting. Under this law, in 1965, the 
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government established the state-owned EMBRATEL to operate long-dis-
tance trunk lines and in 1966 bought the Companhia Telefónica Brasileira 
(CTB) from its foreign owner, Brazilian Traction. CTB was the incumbent 
telephone service provider in the politically and economically important 
states of Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and Minas Gerais. In 1967, a reorga-
nization of the federal cabinet created the Ministry of Communications 
(MC), with responsibilities over telecommunications, broadcasting and 
postal services. Following the model of AT&T in the US, Brazil decided to 
create a subordinate Research Laboratory. So in 1972, TELEBRÁS (Tele-
comunicacóes Brasileiras S/A) was established as a state-owned holding 
company to control and coordinate fi nancially, technically and operation-
ally all the state and local telephone operators.
As in most sectors, even in the telecom sector, from the beginning Brazil 
followed an import substitution policy. However, the Brazilian equipment 
market was dominated by MNCs. The majority of network equipment 
was being imported, with local production restricted to assembling with 
imported components. The government tried to stimulate equipment 
production in Brazil by creating incentives for locating manufacturing 
plants in the country and by increasing local content requirement. In the 
1970s, telecom was in transition from analog to digital systems, and the 
Brazilian government wanted to take this opportunity to develop home-
grown equipment manufacturers. The government announced that the 
digital switching equipment should be developed in Brazil, while MNCs 
were allowed to offer space-switching technology from abroad. At the 
same time, MNCs were given incentives to form joint ventures with 
Brazilian-owned fi rms so that the local manufacturing capacity could be 
strengthened.
In the initial period of TELEBRÁS it was inconceivable to immedi-
ately create an R&D center, because of human resource constraints as 
scientists and engineers educated in the telecom-related disciplines were 
limited. TELEBRÁS tried to overcome this problem by entering into con-
tracts with university research groups to carry out R&D, as well as to 
multiply competence, which was dispersed in several Brazilian universi-
ties. In 1976, TELEBRÁS formally created its own R&D center, called 
CPqD, in Campinas (in proximity to the University of Campinas). The 
CPqD was created within the organic structure of TELEBRÁS in order 
to implement its principal objective that CPqD should work exclusively 
on the equipment to be used in the national telecommunications system. 
CPqD defi ned a strategy to take advantage of the opportunities opened up 
by the ongoing technological changes (emergence of digital technologies) 
and to achieve competence in these emerging technologies. TELEBRÁS, 
through CPqD’s R&D contracts with universities, introduced scholar-
ships and other incentives to attract good students to its projects. Some 
universities, however, created an almost separate structure to manage 
these projects, with general infrastructure and support personnel paid 
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for by CPqD’s R&D contracts (Loural et al. 2006). As a result of this 
separate entity, the establishment of telecom technology as an academic 
discipline suffered in the initial years.
Until the 1990s, CPqD was the nodal agency for R&D, including sub-
contracting to universities and technology transfer to Brazilian manu-
facturing companies. The conditions for transfer of technology were 
that the recipient company should be in the private sector and owned by 
Brazilian nationals. Telecom companies demanded R&D services. MCT 
gave policy and fi nancial support through TELEBRÁS. From the engi-
neering perspective each state/operating company had a special require-
ment to be catered to. CPqD realized that Brazil did not have a critical 
mass of human resources to support such a variety of demands on R&D. 
So it subcontracted R&D to universities and to employ Ph.D. and mas-
ter’s level students in the projects to develop advanced technologies as 
well as product development (prototypes). A similar situation existed in 
private Brazilian-owned companies that received CPqD’s technologies. 
Many of them were new ventures created under the stimuli provided 
by the industrial policy and R&D contracts provided by TELEBRÁS. 
Often, teams from these companies worked under CPqD coordination 
and facilities, rather than their own. This procedure was good for the 
technology transfer process, but the companies failed to develop in-house 
R&D capacities.
In spite of such drawbacks, CPqD was able to transfer technologies for 
more than 90 products to 56 companies. These technologies included: voice 
digital switching; digital transmission; optical and satellite communica-
tions; data switching; terminals; outside plant; optical fi bers; and electronic 
components. The main factor that contributed to the success of technology 
transfer was the fl ow of personnel from universities to CPqD and from 
CPqD to companies, sometimes at the cost of depleting the critical mass 
of well-trained professionals in the institution of origin. For instance, the 
entire team on the digital switching project (Trópico) was transferred from 
the University of São Paulo (USP) to CPqD. Similarly the key technology 
managers in the technology recipient companies have been previously 
leaders in CPqD projects, e.g., as in an optical fi ber technology company. 
The new Brazilian companies that were created with CPqD technologies 
included: Elebra; Promon; SID; Multitel; Avibrás; and ABC-Xtal (Loural 
et al. 2006, pp. 301–302).
From the early 1990s, Brazil started liberalizing its trade provisions very 
quickly, making the Brazilian-ownership requirement for telecom equip-
ment manufacturing companies redundant. The Law No. 4117, which was 
in effect since 1962, was replaced in July 1997 by a new law to organize 
telecommunications in Brazil. The Law No. 9472, known as ‘Lei Geral de 
Telecomunicacóes’ (LGT) (Telecommunications General Law), provided a 
new framework based on principles of competition and universal service. 
Among its provisions are (Loural et al. 2006, pp. 305–306):
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The executive branch of the government was authorized to sell its •
shares in TELEBRÁS, thus privatizing the telecommunications 
system.
A new regulatory agency, ANATEL, was created.•
The government was obliged to enact a bill creating a fund for fi nanc-•
ing Brazilian technological development in telecommunications.
The government was obliged to preserve CPqD’s R&D capabilities.•
However, the law creating the fund, FUNTTEL, for supporting Brazil-
ian telecom technology development was approved only in November 2000. 
FUNTTEL was constituted basically by levying an excise of 0.5 percent on 
the gross revenue of telecommunications services provided by the compa-
nies. A fi xed percentage of the fund’s annual income was to be awarded to 
CPqD to carry on R&D projects. This percentage was 20 percent in the 
fi rst year and 30 percent in subsequent ones. Today FUNTTEL’s funding 
amounts to 50 percent of CPqD’s budget.
About one year after the general law came into effect, TELEBRÁS was 
sold in an auction. Its subsidiaries were reorganized in groups according 
to geographical and size (number of subscribers) criteria. Mobile and fi xed 
operations were separated. The telecommunications business in Brazil was 
divided into three regions. The four large companies that were formerly 
under TELEBRÁS became interstate fi xed line operators (national opera-
tors); in addition, fi ve or six smaller companies were given the mobile tele-
phone operations. Privatization brought a lot of MNC investors, such as 
Telefonica (Spain), Telecom Italia, Sprint/MCI and foreign private invest-
ment companies.
CPqD already by the beginning of the 1990s sensed the ongoing economic 
changes and devised its own survival strategy. Globally, by 1988–1989, the 
external signs of liberalization wave and technological changes in the tele-
communications industry had been noted and the changing trend toward 
services was being discussed. There were broadly three levels or areas in a 
service fi rm that demand R&D generated knowledge: the physical system 
or infrastructure that supports services (in the telecommunications case, the 
network); the operation of this system, including control and maintenance; 
and the services offered by the fi rm (Mitchell 1990). In the early 1990s, 
the economy was in a state of fl ux with liberalization and moves toward 
privatization. Although CPqD was to transfer technologies only to Brazilian 
companies, political pressures compelled it to transfer some switching tech-
nologies to Alcatel, a French company (Loural et al. 2006).
From 1990 onward, CPqD redirected its activities to:
Generation of technologies that could be transferred to the TELE-•
BRÁS group, in the form of support to technical specifi cations, to 
network and services evolution and to the defi nition of architectures, 
topologies and new systems;
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Development of software systems for operations support and automa-•
tion, network planning, billing and business support, in a joint effort 
with operating companies;
Participation in the development of products in cooperation with •
other companies;
Acquisition of competence in strategic basic telecommunications •
technologies;
Provision of technological services to the industry, to the TELEBRÁS •
group and others, by offering technological consulting services, spe-
cialized services and knowledge transfer (Loural et al. 2006, p. 309).
Following this new strategy, CPqD was to:
Conduct R&D in niche products.•
Identify the needs of TELEBRÁS and other subsidiary companies. •
These companies demanded development of operating software sys-
tems (OSS) and business support systems. CPqD at the time had no 
profi le in these areas, but quickly adapted itself, and by the end of 
1990s, it had installed a lot of OSS in Brazilian telecom companies.
Provide technical services, such as testing and certifi cation services. •
At the time of liberalization, a lot of companies wanted to enter the 
Brazilian telecom market. The Brazilian government placed a require-
ment on the companies that they should be certifi ed by CPqD to be 
eligible to participate in the telecom market.
From then on, CPqD reduced its previous efforts aimed at equipment 
development to become mostly a research center dedicated to cater to the 
technological needs of TELEBRÁS subsidiaries and the development of spe-
cialized products required for the group. In 1998, when TELEBRÁS was 
privatized, CPqD was given a new legal status, a ‘non-profi t private foun-
dation.’ The new foundation incorporated the physical and technological 
assets of the earlier CPqD. After the privatization of the TELEBRÁS group, 
the most urgent tasks of the new telecom operators were the expansion 
of their networks and their subscriber bases. However, the new telecom 
operators had to rely on CPqD to provide operation and business support 
systems as well as technical services.
In spite of such an adverse scenario, however, CPqD fi nds that there 
are still some opportunities for local creation of innovative services and 
related products. Services and applications are areas that are highly local 
and strongly depend on the social and cultural characteristics of the target 
population. Furthermore, the complexity of current telecommunications 
system is enormous because different technologies have to share space in 
the operating companies’ networks. These companies need to connect their 
networks and deploy services on different platforms to reach various target 
users. So CPqD changed its strategic positioning to focus on applications, 
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service platforms and integrated management of network and services. 
Moreover, the convergence of telecom and information technologies opened 
up new opportunities for technological development.
Present Strategy
CPqD is now diversifying its clients-base, as the expertise in large opera-
tions and business support systems that were previously developed for tele-
communications could be deployed in other areas such as infrastructure 
utilities and large companies that have their own telecommunications net-
work and information technology resources. FUNTTEL continues to be 
the principal source of fi nancing to carry on R&D. CPqD’s present portfo-
lio has a mix of projects, in three different fronts (Loural et al., 2006):
Some R&D projects are devoted to developing leading-edge technolo-•
gies such as optical packet-switching and wireless ad-hoc networks. 
These cater to niche markets that may be explored later by the remain-
ing Brazilian-owned equipment manufacturers;
The second front is dedicated to more incremental innovation that •
can be applied to public interest situations, as in the case of low-cost 
telecommunication systems and special communication solutions for 
physically impaired people;
The third front is dedicated to developing operations and business •
support systems to compete globally. The Brazilian government is 
starting a program to promote export of software products and ser-
vices, and CPqD already has products operating in several foreign 
countries, including the US, where is has opened a subsidiary and is 
competing in the CLECs market.
Today MNCs enter into collaboration with research institutes such as 
CPqD because of the Informatics Law. Ericsson entered into a partnership 
with CPqD for a strategic technology in the area of optoelectronics. A former 
Brazilian professor of optoelectronics spent some time in Sweden and had 
the opportunity to inform Ericsson of the competencies that are available in 
CPqD. The project involved basic R&D. The Informatics Law only focuses 
on domestic market and does not mention anything about the intellectual 
property (IP) of the technologies developed. So in this project the complete 
IP was assigned to Ericsson. CPqD started commercializing some software 
technologies on its own. For instance, CPqD has developed some geographi-
cal information system (GIS) products and sold them to GIS companies.
Host Country Implications
Foreign R&D is benefi cial for Brazil. It should be more aggressive in pro-
viding R&D outsourcing services.
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The R&D activities of CPqD have led to the emergence of spinoff compa-
nies. For instance, the Trópico digital switch evolved into a next generation 
network (NGN) packet-switching solution, which is being manufactured 
and marketed by a joint venture between CPqD, Promon and Cisco (US). 
‘Cleartech’ is another joint venture, among CPqD, DBA (a Brazilian soft-
ware development company) and EDS (US), that provides clearing services 
between telephony operators. Another spinoff is the ‘Padtec,’ which devel-
ops and manufactures optical wavelength division multiplexing equipment, 
with minority participation of a Brazilian private investment bank.
CPqD also has some employee spinoffs. For instance, some of its 
researchers started two companies. One company, called OPTO LINK, 
develops and manufactures equipment for optical technology applications 
for the media industry. Another company develops and manufactures opto-
electronic components.
R&D collaboration with MNCs is benefi cial to both parties in terms of 
new learning opportunities and knowledge fl ows. However, it depends on 
the type of projects. Most of the projects involve only the use of sophisti-
cated technical skills. But in basic research projects (e.g., the project with 
Ericsson, although the IP was assigned to the company) new knowledge is 
developed through deeper understanding of the fi eld. The most important 
are the learning opportunities in terms of project management techniques.
8 Global Innovation in South Africa
During the apartheid regime, necessitated by international economic and 
political sanctions, South Africa had built up a strong S&T system, par-
ticularly in the defense- and energy-related sectors, through twin strategies 
of import substitution and self-reliance. However, unlike the East Asian 
countries, South Africa did not aim to build up a strong export-oriented 
industrial structure. As result, South Africa has not been closely integrated 
with global corporate production and innovation networks. Export of tech-
nology-intensive goods is considered a measure of an economy’s knowledge 
base. An increase in the ratio of technology-intensive goods in the total 
exports indicates an economy’s growing demand for knowledge. However, 
as Maharajh and Pogue (2008) point out, the global value chains and pro-
duction networks may present a distorted picture, as more complex activi-
ties within a production process may be located in a country other than the 
one exporting the fi nal good. As a result, a high proportion of technology-
intensive goods in total exports of a country does not necessarily refl ect the 
knowledge intensity in domestic industrial activities.
In the case of South Africa, there is evidence of a shift toward more to 
knowledge intensity in manufacturing with an increase in the real value 
of medium-low technology exports from 22 percent of total exports in 
2003 to 27 percent in 2007. At the same time, the share of low-technol-
ogy manufactured goods decreased from 15 percent to 11 percent of total 
exports. Between 2003 and 2006, total exports of manufactured goods 
grew at a compound annual growth rate of 8.6 percent. Exports of high-
technology goods registered the fastest growth at 16.2 percent, followed by 
medium-low goods at 14.4 percent and medium-high technology goods at 
10 percent. The exports of low-technology manufactured goods recorded 
a negative compound annual growth rate of–1.6 percent (Maharajh and 
Pogue 2008, p. 20).
Lorentzen (2005), through case studies of 25 companies, analyzed the 
absorptive capacities of automotive component manufacturers in South 
Africa. The study indicated differing performances by fi rms, with some 
fi rms designing and manufacturing innovative products and others simply 
upgrading their technological capability or striving to attain effi ciency in 
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execution. The root cause for the differential performance seemed to lie 
in their strategic use of advanced technical skills and the type of learning 
opportunities about frontier technology opened up by the in-house R&D. 
The automotive industry is the third-largest sector in the South African 
economy, after mining and fi nancial services, and in 2002 accounted for 
29 percent of the manufacturing output and 6.3 percent of the GDP. The 
share of automotive goods in total exports roughly tripled to 12.8 percent 
from the 1995 fi gure. South Africa has become the most important sup-
plier of catalytic converters to the EU and the second most important to the 
US and holds 12 percent of the world market (p. 1158). Lorentzen (2005) 
categorized the 25 case fi rms into four groups: (i) innovators, (ii) follow-
ers, (iii) mandate executers, and (iv) cliff-hangers. Among the 25, six fi rms 
are considered innovators, with one of them holding multiple international 
product patents and even licensing its technology to major OEMs. Another 
fi rm participated in a government-sponsored research consortium that led 
to a patented process (p. 1161). 
In terms of innovation environment, South Africa now has a compre-
hensive S&T policy framework that provides a clear direction and a strong 
commitment to promote coordination among different government depart-
ments, as well as a series of strategic instruments such as incubator projects, 
centers of excellence and investment incentives (Kahn 2006). Among the 
government incentive mechanisms, the Technology and Human Resources 
for Industry Programme (THRIP) and the Innovation Fund (IF) Programme 
are most likely to involve joint participation by universities, industry and 
government, with specifi ed functions for each partner. “They are both 
designed to ensure multi-institutional and multi-sectoral cross-transference 
of technological knowledge to advance research, human resource capacity 
and the technology outputs of research. The IF is devoted to the promotion 
of commercialization of university research, while THRIP is focused more 
strongly on the current technology needs of fi rms” (Kruss 2008, p. 670).
For South Africa to become a location for global innovation activities 
as well as innovation-based entrepreneurial fi rms, two organizations have 
been playing a catalytic role: The Innovation Hub (Pretoria, Gauteng prov-
ince) and The Cape IT Initiative (Cape Town).
THE INNOVATION HUB (TIH)
The Innovation Hub was created in February 2000, as a private company 
to manage the project. Its mission is to support the Growth and Develop-
ment Strategy of Gauteng province, particularly in the knowledge-econ-
omy sectors by supporting the development of a critical mass of knowledge 
workers in clusters of innovative businesses; the development and growth 
of entrepreneurs in high-technology sectors in the province through incu-
bation facilities and CoachLab activities; the commercialization of local 
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innovative technology development; and the creation of innovation business 
clusters by developing customer-centric business services within a structure 
of measurable value-added services.
Its vision is “(to grow the wealth and quality of life of the people of Gau-
teng, living in a Smart Province generated through innovation) by the full 
implementation of The Innovation Hub Science Park and in support of the 
Provincial Innovation Strategy” (TIH Annual Report 2009).
The Innovation Hub is a full member of the International Associa-
tion of Science Parks (IASP). TIH Science Park has a rich mix of MNCs, 
established domestic fi rms, innovative startups and entrepreneurial proj-
ects in incubation. TIH has become a cluster for innovation activities 
carried out by its enterprise tenants as well as by the nearby national 
research labs such as the Council for Scientifi c and Industrial Research 
(CSIR). The industrial sectors represented by the tenants include: bio-
sciences, electronics, engineering, ICT, smart manufacturing and profes-
sional services.
TIH is an important actor in the implementation of Tshwane’s Smart 
City Initiative that is focused on facilitating interconnectivity and informa-
tion accessibility among people, enterprises, institutions and countries to 
support the Gauteng province in its positioning as a Global City Region.
The fl agship schemes of TIH, among others, include:
The Maximum Business Incubator• —it supports the entrepreneurship 
development. The participants are accepted on the basis of a busi-
ness plan and its fi t with the TIH’s focus areas of ICT, electronics, 
biosciences, advanced materials and manufacturing. For previously 
disadvantaged entrepreneurs, it even offers a pre-incubation program, 
where a business concept could be developed into a proposal with the 
help of mentors from TIH. By the end of 2009, cumulatively 59 com-
panies have participated in the incubation programs, and 29 of these 
have successfully exited the program and graduated to the next phase 
in the startup growth.
The CoachLab• —it is part of the value-added services offered by TIH. 
It is envisaged as an ‘intrapreneurial’ program for fast-track devel-
opment of world-class human resources for the local high-tech sec-
tor. Participants, who are mainly ICT postgraduates, are trained to 
enter the marketplace as active and industry-ready knowledge work-
ers. The program is designed and managed as a partnership between 
TIH, industry and higher education. TIH provides state-of-the-art 
infrastructure and an entrepreneurial environment (including access 
to entrepreneurial service providers), and the industry partners EPI-
USE, Cisco Systems, MTN, Standard Bank and Talentek provide the 
project work, mentorship and supervision. CoachLab participants 
get to do real-time industry projects with an emphasis on delivering 
innovative, value-adding solutions. Talented postgraduate students in 
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ICT-related subjects are recruited from the University of Pretoria, the 
Tshwane University of Technology and the University of South Africa 
(UNISA).
CAPE IT INITIATIVE (CITI)
CITI was established in 1998 by a group of businesspeople who realized 
the potential and the need for an ICT networking and cluster development 
organization that could bring together people, ideas and capital to create a 
strong ICT community in the region and to enhance the attractiveness of 
the Cape as a location for IT investments. Its mission is to stimulate and 
support the growth, promotion and transformation of the ICT cluster in 
the western Cape, in collaboration with business, government, academia 
and other stakeholders.
“The founding vision of CITI was the creation of an ICT cluster that 
is regionally and internationally recognized for excellence in its ability to 
innovate, generate investment, create jobs and grow revenue (all in a way 
which is inclusive of all communities within the Western Cape)” (www.citi.
org.za).
Among CITI’s objectives are: to develop ICT skills and experience 
through close collaboration with all industry bodies, academia and other 
stakeholders; To develop, promote and help transform the ICT cluster, by 
hosting events and roundtables and networking between different actors; 
and to infl uence ICT policy through participation in national processes and 
commissioning of relevant research.
CITI ‘initiates’ projects that meet its mission and objectives. Such ini-
tiative includes identifying, creating, sourcing fi nance and monitoring the 
progress of the project. Among its fl agship projects is the ‘Bandwidth Barn’ 
(BWB). BWB is a subsidiary of CITI, which had started as an ICT incubator 
in 2000 and has now progressed into a full-fl edged Business Accelerator. It 
supports startups by reducing the cost of their overhead services through 
shared offi ce environment and by providing networking opportunities for 
entrepreneurs. BWB offers, through CITI’s funding, business development 
programs to equip both tenants and other entrepreneurs in the ICT sector 
with the necessary skills to graduate from the startup stage to the profi table 
and stable company stage. It has also recently launched a program called 
the ‘Accel Business Development Programme.’
Another project called ‘My Mentor Project’ was launched in 2005, tar-
geting ICT entrepreneurs who have developed valuable technology or busi-
ness concepts, but are unable to transform them into successful businesses. 
The project provides personal and professional support to such potential 
entrepreneurs. By September 2009, 56 companies have passed through this 
program, and 98 percent of them are still in business. Among other proj-
ects is the ‘Youth in ICT,’ a roadshow aimed at attracting youth to pursue 
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careers in ICT and also to bridge the gap in ICT skills, particularly among 
previously disadvantaged youth.
8.1 MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS
DaimlerChrysler and Council for Scientifi c 
and Industrial Research (CSIR)
In 1997, DaimlerChrysler decided to initiate a technology transfer project 
to South Africa that will have a large social impact. DaimlerChrysler has a 
long association with South Africa, where it manufactures Mercedes Benz 
cars. Mercedes C-class cars (W203 RH) (right-hand driven) are manufac-
tured in South Africa for the worldwide market. Among others, these right-
hand driven cars are exported to the UK, Australia and Japan.
Around the time DaimlerChrysler was planning to launch the technol-
ogy transfer projects to South Africa, two developments took place in the 
global business environment:
European Union (EU) legislation was passed making car manufac-•
turers responsible for disposal of old cars by 2011. This put pres-
sure on car manufacturers to incorporate environmentally friendly 
components;
The Motor Industry Development Program (MIDP) of the South •
African government encouraged car manufacturers to use locally 
supplied parts and materials. Under this program car manufacturers 
who increased the local content and export components/cars would 
get incentives in the form of credits that offset import duties (e.g., for 
import of completely manufactured cars).
In order to be ready to meet the EU obligations on the disposal of vehicles, 
DaimlerChrysler has been conducting some basic research in Germany on 
the potential use of natural fi bers in the manufacture of some components. 
Sisal fi ber from Brazil and some other countries was one of the natural 
fi bers tested by DaimlerChrysler. But it did not work out due to diffi culties 
in the manufacturing components using this fi ber.
In 1997, DaimlerChrysler approached the South African Council for Sci-
entifi c and Industrial Research (CSIR) for collaboration in the project. The 
same year a natural fi ber workshop was conducted in South Africa and the 
CSIR, surveying the locally available materials, capacities and capabilities. 
The targets for the project were: (a) components must be used in the new 
Mercedes C-class cars that would be manufactured in South Africa; and (b) 
at least two components must be developed using the natural fi ber. A four-
member team composed of two people each from DaimlerChrysler and 
CSIR was constituted to evaluate the natural resources that could be used 
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and the capabilities available in South Africa. Because DaimlerChrysler 
already had some experience with sisal fi bers from other countries, the team 
started analyzing the properties of sisal fi ber available in South Africa. The 
sisal available in South Africa had characteristics similar to glass fi ber and 
could be used to make components.
Natural fi bers were chosen because they are carbon dioxide neutral, 
environmentally friendly and recyclable. In addition, cost savings are possi-
ble compared to plastics and glass fi ber. These components once developed 
would directly replace the components hitherto manufactured in Germany 
with glass fi ber and plastics. The rear window shelf is the target component 
initially. DaimlerChrysler earlier worked with some other natural fi bers 
such as fl ax. Earlier in Brazil, DaimlerChrysler also worked on making car 
seats and head rests with polymer impregnated rubber and coconut fi ber. 
South Africa was the second country for DaimlerChrysler’s experimenta-
tion with natural fi bers.
The evaluation team proposed the establishment of the entire value 
chain from the production of sisal, processing and manufacturing of com-
ponents. CSIR started working with farmers. The idea of the project was 
that small farmers would produce the sisal, but this required privatization 
of state-owned farms. Moreover, black farmers should be given priority to 
buy these farms, as the post-apartheid government desired. CSIR identifi ed 
two farms that could supply sisal in necessary volumes. But this involved 
working with the farmers in improving the quality, producing consistent 
quality and so on.
The saplings of sisal plants are cultivated in nurseries for a couple of 
months before they are replanted in the fi eld. Plants take four years to 
mature and then can be harvested for eight years, leading to more produc-
tion and work. Water is required in the harvesting process to extract the 
fi ber from the plant. About 20 tons of leaves per hectare could be har-
vested. In the process only three percent (0.6 ton) of fi bers is extracted, with 
the rest of the pulp being used as fertilizer or cattle feed. The fi ber is then 
dried, combed and baled into bulks of 250 kilograms each, which could 
fetch a price of about R1,000. These bales are transported to processors 
that cut the 800-millimeter lengths of fi ber into bits of 60 to 80 millimeters 
and almost weave it into a mesh with a needle punching machine. But in 
the case of the Mercedes compartment the fi ber has be mixed with waste 
cotton to achieve the desired result. Phenol resin is currently still used to 
bind the material to produce the fl eece mat. This mat (fl eece) goes to the 
component manufacturer where a polymer (an organic plastic) is injected 
into the mat as a binding agent and a machine then presses this into the 
shape of the component ready to be fi tted into the Mercedes.
Joint R&D work was undertaken by DaimlerChrysler and CSIR. Most 
of the work was done in Germany by DaimlerChrysler. Much of the R&D 
work on behalf of DaimlerChrysler was carried out by Johann Borgers 
GmbH, a Germany based components manufacturer. Borgers had earlier 
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developed the technology to manufacture fl ax-based (a natural fi ber—fl ax-
seed oil) components. But for this new natural fi ber (sisal), much of the 
experimental and development work had to be done at the component man-
ufacturers’ premises on site. A polymer specialist from CSIR worked with 
the German team in South Africa. Within two weeks the fi rst prototypes 
were made and sent to Germany for testing. “Of two fl eece mats, one feels 
similar to wool and is very soft, it is made up of 20 percent sisal and 80 
percent cotton. Another mat consists of 70 percent sisal and 30 percent cot-
ton and it bristles like a straw. Both were prototypes created in developing 
the best possible fl eece mats.”
Much of the work done in South Africa was related to manufacturing 
process technologies. For instance, sisal has properties similar to glass 
fi ber, so with it came some manufacturing diffi culties. Because of the hard-
ness of the materials, the needles in the punching machine frequently got 
ruined. This required a lot of development work. Similarly achieving the 
right blend or composition of sisal fi ber, waste cotton and organic polymer 
also required a lot of experimental and development work. In the begin-
ning, there were problems in producing the fl eece. Through trial and error, 
however, about 30 types of fl eece samples were made. After 18 months of 
experimentation, one clear winner emerged, which was a thin fl eece mat 
made of 60 percent sisal and 40 percent cotton. The process of evaluat-
ing fl eece was carried out by a German company, Johann Borgers GmbH, 
which has been a long-term DaimlerChrysler supplier and worked with 
natural fi bers earlier.
Many South African fl eece producers showed interest in supplying to 
DaimlerChrysler, which promised to be a profi table undertaking, but none 
of these companies had worked with sisal before. The competing compa-
nies were stringently tested throughout the selection process. Critical evalu-
ators scrutinized the process and assessed the technological capabilities of 
the competitors. Among them, the National Converter Industries (NCI), 
as component manufacturer, and Brits Textiles, as fl eece mat producer, 
emerged as winners. Brits Textiles, though located in Durban, which was 
not the best location, was the youngest of the competitors and was highly 
motivated. It had the most modern machines and was the smallest company 
with about 180 workers. But most of what Brits Textiles produced was 
polyester, and sisal was never used. Brits Textiles did not have a specialist 
for natural fi bers, but was confi dent that it could learn what was needed. 
DaimlerChrysler had already planned for a scenario in which should it 
decide to work with Brits Textiles, it would send two South African techni-
cians to Borgers’s German facility for fi ve days, where the experts at Borg-
ers would train them in the sisal fl eece process.
After the mats are made, the sisal production process moved on to the 
components producer. NCI of East London was chosen as it has experience 
with natural fi bers and had a strong relationship with Borgers. NCI also 
had all the machines needed to transform the fl eece mats into rear window 
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shelves. The technology transfer from Borgers in Germany to NCI in South 
Africa had already been discussed.
Knowledge Flows and Learning
Figure 8.1 depicts the innovation system involved in the project and the 
associated knowledge fl ows.
Borgers transferred the manufacturing process technology to the two 
South African enterprises (SMEs), Brits Textiles for fl eece making, and 
National Converter Industries (NCI) for component manufacturing. A 
lot of experimental work took place at the premises of these companies, 
strongly exposing their personnel to the technologies involved. In addition, 
personnel from these two companies were sent to Borgers’s facilities in 
Germany to gain experience in the processes involved. In addition, Borg-
ers supplied the equipment, machinery, molding technology and compo-















Figure 8.1 Innovation system of DaimlerChrysler/CSIR Innovation system 
(South Africa).
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technology relating to the blending of different fi bers. Transfer of these 
technologies was very important, as a complete line had to be developed 
and South Africa had no prior experience in processing sisal.
An important aspect of the project was the creation of larger social 
impact. So as per the project agreement, CSIR on its own had to develop 
new applications for sisal. The quantities involved in component manufac-
turing are not large enough to keep two farms going. There was a need to 
fi nd alternative uses/applications for sisal. One of the products developed 
by CSIR was a solar cooker (box type). It was commercialized in partner-
ship with a local company. The German Development Agency, GTZ, com-
missioned this local company to manufacture a certain number of these 
cookers for distribution in developing countries. The other sisal products 
developed include riding hats and building materials. CSIR also developed 
new components for cars such as the wheel arch and the parcel shelf.
Over time, CSIR added a Natural Fiber Program to its portfolio of 
research areas and started working with several fi bers including hemp, sisal, 
kenaf fl ex and paper-based product. There is now a large interest in South 
Africa in exploring industrial applications for natural fi bers available in 
the country. The South African government (the Department of Trade and 
Industry—DTI, and the Department of Science and Technology—DST) 
has also signed an agreement with Airbus Industries to develop overhead 
bins with natural fi ber.
There was an exchange of personnel among the partners involved in 
the project. CSIR’s researchers spent three months in Germany at Daim-
lerChrysler’s facilities. Similarly, DaimlerChrysler’s researchers spent six 
months at CSIR. During these exchanges a lot of knowledge was trans-
ferred both ways.
Host Country Implications
The initiative thus included integration between agriculture and industry, 
preserving the environment, empowering rural communities, transferring 
technology from Germany to South Africa and creating jobs. Jobs have 
been created in the northern province by producing the fi ber, and South 
African producers have learned the process of enhancing the fi ber’s proper-
ties and in making a component from natural fi ber. In view of these benefi ts 
for the host country, the project received fi nancial support from the World 
Bank and the Development Bank of Southern Africa. These institutions 
have contributed toward the initial investment of R100 million in the proj-
ect. DaimlerChrysler and CSIR made a joint application to the World Bank 
for project support. CSIR also shared the costs of this project.
Due to the project, the quality of Brits Textiles’ and NCI’s existing pro-
cesses and products improved vastly, meeting world-class manufacturing 
standards. Brits Textiles diversifi ed its business by investing in a new activ-
ity of processing the sisal fi ber, which created additional jobs and increased 
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turnover. NCI’s sales increased and operations improved with new man-
agement techniques (e.g., just in time process) and gained international 
exposure as a supplier of sisal components for the automotive industry.
8.2 SOUTH AFRICAN COMPANIES
Tellumat
Tellumat was established with the management buyout of the technology 
and innovation unit of Plessey in South Africa, which had a long heritage 
of innovation in the electronics industry. Plessey was founded in 1917 in the 
UK and established a South African presence in the early 1960s; it was listed 
on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) in 1995. In 1998, after Plessey 
was acquired by Dimension Data, Tellumat was established from existing 
ex-Plessey business, as a privately owned company. Today Tellumat has 500 
employees, with 100 engineers working in the R&D department.
Since its inception, Tellumat has completed the development of new 
products in nine key product families, with an investment of R80 million 
in R&D and drawing on the intellectual capability provided by its engi-
neers and technologists. Tellumat received prestigious awards from the 
South African Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) in 2002, includ-
ing awards for manufacturing excellence (large and medium enterprises), 
export achievement (large and medium enterprises), BEE (empowerment) 
and The Overall Business Enterprise of the Year Award.
Mission
Tellumat’s stated mission is to be a world-class business focused on innova-
tion, offering its customers dynamic and competitive technology products 
and services, aimed at the communications, defense and contract manu-
facturing markets. It is also open to forming long-term strategic alliances 
with enterprises in similar business worldwide. It uses two key strategies to 
develop the group’s businesses:
A product strategy that involves defi ning, developing, manufactur-•
ing and marketing innovative products for South African and world 
markets;
A services strategy that seeks to provide a comprehensive range of •
services that complement its products and meet its customers’ needs.
Tellumat’s business operations cover three broad areas:
Communications—(a) telecoms—‘Tellumat Telecoms’ is a leading sup-•
plier of customer premises equipment (CPE) to the local and African 
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market lace, e.g., call centers, PABXs, voice recording, broadband, 
telephones and so on; and (b) wireless solutions—‘Tellumat Wireless 
Solutions,’ located in Cape Town, is focusing on providing a means of 
communication for Africans through software solutions.
Defense—(a) defense CT—supply and support of advanced radar, •
navigational, avionics and naval systems; (b) radar—‘Tellumat Radar’ 
specializes in long-range mobile air defense radar systems; and (c) SIA 
solutions—‘SIA Solutions’ supplies, installs, commissions and sup-
ports navigation, approach and airport systems.
Manufacturing—(a) electronic—Tellumat’s electronics assembly and •
manufacturing facility offers end-to-end operational services for spe-
cialized products, demanded by industries requiring advanced techni-
cal electronics. Core manufacturing processes include surface-mount 
assembly, component insertion, wave solder, in-circuit and functional 
testing, system integration and confi guration and mechanical assem-
bly; and (b) mechanical—‘Laingsdale Engineering’ is a single-source 
contract manufacturer specializing in the fi eld of precision mechani-
cal manufacture and assembly. With its origin in the defense industry, 
Laingsdale is focused on fuses, safe and arm devices, kinetic energy 
weapons and a variety of naval countermeasures such as mine clear-
ing devices and moored mine cable cutters.
After Tellumut was established, it developed its own telecom switch 
together with another local company. But later the switching technolo-
gies started changing, requiring huge investments in R&D. So Tellumut 
started focusing on providing software solutions to third-party products/
hardware.
Tellumut has developed a number of products for mobile telephony based 
on GSM technology. These products are based on what is called in local oper-
ations ‘community platform.’ These products have benefi cial implications for 
many developing countries and for poor people. For instance, in Africa the 
penetration of fi xed line telephones is very limited. Moreover, the poor in 
Africa cannot afford to own an individual telephone. They require a commu-
nity pay phone that can be used by several people on pay per use basis. When 
the GSM infrastructure was rolled out in Africa, Tellumut recognized the 
business opportunity of providing mobile services to the poor and designed 
and developed a mobile community pay phone for GSM infrastructure. The 
individual who buys this can become an ‘entrepreneur’ by offering mobile 
phone services to others on a payment basis. The complete phone, called 
MOBICOM, was designed and developed by Tellumut. This includes design 
of the instrument, printed circuit board (PCB), software, two embedded plat-
forms, the interfaces with the PC and management information systems. The 
phone is not like the normal GSM mobile handset, but Tellumut’s product 
works as a PABX on a mobile infrastructure. The device is designed in such 
a way that several other connected services can be offered through software 
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applications. The handset was manufactured in South Africa, with the import 
of some components, including semiconductors from Texas Instruments (TI) 
and plastics from China and Taiwan.
Now MNCs like Siemens and local companies such as Zitec have become 
competitors to Tellumut on this product. In fact almost all the mobile phone 
companies are entering this business.
Corporate Innovation System and Knowledge Flows
Tellumut actively collaborates both with local and foreign organizations. 
For instance, its fi rst switch was developed together with another local 
company GAP. Tellumut is also collaborating with Africa Product Robust.
Tellumut outsources work to local companies. A limited amount of work 
is outsourced to laboratories in Russia and the UK, mainly for certifi cation 
and approvals, such as radio emission testing.
Tellumat’s international partners include: Mitel Networks Corporation 
(US)—a company focused on full value Internet protocol (IP) Communica-
tions and business process integration; KIRK Telecom A/S (Denmark)—a 
company in the business of wireless communications, including wireless 
servers and repeaters.
Tellumut also has research collaboration with the University of Stellen-
bach in South Africa on long-range radios.
In an ongoing project, Tellumut is at an advanced stage on a product 
called SIMPHO, which is a medication management design. An interna-
tionally renowned medical doctor, David Green, approached Tellumut to 
develop a device that can send a message to a central database whenever a 
patient opens the drug bottle. Such a device would effectively monitor the 
administration of drugs to patients and their compliance, a very important 
aspect in treating poor people in remote areas of developing countries. The 
technology has been patented in South Africa and Europe and won many 
awards in South Africa. Currently the product is undergoing trials con-
ducted by SIMPHO Pty Ltd. More than 25 countries have shown interest 
in this technology and product.
South Africa as a Location for R&D
Tellumut feels that there are more business opportunities in Africa than else-
where in the world. South Africa has well-educated human resources, and it 
is easy to come up with new solutions. However, in certain areas of technol-
ogy the number of people available in South Africa is not adequate.
Tellumut is also committed to do work on its part toward corporate 
social responsibility and actively contributes in the areas of education, 
sport, social issues and environment. It also prioritizes recruitment of pre-
viously underprivileged people (black empowerment) in its operations as 
well as in engaging outsourced services.
Global Innovation in South Africa 205
Because of the short-term nature of management practices in South 
Africa, many companies miss the opportunities in Africa. The high costs of 
operating in South Africa and the competition from the Chinese are some 
of the major problems facing the South African businesses.
The Naledi3d Factory
The Naledi3d Factory is a startup fi rm located in the Innovation Hub, the 
science park in Pretoria. Its core competence is in developing three-dimen-
sional (3D) simulations using virtual reality (VR) software technologies. 
It uses a Swedish VR technology platform to design novel virtual learning 
content that overcomes literacy and language barriers for clients ranging 
from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), such as UNESCO, to gov-
ernments and mining companies such as AngloGold Ashanti.
The Naledi3d Factory uses VR to communicate concepts and practices 
in a wide range of areas, including industrial training and safety awareness, 
health and sanitation, heritage, new technology concepts, as well as appli-
cations that can have impact on community development. In addition to the 
African market, the Naledi3d Factory has built up relationships with, and 
developed VR simulations for, companies in Europe and the US.
The Naledi3d Factory focuses on innovative ways of applying a new First 
World technology (VR) to the needs of emerging communities in Africa—what 
is referred to as ‘Social VR.’ In Africa, poor literacy and limited resources pose 
a huge challenge to learning, at schools as well as in adult education programs 
and in areas ranging from science to history, farming and health. The Nale-
di3d Factory’s work so far has covered themes as diverse as basic hygiene in 
Uganda; HIV/AIDs in Ethiopia; land-use planning in Soweto, South Africa; 
alternative power-generation technologies as well as beekeeping, soil conser-
vation and other aspects of farming with farmers in Zimbabwe.
Vision
To become the most respected VR and 3D multimedia knowledge •
company in Africa by working in the knowledge paradigm, to develop 
international partnerships and build a global reputation for its work 
in Africa.
To use the visually interactive nature of virtual reality to communi-•
cate ideas and concepts to address the training and skills needs of 
diverse communities and to help overcome the literacy and language 
barriers to learning.
Product Range and Areas of Application
Industrial training and safety awareness: • 3d-Trainer is a novel tool 
that can address one or many related training or learning concepts 
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and is an interactive training tool to help build Africa’s scarce skills 
base. Many South African companies are starting to see this approach 
as a cost-effective way of providing realistic, visually interactive and 
fl exible training solutions to their employees;
Educational: • interactive 3d learning objects provide an engaging, 
interactive learning experience that can also incorporate audio, video 
and text and have the ability to teach a range of different subjects. 
The language components can also be adapted to suit local conditions 
and the learners’ linguistic needs—a simple procedure that requires 
some basic multimedia sills, but not programming or VR develop-
ment skills or tools;
Marketing and sales: • 3d marketing—through interactive 3D digital 
content, manufacturers and retailers can convey their message to 
their global market with ease. 3D marketing can be used to market 
through the Internet or on in-store touch-screen kiosks;
Architectural and town planning: • Plan 3d-Viz is based on a digi-
talized VR process that presents the viewer with a rich 3D envi-
ronment (such as planned offi ce buildings, sports venues, railway 
lines, roads, airports, dams, shopping centers, hospitals, factory 
buildings) where users can see as well as change things in the way 
they want to, leading to greater understanding of complex plans, 
designs and ideas;
Culture and heritage: • 3d-Heritage is a novel way to visually repre-
sent and highlight Africa’s deep, rich history and heritage. The main 
power of 3d-Heritage lies in the fact that it can simulate how a his-
toric site looked during its peak. The audience is also able to interact 
with the VR model and explore personal perspectives;
Manufacturing: • Product 3d-Viz—Inventors often have wonderful 
ideas, which they fi nd it hard to convey to others. Using Product 
3d-Viz, one can more easily present ideas and concepts, which can 
be modifi ed prior to the expense of detailed product design. For 
large companies, Product 3d-Viz provides a cheaper way of visual-
izing prototypes in a simulated three-dimensional environment.
Selected R&D Projects of Naledi3d Factory
The Naledi3d Factory, in addition to typical commercial product develop-
ment, has also involved itself in the fi eld of social VR in a major way by 
developing projects that have a larger social impact:
Understanding Malaria: Prevention and Its 
Treatment (Funded by UNESCO)
This project involved the use of VR to engage the learner in developing 
a deeper understanding of malaria—what it is; how to prevent or avoid 
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infection; and how to treat a person infected. It is intended that this mate-
rial will be made available to multipurpose centers as part of community 
awareness programs run by various health agencies. The project uses VR 
to raise awareness especially on preventive steps, e.g., spraying, netting and 
protective clothing and so forth. In addition, the project provides basic 
knowledge relating to malaria that will cover the treatment of the disease 
as well as the elimination of breeding grounds. The learning system pres-
ents users a 3D simulation of a rural village that includes a well, a nearby 
stagnant pond, a running stream as well as a number of dwellings. Users 
are presented with various health challenges relating to malaria that they 
must resolve to achieve a specifi c learning outcome. The village communi-
ties are presented with a hands-on experience on how to understand and, 
most important, how to be empowered to be better able to combat malaria. 
Audio and text are used to supplement the visual learning messages wher-
ever appropriate.
Rural Hygiene Project, Nakaseke, Uganda (Funded by UNESCO)
Another project developed by the Naledi3d Factory in this area was one 
of the early research projects, piloted in a multipurpose community tele-
center in Uganda, which teaches basic good rural hygiene practice. At 
Nakaseke (Uganda), about 60 percent of the community is functionally 
illiterate and therefore unable to easily use facilities such as computers. 
However, the VR simulation was well received at all levels. This VR 
model addresses basic issues that lead to water-borne diseases such as 
typhoid, dysentery and cholera as well as diseases such as malaria and 
bilharzia. Emphasis is on visual and audio cues to transfer the message, 
but not the written word. The Nakaseke product simulates a typical rural 
settlement, which includes a kitchen, latrine, bathing area, house, river, 
animals and fruit trees. Together, these offer an environment in which 
users can explore and trigger learning points.. Feedback from Uganda 
shows that the Rural Hygiene simulation has led to a drop in dysentery 
in the village and the district of Nakaseke and is still being used eight 
years after its implementation.
Interactive 3D Learning Object and Water (Funded by UNESCO)
This UNESCO Virtual Multimedia Academy (VMA) project had a num-
ber of objectives: to create locally relevant content on the topic of ‘water,’ 
to share this content locally, to explore and incorporate the concept 
of ‘Learning Objects’ into the material and fi nally, for the fi ve ‘coun-
try teams’ (Ethiopia, Mozambique, Senegal, Sudan and South Africa) 
to explore ways of working together. Using water as a theme, each of 
the fi ve country teams selected topics relevant to their local needs. The 
South African team (Naledi3d Factory) developed the simulations on: 
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(1) how to build a pit-latrine; (2) how hydroelectric power is generated; 
and (3) maintenance aspects of the AFRIDEV PUMP. These interactive 
3D learning objects were built in such a way that the language elements 
(audio and text) could be easily modifi ed (localized) to suit local needs. 
The methodologies developed in this project were evaluated and used by 
Dakar University (Senegal, French) and Eduardo Mondalane University 
(Mozambique, Portuguese).
Industrial Safety—Showing the Impact of a Mine 
Mudrush (An AngloGold Ashanti Project)
Operations in mines in developing countries, and particularly in gold 
mines, can be highly hazardous. Consequently, large resources are 
invested into safety awareness and training. In the case of a ‘mudrush,’ 
a blocked chute can result in thoUSnds of tons of rock and water accu-
mulating behind it, which rushes out as soon as the blockage is cleared. 
Unsafe procedures lead to fatalities. Through VR, the Naledi3d Factory, 
in the fi rst of several safety simulations, demonstrated good and bad prac-
tice and the consequences of each. The virtual mine haulage-way includes 
a chute, rail line and work platform (safety area). The chute is used to 
feed ore to the train, which consists of three hoppers. Normally, the ore 
is loaded into the hopper. However, occasionally a blockage occurs, and 
any miners in the wrong location are either fully or partly buried when 
the blockage is removed. Naledi3d’s product simulates these scenarios in 
an interactive way.
Beekeeping Skills (W. K. Kellogg Foundation and World Links Zimbabwe)
The purpose of this project was to teach basic beekeeping skills to the com-
munity-land (smallholding) farmer who aspires to keep bees as a new source 
of income, as well as existing aspirants who can improve their returns by 
avoiding basic mistakes. The learning system places the learner in a 3D 
world based on a typical smallholding farm. Due to the interactive nature 
of the medium, learners are able to explore and discover for themselves 
(using either SHONA or ENGLISH) the main ‘do’s and don’ts’ of African 
beekeeping. An interface links users to ‘Nhapitapi Farm,’ where users learn 
(interactively) how to start up and manage and how to extract honey. Mar-
keting issues are also addressed briefl y. The success of this project led to 
further work addressing soil and water conservation, farm pests and the 
growing of sorghum.
Corporate Innovation System and Knowledge Flows
Figure 8.2 depicts the corporate innovation system of the Naledi3d Factory 
and the related knowledge fl ows.
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The Naledi3d Factory collaborates actively with external agencies both 
within South Africa and internationally because it has developed a clear 
vision for how and where the company wants to grow. It believes though 
that these goals can only be achieved through collaborations with other 
companies and organizations both locally and globally. Toward this end, 
among others, it has collaboration with the following organizations:
Eon Reality Inc. (US), which develops and manufactures PC-based •
3D interactive simulation solutions for use within marketing, e-com-
merce, architecture and training. The Naledi3d Factory represents 
EON Reality in sub-Saharan Africa and distributes EON Reality’s 
software and hardware systems in the region. The Naledi3d Factory 
also develops software application products to work on EON Real-
ity’s hardware products.
Over the years, UNESCO has been a great and consistent supporter •
of the Naledi3d’s educational initiatives. The company’s relationship 
with UNESCO dates back to 2000 and the early years of the com-
pany. Funding from UNESCO, from the Paris offi ce as well as the 
UNESCO Cluster Offi ce in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), has enabled the 
Naledi3d Factory to establish virtual reality technology as a viable 
educational tool in Africa.
W. K. Kellogg Foundation—A W. K. Kellogg pilot project to teach •
basic farming skills to smallholding farmers in Zimbabwe has sparked 
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Figure 8.2 Innovation system of the Naledi3d Factory (South Africa).
210 Global Innovation in Emerging Economies
what promises to be the biggest interactive 3D agricultural training 
initiative of its kind in the world and has thus far addressed aspects of 
soil and water conservation, pests, beekeeping, farm implements and 
sorghum growing. Naledi’s partnership with the Kellogg Foundation 
(together with World Links) is expected to revolutionize agricultural 
training in Africa and to set a new benchmark for computer-based 
learning.
World Links Zimbabwe—the Naledi3d Factory signed a Memoran-•
dum of Understanding (MOU) with World Links in November 2003. 
World Links Zimbabwe is part of an expansive global network of 
education professionals with a focus on connectivity within schools 
and has 46 centers in Zimbabwean schools alone. The Naledi3d 
Factory has built up a close relationship with World Links Southern 
Africa over the years, as a natural alliance between two organiza-
tions that have a shared goal of bridging the global digital divide 
by using cutting edge ICTs to educate the peoples of the develop-
ing world. The relationship with World Links Zimbabwe matured 
through their initial collaboration on the development and imple-
mentation of beekeeping learning material and grew to encompass 
the development of broader rural skills, through funding support 
from the W. K. Kellogg Foundation.
KCTCS (Kentucky Community and Technical College System, •
US)—as part of its commitment to developing Kentucky’s workforce, 
KCTCS opened the KCTCS Interactive Digital Center, providing 
cutting-edge visualization technologies to support the delivery of 
high-quality simulation-based training to local industry. Located in 
the middle of the Kentucky coal-mining belt, the center has helped 
many local companies to shorten learning cycles and reduce train-
ing costs. The Naledi3d Factory and KCTCS signed a collaborative 
agreement in 2009.
Visual Acuity (UK)—the Naledi3d Factory has built a close relation-•
ship with Visual Acuity in the UK, a leading consultancy, offering 
long-term, independent and unbiased strategic, consulting, design 
guidance and operational advice to clients in all areas of new-media, 
visualization and ICT technology. The company has worked on many 
global projects, including Freedom Park in Pretoria, Hellenic World 
in Athens, the Haydn Planetarium in New York and the California 
Academy of Science in Golden Gate Park.
Doncaster Knowledge Exchange (DKE) was established as an EU cen-•
ter of excellence in Doncaster, South Yorkshire, UK, and provides 
local businesses with a bespoke service enabling them to utilize lead-
ing edge 3D and revolutionary 4D technologies in all areas of their 
operation from product development to sales and marketing
Center of Visualization, Gothenburg (Sweden)• —the center strives to 
stimulate growth in the fi eld of digital visualization, helping to spread 
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visualization technology into new and existing industry segments. 
The center recently partnered with the Media Development Author-
ity in Singapore, and it is planned to extend this relationship to South 
Africa through the Naledi3d Factory.
Tweensense was an innovative startup company located in Delft, the •
Netherlands. By combining 3D models and interactivity, Tweensense 
produced ‘virtual reality solutions’ for desktop-level applications, and 
Tweensense partnered with the Naledi3d Factory as a low-cost con-
tent creation facility in South Africa. However, the partnership ended 
when the activities moved to Kiev (Ukraine) where the development 
costs were found to be even lower.
9 Implications for Innovation Systems
The dynamic business environment analyzed in Chapter 2, suggests that no 
single fi rm however large can master all the technologies needed for its opera-
tions in-house or fi nd them in one location. That is why fi rms globalize their 
R&D, including through ‘outsourcing’ and ‘open source’ innovation models.
The case studies presented in the earlier chapters clearly indicate that the 
scope of R&D activities carried out in emerging economies has broadened in 
recent years. In the past, R&D activities performed in developing countries 
(including emerging economies in the study) were limited to adaptation and/or 
at the most product development for the local market. Developing countries 
were mainly locations of technical services. The location of animal and farm 
facilities for testing of veterinary products, pesticides and agricultural prod-
ucts was mostly in tropical countries (Behrman and Fischer 1980).
By the mid-1980s, however, the global business environment had changed 
considerably. Companies needed to access science and technology (S&T) 
resources from a geographically wider area than earlier. By this time, several 
developing countries had also built up technological capabilities that could 
support R&D activities. The performance of higher-order R&D in devel-
oping countries by MNCs is a relatively recent phenomenon. The earliest 
date of establishment of a global technology unit (GTU), which focuses on 
worldwide products, in India (which is seen globally as an ‘R&D hotspot’), 
was 1985. The regional technology units (RTUs) in India, which develop 
products for Asian and other developing country markets, have evolved from 
the earlier indigenous technology units (ITUs), which developed products 
exclusively for the local market, facilitated by the liberalization of interna-
tional trade (Reddy 1997).
Based on the case studies presented in the earlier chapters this chapter 
analyzes the implications for corporate, host and home country innova-
tion systems.
9.1 CORPORATE INNOVATION SYSTEMS
Since the last few decades, MNCs have been focusing on building a global 
innovation network consisting of R&D units located in clusters close to the 
centers of excellence around the world (Frost et al. 2002). Several studies have 
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shown that the subsidiaries of MNCs tend to tap into external knowledge 
sources in their respective local innovation systems (Reddy 1997). The ques-
tion of whether such knowledge-related links actually improve the fi rm’s over-
all innovative capability is still understudied (J. Singh 2008). In a study of 65 
Japanese pharmaceutical fi rms, Penner-Hahn and Shaver (2005) found that 
fi rms that internationalized their R&D tended to produce more patents than 
did the fi rms with only domestic R&D units. In addition to the benefi ts arising 
from knowledge spillovers from the local innovation system, geographically 
distributed R&D also provides other benefi ts for innovation; for instance, 
geographically spread out R&D personnel tend to avoid “group think” and 
open up their minds for new solutions. Thus, geographically dispersed subsid-
iaries of MNCs tend to develop capabilities that are more unique, providing 
opportunities for novel combinations (Nobel and Birkinshaw 1998).
J. Singh (2008, p. 79), in his empirical analysis of patents fi led by 1,127 
fi rms during the period 1986–1995 (where he interpreted forward citations 
received by a patent as an indicator of technological and economic value of the 
underlying innovation), shows that, in general, the geographic dispersion of 
R&D activities did not result in more valuable innovations. On the contrary, 
according to Singh’s analysis, it resulted in a decrease in the average value of 
a fi rm’s innovations. This suggests that the benefi ts of access to global sources 
of knowledge do not materialize from multilocation presence per se alone, 
but also from a fi rm’s ability to actually integrate geographically dispersed 
knowledge. Singh’s analysis, however, also reveals that innovations originat-
ing from cross-regional integration of knowledge are in fact of greater value, 
because of a positive interaction effect among distributed R&D units.
As Doz et al. (2006) point out, the knowledge inputs required for inno-
vation in most sectors are spread out geographically across the world. 
However, only a few fi rms are able to gain effectively from such dispersed 
capabilities, as the coordination across units is weak; standardized pro-
cesses and systems are lacking; and the necessity for a team of people with 
international experience is not suffi ciently recognized.
In order to remain competitive in a dynamic business environment, 
companies feel the need to disperse innovation networks, in spite of the 
associated risks. How can companies ensure that they confi gure their 
new networks for cost-effectiveness? “First, they can accept that there are 
only two valid reasons to add a node: (1) to cost-effectively access critical 
knowledge that could not otherwise be tapped, and (2) to locate capabili-
ties where they can deliver results better, faster and cheaper than anywhere 
else in the network. Compared with traditional innovation networks, these 
leaner, more consciously designed networks can achieve 37 percent faster 
time-to-market and lower costs by 24 percent, according to estimates based 
on the aggregate experience of survey participants. This statistic suggests 
that when possible, companies should be frugal while expanding and as 
objective as possible when assessing their innovation networks” (Goldb-
runner et al. 2006, p. 2).
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9.1.1 Access to Scarce S&T Human Resources and Infrastructure
As always there are usually multiple factors (not a single one) responsible 
for a phenomenon, including the one relating to location of global R&D 
in emerging economies. The case studies of MNCs’ R&D activities have 
indicated that the primary driving force for locating global R&D activities 
in emerging economies has been technology-related, i.e., to gain access to 
R&D personnel of required quality and expertise. This factor as the main 
driving force has come out quite clearly even in the results of a question-
naire survey carried out in India a decade ago (see Reddy 1997). The case 
studies also suggest that emerging economies in the study have achieved 
an international reputation in certain S&T areas. MNCs are attempting to 
gain access to such knowledge and skills by making R&D investments or 
by linking up with universities and research institutes in these countries.
MNCs, for an overwhelming proportion of their R&D, continue to uti-
lize the resources available in their own home countries (mainly industrial-
ized countries). In recent years, due to rapidly shrinking product life cycles, 
MNCs have increased their R&D activities, thereby increasing the demand 
for R&D personnel. The supply of R&D personnel with required special-
ization in their home countries cannot meet the current demands of MNCs. 
This factor has been given more than twice the importance as a motive by 
the R&D units dealing with new science-based technologies (Reddy 1997). 
In discussions with managers in the corporate headquarters of MNCs, it 
became evident that in recent years gaining access to personnel has been 
the most important factor for locating R&D abroad.1
Emerging economies in the study, particularly China and India, have 
been building up large pools of well-educated scientists and engineers in 
a range of fi elds. Among them Brazil has been producing a large number 
of Ph.D.s in S&T subjects, and the Brazilian government provides schol-
arships to these doctoral students to spend up to one year in universities 
abroad, mainly in the industrialized countries. As part of their efforts at 
innovation capability building, dating back to the 1960s, these countries 
have also established internationally reputed universities and research insti-
tutes that have become centers of excellence (CoEs) in relevant fi elds. Case 
studies presented earlier show that MNCs have established strong linkages 
with the S&T infrastructure in their respective host countries.
Another important driving force for globalization of R&D has been the 
companies’ need for ‘resource fl exibility.’ Global fi rms are often faced with 
situations where they need to ramp up the R&D teams signifi cantly within a 
short period of time or even downsize the teams quickly. Given the shortages 
of suitable personnel in the industrialized world, such fl exibility is not possible 
in the home countries of some MNCs. At the same time, emerging economies 
with their reserves of S&T human resources offer such fl exibility.
Firms also require access to a variety of skills, ranging from broad-based 
knowledge to highly specialized expertise in order to carry out an innovation 
process. Most often it is diffi cult to fi nd these skills in one location or country. 
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So fi rms try to seek such knowledge wherever it is available. Given the size of 
emerging economies discussed in this study, they seem to be able to provide 
such skills or expertise, particularly through their CoEs. The interviews con-
ducted in this research also indicated that the education system in the indus-
trialized world is producing high-quality experts in highly specialized fi elds, 
which are necessary for research at a certain level. Companies, however, also 
require broader skills that can be used in a range of activities in the innovation 
chain. The graduates from the emerging economies in the study seem to fi t the 
requirement of the MNCs.
Another important factor, particularly for outsourcing of R&D, has 
been that fi rms would like to pursue several alternative methods/solutions 
to solve a particular problem so that they can choose the most optimal 
solution among them. Given the rigidity of technological trajectories of 
in-house R&D, fi rms often outsource to, or form alliances with, external 
organizations for new approaches, while pursuing in-house R&D on the 
same research task. By locating in or outsourcing such R&D to emerging 
economies, a fi rm can work on a larger number of alternatives as the costs 
of carrying out R&D in these countries is much lower.
9.1.2 Cost Advantages
Even though it may not be equally crucial, another major driving force for 
the location of R&D in emerging economies has been the cost-related fac-
tor, particularly in the case of outsourcing of R&D. The total costs of car-
rying out R&D in emerging economies such as India and China is much less 
compared to the industrialized countries, mainly due to the lower-wages of 
R&D personnel in these countries. In general, wage costs account for the 
largest proportion of total costs in R&D activities.
In discussions with MNCs, the cost factor did not assume the same 
importance as gaining access to personnel as a primary driving force. This 
is because sometimes, in emerging economies, the advantages of lower-
wages are usually eroded by higher material, communications and other 
costs. For instance, some of the inputs may not be available locally and 
may need to be imported under special conditions, and this adds to the 
total costs. Similarly, lack of infrastructure facilities may require MNCs 
to invest in captive facilities, adding to the total costs; e. g., shortages of 
power may require investing in backup facilities, or poor communication 
lines may require investing in a communication network.
9.1.3 Access to Local/Regional Markets
Another primary driving force for location of R&D in emerging economies, 
particularly in Brazil and China, has been the need to be in proximity to 
regional markets. Part of the reason for this is that MNCs’ R&D units in 
these countries are closely linked to their own and/or customers’ production 
units located in the region (see the case of Rhodia, Brazil). R&D performed in 
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these units is also mainly that of product design and development, i.e., engi-
neering aspects. With an R&D presence in the region, an MNC can identify 
and meet specifi c needs of the customers in the region without delays.
This factor, particularly in recent years, has become very important. The 
emerging economies in the study have large populations, with potential mar-
ket sizes that are bigger than the home countries of MNCs. For instance, 
China and India are now the fi rst and second largest markets, respectively, 
for mobile phones in the world, even surpassing the US. Even at an individ-
ual company level, the mobile telecom company Nokia’s largest markets are 
China and India, respectively. At the same time, there is heavy competition in 
these markets as several competing MNCs are attempting to strengthen their 
positions in the market. So an R&D presence in these countries becomes 
important for fi rms interested in exploiting these markets. An R&D presence 
facilitates better understanding of the local market needs, trends, consumer 
preferences, as well as local standards and regulations.
Moreover, products developed in these emerging economies seem to be bet-
ter suited for markets in other developing countries both within the region and 
worldwide. Local R&D personnel in emerging economies are more sensitive 
to local and regional market needs so as to come up with better-suited prod-
ucts. Simply adapting products developed in home countries (mainly industri-
alized countries) does not seem to bring much success in developing countries. 
Consumer affl uence in emerging economies is growing fairly rapidly, plac-
ing greater demands on companies catering to such markets. Consumers in 
emerging economies are demanding products with the same high functional-
ity and quality as those sold in the industrialized world, but at much lower 
prices. ‘Emerging Products for Emerging Markets’ seems to be the motto, if a 
company wants to prosper in these large markets. In these markets, the busi-
ness strategy should focus on making profi ts by selling volumes rather than 
earning higher profi t margins on low volumes. It is diffi cult for R&D person-
nel located in the industrialized world to understand these unique characteris-
tics, as their focus is more on products with higher profi t margins. So MNCs 
are locating R&D facilities in emerging economies to exploit these markets 
through development of innovative products. For instance, Nokia designed 
and developed low-cost mobile phones in India and exported several millions 
of these phones to Africa and other developing regions. Similarly, Proctor and 
Gamble is developing baby diapers that are affordable to the mass market in 
India and other developing countries. There are several cases of such R&D 
being conducted by MNCs in collaboration with national research institutes 
in emerging economies.2
9.2 HOST COUNTRY INNOVATION SYSTEMS
The assessment of the implications of international corporate R&D activi-
ties for host countries is generally fraught with diffi culties, particularly for 
the emerging host countries, as the trend is still new and the numbers are 
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small. However, through in-depth case studies, this research investigates: 
(i) the type of linkages established by the MNCs’ R&D activities to the 
local systems of innovation and the potential for diffusion of technologies; 
and (ii) the types of spillovers from the international corporate R&D activi-
ties and their effects on the host economy. The host country implications 
are analyzed in the conceptual framework of NSI.
As Dunning (1992) pointed out, in general there are two opposing views 
regarding the impact of MNCs’ R&D on the host countries. One view 
considers R&D-related FDI to be benefi cial to economic growth, as it pro-
vides new technology and managerial skills, which in turn create indirect 
positive effects for the host country at a lower cost. These positive effects 
include technical support to local suppliers and customers, contract jobs 
from foreign R&D units to local research institutes and so on. On the 
other hand, the counterview argues that R&D activities by foreign fi rms 
tend to tap into unique local R&D resources with little or no benefi t to 
the host country. Concentrating on problems of little relevance to the local 
economy, such R&D activities, may be a little more than disguised “brain-
drain,” diverting scarce technical resources from more useful purposes.
However, in the context of emerging economies, where the scientifi c and 
technical resources have so far been underutilized, the counterview may not 
hold much validity. The benefi ts are larger, while the costs involved may be 
marginal. In the case of emerging economy hosts, the cost factor could be 
that such R&D activities may create islands of “high-tech enclaves” with 
little diffusion of knowledge into the economy. But knowledge and skills 
cannot be isolated over the long term. The mobility of personnel, the need 
for local procurement of human and material resources and other factors 
are bound to diffuse technologies throughout the economy.
While analyzing the implications for the host country’s innovation sys-
tem, it is also important to consider the type of R&D being performed and 
its effects. Depending on the type of R&D being carried out, the effect 
on the innovation capability of the host country varies.3 The strength and 
breadth of the ties with the local systems of innovation varies across the fi ve 
types.4 The ties are limited in the case of TTUs, because these only involve 
adaptation of the parent’s technology to local conditions and are better 
done within the manufacturing unit. However, previous studies (Reddy 
1997) indicated that even they had some linkages with the local innova-
tion system in India. This is mainly because of the slightly higher level of 
technical activities undertaken by them. The previous policy environment 
in India and other emerging economies required local material substitu-
tion in products due to import restrictions or sometimes to keep the costs 
lower, and hence, TTUs had to perform more than just tinkering with the 
parent’s technology. ITUs were in general supposed to have stronger ties 
with the local S&T system because of their product development activi-
ties, even though they basically re-do the designs supplied by the parent. 
However, these stronger links are better refl ected in the case of GTUs and 
CTUs, which have stronger ties both to the local innovation system and 
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to the global research networks. Hence, the scope for the diffusion of new 
knowledge to the local innovation system would be higher in the case of 
GTUs and CTUs, whereas TTUs, ITUs and RTUs (in recent years, these 
are performing activities similar to GTUs) mainly utilize and adapt the 
knowledge already available within the corporate system. However, a lot of 
learning takes place in such activities from the innovation system perspec-
tive (Reddy 1997).
This does not imply that TTUs, ITUs and RTUs have no important impli-
cations for the host economy. Since the conversion of research results into 
manufacturing products occurs in the same place, it may lead to other ben-
efi ts such as the development of supplier networks and technology transfer to 
domestic small and medium enterprises (SMEs). On the other hand, GTUs 
and CTUs being de-linked from the operations of production and marketing, 
their innovations are less likely to lead to manufacturing-related benefi ts for 
the host country (Reddy 1997). These higher order innovation activities are 
more closely integrated with the corporate global strategy, and therefore the 
local economic considerations are given low priority.
The case studies in emerging economies indicated that the MNCs’ R&D 
activities in these countries are establishing strong linkages with the local sys-
tems of innovation (no ‘enclave’-like situation). Such linkages are mainly with 
the local universities and research institutes, as well as with the local compa-
nies in some cases (e.g., Intel, China). The case studies also show that these 
R&D activities are well integrated into the MNCs’ global R&D networks. 
In most cases MNCs’ R&D projects involve joint work among their R&D 
units in Brazil, China and India, as well as the R&D units of MNCs located 
in home countries and other industrialized countries (e.g., Motorola, India 
and Brazil; Rhodia, Brazil). MNCs also send their R&D personnel in emerg-
ing economies to the R&D centers at headquarters for training (e.g., Hitachi, 
China). Joint projects lead to the exchange of complementary knowledge and 
help in building up core competencies in each of the R&D units in an MNC’s 
network, including those located in emerging economies.
The density and strength of the local linkages established by MNCs’ 
R&D in the host country depend on the age of the R&D units. It takes time 
for an MNC’s R&D unit to identify the expertise available in other local 
organizations and to establish a reliable and meaningful relationship. R&D 
being a critical activity, with a potential for leakage of confi dential infor-
mation in relationships, MNCs tend to tread carefully before establishing 
linkages. Many global technology units (GTUs) established in emerging 
economies are of recent origin. As the case studies in this book reveal, the 
local linkages are likely to enhance and strengthen in the future.
However, there are also instances of MNCs utilizing national research 
institutes in a host country as an ‘entry mode’ for internationalization of 
R&D into emerging economies. Some MNCs (e.g., DuPont, GE) have col-
laborated with Indian research institutes such as National Chemical Labo-
ratories (NCL), Indian Institute of Chemical Technologies (IICT) and Indian 
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Institute of Science (IISc) for a number of years in their global R&D activities 
before they established their own GTUs in India. In such cases, the MNCs’ 
R&D units have strong local linkages from the inception. MNCs also use out-
sourcing relationships to test the innovation capabilities available in a country 
before deciding to invest in setting up their own R&D unit in that country.
Based on the cases presented earlier, there are two kinds of benefi ts that 
can accrue to the host countries: direct benefi ts and indirect benefi ts (or 
spillover effects).
9.2.1 Direct Benefi ts
In terms of direct benefi ts, the creation of jobs, particularly high-value-
added jobs for scientists and engineers, and the infl ow of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) into the host country are very obvious. The creation of 
high-value-added jobs contributes signifi cantly to the economic wealth of 
the country.
In addition, the global R&D activities of MNCs are creating ‘new types 
of organizations’ that did not exist before in the emerging economies:
9.2.1.1 Stand-alone R&D units
Previously due to the nature of R&D performed (the adaptation of prod-
ucts and processes developed in home countries), MNCs set up R&D as 
part of their manufacturing units in emerging economies. But in the case of 
global R&D (GTU and CTU), MNCs have set up stand-alone R&D units 
that are linked neither to local manufacturing nor to marketing. The core 
business activity of these units is to provide R&D services to the parent 
company. For instance, Motorola India, Texas Instruments India and GE 
India have all been established as GTUs. These units perform only R&D 
for intracorporate business units worldwide. Such organizations did not 
exist previously in emerging economies.
Following this trend, several Indian companies have also spun off their 
R&D units as separate companies, de-linking them from other business 
activities. This has become a practice particularly among the large pharma-
ceutical companies (e.g., Ranbaxy Laboratories, Dr. Reddy Laboratories). 
This enables the stand-alone R&D company to offer R&D services not 
only to the parent company’s business units, but also to other corporate 
customers, including MNCs. As mentioned earlier, establishment of such 
organizations is a new phenomenon in emerging economies, which until 
recently carried out very little corporate R&D.
9.2.1.2 R&D Outsource Service Providers
As the case studies in India indicated, several companies are emerg-
ing to provide purely R&D services to MNC customers. Although these 
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companies are mainly in the domains of ICT and pharmaceutical, even 
in fi elds such as mechanical product design and engineering services new 
outsource service providers are emerging (see the case of QuEST Global 
in India). The appearance of such new types of organizations in emerging 
economies is the direct result of global R&D activities of MNCs in these 
countries. These new organizations are in turn contributing signifi cantly to 
the local economy, including foreign exchange earnings.
9.2.2 Indirect or Spillover Effects
Indirect or spillover benefi ts are numerous and not easily quantifi able. From 
an NSI perspective, global R&D activities show their effects on almost all 
the organizations and institutions of the host country’s NSI. The analysis 
below follows Edquist’s (2005) conceptualization, where organizations and 
institutions are the main components of systems of innovation. Organiza-
tions are formal structures that are established for an explicit purpose, 
such as fi rms, universities, fi nancial institutions and public agencies respon-
sible for innovation and competition policies and regulations. The institu-
tions refer to common habits, norms, routines, established practices, rules 




As mentioned earlier, MNCs’ global R&D activities are facilitating the 
emergence of new business areas, such as R&D outsource service provid-
ers, in host countries. Some of these R&D service providers (see the Indian 
cases) are also developing their own products (in some cases licensing them 
to MNCs for further development). This seems to be something similar to 
computer original equipment manufacturing (OEM) suppliers from Tai-
wan progressing through original design manufacturing (ODM) to original 
brand manufacturing (OBM) by marketing products of their own design 
and brand name (e.g., Acer).
MNCs also, in some cases, are involved in technology transfer (mainly 
for by-products from their R&D) to local companies in host countries. For 
instance, Astra Research Centre India (ARCI––now part of AstraZeneca) 
transferred the know-how for producing the basic tools of DNA-recombi-
nant technology to a then-new local company called GENEI (Gene India), 
which was founded by two Indian scientists, who formerly worked at the 
Tata Institute of Fundamental Research (TIFR). The idea for the establish-
ment of Genei arose when an Indian scientist, who was residing abroad, 
was on a consultancy assignment at ARCI. The fi nancial support to the 
new fi rm was provided by the Technology Development and Information 
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Corporation of India (TDICI), a venture capital company. Prior to ARCI’s 
technology transfer these products were being imported. Genei now exports 
some of these products to the US and other countries. By 2000, Genei had 
built up its own R&D facilities and now manufactures over 100 products 
that include restricting and modifying enzymes, DNA molecular weight 
markers and nucleic acids. From ARCI’s perspective such transfer of know-
how to local fi rms, apart from generating royalties, reduced its dependence 
on imports and provided a stable supply of inputs (Reddy 2000).
Case studies presented in this study also indicate that in emerging econo-
mies, MNCs’ R&D units have established linkages with local companies 
by way of subcontracting (i.e., outsourcing) of R&D or joint R&D work, 
particularly in software and embedded software systems. Such linkages 
involved knowledge fl ows between MNCs and local companies, broaden-
ing and strengthening the knowledge base and technological capabilities of 
local companies.
Although not quantifi ed, the R&D activities of MNCs and the liberal-
ization of the economy (increased competition) have also led to an increase 
in the R&D by domestic companies,5 particularly through collaboration 
with national research institutes. Domestic companies in India have also 
increased their dependence on national research institutes. For example, 
by the mid-1990s, Bharat Electronics and the Indian Institute of Science 
started a joint-venture R&D to develop high-quality compound semicon-
ductor fi lms for device applications. This project’s aim was to develop gal-
lium wafers grown by a metal organic chemical vapor deposition process, 
which has application potential in the defense, space and information 
industries.6 Similarly, IISc and Metur Chemicals collaborated in making 
India self-suffi cient in silicon manufacture.7 Similarly, as the case of IISC 
in India illustrates (see Chapter 5, this volume), many local companies have 
started seeking the IISc’s research support after observing MNCs establish-
ing such linkages with the institute.
Universities and National Research Institutes
As the case studies reveal, one of the most important positive spillovers 
has been that the global R&D activities are infusing the scientifi c commu-
nity in emerging economies with commercial culture. The sponsorship of 
research or subcontracting of R&D to the academic system also contributes 
to diffusion of such a culture. In other words, MNCs’ global R&D activi-
ties are fi ne-tuning the innovation system in host countries to be competi-
tive in generating knowledge. MNCs are also encouraging the scientists in 
host countries to venture beyond just proving the principles and to develop 
tangible products as a contribution to the benefi t of society.
MNCs are also establishing ‘chairs’ in local universities as well as add-
ing new research equipment in university laboratories. Such chairs are 
giving further thrust to research activities in the universities. In emerging 
222 Global Innovation in Emerging Economies
economies where universities have scarce research funding, such spon-
sorship of chair professorships creates a signifi cant impact on research 
(Reddy 2000).
In all the cases presented earlier, MNCs as well as local companies (with 
the exception of R&D outsource service providers) conducting global R&D 
activities in emerging economies have established linkages with the local 
universities and research institutes. While companies do gain access to 
expert knowledge through such linkages, the universities are also gaining 
knowledge from companies, particularly from MNCs, in terms of knowl-
edge relating to product development. In the past, in a developing country 
like India, one of the main reasons for not reaping the benefi ts of its scien-
tifi c capacity had been the lack of application to convert its knowledge into 
products. MNCs, through their global R&D activities, are contributing to 
the diffusion of application skills to the researchers in the universities and 
national research institutes.
As the director of the National Chemical Laboratories (NCL)8 India 
puts it, “[T]he trigger for identifying a research problem comes from 
the industry. The industry has several problems and limited solutions, 
whereas research institutes have a lot of solutions, but do not know 
what the problem is. So, researchers want to be linked to companies 
with strong knowledge base. MNCs have such knowledge base and 
the academic research community gains a lot of knowledge through 
interaction with them. Among others such knowledge includes issues 
relating to systems and processes involved in turning a concept into a 
product as well as managerial and decision processes.”
For instance, in a particular case, NCL India conducted research on a prob-
lem (developing a new material) for a European MNC. But, the material could 
not be developed on time. From the MNC’s perspective the project was a fail-
ure, and so it stopped the project. But, the director of NCL was intrigued by the 
research problem and recruited a Ph.D. student to work on the problem. Three 
years later, a solution to the problem was found, and it resulted in a Ph.D. the-
sis, several papers in international journals as well as four US patents.
As case studies reveal, some MNCs are also collaborating in establish-
ing technology institutions for imparting education (see Motorola Brazil; 
QuEST Global India). Similarly, in the mid-1990s, Motorola India collabo-
rated with the Pune Institute of Advanced Technologies (PIAT) in offering 
a postgraduate degree in advanced telecommunication engineering with a 
software focus. The faculty consisted of both the staff at PIAT and the 
experts from Motorola (Reddy 2000). While such efforts make it easy for 
the MNCs to recruit the graduates of required specialization, they also help 
in introducing such a specialized subject in the host country. Almost all the 
cases presented from Brazil, China and India are contributing to curricu-
lum development in local universities.
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Other effects on the innovation system of the host country include the 
diffusion of knowledge related to patents and other IPRs. Firms and scien-
tists in emerging economies are realizing the importance of patenting and 
are acquiring the knowledge related to it. With the growing importance 
of innovation both by MNCs and local companies in their countries, even 
the academic institutions in emerging economies have come to realize the 
importance of teaching the aspects of IPRs to students. For instance, in 
India, institutes like the IITs and the IISc have started offering a course on 
IPRs for their science and engineering students.
Government
Governments worldwide have for some time recognized the importance of 
innovation and R&D activities, particularly those conducted by MNCs. 
R&D-related FDI has become the most sought-after economic activity by 
governments of both industrialized and developing countries. As discussed 
in earlier chapters in this volume, governments have started using various 
policy instruments, such as incentives in terms of tax rebates, performance-
related requirements and setting new standards and regulations, in order to 
induce and compel MNCs to locate innovation activities in their territories. 
Such an enthusiasm for innovation activities, particularly in developing 
countries (including emerging economies) is unprecedented.
Governments have also reversed several earlier policies such as not per-
mitting foreign companies to conduct early phase clinical trials for new 
drugs in their countries. They have also strengthened the intellectual prop-
erty rights (IPRs) regimes in their countries, although mainly due to the 
commitments to the World Trade Organization (WTO) under the Agree-
ment on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). R&D service 
has become a key item in the WTO negotiations on the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services (GATS) (e.g., Mode 3).
Governments are also investing more on domestic R&D as shown 
by fi gures on R&D as a percentage of GDP. They are spending more on 
increasing the quality and volumes of science and technology graduates. As 
a part of these efforts, governments are also focusing on establishing and 
strengthening centers of excellence (CoE), as well as science parks in order 
to derive positive cluster effects.
9.2.2.2 Institutions
Human Resources
The case studies show that MNCs’ R&D units are also involved in con-
tinuous development of their researchers through training programs both 
within the country and abroad (e.g., Hitachi China, Rhodia Brazil). With 
the mobility of researchers from one company to another such skills get 
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diffused throughout the economy. The discussions with MNCs in emerg-
ing economies revealed that the turnover of the researchers ranges between 
10 and 15 percent. If these personnel move to domestic fi rms, there will be 
signifi cant diffusion of knowledge to the local fi rms.
Entrepreneurship among Scientists and Engineers
In recent years, several small high-tech fi rms have been established by tech-
nocrats in India, especially in ICT and biotechnology (e.g., the cases of 
R&D service providers in India). The researchers felt that MNCs’ R&D 
and their need for special talents are giving them an opportunity to take 
up challenging tasks based on their knowledge and at the same time to try 
their potential as entrepreneurs. Such opportunities were not available in 
India in the past.
In another instance, the Astra Research Centre India (ARCI) (an MNC) 
licensed its technologies for byproducts to local scientists, contributing to 
the emergence of a new class of entrepreneurs, i.e., ‘scientifi c entrepreneurs’ 
(Reddy 2000). The global innovation activities of MNCs in emerging econ-
omies is creating enthusiasm among scientists and engineers to become 
entrepreneurs, either by providing R&D services to MNCs or by develop-
ing a product/service by themselves.
Diffusion of R&D Culture
Until recently, very few companies in developing countries (including emerg-
ing economies) performed R&D. They mainly depended on technology 
transfer from abroad through licensing and adapted such transfers to suit 
the local conditions. With the entry of MNCs’ R&D activities into emerg-
ing economies, local companies have realized the importance of innovation 
for the long-term sustainability of business, particularly in the light of grow-
ing global competition. MNCs’ R&D presence gave the local companies a 
growing confi dence in the human resources and research institutes available 
in their countries to invest in R&D activities. Several Indian companies that 
approached the Indian Institute of Science (IISc) for research collaboration 
have admitted that the IISc’s research work for MNCs made them realize the 
talent and knowledge available in Indian academic institutes.
9.2.2.3 Potential Negative Spillovers
One negative spillover of global R&D activities in the host country has 
been that MNCs are able to recruit and retain the cream of the avail-
able talent, due to the higher salaries, advanced training and other career 
growth opportunities they can offer. Domestic fi rms, on the other hand, 
cannot match the MNCs in these aspects and therefore, have to make do 
with the rest of the talents. This, in turn, may affect the enhancement of 
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technological capabilities in domestic fi rms. This, however, is a perennial 
problem even among domestic fi rms. It becomes important for any fi rm, 
whether local or MNC, to provide job satisfaction to its staff either through 
monetary or nonmonetary benefi ts in order to retain talent.
The R&D units of MNCs may remain as closed ‘enclaves’ with little or 
no linkages with the rest of the host innovation system. The case studies 
presented earlier showed that this is not a valid argument against R&D-
related FDI, as all of them have established strong linkages with local 
research institutes and fi rms. Even in a situation where an MNC’s R&D 
unit remains an enclave diffusion of knowledge cannot be prevented in the 
long run due to the mobility of people.
The new trend of local companies in emerging economies focusing on 
developing products for global markets may have some negative aspects. 
These companies had until now been focusing on catering to the local mar-
ket with unique and low-cost products. Some companies that have higher 
innovation capability are now developing products for industrialized mar-
kets where the profi t margins are higher. This is likely to deprive local 
consumers. This is particularly true of the large Indian pharmaceutical 
companies, which are now focused on developing drugs (new and generic) 
for diseases mainly prevalent in rich countries. This affects the supply of 
low-cost drugs for tropical diseases. In such a situation, the governments of 
developing countries may have to conduct research on developing drugs for 
tropical diseases and license the technology to multiple drug manufactures 
to keep the fl ow of novel drugs to treat these diseases at low cost.
9.2.3 Policy Implications for Host Countries
The increasing science base of new technologies and growing competitive 
pressures to be innovative are necessitating multisourcing of corporate 
technologies. In their search for additional sources of technologies, MNCs 
have also started tapping S&T talents in emerging economies. In the over-
all phenomenon of the globalization of R&D, these patterns are only of 
marginal signifi cance. However, from the perspective of the developing 
host country, the implications assume greater signifi cance. In the beginning 
such R&D activities may be directed by the needs of the MNCs’ strategic 
interests, subordinating the national interests, but a rapid expansion of the 
local technology base and market in the host country may prompt extensive 
local production and expansion of R&D activities, thus shifting the rela-
tive balance in favor of the host country (Reddy 2000). The case studies 
presented earlier show that this has already happened in Brazil, China and 
India. For instance, Motorola India and Texas Instruments India, which 
started their R&D activities exclusively for their global operations, have 
now begun to cater to the fast-growing local market. In August 2005, 
Motorola announced India as its headquarters for high growth markets 
(HGM) and for developing ultra-low-cost mobile handsets.9
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The most important reason for locating global R&D activities in emerg-
ing economies has been the availability of trained personnel. The host 
countries should ensure that this supply line is not dried up. For instance, 
in India, there are already reports of competition for recruitment of trained 
personnel between the domestic and foreign fi rms. This requires increasing 
the intake of students into science and engineering subjects, which in turn, 
may require adding more colleges or universities. Since the quality stan-
dards of the graduates need to be maintained if not enhanced, it may call 
for investments in establishing advanced equipment and sophisticated labo-
ratories. With technological specialization increasing, there may be demand 
from enterprises, both domestic and foreign, to develop new specialties in 
the universities. Development of such specialties may require the initial 
fi nancial support from the government (Reddy 2000). In order to encour-
age more young people to study science and technology subjects, the Indian 
government is now offering one million scholarships, dispersed through 
competitive selection, to high school children pursuing these subjects.
Even if a country does not have a big domestic market, having large pools 
of talented personnel would attract global innovation activities. The grow-
ing global R&D activities of MNCs in countries like the Czech Republic, 
Poland and Romania are evidence of this. Such supply-side policies would 
be more effective in attracting and retaining R&D-related FDI than would 
be demand-side policies such as location of R&D as a performance require-
ment for market entry or for receiving an incentive. Such demand-side poli-
cies would only compel fi rms to do the basic minimum activities to meet the 
requirements of the law, but not substantial innovative work.
In order to increase the positive host country effects of global innova-
tion activities, such interaction of R&D with local industry and other parts 
of the local innovation system, including related production or marketing 
needs, to be encouraged. To be able to reap the positive benefi ts of such 
R&D, the national system of innovation must have suffi cient strength. 
The national policy-making agencies must build up local S&T capabilities 
to assimilate and exploit foreign technologies in order to sustain frontier 
national research capabilities in some areas and to provide an environment 
conducive to technology-based innovation and entrepreneurship (Gran-
strand et al. 1993).
In the case of emerging economies, such global innovation activities 
will help stem the brain drain. The rapid growth in industrial R&D in the 
1950s and 1960s led to the migration of talented scientists and engineers 
from the developing world to corporate laboratories in the industrialized 
countries, especially the US. But today there is a greater pressure on MNCs 
to employ such people in their own countries, often through collaboration 
with local institutions, but increasingly by establishing own laboratories 
(Fusfeld 1995).
In addition to the benefi ts of employing its scientists and engineers, 
global innovation activities will lead to several other benefi ts for the host 
Implications for Innovation Systems 227
countries. Hence, emerging economies should create an attractive policy 
and innovation environment to attract such R&D-related FDI. Such a pol-
icy environment includes favorable FDI policies (particularly sector-specifi c 
policies); tax and other incentives; and nondiscrimination between indig-
enous and foreign fi rms in their access to national scientifi c resources. Most 
important, from the perspective of R&D-related FDI, streamlining of pat-
ent and other intellectual property protection laws in accordance with the 
international practices is essential (Reddy 2000).
In order to attract global innovation activities, a host country should 
provide its national research institutes the freedom and motivation to col-
laborate with foreign fi rms and to undertake subcontract R&D work from 
them. Worldwide, academic institutions are forging closer links with indus-
try, and governments are encouraging it through various means. In some 
countries, academic institutions are even launching commercial ventures 
of their own or in collaboration with the corporate sector (e.g., China). In 
order to enhance the innovation capability and economic benefi ts through 
university-industry collaboration, the establishment of science or technol-
ogy parks may assume importance. Such parks may attract both foreign 
and domestic fi rms to locate R&D, if the parks are situated in proximity 
to reputed academic establishments. In recent years, the establishment of 
such parks has become an important part of regional development plans, 
particularly in Europe. To strengthen university-industry linkages, senior 
managers from both domestic and foreign fi rms may be appointed to the 
management boards of universities and national research institutes. This 
will facilitate designing university educational courses to suit industry 
requirements, and industry will become more aware of the innovation 
capabilities of the national universities.
Scientists and engineers with origins in emerging economies, who are 
working in industrialized countries (diasporas), are playing a major role in 
MNCs’ R&D activities in their home countries either by leading the R&D 
facilities of MNCs in their respective countries of origin or by entering 
into alliances with MNCs or by undertaking R&D activities on a contract 
basis for MNCs through their own fi rms or laboratories. These expatriate 
scientists and engineers may be further encouraged to contribute to their 
home countries by appointing them to the management boards of national 
research institutes, universities and public sector industries or as advisers 
to government ministries.
The ongoing phenomenon seems to offer emerging economies some 
fresh opportunities. Just as internationalization of production activities 
benefi ted the East Asian host countries, globalization of R&D activities 
can be expected to benefi t the emerging host economies. Most important, 
international R&D would be an impetus to the R&D being performed by 
indigenous industry in emerging economies. For instance, the Indian phar-
maceutical industry used to spend an average 1.2 percent of sales on R&D 
a year, but by 2008 the fi gure rose to about 10 percent, largely due to the 
228 Global Innovation in Emerging Economies
entry of MNCs’ R&D and marketing activities and the TRIPS Agreement. 
Similarly, in the face of stifl ing competition in the domestic market, Indian 
auto majors such as Tata Motors, Mahindra and Mahindra and Baja have 
increased their R&D investments signifi cantly and introduced innovative 
competitive products in the market.10
If, by creating a proper investment climate, the host countries could per-
suade the MNCs to commercialize the research results in the country, the 
benefi ts would be even larger and quicker. From the perspective of develop-
ing countries in general, although R&D-related FDI provides long-term 
benefi ts, manufacturing-related FDI infl ows brings quicker and wider ben-
efi ts. R&D-related investments provide international prestige as well as 
employment opportunities for the highly educated. In developing countries, 
including Brazil, China, India and South Africa, however, the vast majority 
of the population is unskilled and uneducated. For the economy to show 
substantial improvements in such large countries, the capabilities of this 
majority of the population need to be enhanced and utilized. This can hap-
pen more effectively through manufacturing-related investments, as they 
tend to have greater multiplier effect, particularly for employment.
9.3 HOME COUNTRY INNOVATION SYSTEMS
The globalization of R&D is likely to increase further with MNCs as well 
as startup companies locating more and more activities away from their 
home countries. While the US remains one of the most attractive locations 
for R&D, the emerging economies are also increasingly becoming attrac-
tive locations for global innovation. Technological and commercial capa-
bilities of some large companies from emerging economies are gradually 
increasing, narrowing the gap with the best of the MNCs from the indus-
trialized world. The availability of qualifi ed manpower, the presence of 
internationally reputed universities and research institutes, the low costs of 
conducting R&D, growing markets with unique characteristics and attrac-
tive investment opportunities are likely to favor the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, 
India, China and South Africa) group of countries for global R&D. The 
industrialized world, however, would continue to be the home for major 
investments in fundamental research and in the generation of advanced 
technologies for several decades to come. It is important for industrialized 
countries to recognize that their monopoly over innovation and technologi-
cal development would now face competition from new entrants.
Globalization of innovation activities has signifi cant implications for 
home countries. First, by globalizing some of the non-core or peripheral 
R&D activities, the home country fi rms could concentrate their resources 
on higher-value-added and/or core activities and in developing leading-edge 
technologies. This is facilitated by the changing dynamics of innovation 
processes that enable divisibility of innovation process. Second, through 
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the increased competitiveness that their companies derive through glo-
balization of R&D, home countries can enhance the overall strength 
of their economies. In this respect, emerging economies could become 
collaborative partners. Third, industrialized home countries, however, 
are likely to feel competitive challenges from emerging economies in a 
number of markets, including their own domestic markets, but mainly in 
third-country markets.
Industrialized home countries could strengthen their innovation systems 
by analyzing the global business environment. In order to build a globally 
competitive industrial/service (technology) sector that generates sustainable 
revenues and jobs, a country requires companies performing a broad range 
of activities (product, processes and services) within the sector. Product 
innovation is very important, but an entire technology sector cannot be 
developed with individual product innovations alone. In this respect, home 
countries could analyze the changing innovations dynamics and use this 
analysis to facilitate the emergence of fi rms in a wide range of activities in 
the innovation chain (Reddy 2007).
9.3.1 Changing Innovation Dynamics and 
Opportunities for Home Countries
As shown in Chapter 2 , the innovation processes in several industries is 
becoming modular and submodular in nature. This innovation dynamics 
has opened up commercial opportunities for new fi rms to emerge in every 
activity (or even subactivity) to provide specialist innovation services to 
other companies in their innovation process. The service providers are also 
innovation-based companies, since they develop new processes and plat-
form technologies. R&D service providers are not just a low-cost phenom-
enon, and this is refl ected in the healthy growth of R&D services business 
in the US. Therefore, home countries (particularly the European countries), 
apart from promoting basic research and product innovations, also have 
the opportunity to promote the emergence of companies that can compete 
in the growing global R&D outsource services business.
9.3.2 Commercial Opportunities
9.3.2.1 Large Markets with Growing Affl uence
The emerging economies (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) 
are large economies with growing affl uence. For instance, China and India 
have already become the fi rst and second largest markets in the world for 
mobile telephones. History shows that such large economies (in terms of 
population, market size and breadth of their industrial and other techno-
logical capacities), with similar socio-economic conditions, growing rapidly 
together simultaneously, is a new phenomenon (hence the term BRICS). If 
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a fi rm can gain entry into or expand its market share in these countries 
through an R&D presence, the home country of the fi rm would benefi t 
from the growing business:
First, with the near saturation in industrialized countries in many •
sectors, their companies (e.g., MNCs) might have to depend on these 
emerging markets for growth. Therefore, it is almost imperative for 
some R&D activities to be located in these countries, particularly 
because the consumers in emerging economies and other developing 
countries share some common attributes that are different from the 
consumers in industrialized countries (e.g., functionality and quality 
at low prices and low profi t margins but high volumes).
Second, through an R&D presence in emerging markets, an MNC •
can pre-empt the emergence of local companies as competitors by 
developing suitable products for the developing world (e.g., Texas 
Instrument’s single-chip solution for mobile handsets and Nokia’s 
low-cost mobile handsets).
Third, by locating R&D in emerging economies, MNCs based in •
industrialized countries can also overcome an important competitive 
advantage of the fi rms in emerging economies, which is the low cost 
of operations, while competing with them in the global markets. For 
instance, MNCs from industrialized countries such as IBM, Accen-
ture and PWC have located their R&D units in India to meet the com-
petitive challenges posed by Indian IT companies such as TCS, Infosys 
and Wipro, which are partly derived from the low cost of operations, 
for securing business in global markets. Thus, the home countries of 
MNCs could benefi t from the resources available in emerging econo-
mies. However, the benefi ts, particularly in terms of jobs, may have 
to be shared with emerging economies.
Last, fi rms based in emerging economies are also showing interest in •
forming marketing partnerships with foreign companies, facilitating 
entry of foreign companies into their markets.11.
9.3.2.2 Potential to License-in Innovations from 
Firms Based in Emerging Economies
Many companies from emerging economies are now concerned with devel-
oping products and services for the global markets as the case studies in this 
book reveal. Although these companies have the innovation capabilities to 
do so, most often they do not have the necessary ‘complementary assets’ 
needed to carry through the innovation to the commercial stage and/or to 
access global markets. So they seek to collaborate with MNCs or other for-
eign fi rms that have these ‘complementary assets’ either by licensing these 
innovations or by entering into marketing alliances. Both research-intensive 
startup companies as well as large companies in emerging economies are 
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adopting this strategy. For instance, some large pharmaceutical companies 
are now focused on developing new chemical entities (NCEs). But due to 
lack of resource to carry out multicentered clinical trials and the global dis-
tribution networks, they have been licensing these NCEs to major pharma 
MNCs in industrialized countries. In addition to receiving royalties, these 
companies would like to retain marketing rights for the domestic market.12
9.3.2.3 Potential for Location of Non-core R&D 
and Other Technological Operations
Availability of large pools of well-qualifi ed scientists and engineers at sub-
stantially lower wages compared to those in industrialized countries and 
the presence of several centers of excellence in S&T fi elds that are willing to 
collaborate with industry make emerging economies attractive locations for 
innovation activities. With the WTO-complied IPRs legislation in place, the 
perceived risk of leakage of know-how is also reduced. The establishment 
of science parks with state-of-the-art facilities in emerging economies has 
taken care of the required infrastructural facilities for innovation activities 
of foreign and domestic companies. Presently, the shortage of S&T person-
nel is hampering the growth of home-based companies in industrialized 
countries. Location of core- and non-core technological activities in emerg-
ing economies could be a viable and profi table solution to these companies 
and other research organizations. Such location can be done either through 
R&D-related FDI in creating facilities or through technology alliances or 
outsource relationships with local organizations.13
Similarly other opportunities are also available for R&D collabora-
tion with fi rms from emerging economies. For instance, Biocon India has 
entered into R&D collaboration with Nobex Corporation of the US to 
jointly develop oral insulin for the global and Indian markets. Biocon also 
established a strategic partnership with the New York-based Vaccinex to 
discover and co-develop at least four therapeutic antibody products. As 
part of these partnership deals, Biocon will make equity investments in 
both Vaccinex and Nobex (Ernst & Young 2005, p. 75).
9.3.3 Competitive Challenges
9.3.3.1 Competition in the Global Markets
Companies from emerging economies, at least in the near future, are not 
in a position to pose a threat to MNCs in industrialized country markets 
(including MNCs’ home countries). But they may put some competitive 
pressure on MNCs’ branded products in these markets through innovative 
and low-cost substitutes. The success of automobiles from South Korea 
and consumer electronics from South Korea and Taiwan in the European 
and American markets at the cost of homegrown companies provides an 
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illustration of this competitive pressure. In addition, these innovative and 
cheaper products from emerging economies seem to be more appealing to 
the consumers in other developing countries than are the high-cost alterna-
tives from MNCs. Companies from Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa (BRICS) may not only gain from their huge domestic markets, but 
also establish themselves in one another’s markets as well as in other devel-
oping countries, mainly because their innovative products seem to meet 
the precise requirements of growing markets in developing countries, bet-
ter than do the perceived overengineered products from the industrialized 
world. The penetration of the Chinese company Huawei Technologies, a 
telecom systems manufacturer, into several markets of Asia, the Middle 
East and Africa in direct competition with the telecom majors from the 
industrialized world is an indication of competitive challenge.
9.3.3.2 Competition in Mergers and Acquisitions 
(M&As) of Companies Worldwide
In recent years, companies from emerging economies have been acquir-
ing and/or merging with strategic companies in the industrialized world. 
Such activity, so far, is mainly seen in the acquisition of ailing companies 
in industrialized countries. The acquisition of the Bentley and Land Rover 
automobile companies in the UK by Tata Motors of India is an illustra-
tion. While such acquisition can be attributed to the fi nancial strength of 
the acquiring company, the main reason for acquiring an ailing company 
is that the acquirer feels that it has the necessary technological/innovative 
and managerial skills to transform the ailing company into a successful 
company. The companies from emerging economies are also acquiring suc-
cessful companies in the industrialized world, sometimes even outbidding 
MNCs from the industrialized world.14
9.3.4 Policy Implications for Home Countries
In order to address the question of how home countries respond to the 
globalization of R&D, it is important to better understand the driving 
forces for globalization of R&D, the type of R&D moving away from home 
countries and the technology sectors in which the most substantial R&D 
is moving away, before designing policy responses to address the issue. If 
the driving forces for R&D being relocated abroad are market-related or 
technology adaptation type (e.g., TTU), there should not be much concern. 
If the driving forces for R&D relocation are technology-related (including 
access to S&T personnel) or cost-related and the type of R&D relocated is 
related to global product development (GTU) or corporate basic research 
(CTU), there is defi nitely a need to better understand the specifi c reasons. 
The studies conducted in the industrialized world until now tend to group 
together all types of driving forces, R&D and technology sectors and arrive 
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at a conclusion that all is well. The high-tech industries have a higher pro-
pensity to globalization of R&D as these technologies allow divisibility of 
innovation, de-linking R&D from manufacturing, and are highly human 
resource-intensive. To operate in science-based high technologies such as 
biotechnology, software or electronics, substantial industrial experience 
is unnecessary as much of the knowledge is codifi ed (i.e., move from a 
‘learning-by-doing’ situation to ‘learning-by-training’). Emerging econo-
mies with their large pools of S&T personnel with lower costs can be ideal 
locations for MNCs from industrialized countries to carry out their strate-
gic R&D (Reddy 2000).
If the driving forces for relocation of R&D from a home country are 
related to ‘systemic rigidities’ (e.g., overspecialization of education at the 
undergraduate level, lack of interdisciplinary approaches at higher levels) in 
the national systems of innovation system (NSI) or weaknesses in the NSI, 
such as being unable to produce adequate human resources in S&T, then 
the policies need to address these issues urgently. Otherwise, if a competi-
tive advantage lost once it is lost forever, as other successful economies are 
likely to have greater learning opportunities.
It is also, however, natural for companies to look outside the national 
boundaries for their technology requirements. If companies are prevented 
from seeking technology from outside their home countries, their long-
term sustainable growth may be affected. The innovation system in some 
industrialized countries (particularly in Europe) is inward looking and has 
incentives to keep it so. As Narula (2003, p. 77) points out, sometimes 
companies may not be in a position to search outside their national bound-
aries for advanced technologies because of the ‘systemic lock-in’ into NSI. 
‘Systemic lock-in’ refers to “the extent to which fi rms are embedded and 
interdependent on the external domestic (non-fi rm) actors that comprise 
the SI [systems of innovation].” Such a lock-in may be an effi cient outcome 
under certain circumstances, particularly in sectors where the NSI are com-
petitive. However, it can have negative consequences, especially when radi-
cal innovations or technological discontinuities are externally generated, 
and the NSI cannot respond to the challenge adequately.
9.3.4.1 Establishment of “Centers of Excellence”
The emerging economies, particularly China and India, following the former 
Soviet Union model, built up national research centers (in the present form 
of centers of excellence) to conduct research for building up S&T capabili-
ties, whereas universities focused on providing education. For many decades, 
these institutions worked in isolation from industry, but carried out inter-
nationally acclaimed research. At the time, the industry in emerging econo-
mies was mainly interested in manufacturing products (mainly engineering 
and consumer) for the domestic market by using imported technologies. In 
protected markets the industry did not have any motivation to carry out its 
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own R&D or to collaborate with the centers of excellence. However, with 
the emergence of new science-based technologies and their pervasive infl u-
ence over a wide range of products, the centers of excellence have suddenly 
become prominent. Recognizing the competence available in these centers 
(e.g., through internationally published articles), several MNCs started using 
them for some of their R&D activities. After noticing the interests of MNCs 
in linking with their national research institutes, the domestic companies 
of emerging economies have started realizing that these research institutes 
have a lot to offer in terms of technological solutions and that they need not 
always look for technology transfer from abroad.
Unlike in the past, in the new techno-economic paradigm, innovations 
require inputs from several disciplines. The traditional university structure in 
industrialized countries (where much of the research is presently carried out) in 
the form of different departments, based on disciplines and/or subdisciplines, 
can still perhaps meet the requirements for innovation. But it requires a lot of 
networking and collaboration between different departments. Consequently, 
the traditional structure imposes certain transaction costs in networking and 
likely time delays due to imperfect coordination (systemic rigidity). On the 
other hand, the centers of excellence employ researchers from different dis-
ciplines under one roof, and these specialists also get exposure to working 
in teams with other specialists. They all work in one organizational culture. 
Such a culture better equips the teams to overcome technical problems and 
also makes it easy for the industry to seek their collaboration.
9.3.4.2 Research Collaboration Agreements with Emerging Economies
In recent years, several industrialized countries have been entering into sci-
ence and technology collaborative agreements with emerging economies. 
For instance, India and the UK would collaborate in a series of high-end 
research projects under a new multimillion pound program. The areas pro-
posed for research include the next-generation communications technol-
ogy, biotechnology and nano technology.15 Such collaborative agreements 
would help in leveraging the skills and capabilities available in emerging 
economies that could be used for fi nding solutions for national as well as 
global problems. The inevitable question that arises, of course, is who cap-
tures the value in such collaborations? It is also important to acknowledge 
that given the technological/innovative capabilities of the emerging econo-
mies and their economies showing faster growth rates, some sharing of 
returns may be inevitable.
9.3.4.3 Attract Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) from Emerging Economies
In the last decade or so the emerging economies have become important 
destinations for FDI. But what has been overlooked is that in recent years 
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these economies have also started becoming important source countries for 
global FDI fl ows. Companies from Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa are increasingly looking for investment opportunities in other coun-
tries. While much of such investments goes to other emerging economies 
(or developing countries), substantial investments are also being made in 
industrialized countries. From the perspective of innovation systems, such 
inward FDI from emerging economies into industrialized countries tends 
to be technology-related, i.e., these companies would like to gain access to 
advanced technologies through FDI. Companies from emerging economies 
have been investing in locating R&D units in industrialized countries, just 
as their counterparts from the industrialized world are investing in their 
countries. This is an indication that industrialized countries and emerg-
ing economies have ‘complementary’ rather than ‘competitive’ knowledge 
bases. Such investment infl ows would help in revitalizing innovation man-
agement practices in both countries.
10 Innovations in Emerging Economies
Implications for Other Developing 
Countries (South-South Dimension)
The previous chapter analyzed the implications of global R&D in emerging 
economies for the innovation systems of the main actors, the companies, 
the host countries and the home countries. In addition to these main actors, 
innovations in emerging economies have implications for other developing 
countries. Recognizing the innovation capabilities of the emerging econ-
omies, companies from other developing countries have started locating 
R&D activities in emerging economies. Companies from China, South 
Korea, Thailand and Singapore have established R&D centers in India. 
Similarly, South Korean companies have also located R&D units in China 
and Russia. By investing in R&D facilities in emerging economies, compa-
nies from other developing countries are able to access skills and knowl-
edge that are not easily available in their home countries. Such South-South 
fl ow R&D-related FDI and trade in know-how and technology-intensive 
products are likely to increase in the near future.
As an illustration of the ongoing trend, India has become a major sup-
plier of medicines and ICT-related products and services to other develop-
ing countries, particularly in Africa. India has also built a pan-African ICT 
network that is linked to India to provide ‘telemedicine’ services form India 
to hospitals in Africa. In July 2006, India launched a ‘telemedicine’ project 
in Ethiopia at a cost of US$2.13 million. The technologies provided allow 
doctors at Ethiopia’s Black Lion Hospital to connect with doctors in India 
for consultation. The Black Lion Hospital is connected to remote Nekempte 
Hospital, which is located about 250 kilometers west of Addis Ababa. The 
high-speed connection allows doctors on both sides to fl ip electronically 
between charts and to use light pens to highlight important parts of the 
records. Medical charts not only fi ll the displays, but also provide a small 
window in which the doctors can see one another.1 This is part of a larger 
program to connect all 53 African nations by a satellite and fi ber-optic 
network with India that would provide effective communication and con-
nectivity among the nations. The proposed network would mainly provide 
telemedicine, tele-education, Internet, video conferencing and VOIP ser-
vices and also support e-governance, e-commerce, infotainment, resource 
mapping and meteorological services. The entire program, called ‘the 
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pan-African e-network,’ is a joint development of India and the African 
Union, with an estimated cost of about US$136 million. The network is 
designed to have 169 VSAT terminals, with three of them in each country 
to provide tele-education, telemedicine, and heads of state (VVIP) connec-
tivity, with a satellite hub earth station located in Senegal. The tele-ed-
ucation services are provided from reputed universities in India and fi ve 
leading regional universities in Africa. The telemedicine services are pro-
vided through 12 super specialty hospitals in India and fi ve super specialty 
hospitals in Africa (TCIL 20072).
China has designed, built and launched satellites for developing countries 
such as Nigeria and Venezuela. Similarly, Brazil and South Africa are play-
ing vital roles in supplying innovative and technology-intensive products to 
other developing countries, particularly in their respective regions. Devel-
oping countries, which previously could not get access to such technology-
intensive products and services either due to their high cost or because of 
their unsuitability to local conditions, are now able to derive the benefi ts of 
new products and services that originated in another developing country in 
knowledge-intensive sectors.
At a broader level, innovations in emerging economies have implications 
for other developing countries at three levels:
 i. Access to technology-intensive innovative products (with full func-
tionality and quality) at affordable prices. Such products provide 
and enhance individual consumer welfare. Products such as low-cost 
mobile telephone handsets developed in emerging economies (see 
Texas Instruments’ single-chip solution case in this chapter) also pro-
vide societal benefi ts by enabling the handset owner to participate in 
economic activities such as agriculture trading from the rural areas;
 ii. Innovation capability available in emerging economies can be utilized 
for solving many of the problems faced by developing countries, par-
ticularly the least-developed countries (LDCs). For instance, one of the 
major problems faced by the global aid agencies involved in immuniza-
tion programs in developing countries has been the lack of refrigerated 
facilities to store vaccines, particularly in the remote areas of LDCs. 
Millions of vials of vaccines have gone bad for this reason. Now the Bill 
and Melinda Gates Foundation is working with the National Chemi-
cal Laboratory (NCL), Pune, India, on the possibilities of developing 
vaccines that do not require cold storage facilities. Similarly, the Sie-
mens Corporate Technology Unit in Bangalore, India, is researching 
deploying medical-imaging solutions in a simple manner. Presently, 
the solutions for medical imaging are deployed within hospitals using 
high-end, compute-intensive workstations, which are complex and 
expensive and therefore beyond the reach of most developing coun-
tries. Providing medical-imaging solutions on user-friendly, small and 
convenient devices such as palmtops and laptops requires signifi cant 
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challenges to be addressed in client server technologies, networking 
and imaging applications areas. Siemens Corporate Technology Unit 
in India has been successful in developing such breakthrough solu-
tions, opening up new cost-effective solutions, without compromising 
the functionality, to hospitals in developing countries.
 iii. Potential to utilize and learn from emerging economies to build the 
ability to exploit natural resources available in developing countries. 
Most of the developing world is endowed with huge natural resources, 
which are now underutilized. The cases from South Africa presented 
in Chapter 8 refl ect the enormous potential to use these resources. 
Naledi3d used ‘virtual reality’ technologies to improve learning in 
African countries. Similarly, Tellumut’s community mobile hand-
set brought widespread benefi ts to African countries. South Africa’s 
CSIR shows the way for other developing countries by developing car 
components using the naturally occurring ‘sisal’ plant. South Africa’s 
program on the utilization of natural resources is something that all 
developing countries can learn from. The national research institutes 
and companies (including MNCs) in emerging economies (Brazil, 
China, India and South Africa) have built up capabilities to identify, 
isolate, extract and purify active ingredients from plants for applica-
tion in several industrial sectors such as pharmaceuticals, cosmetics 
and industrial enzymes. Other developing countries have the oppor-
tunity to engage the services of these organizations in emerging econ-
omies to develop organic compounds and/or products from the fl ora 
available in their respective countries. These organizations located in 
emerging economies are open to providing R&D outsource services, 
and the cost of conducting R&D will be within the affordable limits 
of other developing countries.3
To a large extent, developing countries tend to rely on technologies and 
products that were basically designed and developed for markets in the 
industrialized world. These products tend to be expensive and beyond the 
reach of the average consumer in developing countries. Such technologies/
products are adapted to suit the operating conditions in developing coun-
try markets and the affordability of the consumer. In order to make them 
more affordable in developing countries, products are stripped down to 
the basic function without the additional functionalities that are available 
to consumers in the industrialized world. The other extreme solution has 
been to focus on ‘appropriate technology’ for developing countries. These 
appropriate technologies, while very useful in improving the productivity 
of the people at the bottom of the pyramid, unfortunately cannot facilitate 
a developing country’s progress from a low-value-added economy toward 
becoming a high-value-added participant in the global economy.
With the entry of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa) group of countries into the global scenario, particularly since the 
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turn of the century, high technology (products and services) solutions 
designed with a focus on customers in emerging economies started appear-
ing. The primary reason for this has been the shift in the techno-economic 
paradigm (see Freeman and Perez 1988; Perez and Soete 1988). All the 
emerging economies in this study had built up huge research capabilities 
since the early 1950s. But the old technology paradigm required even greater 
‘accumulated knowledge’ (because of the weight of ‘tacit knowledge’) and 
a ‘learning-by-doing’ type of approach to accumulate such knowledge. So 
these research facilities built up by the BRICS countries remained ‘islands 
of excellence’ without any tangible benefi ts (other than research publica-
tions). But with the emergence of a new techno-economic paradigm in 
terms of new science-based technologies (particularly since the 1980s), 
where the distinction between basic research and product development is 
blurred, the S&T infrastructure built up by the BRICS countries has fi nally 
started yielding the results that were expected of it in the fi rst place. The 
new science-based technologies reduced the ‘tacit’ element of the technol-
ogy, as much of the knowledge is codifi ed, and thereby reduced the need 
for long experience in industrialization and accumulated knowledge for 
economic application. In short, the new techno-economic paradigm moved 
the economic activity from ‘learning-by-doing’ type of approach toward 
a ‘learning-by-training’ approach. The East Asian countries were the fi rst 
to benefi t from the shift in the techno-economic paradigm by developing 
capabilities in the electronics industries. But they could not offer much in 
terms of a South-South dimension, as their focus was more on manufactur-
ing activities than on innovation. Being relatively small countries, they did 
not build up much S&T infrastructure, at least in those days.
The entry of the BRICS is different in the sense that they are all very big 
countries with dual economies, where some sectors are on a par with the 
most advanced sectors of the industrialized world while some sectors refl ect 
the characteristics of the least-developed countries (LDCs). In order for 
these countries to achieve sustainable growth, they need to bridge the gap 
between the dual economies that exist in their countries. They are being 
helped by two developments in this respect: (1) the usefulness of their old 
S&T infrastructure in the new techno-economic paradigm; and (2) the 
almost stagnant growth of markets in industrialized world, for various 
reasons including demographic changes. Therefore, emerging economies 
with large markets are becoming the major source of growth for compa-
nies worldwide (including MNCs). The dual characteristics of economies 
in BRICS countries make them attractive both as potential competitors and 
as collaborators, with competitive challenges and opportunities. One the 
one hand, MNCs could rely exclusively on one segment of the market, the 
affl uent one, to sell products with high profi t margin (the same strategy as 
in the industrialized world), while leaving the whole mass market in emerg-
ing economies to be exploited by local companies. If they do so, as Porter 
(1986) predicted, companies in emerging economies would benefi t from 
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the scale of economies and would pose a greater challenge to MNCs in the 
global markets.
MNCs have realized that in order to capture the mass markets in the 
fast-growing emerging economies, where consumer affl uence is making 
them boldly express their preferences, the old method of adapting the prod-
ucts made for industrialized country markets to emerging country markets 
by stripping down the functionalities to reduce the price would not work. 
An additional challenge to MNCs has been that, with the liberal trade 
practices in emerging economies, the really affl uent can buy those products 
abroad and ship them home. There was really no need to cater exclusively 
to the upper end of the market through local presence. On the other hand, 
local companies in emerging economies, taking advantage of the windows 
of opportunity provided by the new techno-economic paradigm (Perez 
and Soete 1988), started competing with the MNCs in their own home 
as well as in other markets in several market segments. These companies 
have started capturing the mass markets by selling products of a quality 
higher than or equal to those sold by MNCs, at a fraction of the MNCs’ 
prices, in their home countries. The successes of Nirma in washing pow-
der and ‘Thumps Up’ cola in India refl ect the limitations of MNCs, which 
base their products and brand names on the same trajectories as their suc-
cess in industrialized home countries. Moreover, these fi rms from emerging 
economies started competing in other developing country markets, where 
the consumer preferences are more or less similar to the emerging econo-
mies. There is also a potential challenge that these companies would enter 
the markets in the industrialized world to cater to the low-end segment 
with their qualitative and cheaper products. These individual successes of 
companies from emerging economies have awakened MNCs from indus-
trialized countries to recognize the potential of mass markets in emerg-
ing economies, which runs contradictory to their business philosophy of 
deriving higher profi t margins per product sold rather than higher profi ts 
through higher volume of sales.
MNCs have started designing new innovative products from scratch 
for emerging markets. These are often dubbed as Emerging Products for 
Emerging Markets. With the markets in industrialized world growing 
slowly, MNCs have to rely on fast-growing emerging markets for sustain-
able growth. The best way to address these market needs is by locating R&D 
units in these emerging economies. Local researchers are more sensitive to 
local consumer needs, preferences and habits, in contrast to researchers in 
the home countries of MNCs. Given the large size of these emerging econo-
mies (BRICS group), it is a worthwhile investment for MNCs to make. 
Moreover, these so-called emerging products for ‘emerging markets’ can 
also be sold in markets with similar characteristics worldwide (e.g., other 
developing countries), benefi ting millions of consumers with low purchas-
ing power, but with aspirations to use technology-intensive products to 
improve their living standards.
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The following cases of ‘emerging products’ for ‘emerging markets’ illus-
trates the concept and benefi ts of these innovations for hitherto marginal-
ized people across the world. They are, in many ways, the real examples of 
‘inclusive innovations.’
10.1 THE ‘SINGLE CHIP SOLUTION’ FOR MOBILE 
PHONES AND OTHER ICT PRODUCTS
Texas Instruments (TI), a US-based MNC in the business of electronics 
and semiconductors, was perhaps the fi rst global technology unit (GTU) to 
be established in a developing country (India), back in 1985, to carry out 
product development for the global markets. At that time, TI was not sell-
ing any products in India, and it did not have any manufacturing facilities 
in the country. TI set up a stand-alone R&D center to focus exclusively on 
product development for global markets. Back then, the infrastructure in 
India was very poor, with large pools of highly qualifi ed engineers and sci-
entists whose wages were much lower than their counterparts in the US.
Among other R&D activities, TI India set up a Mixed Signal Products 
(MSP) Design Center in 1988 for the design of mixed signal integrated 
circuits as part of TI’s worldwide team. The group has been involved in 
developing design methodologies for mixed signal designers worldwide, 
and on the design front, the group has been focusing on mixed signal ICs, 
where complex digital signal processing and analog interface are inte-
grated onto the same chip. The group has been concentrating on three 
mixed signal applications: graphics palettes (embedded ASICs), telecom-
munication and multimedia and hard disk drives. These designs range 
from above 125 megahertz devices to ultra-low- power applications to 
suit the emerging market needs. The group also develops mixed signal 
libraries for its worldwide design community (see Reddy 2000, for a com-
plete case study of TI India).
During the two-plus decades since TI India was established, the Indian 
economy has gone through a rapid transformation. With the liberalization 
of the economy, economic activities have expanded and consumer affl uence 
began growing. As a result, the demand for many products such as mobile 
phones and consumer electronics, which use TI’s semiconductors, started 
multiplying rapidly. Although TI does not have a manufacturing facility in 
India, a proportion of its R&D resources in India are now devoted to con-
ceiving, designing and developing semiconductor chips for the local market 
in India and other similar markets.
As the chairman of Texas Instruments (TI), Tom Engibous, put it, 
“India has become a design destination for many companies because 
people here understand the long-term benefi t of having the knowledge 
to develop entire systems. For example, we just announced the fi rst cell 
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phone to be conceived, designed and manufactured in India. This is a 
great milestone not only for TI and for our customers, but also for the 
country. By becoming an expert in the design of full systems for com-
munications and entertainment applications, India will set itself apart 
from others.”4
The comments above refer to the ‘single-chip solution’ for mobile hand-
sets. It has been estimated that about 80 percent of the world’s population 
has been covered by wireless telecom networks. But only about 20 percent 
of the population subscribes to wireless services. This is mainly due largely 
to the cost of mobile handsets, according to the GSM Association. This sit-
uation provides a huge business opportunity for delivering mobile services 
to large sections of the world’s population, subject to the cost of handsets 
coming down signifi cantly. In 2005, in India alone, roughly 11 percent 
of the total population had telecom connectivity with a mobile subscriber 
base of 58 million, according to the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, 
June 5. TI’s cost-effective single-chip cell phone solution enables mobile 
phone manufacturers to tap the huge market opportunities in India and 
other emerging markets worldwide. The wireless solutions will be more 
useful in developing countries where the availability of landline networks 
is limited. According to Engibous, “TI developed its single-chip solution 
specifi cally to narrow the ‘digital divide.’ Our customers can use this tech-
nology to make ultra-low-cost handsets affordable in largely untapped con-
sumer markets such as India, China, South America, Eastern Europe and 
other emerging markets.”5
In December 2004, TI announced that it had developed the industry’s 
fi rst single-chip solution for mobile phones. A mobile phone typically 
requires multiple chips to operate, which adds to the overall costs. Based 
on TI’s 90-nanometer CMOS manufacturing technology, the ‘single-chip’ 
solution is aimed at mobile phones designed for the voice-centric mass-
market segment. Using TI’s digital RF processor (DRP) technology, TI’s 
single-chip solution integrates functions performed by different electron-
ics in the handset onto a single chip to signifi cantly reduce cost, power 
requirements, board area and silicon area, the main performance factors 
that are crucial for high-volume entry-level mobile phones. TI’s solution, 
developed initially for GSM/GPRS handsets, is facilitating development 
of additional wireless interfaces. The GSM Association (GSMA), realizing 
the need for affordable mobile handsets in developing countries, launched 
its ‘Emerging Markets Initiative’ in 2005. The GSMA has been work-
ing with manufacturers to deliver mobile phones at a price below US$40 
(from the prevailing lowest price of about US$80 to US$100, beyond the 
reach of most people), in order to create opportunities to add 100 million 
connections per year. Such an expansion in subscriber base will also dra-
matically increase the demand for GSM-based communication systems 
(e.g., base stations).
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Simultaneously, TI also announced the fi rst cell phone built entirely in 
India, from concept to design to production. Based on TI’s TCS chip-set 
family, including the single-chip Bluetooth module and other logic/linear 
components, these designs will serve as platforms for the development of a 
variety of mobile handsets for different market segments, from ultra low-
cost to mid-range voice- and feature-rich data-centric handsets. The mar-
ket launch of the fi rst phones based on TI and BPL (India) cooperation was 
scheduled for September 2005 and the Primus (India) phones for produc-
tion at the end of 2005.6
With the global launch, in August 2005, of its single-chip mobile 
solution, which was designed and developed at TI India’s development 
center in Bangalore, manufacturers such as Nokia, Motorola and Erics-
son were expected to launch handsets based on the single-chip solution 
within nine months. This solution, which was specifi cally designed for 
India, involves putting on the same slab of silicon two disparate sets of 
circuits: the digital audio portion that handles voice capability and the 
radio frequency (RF) circuits that send the signal to and fro, as radio 
waves. According to Ramachandran, the director-general of the Cellular 
Operators Association of India (COAI), this technological solution will 
help in realizing the dream of an INR1,000 [US$20] mobile and boost 
cellular penetration to achieve the target of 250 million phones by the 
end of 2007.7
At the 2005 3G summit in Mumbai, India, Texas Instruments India 
announced the launch of the ‘eCosto’ chip, its single-chip solution meant to 
foster the development of low-cost ‘multimedia rich’ phones. By integrating 
the radio frequency (RF) transceiver and analog codec with the digital base 
band, the platform substantially reduces board spaces, extends battery life 
and makes a more powerful and versatile handset. eCosto’s ‘multimedia 
rich’ capabilities include: advanced video capture, playback and stream-
ing with up to QVGA screen quality at 30 frames-per-second, digital still 
camera up to three mega pixels with sub-second shot-to-shot delay, plus 
color LCD and interactive 2D/3D gaming with graphics. TI’s strategy for 
emerging markets, as they evolve beyond voice-centric and basic multime-
dia applications, is to support the integration of more advanced features 
into single-chip cell phone solutions.8
Soon after TI delivered the industry’s fi rst integrated single-chip solution 
for mobile phones, TI and Nokia announced a cooperation whereby Nokia 
will incorporate TI’s single-chip solution into its future mobile phones to 
offer more cost effective advanced handsets, especially in high-volume 
entry markets. The launch of the single-chip solution fulfi ls a commitment 
TI made in 2002 when the company announced its intention to integrate 
the bulk of handset electronics on a single chip and to test the fi rst product 
in 2004.9
By incorporating TI’s single-chip solution, Nokia within nine months 
shipped more than 20 million handsets from its manufacturing facilities in 
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India to markets in India and Africa. Motorola came out with a series of 
ultra-low-cost handsets designed without losing on functionalities.
Following TI’s pioneering innovation, several other semiconductor 
manufacturers announced their own single-chip solutions, providing 
mobile handset manufacturers a variety of alternative semiconductors to 
choose from. For instance, NXP, a semiconductor company founded by 
Philips, announced its own single-chip solution that enables feature-rich 
handsets: Delivering complete system-level operation in a single monolithic 
integrated circuit (IC), NXP’s multimedia solution is designed for ultra-
low-cost (ULC) mobile handsets, with complete dual-band GSM/GPRS 
modem and external ICs required for power amplifi er and memory. By 
integrating analog and digital base bands, NXP’s solution allows handset 
manufacturers (OEMs/ODMs) to deliver higher levels of rich multime-
dia content to entry-level cell phone users in a reliable, cost- and power-
effi cient package. In addition, the ULC+ multimedia solution enables a 
music phone with color screen, MP3 playback, removable fl ash memory 
card and FM tuner for a total bill of materials under US$20. Entry-level 
users in emerging markets like China, India and Latin America now 
desire the same value-added functionalities available in the industrialized 
world. NXP’s solution also allows signifi cant fl exibility in network plan-
ning, particularly in emerging markets where network coverage tends to 
be sparse in rural areas, as well as in oversubscribed urban areas where 
sub-par RF performance can create interference on neighboring chan-
nels, thereby impacting overall cellular network effi ciency. NXP’s India 
Center played an important role in the development of the solution, the 
PNX4903 subsystem.10
Following the successes of the single-chip solution developed by the IC 
manufacturers for GSM/GPRS standards, Qualcomm also embarked on 
fi nding a similar solution for its CDMA standard, which is traditionally 
cheaper than GSM products/systems. Through its single-chip solution, the 
US technology major Qualcomm is expecting CDMA handset sales num-
bers in India to match those of the GSM-based handset sales numbers in 
2006. More than half of the CDMA handsets sold in the Indian market 
are priced below US$50. Qualcomm holds the global patents for CDMA-
based products and solutions. Mobile handset manufacturers such as 
LG, Samsung and BenQ have an agreement with Qualcomm to develop 
CDMA handsets. Qualcomm has two R&D centers in India employ-
ing 300 engineers, with an expected addition of a few hundred more in 
2006. India would be one of the fi rst markets where Qualcomm’s single-
chip product would be launched. Qualcomm’s single-chip solution offers 
mobile phone manufacturers the fl exibility to use the same chip to develop 
handsets at different price points. The single-chip solution will enable 
manufacturers to develop handsets that could be priced below US$50, as 
well those handsets in the US$60 to US$100 range, but still enables more 
data capabilities and functionality at the entry level. R&D engineers at 
Innovations in Emerging Economies 245
Qualcomm’s Indian centers have made important contributions to devel-
oping this single-chip solution.11
Single-Chip Digital TV
The single-chip phenomenon has now spread to a wide variety of prod-
uct areas that use ICs. The basic idea of offering function-rich products at 
affordable price is perhaps the only strategy to be successful in emerging 
markets. For instance, by 2004, the fi rst ever single-chip solution for a 
digital TV was expected to be offered worldwide to the entertainment elec-
tronics industry. It was developed by a small team of Indian engineers at the 
Bangalore-based India Design Center of the US-based analog device major, 
National Semiconductor. The product, a total ‘solution-on-a-chip’ (SOC), 
incorporates all the building blocks; the signal processing, graphics, audio, 
video and radio-frequency circuits necessary to build a state-of-the-art dis-
play monitor compatible with the emerging global digital TV standards. 
Such technology would serve the new ‘convergence’ market where TV and 
PC display functions are virtually interchangeable. It would signifi cantly 
reduce the price of new generation digital TV sets suitable for the recep-
tion of ‘combo’ broadband video plus data signals through direct to home 
(DTH) satellites or cable.12
Common People’s Chip13––The Single-chip Solution
As an illustration of the innovations that have an origin in emerging 
economies and implications for other developing countries, the follow-
ing examples would serve best. For instance, in an ultrasound machine, 
the machine transmits waves into the body of an individual; these hit the 
targeted tissue/body parts and bounce back. When they bounce back, 
they are picked up by sensors in the machine, which then calculate the 
distance the numerous different waves have traversed and, based on that, 
present an image of the tissue (e.g., the growth of a fetus over time). In 
this entire process, several elements are involved: (i) the low noise ampli-
fi er (LNA), which serves the purpose of amplifying the waves, but at the 
same time keeps its own noise level low; otherwise that sound could inter-
fere with that of the wave signals; (ii) the voltage-controlled amplifi er 
(VCA), which provides a second level of amplifi cation to give the ‘precise’ 
voltage to the waves so that the waves remain strong enough to be read 
effectively by the sensors. Some waves travel a longer distance, and many 
of them become too weak before they reach the sensors. The VCA pro-
vides a boost to these waves, which are the ‘real world’ analog signals 
that then meet an analog-to-digital converter (ADC) so that they can be 
converted into binary language of (1s and 0s) the digital world, where 
the digital signals can be processed quickly by digital signal processors 
(DSPs) to get the images required.
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Typically, the LNA and VCA used to be located on one chip and the 
ADC on another. TI India developed the pioneering process to integrate all 
of these processors into a single chip, without compromising the overall per-
formance levels. This innovation brings several advantages. For instance, 
an ultrasound machine consists of many LNA/VCA and ADC chips. With 
the integration of several functions on a single chip, the space required, 
which used to be occupied by several chips with each performing a single 
function, becomes signifi cantly less and thus enables the design of more 
portable machines, and because the signals have to travel less distance, the 
power required for the operation will be less.
Several semiconductor companies are making efforts to fi nd similar 
solutions to bring the benefi ts of more advanced and modern health care, 
education, communications and even banking facilities to ‘common Indi-
ans,’ especially those residing in rural and remote locations. The effort is 
to bring greater functionality into a single chip in order to make the end 
product more affordable. These high-tech innovations have the potential 
to bring a lot of benefi ts to common people in developing countries. Such 
benefi ts include:
 i. Banking: NXP Semiconductors and A Little World, providers of a 
mobile platform for ‘inclusive banking,’ introduced technology-en-
abled solutions to enhance micro-banking in villages in India, as a 
pilot project deployed by seven major banks in over 450 villages across 
four states in India. The solution is based on NXP’s near fi eld commu-
nication (NFC) technology, which is a short-range wireless connectiv-
ity technology that enables consumers to securely exchange and store 
various kinds of information, simply by bringing two devices close 
together. In this particular case, the two devices are an NFC-enabled 
mobile phone and an RFID (radio frequency identifi cation) card. The 
mobile phone (with the bank personnel) executes the functions of a 
branch of the bank by storing the entire database of customers in the 
villages. It enables the banks to eliminate the cost and effort of setting 
up physical branches in rural areas, while providing full services for 
cash deposits and withdrawals, utility payments and money transfers. 
The smart card with a chip, which will be in the possession of the 
customer, stores the identity of the customer such as name, address, 
photograph, fi ngerprint templates and relevant details of the savings 
or loan accounts held by the issuing bank. With more than 40 percent 
of Indians lacking access to formal fi nancial services, this technology 
helps in getting this segment into the banking fold.
 ii. Phones and computers: semiconductor companies such as TI and 
NXP have developed a single-chip solution for the ultra-low-cost seg-
ment of the mobile handset market. This solution works by integrat-
ing the analog and digital base bands, radio frequency transceiver, 
power management and audio circuitry in a single IC. In 2008, Intel 
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announced its Atom processor, a new range of low-power proces-
sors designed specifi cally for mobile Internet devices (MIDs), and a 
new class of simple and affordable Internet-centric computers arriv-
ing later this year. The Atom chip, according to Intel, measures less 
than 25 millimeters, making it the company’s smallest and lowest 
power consuming processor yet. Intel’s competitor, AMD, under its 
50X15 initiative that seeks to enable affordable Internet access and 
low-power computing capability for 50 percent of the world’s popula-
tion by the year 2015, has introduced the Protos Desktop in alliance 
with Wipro (India). Protos, which is India’s smallest fully functional 
desktop, caters to the needs of people who require basic computing 
and Internet. It consumes up to 25 percent less power when compared 
to a conventional desktop.
10.2 The World’s Cheapest Car: Revamping 
Traditional Technologies for Emerging Economies
Unlike the previous example, this case is about using traditional technolo-
gies, automobile engineering, to develop ‘Emerging Products’ for ‘Emerging 
Markets.’ In a traditional technology sector that involves ‘learning-by-
doing’ and requires accumulated knowledge, Tata Motors India, a com-
pany in an emerging economy, has set new standards in the car industry by 
developing a low-cost car without compromising functionalities. The most 
important feature of this innovation is its potential to promote ‘entrepre-
neurship’ across the countries in the South (the term ‘South’ refers to the 
developing world, sometimes called the Third World).
The concept of Nano originated with the idea to offer an affordable and 
safer mode of transport to people (families) who are currently using two-
wheelers such as scooters and motorcycles, but without a signifi cant increase 
in costs. Ratan Tata, the chairman of Tata Motors India, conceived it as a 
‘people’s car’ and offered to sell it at INR100,000 (US$2,000 to US$2,500, 
depending on the exchange rate. Tata Motors launched this ultra-low-cost 
car on January 10, 2008, at the Auto Expo 2008 in New Delhi. Judging 
by the extreme enthusiasm that greeted the launch, the Nano has exceeded 
industry expectations.
The Nano is a result of breakthroughs at many different dimensions of 
innovation, in price, in size, in distribution and in technology. By using 
lighter steel and a smaller engine and having longer-term sourcing agree-
ments (technology alliances) with parts suppliers, Tata was able to keep the 
price of the Nano down. Tata has fi led for 34 new patents on the Nano; 
most are in the engine. This is a very small number of patents compared to 
the international auto majors, who would fi le for thoUSnds of patents for a 
single innovation. The distribution model of the car is seen an innovation 
by itself, as the Nano uses modular design and manufacturing. Just like a 
bicycle, Nano is expected to be sold in kits that would be distributed and 
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serviced by the ‘entrepreneurs’ who will assemble them for consumers. The 
Nano basic will be marketed at INR100,000 (US$2,000 to US$2,500), but 
there will be many variants of it, including an air-conditioned one, and the 
prices could go up to US$4,000, still less than the Maruti 800 (India), until 
now the world’s cheapest car at US$4,800. The Nano will be customized 
for overseas markets and exported. Tata intends to export the car to emerg-
ing markets in Africa, Latin America and Asia, where it will be a natural 
fi t. Typically, the auto industry creates one of the highest multiplier effects 
on the economy. The Nano, having created a new market segment, has 
already begun to build an industry around it. India’s Apollo Tires has said 
it will start to make tires for small cars like the Nano (Kripalani, Business 
Week, January 10, 200814).
Technological Innovation15
i. Chassis, suspension and brakes: for a low-cost car, Nano is not a 
pure single structure construction, but has subframes, in the form 
of a couple of long members and cross-members for rigidity, which 
aid in the ride, handling and safety. The suspension systems are all 
independent (just as in other cars); the front suspension struts are 
supported by a lower A-arm for improved steering feel and direc-
tional control. The coil-sprung independent rear suspension in Nano 
consists of twin arms with lots of articulation. Nano uses a stiffer 
front suspension and wider tires at the rear, as well as measures like 
shifting the battery and fuel tank to under the front seats. Nano 
does not use expensive disc brakes, but relatively inexpensive drum 
brakes instead. Nano has a good amount of ground clearance of 180 
millimeters, which permits going off-road or better handling on poor 
roads in developing countries.
ii. Engine and gearbox: the Nano’s motor is an all-aluminum, 624- 
cubic centimeter, in-line, two-cylinder motor. It is kept so to keep 
costs down and, therefore, the valve gear is a simple two valves per 
cylinder, driven by a single overhead camshaft. The small engine is 
situated under the rear seat inside the rear axle line to facilitate bet-
ter handling. The engine management system is supplied by Bosch 
(the German MNC) and this ‘Value Motronic’ version is essentially a 
low-cost version of Bosch’s full-fl edged Motronic System. The Value 
Motronic uses a simple engine control unit (ECU) with software that 
is especially tailored for this car. This customized setup allows Bosch 
to use comparatively basic electronic circuitry, which substantially 
reduces the number of sensors that relay information to the ECU. A 
typical Motronic System requires seven or eight sensors, but Nano’s 
engine has only four basic ones. This system costs less than half of 
a normal system and yet meets the Bharat Stage III (Indian) emis-
sion norms. However, to meet Euro IV, the ECU may need to be 
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upgraded. In terms of innovation, another big challenge with Nano 
was to control noise, vibration and harshness (NVH), both from the 
engine and the road, without costly soundproof materials. This was 
achieved by optimizing the sheet metal frequencies to control boom 
and vibration.
Organization of Innovation16
The creation and design of the world’s cheapest car is an excellent example 
of innovation and ingenuity, both inside and outside the organization. The 
Nano mission began back in 2003, when the chairman of Tata Motors 
India gave its engineers a challenge to build a ‘people’s car.’ He set three 
requirements for the new vehicle: (1) It should be low-cost; (2) it should 
adhere to regulatory requirements; and (3) it should achieve performance 
targets such as fuel effi ciency and acceleration capacity. The early designs 
developed were close to a scooter on four wheels, and they were quickly 
discarded. The chairman wanted a real car.
Tata Motors called a meeting of its top parts suppliers and, after showing 
them the discarded prototypes of the car, asked them to help. Auto parts 
manufacturers, both local and foreign, including Germany’s Bosch, which 
makes the computer that is the heart of the car’s engine, were skeptical. But 
Tata convinced them by pointing out that not only would their companies’ 
specifi c developments for the Nano help to make history but they could 
also improve their respective companies’ businesses. For instance, the Rane 
Group, which makes a rack and pinion steering system, focused its R&D 
on reducing the weight of the materials used, replacing the steel rod of the 
steering with a steel tube, leading to a major cost reduction. A typical prod-
uct of this type is made of two pieces, but it was redesigned as one piece to 
save on machining and assembling costs. According to the Rane Group, the 
world has seen this sort of integration of two pieces into one, but for dif-
ferent applications and never for a new car and to reduce costs (a follow-on 
innovation driven by market forces).
Similarly, GKN Driveline India, a subsidiary of global auto parts leader 
GKN, designed the driveshaft––the component that transfers power from 
the engine to the wheel. Its team over a year developed 32 prototype vari-
ants to create the perfect driveshaft for the Nano. It also brought designers 
from the company’s French and Italian units and designed the driveshaft to 
make it lighter and easier to manufacture. For the Nano’s rear-wheel drive 
system, GKN designed a smaller diameter of shaft, which made it lighter 
and saved on material costs. Keeping the cost level has been the biggest 
challenge for Tata Motors, and it will continue to pose challenges in the 
future as well, particularly as the prices of raw materials like steel have 
more than doubled since the project was launched, and the company has to 
follow the new and stricter industry regulations (Kripalani, Business Week,
May 9, 2008).
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A modular design revolution: according to Hagel and Seely Brown 
(200817) of Deloitte LLP’s Center for Edge Innovation, Tata Motors did not 
draw a lot of attention to what is perhaps the most innovative aspect of the 
Nano, which is its ‘modular design.’ The Nano is constructed of parts and 
components that can be built and shipped separately to be assembled in a 
number of locations. The Nano is expected be sold in kits that would be 
distributed, assembled, and serviced by local entrepreneurs. Ratan Tata, in 
an interview with The Times of London said: “A bunch of entrepreneurs 
could establish an assembly operation and Tata Motors would train their 
people, would oversee their quality assurance and they would become sat-
ellite assembly operations for us. So we would create entrepreneurs across 
the country that would produce the car. We would produce the mass items 
and ship it to them as kits. That is my idea of dispersing wealth.” In fact, 
even going beyond this, Tata plans to provide the tools for local mechanics 
to assemble the car in existing auto repair shops or even in new garages cre-
ated to cater to remote rural customers. This is a breakthrough element of 
the Nano innovation. The Tata Motors/Nano approach is in contrast with 
the strategy of more established auto manufacturers for whom each new 
model represents an advance in tighter integration, with more and more of 
the functionality deeply embedded in electronics that truly feel like a ‘black 
box’ to the customer.
Recognizing the potential economic benefi ts that Tata’s Nano could 
bring by transforming transportation systems, particularly in developing 
countries, already several governments in Africa and Latin America have 
approached Tata Motors to locate Nano operations in their countries, too. 
In countries where the public transport system is appalling and private 
transportation is limited to the affl uent, the Nano could bring signifi cant 
benefi ts to common people. Moreover, the Nano could promote entrepre-
neurship not only in terms of assembler, but also repair and service outlets 
in rural areas. The Nano could be used as taxis by individual entrepre-
neurs in places where currently three-wheelers, with questionable safety, 
are being used.
11 Summary and Conclusions
In recent years, MNCs have been conducting strategic innovation activities 
in emerging economies. Although, in the past, there were cases of MNCs 
conducting R&D in developing countries, such innovation was mainly 
related to adaptation of products and processes to the local conditions and/
or at most product development for local markets (i.e., variants based on 
the parent’s technology). It is only since the mid-1980s that MNCs have 
started carrying out strategic innovation, such as those relating to devel-
oping products for global markets or mission-oriented basic research for 
long-term corporate use in emerging economies, although the scale of such 
operations is still small. Mainly only the MNCs dealing with new science-
based technologies (e.g., ICT, biotechnology and so forth.) have started 
locating strategic innovation activities in emerging economies.
The primary driving forces for such a move by MNCs are both technology-
related, i.e., gaining access to R&D personnel; as well as cost-related, i.e., to 
leverage the low-cost advantages in emerging economies; and market-related, 
i.e., with the markets in emerging economies growing faster than those in the 
industrialized world. It has become imperative to locate innovation activities 
in these countries to better understand the needs and preferences of the con-
sumers and to develop innovative products for such markets (e.g., emerging 
products for emerging markets). This is a new phenomenon and is signifi -
cantly different from developing products for the local market (based on the 
parent’s technology) in the earlier era. The present situation requires perfor-
mance of more complex and advanced innovation activities, perhaps also not 
performed by the parent company itself until now. Another important driving 
force for locating R&D in emerging economies has been that the manufactur-
ing facilities of most industrial customers of MNCs are located in emerging 
economies (e.g., China). They manufacture products for worldwide markets. 
In order to capture this intra-industry (or B2B) business, it becomes necessary 
to locate R&D centers in such locations to provide the customer with innova-
tive and timely solutions.
However, it should be remembered that at the global level the proportion 
of R&D conducted in developing countries (including emerging economies) 
by MNCs is still only marginal. Over two-thirds of MNCs’ R&D activities 
are located within the industrialized world. It is often diffi cult to get an exact 
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estimate of the R&D performed by MNCs outside their home countries. At an 
average the internationalized corporate R&D ranges between 10 to 15 percent 
of total R&D conducted by MNCs, although the fi gure is rising steadily. The 
fi gure, however, is greater for MNCs based in small industrialized countries. 
Of the limited R&D conducted overseas, the share of developing countries 
would be only a small proportion, and this again depends on whether it is 
measured on the basis of R&D expenditures or R&D personnel or propor-
tion of patents originating from innovation activities in developing countries. 
Similarly, the fl exibility and the propensity for internationalization of R&D 
vary between different sectors, with the new science-based technologies scor-
ing higher on both counts than the conventional technologies (Reddy 1997).
In addition, since the beginning of the new millennium (2000s), fi rms 
based in emerging economies have started performing R&D to develop prod-
ucts and services for the global markets (i.e., global innovation), putting them 
in direct competition with incumbent MNCs in the industrialized countries. 
In this effort, the emerging economy fi rms are being supported by their uni-
versities and national research institutes, which help the fi rms with innovation 
and technological activities (particularly in China).
This study, through empirical analysis (in-depth case studies), attempted to 
show that the characteristic features of innovation performed in some develop-
ing countries (which are called emerging economies) by both MNCs and local 
fi rms are changing signifi cantly, making them attractive locations for more 
R&D-related FDI. This means that something uncommon or unforeseen is 
happening. What is it? Why is it happening? And what are its implications 
for the corporations, host and home countries (the actors) involved? Although 
when viewed from the perspective of all MNCs (or fi rms from emerging econ-
omies) as a group or all developing countries as a block, such activities are 
still marginal, when viewed from an individual actor’s perspective such devel-
opments assume greater signifi cance. It may be pointed out here that in the 
1970s, internationalization of production also started as a marginal activity, 
with labor-intensive assembly activities relocated into low-cost countries, espe-
cially the newly industrializing economies (NIEs––Hong Kong, Singapore, 
South Korea and Taiwan). Starting with such low-tech activities of MNCs, the 
NIEs today have built up strong skills in production engineering and are now 
increasingly becoming locations for R&D activities. For instance, South Korea 
and Taiwan are today the foremost countries in the world that have micro-
machining capabilities (perhaps with the exception of Japan).
11.1 GLOBAL INNOVATION OF MNCS IN EMERGING 
ECONOMIES––DETERMINING FACTORS
11.1.1 Demand-side Factors
As analyzed in the theoretical framework (see Chapter 3, this volume), 
the internationalization of corporate R&D could be conceptualized as 
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occurring in waves or phases. In an evolutionary fashion, MNCs tend to 
gain more confi dence in the capabilities of their subsidiaries abroad and the 
NSI in host countries, increasing the level and complexity of the innova-
tion being assigned to them. Until the 1970s, the MNCs that were inter-
nationalizing their business were mainly those dealing with conventional 
technologies (e.g., mechanical and electrical engineering, consumer goods 
and so on) which required adaptations to individual local market condi-
tions. So in the initial phases, to carry out such adaptation work, TTUs 
were established in host countries abroad. By the mid-1970s, in order to 
increase the market share in host countries, a need for increased sensitivity 
to local conditions became apparent. Along with the expansion of pro-
duction facilities, some localized innovation activities were established to 
develop products exclusively for local markets (ITUs) (but basically derived 
from the parent’s technologies). However, most of such R&D was located 
within the industrialized host countries. Only a few large developing coun-
tries, such as India, were locations for even these limited functions.1 A good 
example of such an ITU’s innovation would be Unilever’s (UK) subsidiary 
Hindustan Lever in India. Based on the detergent powder developed by 
the parent, the Indian affi liate developed a detergent cake for the Indian 
market. In India, where clothes are not washed in washing machines but in 
fl owing water (either rivers or taps), powder was not a good choice. Hence, 
due to this variation in cultural habit, the cake had to be developed to gain 
a market share. It was considered to be an innovative product in India, with 
improved effi cacy, compared to the earlier bar soap to wash clothes.
However, by the late 1970s, the industries based on new science-based 
technologies, especially those that were microelectronics-based, had begun 
to emerge rapidly, transforming the characteristic features of global competi-
tion by dramatically changing the industrial production system. This change 
in the techno-economic paradigm2 has eroded the competitiveness of fi rms 
and countries that were leaders in conventional technologies and at the same 
time enabled some newcomers to take the lead (Ernst and O’Connor 1989). 
This volatile competitive situation was evidenced by the challenges posed to 
MNCs by the newly emerged high-technology fi rms in the electronics and 
biotechnology sectors.3 For instance in the semiconductor business, during 
1975–1985, USA-based MNCs dominated the market for dynamic random 
access memories (DRAMs). After the mid-1980s, Japanese MNCs overtook 
USA companies in global market share and were expected to maintain their 
lead for several decades. But another newcomer, Samsung of South Korea, 
entered the fi eld and snatched the lead by accomplishing a phenomenal 
growth in a very short period. In 1989, Samsung was in ninth place in the 
global markets in memory chips, but by 1993 it had attained the number 
one position in the world (Business Week 1994, p. 23).
Furthermore, techno-economic and social developments in the 1980s have 
created a relatively more harmonized market in which consumer needs (at 
least some) worldwide could be met with standardized products. This com-
pelled MNCs to adopt global strategies to remain competitive (Levitt 1983). 
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Due to the convergence of consumer needs and the rapid international diffu-
sion of technologies, MNCs from the industrialized world could no longer 
depend on their home countries alone to provide the ideal conditions for inno-
vation. New needs could emerge anywhere in the world, and the technological 
solutions to meet such needs could be located in another part of the world. 
These developments have increased the necessity for worldwide learning and 
the location of some strategic innovation activities away from home countries 
(Bartlett and Ghoshal 1991). As a result, in the 1980s, several MNCs located 
some strategic activities abroad. IBM’s basic research center in Switzerland 
and global product development center in Germany illustrate this trend.
Furthermore, in order to reduce risks as well as development time and to 
obtain complementary knowledge and skills, fi rms started joining hands with 
earlier rivals in technological alliances. However, all such innovation-related 
activities were confi ned to the industrialized world. By the mid-1980s, the 
rapid pace of innovation and technological activities increased the demand 
for R&D personnel, surpassing the supply in the industrialized world. The 
competition for recruitment of scarce R&D personnel was also pushing up 
the costs. As a corollary, companies started searching globally, including new 
countries such as India, Israel, South Korea and Taiwan (perhaps based on 
their international publications or patent records) for locating their innova-
tion activities.
As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, the empirical evidence suggests that 
since around the mid-2000s, emerging economies have become more attrac-
tive locations for innovation-related activities than were the traditional lead-
ers like the USA and the EU countries. This focus on emerging economies is 
now mainly driven by the need for R&D presence in rapidly growing markets 
(particularly in the light of continuing recession in the industrialized world) 
and the need to be in proximity to major business customers, who are largely 
located in the emerging economies.
11.1.2 Supply-side Factors
Complementing the demand-side factors that are compelling and/or per-
suading MNCs to locate R&D, supply-side factors in emerging economies 
are also favoring such a move. Some developing countries possessed supply-
side factors. In their efforts to build up technological capacity for economic 
development, over the years many developing countries (e.g., the BRICS 
group) have built up large reserves of S&T personnel. However, until the 
early 1990s, such efforts, instead of resulting in rapid economic development, 
mostly resulted in increased unemployment among the educated or in brain 
drain. The twin reasons for such a situation have been: (a) mismatch between 
the requirements and human resources development (HRD) planning; (b) the 
low level and slow pace of industrialization. Even the limited industrializa-
tion in such countries mainly took place through transfer of ready-made tech-
nologies by MNCs (Reddy 1993).
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In developing countries (particularly in the emerging economies) S&T 
manpower was lying dormant due to its underutilization by the indigenous 
industry. In most of these countries, either the industrialization did not 
take place at a corresponding level or the then existing industry, because 
of the low-emphasis on R&D, was not able to fully utilize the available 
manpower. These pools of S&T personnel were available for utilization 
by MNCs for their innovation activities at much lower-wages compared to 
their counterparts in industrialized countries.4
From the supply side, an added attraction for MNCs has been the inter-
est among researchers from developing countries, who are educated and 
working in industrialized countries, to return to their native countries and 
work on challenging tasks for MNCs.5 Many researchers from developing 
countries have attained reputations in their respective fi elds of study in 
industrialized countries. Earlier such people who were educated in industri-
alized countries chose to stay abroad, because of the lack of technologically 
challenging tasks in their developing home countries. Now with MNCs 
creating facilities similar to those available in industrialized countries and 
their home economies transforming positively, these researchers are show-
ing greater interest in returning to their home countries, leading to a reverse 
brain drain. These expatriate researchers are familiar with the operations 
of MNCs and the systems in industrialized countries, as well as the operat-
ing conditions in their native countries.
As Fusfeld (1994) pointed out in the 1990s, the availability of educated, 
but underutilized personnel in developing countries representing a combi-
nation of talent and low-wages has an important implication for industrial 
research. These pools of scientists and engineers in non-OECD countries 
will continue to grow. There are three mechanisms by which these person-
nel will infl uence future industrial research: (1) MNCs from industrial-
ized countries will locate more innovation activities in developing countries 
with large pools of scientists and engineers; (2) MNCs will subcontract 
specifi c R&D projects and related technical services to fi rms or research 
institutes or universities or government agencies in developing countries; 
and (3) entrepreneurial activity and industrial growth in developing coun-
tries will lead to the evolution of a base of industrial research in domestic 
fi rms, with increased absorption of domestic scientists and engineers.
11.1.3 Enabling Factors
In the early 1970s, one of the main reasons that MNCs did not locate 
strategic R&D abroad was the diffi culty involved in coordinating and 
supervising such activities (Mansfi eld 1974). But by the mid-1970s, the 
improvements in ICT had vastly facilitated the scope for international 
sourcing of knowledge. The new technologies have become not only driv-
ing forces, but also enabling forces for the globalization of innovation. By 
the late 1970s, many MNCs dealing with new science-based technologies 
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had established worldwide organization of R&D and international sourc-
ing of S&T resources. ICT has enabled the geographical dispersal of cor-
porate R&D worldwide as well as ensured the fl ow of technologies within 
the corporate group structures globally (OECD 1992). ICT, especially with 
the introduction of digital technology, enabled the exchange of detailed 
designs, drawings and specifi cations without time delays.
Another feature of new science-based technologies that enabled the 
globalization of R&D, particularly in industries such as pharmaceuticals, 
chemicals, microelectronics, biotechnology and new materials, has been 
their closeness to basic science. The increasing role of scientifi c knowledge 
in major technological developments is also increasing the number of dis-
ciplines relevant to innovation and thereby the necessity for companies to 
depend on external sources, particularly universities, for basic science-based 
knowledge inputs (Chesnais 1988a). Some developing countries, although 
not highly industrialized, have internationally reputed academic estab-
lishments. The proximity of new technologies to basic science is allowing 
MNCs to utilize the talents in such academic establishments in developing 
countries for their R&D requirements by sponsoring research, by subcon-
tracting R&D or by research collaboration (Reddy 19936).
Moreover, because of their basic science base, even theoretically trained 
personnel, with little or no industrial experience, can be utilized in innova-
tion-related activities in new technologies. Such theoretically trained per-
sonnel are available in surplus in some developing countries, opening up 
opportunities for them to join the global R&D networks of MNCs. Unlike 
in conventional technologies, where ‘learning by doing’ plays the vital role 
in acquiring skills, the skills in new technologies can be acquired through 
formal training and education.
Another characteristic feature of new science-based technologies that 
has emerged in discussions with the MNCs’ R&D has been that innovation 
process in new technologies is divisible into activities and/or subactivities, 
which can later be integrated to result in fi nal innovation. For instance, in 
the initial phases of establishing Astra Research Center India (ARCI), the 
molecular biology portion of innovation was carried out at ARCI in India 
and the pharmacology and toxicology were carried out by Astra’s R&D 
units in Sweden, with the fi nal integration for product development taking 
place in Sweden (see Reddy 2000, for a complete case study of ARCI). It 
is this divisibility of innovation process that enables joint R&D projects 
and technology alliances, where each partner contributes the knowledge 
in which it has expertise. By implication, this also means that innovation 
activities can be divided into ‘core’ and ‘non-core’ or ‘supplementary’ activ-
ities. MNCs can save on costs by performing (or outsourcing) some of the 
non-core activities in emerging economies. At the same time, it also releases 
critical resources in home countries for concentration on core activities.
In the past, especially in conventional technologies, the economies of 
scale required for R&D were considered to be one of the main reasons 
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for retaining substantial R&D in the home countries of MNCs. But in the 
new techno-economic paradigm the advantages of economies of scope have 
overcome the barriers of economies of scale. According to Mytelka (1993), 
contrary to earlier views, critical mass can now be achieved in terms of the 
size of the ‘system’ needed to acquire the knowledge rather than the size of 
the fi rm itself. This applies to all activities in the value chain from concep-
tion of an idea to marketing.
At the macro level, one of the important enabling factors for MNCs’ 
R&D activities in emerging economies has been the changes in host govern-
ment policies related to trade, FDI and particularly the intellectual property 
rights (IPRs) regime (see Chapter 2, this volume, for complete discussion).
However, in discussions with MNCs, the IPRs regime in the host coun-
try did not seem to be critical for locating or outsourcing innovation activi-
ties, as there are some ways to protect their intellectual property (IP). The 
reasons for this seem to be two-fold: (1) The entire innovation process for a 
product does not take place in one location. So each location only has the 
knowledge related to the activity handled by that unit, and such informa-
tion without collaboration from units in other locations is not of much use 
for imitation. (2) In new technologies, the ability to copy and produce a 
product is not suffi cient to be successful in business. The global marketing 
and distribution networks and the brand names, apart from technological 
edge, have become equally important for entry into global markets. And 
these advantages rest with the MNCs.
Another policy change in developing countries that has direct bearing on 
the location of MNCs’ R&D activities has been the opening up of access 
to their national research institutes to foreign fi rms. Following a reduction 
in government fi nancial support, research institutes are now motivated to 
earn a portion of their budgets from enterprises, including foreign-owned 
(Reddy 2000).
11.1.4 Internal Factors
To meet the challenges posed by the rapidly changing global business envi-
ronment, MNCs have also rationalized their corporate structures, which 
in turn acted as an enabling factor for globalization. From the operational 
perspective of MNCs, the nature of demand and the increasing science 
base of new technologies are leading to homogenization of certain interna-
tional markets and standardization of technologies for global markets. At 
the same time, they are generating wider variety and fragmentation in other 
markets (Granstrand et al. 1992). This necessitates changing the traditional 
headquarters-subsidiary relationships into a global intra-organizational 
network-based management structure. The creation, exploitation and dis-
semination of new technology in a global organization require simultane-
ous achievement of effi ciency, local responsiveness, and worldwide learning 
and know-how transfer (Bartlett and Ghoshal 1991).
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According to Porter (1986), MNCs have been compelled to shift from a 
multidomestic approach, where each subsidiary was confi ned to servicing a 
local market, to a global strategy, where subsidiaries are assigned a special-
ized role to play in the developments planned and organized from the center. 
This new role of subsidiaries may involve an increased emphasis on deriv-
ing distinctive new product variants as part of a regional or world product 
mandate, or if a unique ‘global product’ is envisaged, providing research 
input into its creation. Such rationalization has also become easier with the 
liberalization of economies worldwide and the establishment of the WTO.
11.2 GLOBAL R&D IN EMERGING ECONOMIES
The ‘product life-cycle’ theory suggested by Vernon (1966) has had a pro-
found infl uence on the studies concerning the internationalization of pro-
duction activities. However, in recent years, especially in the light of the 
globalization of business operations, including R&D, the relevance of the 
model to the new global environment is increasingly being questioned.
According to Cantwell (1995), the product life-cycle model was based on 
the hypothesis that innovation activities are almost always carried out in 
the home country of the MNC. The reasons for this have been: (1) econo-
mies of scale are important in R&D activities and therefore may need to be 
concentrated in a single center; (2) there are locational economies of inte-
gration involved in R&D, as the development of new products or processes 
requires close interaction between R&D, manufacturing and marketing; 
and (3) innovation is perceived as a demand-led process, where the special 
demands of sophisticated consumers and skill-intensive downstream facili-
ties in the home countries are seen as providing stimulus for innovation.
Using the USA patent data for 100 years, which specifi es the location 
of technological activity at the corporate level, Cantwell (1995) points out 
the weakness of the product life-cycle’s hypothesis concerning the loca-
tion of R&D activities. Based on the data, he argues that even historically 
the model was not correct. The USA electrical companies and European 
chemical companies had signifi cantly internationalized their technological 
activity in the inter-war period. The data also indicate that, in recent years, 
the categories of industries internationalizing their technological activities 
have further broadened, including a wider range of companies.
Based on the results of subsequent studies, the product life-cycle theory 
was criticized on the grounds that the changes in the behavior of MNCs, 
due to internal pressures from well-established affi liates or external pres-
sures from the host country governments, may lead to the compression of 
product cycle (Giddy 1978), giving scope for near-simultaneous occurrence 
of innovation in several major markets (Pearce 1989).
In a later paper Vernon (1979) conceded that there has been a con-
siderable increase in the spread of the geographical network of MNCs’ 
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operations. As MNCs increasingly adopted a global approach, the spread 
of their operations increased, and the overall time lag between the intro-
duction of a new product in the USA and its diffusion into other loca-
tions decreased dramatically. By the late 1970s, there had been a number of 
changes in Europe’s macro environment, closing the gap between Europe 
and the USA.
In the present context, the product life-cycle theory is only relevant to 
the extent that the home countries of MNCs tend to be the location for the 
majority of innovation activities, as the largest proportion of R&D expen-
ditures are incurred there. However, the changes in the global environment 
have made it possible for the product cycle to start anywhere in the world 
in the corporate system. As Bartlett and Ghoshal (1991) stated in the early 
1990s, the latest fashion or huge market need could emerge in other coun-
tries and the technologies to meet such demands could be located in some 
other country. This implies that the initial phases of the product cycle can 
also be located in countries other than the home base (in the industrial-
ized world). MNCs are pooling the resources available at the corporate 
level globally to fi nd solutions. Effi cient manufacturing subsidiaries may be 
converted into ‘international production centers,’ and the innovative R&D 
units of subsidiaries may be treated as ‘worldwide centers of excellence’ for 
a specifi c product or process development.
MNCs’ strategic innovation activities in emerging economies negate the 
conventional views that developing countries have the capability to perform 
only low-tech activities. Instead, the trend suggests that even in developing 
countries (at least in some of them) there are segments that can perform 
high-tech activities given the resources. However, this does not mean that 
developing countries have achieved advanced technological capabilities 
on a par with the industrialized countries. It only means, just as Vernon 
observed the developments in Europe that negated his product cycle theory, 
that there have also been changes taking place in some developing countries 
that make them conducive for the location of activities related to the early 
phases of the product cycle.
The business environment for companies is increasingly being infl uenced 
by global developments, not only in terms of economic opportunities, but 
also in terms of technological developments. Whereas, traditionally, the 
technological and economic changes in the business environment took 
place in the USA, Europe and Japan, today some emerging economies such 
as Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa are playing a minor, but 
fast-growing role in such developments. They have emerged not only as 
large potential markets, but also as noticeable competitors and attractive 
locations for strategic innovation activities.
The liberalization of economies for trade and investments has played a 
major role in the entry of emerging economies into the global business envi-
ronment. The new techno-economic paradigm, which gave raise to several 
science-based technologies, also played a critical role in the integration of 
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new countries into the global business environment. Freeman and Perez 
(1988), in a historical analysis, showed how at the emergence of each new 
techno-economic paradigm new windows of opportunities were opened up 
for latecomers to industrialization and how the leading nations in an earlier 
paradigm were overtaken by the newcomers at the change of every techno-
economic paradigm.
In the traditional technologies such as mechanical and electrical engineer-
ing, much of the learning and accumulation of knowledge took place through 
‘learning-by-doing’ over long periods, as successful innovation and diffusion 
of these technologies required signifi cant ‘tacit knowledge,’ Consequently, 
countries with vast industrial experience had a strong competitive advantage 
in these technologies. The entry-barriers were too high to latecomers. But in 
the new science-based technologies, much of the required knowledge is codi-
fi ed, hence the corporate world’s growing emphasis on intellectual property 
rights (IPRs). The learning paradigm has started shifting from that of ‘learn-
ing-by-doing’ toward ‘learning-by-training,’ The science-based technologies, 
by lowering the entry barriers, opened up new opportunities to latecomers 
to compete in the global economy on an equal footing. The success of South 
Korea and Taiwan in the electronics industry is an evidence of this process. 
A similar process is underway in other technology sectors such as software, 
telecom, biotechnology and nano technology, opening up new opportunities 
to emerging economies that have a substantial number of trained scientists 
and engineers. Furthermore, even conventional technologies themselves inte-
grate signifi cant proportion of new technologies in their products (e.g., about 
30 percent of automobile parts are composed of electronics).
At the moment the emerging economies do not pose a signifi cant direct 
threat to the industrialized countries. But in the medium-term, with the exis-
tence of large domestic markets and the availability of low-cost resources, 
some companies located in emerging economies are likely to narrow the 
technological and economic gap with the MNCs. Instead of looking at the 
emerging economies as potential competitors, companies based in industri-
alized countries could focus on the potential opportunities that emerging 
economies can open up.
The business strategy of companies from the industrialized countries 
has traditionally been to focus on products (more advanced) and markets 
that provide higher profi t margins with low sales volumes. Such a strategy 
arises from the small domestic market, which has an ability to pay higher 
prices. On the other hand, companies in the emerging economies follow a 
strategy of achieving high sales turnover, even with low profi t margin. The 
consumers in emerging economies have lower purchasing power, and so 
the demand is more sensitive to price. Therefore, companies derive profi t 
through higher sales volumes. Given the growing cost sensitivity, without 
compromising on functionality and quality, in the rapidly growing mar-
kets, the traditional business strategies of striving for high profi t-margins 
on low volumes may need to be revised.
Summary and Conclusions 261
As Mathews (2006, p. 15) notes, the literature on international business/
economics over the course of the past decade has been somewhat respon-
sive to the new trends described above. It has now moved from viewing the 
MNC as an agent of internationalization to one where the MNC is seen 
as both initiator and benefi ciary of globalization. Along with this shift in 
emphasis there has been a shift in understanding the rationale of multina-
tionality and the means through which fi rms seek to obtain advantages 
from globalizing operations (Caves, 1982; Chi and McGuire, 1996). In the 
1960s and 1970s, MNCs operated in a regime of import substitution and 
closed markets and therefore had to establish miniversions of themselves as 
more or less self-contained subsidiaries in each national market. In such a 
business environment, the theoretical explanations of the sources of multi-
national advantage focused on the MNC’s ability to exploit its domestically 
derived advantages abroad (see also Chapter 3, this volume, particularly 
Hymer 1976 and Kindleberger 1969). But as globalization progressed, the 
source of multinational advantage is seen as arising not so much from the 
exploitation of existing advantages but from the tapping of resources that 
would otherwise not be available to a fi rm competing solely at home and 
exporting from the home base (Forsgren 1999). As the global economy 
becomes more and more closely interlinked, MNCs have been seeking new 
advantages by establishing global value chains, where product develop-
ment, production and logistics are located around the world, in terms of 
cost considerations (e.g., labor-intensive operations in low-cost countries) 
or considerations of access to knowledge resources (e.g., R&D operations 
in knowledge-intensive regions) (Zander 1999).
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 11
 1. In countries with small markets, research teams were sent from headquarters 
on missions to provide technical support for adaptation, rather than estab-
lishing an R&D unit (Ronstadt 1997 and Behrman and Fischer 1980).
 2. See Chapter 3 of this book, particularly Freeman and Perez 1988 and Perez 
and Soete 1988.
 3. For example, Nokia of Finland has become the second-largest supplier of 
mobile telephones worldwide. Similarly, Samsung of South Korea became 
the fi rst company in the world to develop a working prototype of the 256-
megabit chip (Business Week 1994, p. 23).
 4. Some developing countries, such as India and Brazil, are characterized by 
dual segments. One small segment is technologically highly developed and 
exhibits complementary characteristics to the systems in the industrialized 
world, and the other larger segment is highly underdeveloped and poor, mak-
ing the whole country less developed. MNCs are attempting to utilize this 
advanced segment for their R&D.
 5. Astra Research Centre India was in fact established mainly because of inter-
est among the Indian researchers settled in the USA in returning to India. 
For related detailed discussion, see also Science (1993), pp. 346–367 and 
Business Week (1994), pp. 36–37.
 6. The cases of AKZO Chemicals subcontracting R&D to National Chemi-
cal Laboratories, India, and the research collaboration between Glaxo and 
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Similarly even the MNCs based in developing countries are also entering into 
research collaboration with universities abroad. The collaboration between 
United Microelectronics Corp. of Taiwan and Fudan University of China in 
VLSI chip designing is a good example of that.
This page intentionally left blank 
Bibliography
Alcácer, J. and Chung, W. (2007). “Location Strategies and Knowledge Spillovers.” 
Management Science 53 (5): 760–776.
Amsden, A. H. and Tschang, F. T. (2003). “A New Approach to Assessing the Tech-
nological Complexity of Different Categories of R&D (with Examples from 
Singapore).” Research Policy 32: 553–572.
, Tschang, T., and Goto, A. (2001). “Do Foreign Companies Conduct R&D 
in Developing Countries? A New Approach to Analyzing the Level of R&D, 
with an Analysis of Singapore.” ADB Institute Working Paper 14. Tokyo: Asian 
Development Bank Institute, March.
Archibugi, D., Howells, J. and Michie, J. (1999a). “Innovation Systems and Policy 
in a Global Economy.” In D. Archibugi, J. Howells and J. Michie, eds, Inno-
vation Policy in a Global Economy, 1–18. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
. (1999b). “Innovation Systems in a Global Economy.” Technology Analysis 
& Strategic Management 11 (4): 527–539.
Arora, A., Arunachalam, V. S., Asundi, J. and Ronald, F. (2001). “The Indian 
Software Services Industry.” Research Policy 30 (3): 1267–1287.
Arora, A. and Gambardella, A. (2004). “The Globalization of the Software Indus-
try: Perspectives and Opportunities for Developed and Developing Countries.” 
Working Paper 10538. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic 
Research, June.
Athreye, S. and Cantwell, J. (2007). “Creating Competition? Globalisation and the 
Emergence of New Technology Producers.” Research Policy 36: 209–226.
Bartlett, C. A. and Ghoshal, S. (1991). Managing across Borders: The Transna-
tional Solution. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
Bas, C. L. and Sierra, C. (2002). ‘‘Location versus Home Country Advantages.” 
In R&D Activities: Some Further Results on Multinationals’ Locational Strate-
gies,” Research Policy 31: 589–609.
Behrman, J. N. and Fischer, W. A. (1980). Overseas R&D Activities of Transna-
tional Companies. Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain.
Bhattacharya, A. and Michael, D. C. (2008). “The BCG 50 Local Dynamos: How 
Dynamic RDE-Based Companies Are Mastering Their Home Markets—and 
What MNCs Need to Learn from Them.” Boston: The Boston Consulting 
Group. March.
Birkinshaw, J. M. and Morrison, A. (1995). “Confi gurations of Strategy and Struc-
ture in Subsidiaries of Multinational Corporations.” Journal of International 
Business Studies 26: 729–754.
Bonin, B. and Perron, B. (1986). “World Product Mandates and Firms Operating 
in Quebec.” In H. Etemad and L. Séguin Dulude, eds, Managing the Multina-
tional Subsidiary, 161–176. London: Croom Helm.
270 Bibliography
Borini, F. M., Oliveira Jr., M. M. and Guevara, A. J. H. (2005). “Determinant Fac-
tors of the Subsidiaries Roles in Emerging Economies.” Paper presented at the 
Academy of Management Meeting, Honolulu, August 5–10.
Bowonder, B., Thomas, M. T., Rokkam, V. M. and Rokkam, A. (2003). “The 
Global Pharmaceutical Industry: Changing Competitive Landscape.” Interna-
tional Journal of Technology Management 25 (3, 4): 201–226.
Brash, D. T. (1966). American Investment in Australian Industry. Canberra: Aus-
tralian National University Press.
Breschi, S. and Lissoni, F. (2001). “Knowledge Spillovers and Local Innovation Sys-
tems: A Critical Survey.” Industrial and Corporate Change 10 (4): 975–1005.
Brito Cruz, C. H. and de Mello, L. (2006). “Boosting Innovation Performance 
in Brazil.” Economics Department Working Paper No. 532, ECO/WKP 
(20006)60. Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), December 6th.
Brusoni, S., Principe, A. and Pavitt, K. (2001). “Knowledge Specialization and 
the Boundaries of the Firm: Why Do Firms Know More Than They Make?” 
Administrative Science Quarterly 46: 597–621.
Buderi, R. (2005). “Microsoft: Getting from ‘R’ to ‘D.” Technology Review 108 
(3, March): 28–30.
Burstall, M. L., Dunning, J. H. and Lake, A. (1981). Multinational Enterprises, 
Government and Technology: Pharmaceutical Industry. Paris: Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
Business Week. (2008). “S&P/Business Week Global Innovation Index: The World’s 
50 Most Innovative Companies.” May 1. http://bwnt.businessweek.com/inter-
active_reports/innovative_companies/ (downloaded on 5/14/2008 at 14.21).
. (2003). “The Rise of India.” December 8, 38–48.
. (1999). “How Lenovo Lives Up to Its Name.” February 5.
. (1994). “21st Century Capitalism—Part II: Technology & Manufacturing, 
The New Global Workforce, The Emerging Middle Class, and Where Are We 
Going?” December 19, 20–68.
Cantwell, J. A. (1998). “The Globalization of Technology: What Remains of the 
Product-Cycle Model?” In A. Chandler, P. Hagstrom and O. Solvell, eds, The 
Dynamic Firm, 263–288. New York: Oxford University Press.
. (1995). “The Globalisation of Technology: What Remains of the Product 
Cycle Model?” Cambridge Journal of Economics 19 (1): 155–174.
. (1992). “The Internationalisation of Technological Activity and Its Impli-
cations for Competitiveness.” In O. Granstrand, L. Håkanson and S. Sjölander, 
eds., Technology Management and International Business: Internationalisa-
tion of R&D and Technology, 75–95. Sussex, UK: John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
 and Janne, O. (1999). “Technological Globalisation and Innovative Cen-
tres: The Role of Corporate Technological Leadership and Locational Hierar-
chy.” Research Policy 28 (2–3): 119–144.
Carlson, B. and Stankiewicz, R. (1995). “On the Nature, Function and Compo-
sition of Technological Systems.” In B. Carlsson, ed., Technological Systems 
and Economic Performance: The Case of Factory Automation, 21–56. Dor-
drecht: Kluwer.
Cassiolato, J. (2006). “The Brazilian Innovation System and the BRICS Project.” 
Presentation. Rio de Janeiro: Economics Institute of Federal University of Rio 
de Janeiro.
, Lastres, H. and Maciel, M., eds. (2003). Systems of Innovation and Devel-
opment: Evidences from Brazil. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
Casson, M. and Singh, S. (1993). “Corporate Research and Development Strate-
gies: The Infl uence of Firm, Industry and Country Factors on the Decentralisa-
tion of R&D.” R&D Management 23 (2): 91–107.
Bibliography 271
Castro, C. M. (1989). “What Is Happening in Brazilian Education?” In E. L. Bacha 
and H. S. Klein, eds., Social Change in Brazil, 1945–1985: The Incomplete 
Transition. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.
Caves, R. E. (1982). Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
. (1971). ”International Corporation: The Industrial Economics of Foreign 
Investment.” Economica 38: 1–27.
Chandler, R. (1977). The Visible Hand. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press.
Chen, S-H. (2004). “Taiwanese IT Firms’ Offshore R&D in China and the 
Connection with the Global Innovation Network.” Research Policy 33: 337–
349.
Chesnais, F. (1988a). “Multinational Enterprises and the International Diffusion 
of Technology.” In G. Dosi, C. Freeman, R. Nelson, G. Silverberg and L. Soete, 
eds., Technical Change and Economic Theory, 496–527. London and New 
York: Printer Publishers.
. (1988b). “Technical Cooperation Agreements between Firms,” STI Review 
4: 51–119.
Chi, T. L. and McGuire, D. J. (1996). “Collaborative Ventures and Value of Learn-
ing: Integrating the Transaction Cost and Strategic Option Perspectives on the 
Choice of Market Entry Modes.” Journal of International Business Studies 27 
(2): 285–307.
Clarke, P. (2006). “U.S. Turns to the Czech Republic for R&D.” Electronics 
Supply & Manufacturing. December 27, 2006. http://www.my-esm.com/
showArticle?articleID=196702141 (downloaded on 5/8/2008).
Consoni, F. and Quadros, R. (2006). ‘From Adaptation to Complete Vehicle 
Design: A Case Study of Product Development Capabilities in a Carmaker in 
Brazil.” Int. J. Technology Management 36 (1/2/3): 91–107.
. (2003). “Between Centralisation and Decentralisation of Product Devel-
opment in Multinational Corporations: Recent Trajectories in Brazilian Subsid-
iaries of Car Assemblers.” In XXVII EnANPAD. Anais Eletrônicos. Atibaia: 
ANPAD.
Costa, I. (2005). “Notes on R&D and TNCs Affi liates in Brazil.” Paper presented 
at the Expert Group Meeting on the World Investment Report (WIR 2005), 
Geneva, UNCTAD, January 24–26.
 and Queiroz, S. R .R. (2002) “Foreign Direct Investment and Technological 
Capabilities in Brazilian Industry.” Research Policy 31: 1431–1443.
Council on Higher Education. (2004). South African Higher Education in the First 
Decade of Democracy. Pretoria: Council on Higher Education, the Republic of 
South Africa.
Craemer, D. (1976). “Overseas Research and Development by United States Mul-
tinationals, 1966–1975: Estimates of Expenditures and a Statistical Profi le.” 
New York: The Conference Board.
Deccan Chronicle. (2002). June 28.
Dehoff, K. and Sehgal, V. (2007). “Innovators without Borders: Features: Special 
Report.” strategy+business 44: 1–8. Booz Allen Hamilton Inc.
De Meyer, A. and Mizushima, A. (1989). “Global R&D Management.” R&D 
Management 19 (2): 135–146.
Dias, A. V. C. and Galina, S. V. R (2004). “Profi t Strategies, Productive Models 
and the Global Organisation of Innovation Activities: A Comparison between 
the Automotive and the Telecommunication Industries in Brazil.” Actes du 
GERPISA 2004. Paris: 2nd GERPISA International Colloquium.
Dikshit, S. (2008). “India One of Our Prime Partners: Airbus.” The Hindu. May 
29. http://www.thehindu.com/2008/05/29/stories/2008052961441200.htm 
(downloaded on 6/3/2008 at 17.45).
272 Bibliography
Doz, Y., Wilson, K., Veldhoen, S., Goldbrunner, T. and Altman, G. (2006). Inno-
vation: Is Global Way Forward? Survey Results. A Joint Study by Booz Allen 
Hamilton and ISEAD.
Doz, Y. (1987). “International Industries: Fragmentation versus Globalization.” 
In B. R. Guile and M. Brooks, eds., Technology and Global Industry, 96–118. 
Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press.
Drews, J. (2000). “Drug Discovery: A Historical Perspective.” Science 287: 1960–
1964.
DST. (2004). Fruits of Freedom: South Africa’s Achievements in Science and Tech-
nology during the First Decade of Democracy. Pretoria: Department of Science 
and Technology (DST), the Republic of South Africa. ISBN: 1–920030–06–9.
. (1994) Research and Development Statistics, 1992–93. New Delhi: 
Department of Science and Technology, Government of India.
Dunning, J. H. (1992). “Multinational Enterprises and the Globalisation of Inno-
vatory Capacity.” In O. Granstrand, L. Håkanson and S. Sjölander, eds., Tech-
nology Management and International Business : Internationalisation of R&D 
and Technology, 19–51. Sussex, UK: John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
. (1977). “Trade, Location of Economic Activity and the Multinational 
Enterprise: A Search for an Eclectic Approach.” In B. Ohlin, P.O. Hesselborn 
and P.M. Wijkman, eds., The International Allocation of Economic Activity, 
395–418. London: Macmillan.
. (1958). American Investment in British Manufacturing Industry. London: 
Allen and Unwin.
Dörrenbächer, C. and Wortmann, M. (1991). “The Internationalisation of Corpo-
rate Research and Development.c Intereconomics (May, June): 139–144.
Edquist, C. (2005). “Systems of Innovation: Perspectives and challenges.” In The 
Oxford Handbook of Innovation, 181–208. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
. (1997). “Systems of Innovation Approaches, Their Emergence and Charac-
teristics.” In C. Edquist, ed., Systems of Innovation: Technologies, Institutions 
and Organizations, 1–35. London: Pinter.
EIU. (2004). Scattering the Seeds of Innovation: the Globalization of Research 
and Development. London: The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU).
Ernst, D. (2006). “Innovation Offshoring: Asia’s Emerging Role in Global Innova-
tion Networks.” East-West Center Special Reports, No. 10, July.
. (2005a) “Complexity and Internationalisation of Innovation: Why Is Chip 
Design Moving to Asia?” International Journal of Innovation Management 9 
(1): 47–73.
. (2005b). “Complexity and Internationalisation of Innovation: Why Is Chip 
Design Moving to Asia?” Presentation made at the Expert Group Meeting on the 
World Investment Report (WIR 2005), Geneva, UNCTAD, January 24–26.
 and O’Connor, D. (1989). Technology and Global Competition—The 
Challenge for Newly Industrialising Economies. Development Centre Studies. 
Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
Ernst & Young. (2005). Beyond Borders: Global Biotechnology Report. A Report 
by the Ernst & Young Inc.
. (2004). Global Pharma Report. A Report by the Ernst & Young Inc.
Etzkowitz, H.,, de Mello, J. M. C. and Almeida, M. (2005). ”Towards ‘Meta-
innovation’ in Brazil: The Evolution of the Incubator and the Emergence of a 
Triple Helix.” Research Policy 34: 411–424.
Fagerberg, J. (1994). “Technology and International Differences in Growth Rates.” 
Journal of Economic Literature 32 (3): 1147–1175.
Farrell, D., Laboissiere, M. A. and Rosenfeld, J. (2005). “Sizing the Emerging 
Global Labor Market.” The McKinsey Quarterly No. 3.
Financial Times. (2005). June 9. As cited in UNCTAD 2005, 176.
Bibliography 273
Forbes, N. (2003). “Higher Education, Scientifi c Research and Industry: Refl ec-
tions on Priorities for India.” Working Paper No. 188. Stanford Center for Inter-
national Development. Stanford: Stanford University, October.
Forsgren, M. (1999). “Some Critical Notes on Learning in the Uppsala Interna-
tionalization Process Model.” Working Paper No. 99/23. Stockholm: Stock-
holm School of Economics, Institute for International Business.
Forster, C. J. (2006). China’s Secret Weapon? Science Policy and Global Power.
London: The Foreign Policy Centre, April.
Freeman, C. (1995). “The National System of Innovation in Historical Perspec-
tive..” Cambridge Journal of Economics 19 (5): 5–24.
. (1987). Technology Policy and Economic Performance: Lessons from
Japan. London: Frances Pinter.
 and Perez, C. (1988). “Structural Crises of Adjustment: Business Cycles 
and Investment Behaviour.” In G. Dosi, C. Freeman, R. Nelson, G. Silverberg 
and L. Soete, eds., Technical Change and Economic Theory, 38–66. London: 
Pinter Publishers.
Frew, S. E., Rezaie, R., Sammut, S. M., Ray, M., Daar, A. S. and Singer, P. A. 
(2007). “India’s Health Biotech Sector at a Crossroads.” Nature Biotechnology
25 (4): 403–417.
Friedman, T. L. (2006). The World Is Flat: The Globalized World in the Twenty-
fi rst Century. London: Penguin Books Ltd.
Frobel, F., Heinrichs, J. and Kreye, O. (1980). The New International Divi-
sion of Labour: Structural Unemployment in Industrialized Countries and 
Industrialization in Developing Countries. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press.
Frost and Sullivan. (2004). Outsourcing Technology in Asia: Analysis of the 
Changing Face of R&D. San Antonio: Frost and Sullivan Company.
Frost, T. S., Birkinshaw, J. and Ensign, P. (2002). “Centers of Excellence in Multi-
national Corporations.” Strategic Management Journal 23: 997–1018.
Furman, J. L. and Hayes, R. (2004). “Catching Up or Standing Still? National 
Innovative Productivity among ‘Follower’ Countries, 1978–1999.” Research 
Policy 33: 1329–1354.
Furtado, J., Zanatta, M., Costa, I., Strachman, E. and Queiroz, S. (2003). “FDI 
and Technology Policies in Brazil.” Paper presented at the Conference of the 
European Association of Evolutionary Political Economy (EAEPE), Maastricht, 
November 7–10.
Fusfeld, H. I. (1995). “New Global Sources of Industrial Research.” Technology in 
Society 17 (3): 263–277.
. 1994). Industry’s Future—Changing Patterns of Industrial Research.
Washington, D.C.: American Chemical Society.
Galina, S. V. R. and Bortoloti, L. (2004). “Subsidiaries Involvement in Techno-
logical Development of Telecommunication Industry: Results from S&T Indica-
tors.” REAd—Special Issue 42, 10 (6, December).
Galina, S. V. R. and Plonski, G. A. (2002). “Global Product Development in the 
Telecommunication Industry: An Analysis of the Brazilian Subsidiaries Involve-
ment.” Proceedings of the Ninth International Product Development Manage-
ment Conference, European Institute for Advanced Studies in Management 
(EIASM), Sophia-Antipolis. France, May.
Gassman, O. and Han, Z. (2004). “Motivations and Barriers of Foreign R&D 
Activities in China.” R&D Management 34 (4): 423–437.
Giddy, I. H. (1978). “The Demise of the Product Cycle Model in International Busi-
ness Theory.” Columbia Journal of World Business 13 (1): 90–97.
Giridharadas, A. (2007). “In India, Outsourcing Moves to the Top Floor.” Inter-
national Herald Tribune, Tuesday, April 3.
274 Bibliography
Gold, A. R., Leibowitz, G. and Perkins, A. (2001). “A Computer Lenovo in the 
Making.” McKinsey Quarterly 3: 73–83.
Goldbrunner, T., Doz, Y., Wilson, K. and Veldhoen, S. (2006). The Well-Designed 
Global R&D Network. Resilience Report. Strategy+business. Booz Allen Ham-
ilton Inc.
Goldman Sachs. (2007). India’s Rising Growth Potential. Goldman Sachs Inc. 
January.
Gomroy, R. and Baumol, W. (2000). Global Trade and Confl icting National Inter-
ests. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Granstrand, O., Håkanson, L. and Sjölander, S. (1993). “Internationalisation of 
R&D—A Survey of Some Recent Research.” Research Policy 22: 413–430.
. (1992). “Introduction and Overview.” In O. Granstrand, L. Håkanson and S. 
Sjölander, eds., Technology Management and International Business: Internation-
alisation of R&D and Technology, 1–18. Sussex, UK: John Wiley & Sons.
Gupta, A. and Dutta, P. K. (2005). “Indian Innovation System: Perspective and 
Challenges.” Technology Exports, 7 (4, April–June): 1–7.
Hagedoorn, J. and Schakenraad, J. (1989). “Strategic Partnering and Technologi-
cal Cooperation.” In B Dankbar, B. Groenewegen and H. Schenk, eds., Perspec-
tives in Industrial Economics, 3–37. Dordrecht: Kulwer.
Hamel, G. (1991). “Competition for Competence and Inter-partner Learning within 
International Strategic Alliances.” Strategic Management Journal 12: 83–103.
Hariharan, R. (2005). “Managing Nokia R&D in China.” Presentation at the 
Conference on Global R&D in China, Nanjing, PRC, May 27–30.
Ho, J. (2005). “Lucent Bell Labs in China—An Account of Personal Experience.”. Pre-
sentation at the Conference on Global R&D in China, Nanjing, PRC, May 27–30.
Hood, N. and Young, S. (1982). “US Multinational R&D: Corporate Strategies 
and Policy Implications for the UK.” Multinational Business 2: 10–23.
Horst, H. T. (1978). A Home Abroad: A Study of Domestic and Foreign Operation of 
the American Food Processing Industry. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing 
Co.
Howells, J. and Neary, I. (1995). Intervention and Technological Innovation: Govern-
ment and the Pharmaceutical Industry in the UK. Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan.
Howells, J. R. (1990). “The Internationalisation of R&D and the Development of 
Global Research Networks.” Regional Studies 24 (6): 495–512.
Hu, M-C. and Mathews, J. A. (2008). “China’s National Innovative Capacity.” 
Research Policy 37 (5): 1465–1479.
Hymer, S. (1976). International Operations of National Firms: A Study of Direct 
Foreign Investment. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Håkanson, L. (1992). “Locational Determinants of Foreign R&D in Swedish Mul-
tinationals.” In O. Granstrand, L. Håkanson and S. Sjölander, eds., Technology 
Management and International Business: Internationalisation of R&D and 
Technology, 97–115. Sussex, UK: John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
. (1990). “International Decentralisation of R&D—The Organisational 
Challenges.” In C. A. Bartlett, Y. Doz and G. Hedlund, eds., Managing the 
Global Firm, 257–277. London and New York: Routledge.
IBM. (2006). “IBM Annual Study: Jobs Created by Foreign Investment Grow More 
Than 20 Percent Worldwide.” Armonk, New York: IBM’s PLI-Global Location 
Strategies. IBM Press Room, September 18, 2007. http://www-03.ibm.com/
press/us/en/pressrelease/22322.wss (downloaded on 5/8/2008 at 15.14).
IDB. (2006). “Enhancing Technological Innovation in Brazil.” IDB News. Web 
Story, Inter-American Development Bank, July 21. http://www.iadb.org (down-
loaded on 6/25/2008 at 16.58).
Intel China Research Center. (2005). “Intel R&D in PRC: Strategic Implications 
for the Future.” Presentation at the Conference on Global R&D in China, Nan-
jing, PRC, May 27–30.
Bibliography 275
Intel News Release. (2006). “Intel Establishes $50 Million Venture Capi-
tal Fund for Brazil.” March 28. http://www.intel.com/pressroom/archive/
releases/20060328corp.htm (downloaded on 6/25/2008 at 17.23).
ITRS. (2004). International Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors, 2003 Edi-
tion. Austin: Semiconductor Industry Association.
. (2002). International Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors, 2001 
Edition. Austin: Semiconductor Industry Association.
Kahn, M. (2006). “The South African National System of Innovation: From Con-
structed Crisis to Constructed Advantage?” Science and Public Policy 33 (2): 
121–130.
Katrak, H. (2002). “Does Economic Liberalization Endanger Indigenous Technological 
Developments? An Analysis of the Indian Experience.” Research Policy 31: 19–30.
Kindleberger, C. P. (1969). American Business Abroad: Six Lectures on Direct 
Investment. New Haven: Yale University Press.
King, D. A. (2004). “The Scientifi c Impact of Nations: What Different Countries 
Get for Their Research Spending.” Nature 430 (July 15): 311–316.
Kogut, B. (1988). “Joint Ventures: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives.” Strate-
gic Management Journal 9: 312–332.
Kondratieff, N. D. (1935). “The Long Waves in Economic Life.” Review of Eco-
nomic Statistics 17 (6): 105–115.
Kraemer, K. L. and Derick, J. (2001). “Creating a Computer Industry Giant: China’s 
Industrial Policies and Outcomes in the 1990s.” Working Paper. Irvine: Center for 
Research on Information Technology and Organization, University of California.
Krishna, V. V. (2001). “Refl ections on the Changing Status of Academic Science in 
India.” International Social Science Journal 168 (June): 231–246.
Kruss, G. (2008). “Balancing Old and New Organisational Forms: Changing 
Dynamics of Government, Industry and University Interaction in South Africa.” 
Technology Analysis & Strategic Management 20 (6): 667–682.
Kuemmerle, W. (1997). “Building Effective R&D Capabilities Abroad.” Harvard 
Business Review (March, April): 61–69.
Kumar, K. and McLeod, M.G., eds. (1981). Multinationals from Developing 
Countries. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books.
Kumar, N., and Aggarwal, A. (2005). “Liberalization, Outward Orientation and 
In-house R&D Activity of Multinational and Local Firms: A Quantitative 
Exploration for Indian Manufacturing,” Research Policy 34: 441–460.
Kumar, N. and Joseph, K. J. (2004). “National Innovation Systems and India’s IT 
Capability: Are There Any Lessons for ASEAN Newcomers?” RIS Discussion 
Paper RIS-DP No. 72/2004. New Delhi: Research and Information System for 
the Non-Aligned and Other Developing Countries (RIS).
Lall, S. (2000). “The Technological Structure and Performance of Developing 
Countries Manufactured Exports, 1985–1998.” Oxford Development Studies
28 (3): 337–369.
. (1983). The New Multinationals: The Spread of Third World Enterprises.
Chichester, UK: Wiley.
. (1979). “The International Allocation of Research Activity by US Multina-
tionals.” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 41 (4): 313–331.
Landau, R. and Rosenberg, N. (1992). “Successful Commercialization in Chemical 
Process Industries.” In N. Rosenberg, R. Landau and D. Mowery, eds., Technol-
ogy and the Wealth of Nations, 73–120. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Langlois, R. N. (2003). “The Vanishing Hand: The Changing Dynamics of Indus-
trial Capitalism.” Industrial and Corporate Change 12 (2): 351–385.
Leadbeater, C. and Wilsdon, J. (2007). The Atlas of Ideas: How Asian Innovation 
Can Benefi t Us All. London: Demos.
Levitt. T (1983). “The Globalization of Markets.” Harvard Business Review (May, 
June): 92–102.
276 Bibliography
Liebenau, J. (1984). “International R&D in Pharmaceutical Firms in the early 
Twentieth Century.” Business History 26: 329–346.
Long, F. A. (1988). “Science, Technology and Industrial Development in India,” 
Technology In Society 10: 395–416.
Long, G. (2005). “China’s Policies on FDI: Review and Evaluation.” In T. H. Moran, 
E. M. Graham and M. Bloomström, eds., Does Foreign Direct Investment Promote 
Development? 315–336. Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics.
Lorentzen, J. (2005). “The Absorptive Capacities of South African Automotive 
Component Suppliers.” World Development 33 (7): 1153–1182.
Loural, C.A., Filho, R.A.Z., Bordeaux Rego, A.C.G. and de Oliveira, R.C. (2006). 
“Technological Development of Brazilian Telecommunications in the Past 
Decades.” Telematics and Informatics 23: 294–315.
Lundvall, B-Å. (1992). “Introduction.” In B-Å. Luvall, ed., National Systems of 
Innovation: Towards a Theory of Innovation and Interactive Learning, 1–20. 
London: Pinter.
. (1988). “Innovation as an Interactive Process: From User-Producer Interac-
tion to National Systems of Innovation.” In G. Dosi, C. Freeman, R. Nelson, 
G. Silverberg and L. Soete, eds., Technological Change and Economic Theory.
London: Pinter.
Maharajh, R. and Pogue, T. E. (2008). “South African Science, Technology and 
Innovation Scoreboard 2008.” Pretoria, South Africa: COFISA and Institute for 
Economic Research on Innovation (IERI), November 14.
Mansfi eld, E. (1974). “Technology and Technical Changes.” In J.H. Dunning, 
ed., Economic Analysis and the Multinational Enterprise, 147–183. London: 
George Allen and Unwin.
, Teece, D. and Romeo, A. (1979). “Overseas Research and Development by 
US-Based Firms.” Economica 46: 187–196.
Marais, H. C. (2000). Perspectives on Science Policy in South Africa. Pretoria, 
South Africa: Network Publishers.
Mashelkar, R. A. (2006). “Beyond Bangalore? The Changing Landscape of Indian 
Science and Innovation.” Presentation, June 27. http://www.csir.res.in/Exter-
nal/Heads/aboutcsir/leaders/DG/Presentations/BeyondBangalore.pdf (down-
loaded on 5/8/2009 at 23.15).
Mathews, J. A. (2006). “Dragon Multinationals: New Players in 21st Century Glo-
balization.” Asia Pacifi c Journal of Management 23: 5–27.
. 2003). “Competitive Dynamics and Economic Learning: An Extended 
Resource-Based View.” Industrial and Corporate Change 12 (1): 115–145.
McKinsey Global Institute. (2005) The Emerging Global Labor Market, Part II: The 
Supply of Offshore Talent in Services. San Francisco: McKinsey & Company.
MCT. (2000). Resultados da Lei 8248/91, as cited in Galina and Bortoloti 2004.
Melin, L. (1992). “Internationalization as a Strategy Process.” Strategic Manage-
ment Journal 13 (2): 99–118.
Meyer-Stamer, J. (1995). “New Departures for Technology Policy in Brazil.” Sci-
ence and Public Policy 22 (5): 295–304.
Mitchell, G. (1990). “Research and Development for Services.” Research Technol-
ogy Management (November, December): 37–44.
MoC. (2005). Report of the Foreign Trade Situation of China. Beijing: Ministry of 
Commerce, People’s Republic of China.
Morel, C.M., et al. (2007). “The Road to Recovery.” Nature 449 (September 13): 
180–182.
Morris, F. (2005). “Foreign Direct Investment, R&D, and Innovation: Concepts 
and Data.” Background paper prepared for UNCTAD. Mimeo. Arlington, Va.: 
U.S. National Science Foundation, as cited in UNCTAD 2005.
Bibliography 277
Mowery, D.C. (1992). “International Collaborative Ventures and US Firms’ 
Technology Strategies.” In O. Granstrand, L. Håkanson and S. Sjölander, 
eds., Technology Management and International Business: Internation-
alisation of R&D and Technology, 209–249. Sussex, UK: John Wiley & 
Sons Ltd.
. (1983). “The Relationship between Contractual and Intra-fi rm Forms of 
Industrial Research in American Manufacturing, 1900–1940.” Explorations in 
Economic History: 351–374.
, Oxley, J. E. and Silverman, B. S. (1998). “Technological Overlap and 
Interfi rm Cooperation: Implications for the Resource-based View of the Firm.” 
Research Policy 27: 507–523.
Mustar and Laredo. (2002), as cited in Etzkowitz et al. 2005.
Mytelka, L. K. (2000). “Local Systems of Innovation in a Globalized World Econ-
omy.” Industry and Innovation 7 (1): 15–32.
. 1993). “Rethinking Development: A Role for Innovation in the Other ‘Two 
Thirds.” Futures 25 (6): 694–712.
. 1990). “New Modes of International Competition: The Case of Strategic 
Partnering in R&D.” Science and Public Policy 17 (5): 296–302.
NACI. (2006a). “The South African National System of Innovation: Structures, 
Policies and Performance.” Background Report to the OECD Country Review 
of South Africa’s National System of Innovation. Pretoria: National Advisory 
Council on Innovation (NACI), July 21.
. (2006b) Innovation for a Better Future. NACI Annual Report 2005/2006. 
Pretoria: National Advisory Council on Innovation (NACI).
Narula, R. (2003). Globalization & Technology: Interdependence, Innovations 
Systems and Industrial Policy. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
. 2002). “Innovation Systems and ‘Inertia’ in R&D Location: Norwegian 
Firms and the Role of Systemic Lock-in.” Research Policy 31: 795–816.
Nassif, A. (2007). “National Innovation System and Macroeconomic Policies: Bra-
zil and India in Comparative Perspective.” Discussion Paper No. 184, United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Geneva: United 
Nations, May, UNCTAD/OSG/DP/2007/3.
NASSCOM. (2006). National Association of Software and Services Companies. 
(www.nasscom.in) (downloaded 3/122007).
Nelson, R.R. (1993). “A Retrospective.” In R. R. Nelson, ed., National Innovation 
Systems: A Comparative Analysis, 505–524. New York and Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
. 1988). “Institutions Supporting Technical Change in the United States.” In 
G. Dosi, C., Freeman, R. Nelson, G. Silverberg and L. Soete, eds., Technologi-
cal Change and Economic Theory. London: Pinter.
, and Rosenberg, N. (1993). “Technical Innovation and National Systems.” 
In R. R. Nelson, ed., National Innovation Systems: A Comparative Analysis, 
3–22. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Niosi, J. (1999). “Introduction—The Internationalization of Industrial R&D: 
From Technology Transfer to the Learning Organization.” Research Policy 28 
(2, 3): 107–117.
Nobel, R. and Birkinshaw, J. (1998). “Innovation in Multinational Corporations: 
Control and Communication Patterns in International R&D Operations.” Stra-
tegic Management Journal 19 (5): 479–496.
NRCSTD. (2003). Report on China’s S&T Development Research. Beijing: 
National Research Center for Science and Technology Development.
NSB. (2008). Science and Engineering Indicators: 2008. National Science Board, 
NSB. Arlington, Va.: National Science Foundation.
278 Bibliography
NSF. (2007). Asia’s Rising Science and Technology Strength: Comparative Indi-
cators for Asia, the European Union, and the United States. Arlington, Va.: 
National Science Foundation, Division of Science Resources Statistics, May 
2007, NSF 07–319.
NyTeknik. (2007). “Svenska proteinforskare måste få hjälp i Indien.” Onsdag, mai 
9 (in Swedish).
Odagiri, H. and Yasuda, H. (1996). “The Determinants of Overseas R&D by Japa-
nese Firms: An Empirical Study at the Industry and Company Levels.” Research 
Policy 25: 1059–1079.
OECD. (2006). Evolution of Student Interest in Science and Technology Studies—
Policy Report. Paris: Global Science Forum, Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development.
. (1992). Technology and the Economy—The Key Relationships. Paris: 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
. (1988). Science and Technology Policy Outlook, 1988. Paris: Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
Patel, P. and Vega. M. (1999). “Patterns of Internationalisation of Corporate Tech-
nology: Location versus Home Country Advantages.” Research Policy 28 (2, 3): 
145–155.
PBQP. (1992). “Pesquisa qualidade e produtividade no meio empresarial.” Brasilia, 
as cited in Meyer-Stamer 1995.
Pearce, R. D. (1999). “Decentralised R&D and Strategic Competitiveness: Globa-
lised Approaches to Generation and Use of Technology in Multinational Enter-
prises (MNEs).” Research Policy 28 (2, 3): 151–178.
. (1989). The Internationalisation of Research and Development by Multi-
national Enterprises. London: Macmillan.
Penner,-Hahn, J. and Shaver, J. M. (2005). “Does International Research and 
Development Increase Patent Output? An Analysis of Japanese Pharmaceutical 
Firms.” Strategic Management Journal 26 (2): 121–140.
Penrose, E. (1995). The Theory of the Growth of the Firm. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press; fi rst published in 1959.
Pereira, R. S. (1998). As cited in Etzkowitz et al., 2005.
Perez, C., and Soete, L. (1988). “Catching Up in Technology: Entry Barriers and 
Windows of Opportunity.” In G. Dosi, C. Freeman, R. Nelson, G. Silverberg 
and L. Soete, eds., Technical Change and Economic Theory, 458–479. London 
and New York: Printer Publishers.
Petrella, R. (1992). “Internationalisation, Multinationalisation and Globalisa-
tion of R&D: Toward a New Division of Labour in Science and Technology?” 
Knowledge and Policy 5 (3): 3–25.
Polastro, B. S. and Tulcinsky, S. (2004). “India and China for Fine Chemicals.” 
Scrip Magazine (October): 39–41.
Porter, M. E. (1990). “The Competitive Advantage of Nations.” Harvard Business 
Review (March, April): 73–93.
. (1986). “Introduction and Summary” and “Competition in Global Indus-
tries: A Conceptual Framework.” In M. E. Porter, ed., Competition in Global 
Industries, 1–11, 15–60. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
. (1980). Competitive Strategy—Techniques for Analyzing Industries and 
Competitors. New York and London: The Free Press.
Poynter, T. A. and Rugman, A. M. (1982). “World Product Mandates: How Will 
Multinationals Respond?: Business Quarterly 47 (3): 54–61.
Queiroz, S., Zanatta, M. and Andrade, C. (2003). “Internationalization of MNCs’ 
Technological Activities: What Role for Brazilian Subsidiaries?” Paper presented 
at SPRU Conference in honor of Keith Pavitt, Brighton, November 13–15.
Bibliography 279
Radyuhin, V. (2008). “IT Opportunities & Challenges in Russia.” The Hindu,
January 19, 2008, p. OP-ED 11.
Reddy, A. S. P. (1993). “Emerging Patterns of Internationalisation of Corporate 
R&D: Opportunities for Developing Countries?” In C. Brundenius and B. 
Göransson, eds., New Technologies and Global Restructuring—The Third 
World at a Crossroads. London: Taylor Graham.
, and Sigurdson, J. (1994). “Emerging Patterns of Globalisation of Corpo-
rate R&D and Scope for Innovation Capability Building in Developing Coun-
tries?’ Science and Public Policy 21 (5): 283–294.
Reddy, P. (2007). Globalisation of the Biomedical Industry and the Biomedical 
Innovation System of India. Stockholm: Center for Business and Policy Studies 
(Studieförbundet Näringsliv och Samhälle—SNS).
. (2000). Globalization of Corporate R&D: Implications for Innovation 
Systems in Host Countries. London and New York: Routledge.
. (1997). “New Trends in Globalization of Corporate R&D and Implica-
tions for Innovation Capability in Host Countries: A Survey from India.” World 
Development 25 (11): 1821–1837.
Ronstadt, R. (1977). Research and Development Abroad by US Multinationals.
New York: Praeger Publishers.
Safarian, A. E. (1966). Foreign Ownership of Canadian Industry. Toronto: 
McGraw Hill of Canada.
Samuelson, P. A. (2004). “Where Ricardo and Smith Rebut and Confi rm the Argu-
ments of Mainstream Economists Supporting Globalisation.” Journal of Eco-
nomic Perspectives 18 (3): 135–146.
Schoenberger, E. (1988). “Multinational Corporations and the New International 
Division of Labour: A Critical Appraisal.” Inst. Reg. Sci. Rev. 11: 105–119.
Schumpeter, J. A. (1939). Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical, and Statisti-
cal Analysis of the Capitalist Process. New York and London: McGraw-Hill.
Schwaag-Serger, S. (2006). “China: From Shop Floor to Knowledge Factory?” In 
M. Karlsson, ed., The Internationalization of Corporate R&D: Leveraging 
the Changing Geography of Innovation. Stockholm: ,The Swedish Institute for 
Growth Policy Studies (PS).
Science. (1996). “India—Industrial R&D Gets Boost Despite Lack of Patent 
Reform..” 271 (January 26): 442–443.
. (1995a). “Science in China: A Great Leap Forward.” 270 (November 17): 
1131–1154.
. (1995b). “Joint Research—India Cracks Whip to End Addiction to State 
Funds.” 267 (March 10): 1419–1420.
. (1993). “Science in Asia.” 262 (October 15): 345–381.
Sigurdson, J. (2005). Technological Superpower China. Cheltenham, UK and 
Northampton, Mass: Edward Elgar.
. (1990). “The Internationalisation of R&D—An Interpretation of Forces 
and Responses.” In J. Sigurdson, ed., Measuring The Dynamics of Technologi-
cal Change. London and New York: Printer Publishers.
Simon, D .F. (2005). “Hearing on China’s High Technology Development.” The 
US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, April, as cited in For-
ster 2006, p. 17.
Simpson, L. (2004). Engineering Aspects of Offshore Outsourcing And Public 
Policy Investigation. Washington D.C.: Washington Internships for Students 
of Engineering (WISE), August 6. http://www.wise-intern.org/journal/2004/
WISE2004-LoriSimpsonFinalPaper.pdf (downloaded 3/12/2007).
Singh, A. (1995). “IITs Yesterday and Tomorrow.” Economic and Political Weekly
30 (38, September 23): 2389–2394.
280 Bibliography
Singh, J. (2008). “Distributed R&D, Cross-regional Knowledge Integration and 
Quality of Innovative Output.” Research Policy 37: 77–96.
. (2007). “Asymmetry of Knowledge Spillovers between MNCs and Host 
Country Firms.” Journal of International Business Studies 38: 764–786.
Singh, N. (2003). “India’s Information Technology Sector: What Contributes to 
Broader Economic Development?” Technical Paper No. 207, Development Cen-
ter. Paris: OECD.
Srinivasan, T. N. (2001). “Integrating India with the World Economy: Progress, 
Problems and Prospects.” Mimeo, Economic Growth Center, Yale University, 
as cited in Nassif 2007.
Stubenitsky, F. (1970). American Direct Investment in the Netherlands Industry.
Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press.
Sturgeon, T. (2002). “Modular Production Networks: A New American Model of 
Industrial Organization.” Industrial and Corporate Change 11 (3): 451–496.
Suarez-Villa, L. (1990). “Invention, Inventive Learning, and Innovative Capacity.” 
Behavioral Science 35 (4): 290–310.
Sun, Y. (2003). “Strategic or Tactical? Foreign Research and Development in Develop-
ing Countries, A Case Study of China.” Asian Geographer 22 (1, 2): 143–167.
, Du, D. and Huang, L. (2006). “Foreign R&D in Developing Countries: 
Empirical Evidence from Shanghai, China.” The China Review 6 (1): 67–91.
TCIL. (2007). “Pan-African e-Network: Heralding New Era in Providing Tele-edu-
cation & Tele-medicine Services to African Countries.” http://www.tcil-india.com 
(downloaded 5/28/2008).
Teece, D. J. (1992). “Competition, Cooperation, and Innovation: Organizational 
Arrangements for Regimes of Rapid Technological Progress.” Journal of Eco-
nomic Behaviour and Organization 18: 1–25.
. (1982). “Towards an Economic Theory of the Multiproduct Firm,” Journal 
of Economic Behaviour and Organization 3: 39–63.
Terpstra, V. (1977). “International Product Policy: The Role of Foreign R&D.” 
Columbia Journal of World Business 12: 24–32.
The Economist. (2008). “The Challengers.” January 10. http://www.economist.
com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10496684 (downloaded 5/28/2008).
. (1998). “The Alchemists: Survey of the Pharmaceutical Industry.” Febru-
ary 21, 1–18.
The Hindu. (2006). “Dr. Reddy’s Completes Acquisition of Betapharm.” March 7.
. (2005). “IISc Identifi es Nine Projects with Boeing: Over 30 Faculty Mem-
bers Involved.” September 16, p. 13.
. (2003). “Indian Engineers Develop Single-chip Digital TV.” April 27. 
http://www.thehindu.com/2003/04/27/stories/2003042701471000.htm (down-
loaded on 6/25/2008 at 15.32).
The Hindu Business Line. (2005). “Texas Instruments Unveils Single-chip 
Mobile Solution.” http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2005/08/09/stories/
2005080902580400.htm (downloaded on 6/25/2008 at 15.31).
The Innovation Hub (2009) Annual Report 2009. 
The US Tariff Commission. (1973). Implications of Multinational Firms for World 
Trade and Investment and for US Trade and Labor. Washington, D.C.: Govern-
ment Printing Offi ce.
The Wall Street Journal. (1997). “China’s Personal-Computer Industry Is Starting 
to Beat Out U.S. Companies.” November 19.
TIFAC. (2006). FDI in the R&D Sector. New Delhi: The Technology Information, 
Forecasting & Assessment Council, Government of India.
UNCTAD. (2005). World Investment Report, 2005: Transnational Corporations 
and the Internationalization of R&D. United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development. New York and Geneva: United Nations.
Bibliography 281
UNESCO. (2007). Institute for Statistics. Paris: United Nations Education, Social 
and Cultural Organisation, as cited in NSB 2008.
Vernon, R. (1979). “The Product Cycle Hypothesis in a New International Envi-
ronment.” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 41 (4): 255–67.
. (1974). “The Location of Industry.” In J. H. Dunning, ed., Economic Anal-
ysis and the Multinational Enterprise, 89–114. London: Allen and Unwin.
. (1966). “International Investment and International Trade in the Product 
Cycle.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 88: 190–207.
Viotti, E. B. (2002). Technol. Forecast. Soc. 63: 653–680, as cited in Morel et al. 
2007.
von Zedtwitz, M. (2004). “Managing Foreign R&D Laboratories in China.” R&D 
Management 34 (4): 439–452.
Walsh, K. (2005). “Foreign R&D in China: Drivers, Dynamics, and New Directions.” 
Presentation at the Conference on Global R&D in China, Nanjing, PRC, May 
27–30.
. (2003) Foreign High-Tech R&D in China. Washington, D.C.: The Henry 
L. Stimson Center.
Wang, H. (2005). “France Telecom’s R&D in China.” Presentation at the Confer-
ence on Global R&D in China, Nanjing, PRC, May 27–30.
Wei, X. and White, S. (2004). “Sequential Learning in a Chinese Spin-off: The 
Case of Lenovo Group.” R&D Management 34 (4): 407–422.
Wells, L. T. (1983). Third World Multinationals: The Rise of Foreign Investment 
from Developing Countries. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Wen, Ke (2005). “Barriers for Foreign R&D in China.” Presentation at the Confer-
ence on Global R&D in China, Nanjing, PRC, May 27–30.
Westney, D. E. (1988). “International and External Linkages in the MNC: The 
Case of R&D Subsidiaries in Japan.” Working Paper Y No. 1973–88. Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Sloan School of Management, MIT.
Wilson, D. and Purushothaman, R. (2003). Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 
2050. Global Economics Paper No. 99. October 1. Goldman Sachs Group Inc.
Wong, P. K. and Mathews, JA. (2004). “Editorial: Competitive Strategies of Asian 
High Tech Firms: The Challenge of Late-industrialisation.” International Jour-
nal of Technology Management 29 (1/2): 1–5.
World Bank. (2008). Unleashing India’s Innovation, ed. M. A. Dutz. Washington, 
D.C.: World Bank Group.
Wortmann, M. (1990). “Multinationals and the Internationalisation of R&D: New 
Developments in German Companies.” Research Policy 19: 175–183.
Xielin, L. and White, S. (2001). “China’s National Innovation System in Transition: 
An Activity-Based Analysis.” National Science Foundation, Tokyo Regional 
Offi ce, January.
Yeung, H. W. C., ed. (2000). The Globalization of Business Firms from Emerging 
Economies. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
Yoshida, P. G. (2008). “India Emerging (Maybe) as Major R&D Center.” Research 
Technology Management (March/April): 2–4.
Yuan, Z. (1995). “Reform and Restructuring of China’s Science and Technology 
System.” In D. F. Simon, ed., The Emerging Technological Trajectory of the 
Pacifi c Rim, 213–238. New York: M. E. Sharpe Inc.
Zander, I. (1999). “Whereto the Multinational? The Evolution of Technological 
Capabilities in the Multinational Network.” International Business Review 8: 
261–291.
Zanfei, A. (2000). “Transnational Firms and the Changing Organisation of Inno-
vative Activities.” Cambridge Journal of Economics 24: 515–542.
This page intentionally left blank 
Index
A
A Little World 246
Accelerated and Shared Growth 
Initiative for South Africa 
(ASGISA) Program 101
Accenture 230
active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) 
76, 84, 121, 125, 126










alliances: global interorganizational 
strategic 36–7
Amsden, A.H. 4, 35, 36
AngloGold Ashanti 208
APIDC Venture Capital Ltd 85
applied R&D 35, 36, 47
appropriate technologies 238
Archibugi, D. 54
ARCI (Asia Research Center India) 
220, 220–1, 224, 256
Argentina 4
Asian countries 14, 68–72
Association of South East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) 29





Atomic Energy Corporation 101
automobile MNCs: in Brazil 169
automotive industry 28–9, 40; South 
Africa 193–4, 197
aviation industry 40
Avra Laboratories 128–30; background 
128; R&D services 129–30; rea-
sons for companies outsourcing 




Bandwidth Barn (BWB) (South Africa) 
196
banking: and single-chip solution 246
Bartlett, C.A. 2, 34, 259
Bas, C.L. 50
Baumol, W. 13
beekeeping skills project 208
Behrman, J.N. 46–7
Beijing Electron Positron Collider 
(BEPC) 88
Beijing University 92, 166
Beijing University of Post and Telecom-
munications (BUPT) 92, 93, 159




bilateral investment treaties (BITs) 18




biopharmaceutical industry: India 83–6
biotechnology industry 19, 21, 58, 60, 
75; South Africa 104–5
Boeing: and Indian Institute of Science 
137; outsourcing of R&D 8–9
Bombay University 81
Page numbers in italics denotes a table/diagram
284 Index
Booz Allen Hamilton 6, 8, 39




Boston Consulting Group 12, 31
brain drain 52, 226, 254
Brash, D.T. 45
Brazil 4, 5, 12, 31, 72, 93–100, 
168–92; and CenPRA 183–6; 
classifi cation of foreign subsid-
iaries 169–70; collaboration 
between universities and foreign 
fi rms 174–5, 178–80, 183; 
coordination between federal 
and state-level agencies 98–9; 
and CPqD 186–92; driving 
forces behind location of foreign 
R&D in 171–2, 176–7, 184–5; 
and fi scal incentives 95; foreign 
R&D activities in 168–9; global 
innovation in 168–92; implica-
tions of foreign R&D for 175, 
180, 183, 186, 191–2; import 
tariffs 73; incubator movement 
98; Informatics Law 171, 172, 
174, 184–5, 191; innovation 
environment 93–100; jobs cre-
ated by internal FDI 7; Motorola 
in 19, 171–5, 225; multina-
tional corporations in 171–83; 
national research institutes 
183–92; patenting activity 97; 
pharmaceutical sector 96–7; 
R&D expenditures 68; research 
performance 94–5; Rhodia 
in 175–80; S&T policies and 
personnel 94–6, 214; Siemens 
in 181–3; supplying of products 
to other developing countries 
237; technological intensity of 
exports 73, 73; telecommunica-
tions sector 186–92; and US-
based MNCs R&D expenditure 
71; venture capital in 99–100; 
weaknesses of NSI 100; see also
BRICs countries
Brazilian Agricultural Research Corpo-
ration (EMBRAPA) 96
BRICs countries (Brazil, Russia, India 
and China) 15–16, 66–7, 
228, 229, 232, 238–9; annual 
increase in spending 67; com-
bined GDP 66; dual charac-
teristics of economies in 239; 
and high-tech sectors 75; S&T 
infrastructure built up by 239
Britain 49
Brito Cruz, C.H. 98




Cantwell, J. 1, 4, 14, 33, 258
Cape IT Initiative (CITI) (South Africa) 
196–7
CAPES (Coordination for the Train-
ing of Human Resources at the 
University Level) (Brazil) 94
car industry: development of low-cost 




catching-up opportunities: and new 
technologies 56–8
Caves, R.E. 42
CCT (National Council for Science and 
Technology) (Brazil) 99
CenPRA (Centro de Pesquisas Renato 
Archer) 183–6
Center for Development of Advanced 
Computing (C-DAC) (India) 83
Center of Visualization (Gothenburg) 
(Sweden) 210–11
center-for-global structure 2
centers of excellence (COEs) 77, 83, 
113, 131, 170, 172, 194, 212, 
214, 215, 233–4
Centro de Informática (CIN) (Brazil) 
174
Centro de Pesquisa e Desenvolvimento 
em Telecomunicacóes (CPqD) 
186–92






China 4, 5, 86–93, 143–67, 216; barriers 
to foreign R&D in 146; col-
laboration between universities 
and foreign fi rms 92–3, 145, 
148, 154, 158–9; driving forces 
behind location of foreign R&D 
in 145–6, 147, 148, 149, 152, 
Index 285
156–7; economy 145–6; examples 
of foreign corporate R&D 147–9; 
Five Year Plan (11th) 156; forms 
in which foreign companies con-
duct R&D 145; France Telecom 
in 148; global innovation in 6, 7, 
143–67; Hitachi in 155–60; impli-
cations of foreign R&D for 155, 
159–60, 167; incentives offered 
to foreign companies to estab-
lish R&D units 143; innovation 
environment 86–93; institutional 
reforms 89–90; Intel Corpora-
tion in 149–55, 165; jobs created 
by inward R&D 7; Lucent Bell 
Labs in 148–9; multinational 
corporations in 149–60; Nokia in 
147–8; NSI features and factors 
for successful working of 88, 93; 
number of foreign-invested R&D 
centers 143–4; patenting activity 
86; pharmaceutical industry 75–6; 
private enterprises 86; public 
research organizations (PROs) 86; 
R&D expenditure of US-based 
MNCs 71; R&D growth rate and 
expenditures 68; rise of in global 
economy 14; S&T system and 
personnel 39, 68, 71, 72, 87–90, 
93; stages in evolution of foreign 
R&D in 146; standards setting 
program 90–1; strategic and tacti-
cal R&D 144; strengths in R&D 
activities 154–5; supplying of 
products to developing countries 
237; university system 71, 72, 
86, 91–3; weaknesses of in R&D 
activities 93, 155; see also BRICs 
countries
Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) 87, 
90, 160, 164




CITI (Cape IT Initiative) 196–7
Citrus Producers’ Association (Fun-
decitrus) 96
clinical trials: and drug discovery 25
CNDI (Conselho Nacional de Desen-
volvimento Industrial) 99
CNPq (National Council for Scientifi c 
and Technological Development) 
(Brazil) 94
CoachLab (South Africa) 194, 195–6
comparative advantage 32–3
competition: changing pattern of 
29–31, 32
‘competitive forces’ analysis 37
conglomerate diversifi cation 42
contract research organizations (CROs) 
25, 123, 125
Corporate Technology Units see CTUs
cost advantages: and location of global 
R&D in emerging economies 
215
Costa, I. 170
Council for Scientifi c and Industrial 
Research (India) see CSIR (India)
Council for Scientifi c and Industrial 
Research (South Africa) see
CSIR (South Africa)
Covance 25
CPqD (Centro de Pesquisa e Desenvol-
vimento em Telecomunicacóes) 
186–92
Craemer, D. 45
CSIR (Council for Scientifi c and Indus-
trial Research) (India) 77, 80, 
81–2, 130
CSIR (Council for Scientifi c and Indus-
trial Research) (South Africa) 
105, 106, 195, 197–9, 201, 238
CTUs (Corporate Technology Units) 
46, 51, 53, 60, 139, 140–1, 141,
217, 218
Czech-Invest 7–8
Czech Republic 8, 226
D
DaimlerChrysler 197–202; implications 
of R&D activities for South 
Africa 201–2; innovation system 
200; joint R&D work on sisal 
fi bre with CSIR 197–9; knowl-
edge fl ows and learning 200–1
de Mello, L. 98
decentralized federation 3
demand-side factors: and location of 
R&D in emerging economies 
252–4
Department of Science and Technology 
(Brazil) 97
Department of Science and Technology 
(DST) (South Africa) 102, 104










Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories 84
dragon multinationals 11, 44
drugs: discovery and development pro-
cess 22–5, 24
Dunning, J.H. 43, 44, 45, 52, 217





Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) 6, 
108
Edquist, C. 55, 220
ELDORADO 174
electronics industry 2, 7, 14, 21, 49, 58, 
62, 260
Eli Lilly 76, 128
Embraer 12
EMBRAPA (Brazilian Agricultural 
Research Corporation) 96
emerging economies 4–10; access to 
S&T resources/personnel as 
driving force behind location of 
global R&D activities in 5, 20, 
35, 38, 39, 48, 51, 53, 67, 74–5, 
118, 139, 140, 214–15, 226, 
254–5; amount of R&D activi-
ties in 251–2; cost advantages 
of locating global R&D in 215; 
driving forces behind locating 
R&D in 7, 35, 38, 50–1, 74, 
214–16, 251, 252–8; economic 
growth 62; global innovation by 
companies based in 1, 10–15, 
236–50, 252; growth of markets 
in 40; in high-tech sectors 75–6; 
impact of global R&D activities 
on see host country implica-
tions; impact on home countries 
for locating R&D activities 
in see home country implica-
tions; innovation environment 
in 66–107; internal factors for 
MNCs locating R&D in 257–8; 
local/regional market access 
as reason for locating global 
R&D in 215–16; location of 
global R&D in 1, 4–10, 21, 
31–2, 35–6, 37–40, 41, 60, 
62, 65, 212, 251; narrowing 
of gap between industrialized 
countries and 5–6, 32; overview 
of innovation potential 67–76; 
R&D expenditures 68; research 
collaboration agreements with 
234; S&T capabilities 67–72; as 
source countries for FDI 234–5; 
supply-side factors for MNCs 
locating R&D in 254–5; and 
technological catch-up 14
emerging products for emerging markets 
62, 240–50; low-cost car 247–50; 
single cell solution 241–7
Engibous, Tom 241–2
engineering industry 27–9, 30–40, 48
engineers see S&T personnel/resources
enterprise sector: impact of global 
R&D activities on 220–1








FDI (foreign direct investment) 19, 32, 
41; conditions for taking place 
43–4; emerging economies as 
source countries for 234–5; and 
transactional costs 42
FINEP 99





free trade agreements (FTAs) 18
Freeman, C. 53, 260
Friedman, T.L. 32
FUNTTEL 189, 191











Ghoshal, S. 2, 34, 259
GKN Driveline India 249
Glenmark Pharmaceuticals 85
global economic changes 18–19; impact 
of 29–32
global platforms 169–70
Global Software Group (CSG) 112–13, 
114
Global Technology Units see GTUs
globalization of R&D 1–4; actor net-
work 59, 59; and emerging econ-
omies see emerging economies; 
evolution framework 58–65, 63,
64; motives for 50–1; studies on 
since 1980s 49–51
Goldman Sachs 15, 66
Gomroy, R. 13
good clinical practice (GCP) 19
good manufacturing practice (GMP) 19
government: and R&D activities 223, 257
Granstrand, O. 50, 53
Green, David 204
Grupo Positivo 31
GSM Association (GSMA) 242
GTUs (Global Technology Units) 46, 
51, 52, 60, 139, 140, 141, 141,




Håkanson, L. 3, 50
Han, Z. 145
Hanwang Technologies Co. Ltd 163–7, 
166
Hayes, R. 5, 6, 56
HCL Technologies 9
health care products: reform of regula-
tions relating to 19
Hewlett-Packard (HP) 108, 184–6
High-Tech Research Development Pro-
gram (China) 89
high-tech sector: emerging economies in 
75–6; and globalization of R&D 
233
Hill Report (1944) 77
Hindustan Aeronautical Limited (HAL) 
8
Hisense 13
Hitachi 155–60; background 155–6; 
corporate innovation system and 
knowledge fl ows 158–9, 158;
driving forces behind locating 
of R&D in China 156–7; R&D 
activities in China 156, 157–8
home-base-augmenting site 3
home-base-exploiting site 3
home country implications 121, 125, 
155, 228–35; changing innova-
tion dynamics and opportunities 
229–31; competitive challenges 
from emerging economies 
231–2, 240; complementar-
ity between host countries and 
59; large markets with growing 
affl uence benefi ts 229–30; policy 
232–5; potential for location 
of non-core R&D and other 
technological operations 231; 
potential to license-in innova-
tions from fi rms based in emerg-
ing economies 230–1; research 
collaboration agreements with 
emerging economies 234–5
home market companies 47
Hood, N. 47
horizontal extension 42
host country implications 51–3, 
216–28; Brazil 175, 180, 183, 
186, 191–2; China 155, 159–60, 
167; dependent on type of 
R&D being performed 217–18; 
diffusion of knowledge related 
to patents and other IPRs 223; 
diffusion of R&D culture 224; 
direct benefi ts 219–20; enterprise 
sector 220–1; entrepreneurship 
among scientists and engineers 
224; government policies incen-
tives and policies 223, 257; 
human resources 223–4; increase 
in R&D by domestic companies 
221; India 115, 120–1, 124–5, 
127–8, 130, 134, 138; indirect/
spillover effects 220–5; invest-
ing more by governments on 
domestic R&D 223; linkages 
with universities and national 
research institutes 221–3, 227; 
opposing views of 217; and 
policy 225–8; potential negative 
spillovers 224–5; South Africa 
201–2; strong linkages between 
MNC and local system of inno-
vation 218; technology transfers 
220–1
288 Index
host market companies 47
Hu, M-C. 86





IBM 160, 230; PLI-Global Location 
Strategies service 7
ICICI Bank 85
ICT industry (India) 82–3
incubator movement (Brazil) 98
India 4, 5, 72, 76–86, 108–42, 212, 
216, 219, 226, 253; and Airbus 
9; biopharmaceutical indus-
try 83–6; challenges to higher 
technical education (HTE) 80; 
creation of science parks through 
public-private partnerships 85–6; 
driving forces behind location of 
foreign R&D in 110, 111–12, 
117–18, 124, 126, 130, 139–41, 
140, 141; economic growth 66; 
global innovation in 6, 7, 9–10, 
31, 108–42; ICT industry 82–3; 
implications of foreign R&D 
for 115, 120–1, 124–5, 127–8, 
130, 134, 138; import tariffs 72; 
industry sector 82; innovation 
environment 76–86; jobs created 
by inward FDI 7; liberalization 
of economy 84, 241; linkages 
of different R&D units 141–2; 
MNCs setting up global R&D 
activities in 108–9, 110–21; 
Motorola in 108, 110–15, 222; 
national research institutes 77, 
80–2, 109, 123, 130–8; NSI 
76–7; organizations providing 
engineering services 118; phar-
maceutical industry 76, 83–4, 
122, 227–8; QuEST Global in 
115–21, 220; questionnaire 
survey 139–42, 140, 141; R&D 
expenditures 68; S&T capa-
bilities 39, 76; scientifi c research 
and publications 69, 69, 77–8; 
and single-chip solution 241–7; 
supplier of medicines and ICT 
to other developing countries 
236–7; technological intensity of 
exports 73, 73; Texas Instru-
ments in 219, 225, 237, 241–4; 
types of R&D carried out by 
MNCs 139, 140, 141; univer-
sity system 71, 72, 77, 78–80, 
110; and US-based MNCs R&D 
expenditure 71; venture capital 
funding in 85; see also BRICS
Indian Airbus Engineering Center 9
Indian companies 12, 121–30
Indian Institute of Chemical Technology 
(IICT) 123, 128, 129, 130–4, 
218; areas of research 131; back-
ground 131; knowledge fl ows 
and learning 133–4; reasons for 
companies outsourcing R&D to 
133; selected R&D capabilities 
131–3; vision 131
Indian Institute of Science (IISc) 114, 
119, 134–8, 219, 221; allowing 
of companies to set up R&D 
laboratories inside premises 137; 
background 134–5; and Boeing 
137; clients collaborated with 
137; divisions and areas active in 
135; knowledge fl ows and learn-
ing 138; reasons for companies 
collaborating with 136–8; and 
Society for Innovation and Dis-
covery (SID) 135–6
Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) 
78–9, 80, 113–14, 115, 119
Indian Ministry of Science and Technol-
ogy 82
Indigenous Technology Units see ITUs
Infi neon 108
Informatics Law (Brazil) 171, 172, 174, 
184–5, 191
Information Technology (IT) Law 
(Brazil) 168
Infoys 9
Innovation Fund (IF) Programme 
(South Africa) 194
innovation process: divisibility/modu-
larization of 21–9, 38
Inovar Project 99
INSEAD 6




Intel Corporation 109, 246–7; joint 
venture with Lenovo 155, 161, 
163
Intel Corporation (in China) 149–55, 
165; background 149; corporate 
Index 289
innovation system and knowl-
edge fl ows 152–4, 153; driving 
forces behind locating R&D in 
China 152; implications of R&D 
activities for China 155; R&D 
activities 150–2
intellectual property rights see IPRs
Inter-American Development Bank 
(IDB) 99
internal network 3
International Association of Science 
Parks (IASP) 195
International Finance Corporation 
(IFC) 85




internationalization of production 
41–5, 252
internationalization of R&D: early 
studies 45–9; fi rst wave prior 
to 1970s 60–1; reasons for 50; 
second wave in 1970s 61, 63;
transformation to globalization 
from 61, 64
IPRs (intellectual property rights) 19, 
93, 223, 228, 257, 260
Israel 71
ITUs (Indigenous Technology Units) 46, 
51, 52, 60, 61, 139, 141, 141,
142, 212, 217, 218, 253
J
Janne, O. 4
Japan 2, 53, 68, 70–1, 213






KCTCS (Kentucky Community and 
Technical College System) (US) 
210
Kearney, A.T. 6
Kellogg Foundation 208, 209–10
Key Technologies R&D Program 
(China) 88
King, Sir David 69
KIRK Telecom A/S 204
knowledge fl ows 113–15, 119–20, 124, 
126–7, 133–4, 138–9, 152–4, 
158–9, 163–4, 165–6, 173–4, 





Kumar, N. 11, 82, 82–3
L
Lall, S. 11, 48
large-scale markets: emergence of new 
29–30
learning-by-doing approach 38, 233, 
239, 247, 256, 260
learning-by-training approach 38, 233, 
239, 260
least-developed countries (LDCs) 237
Legend see Lenovo
Lenovo 12–13, 90, 155, 160–3
Levitt, T. 30
licensing 230–1
Linkage, Leverage and Learning (LLL) 
44–5
local-for-local structure 2
local/regional market access: and locat-
ing of global R&D in emerging 
economics 215–16
locally integrated laboratory (LIL) 47
Long, F.A. 79
Lorentzen, J. 193, 194
Lucent Bell Labs 148–9
Lundvall 53
M
McKinsky Global Institute 74
McLeod, M.G. 11
Magellan Aerospace Corporation 118
Maharajh, R. 193
malaria R&D project 206–7
Marais, H.C. 101
Mashelkar, R.A. 69
Mathews, J.A. 11, 38, 44, 86, 261




mergers & acquisitions 232
Metur Chemicals 221




Microsoft India Development Center 
(MIDC) 109
290 Index
mine mudrush project 208
Ministry of Communication (MC) 
(Brazil) 187
Ministry of Science and Technology 
(MCT) (Brazil) 96, 97, 99
Ministry of Science and Technology 
(MOST) (China) 87, 88
Mission Oriented Science Agencies 
(MOSA) (India) 77–8
Mitel Networks Corporation 204
Mitsubishi 8–9
MNC FOSECO 170
MNCs (multinational corporations): 
organization structures for inter-
national R&D 2–3; rationaliza-
tion of activities 33–6; strategies 
to maintain competitiveness of 
2, 32–4
Most Innovative Companies’ ranking 
12
Motor Industry Development Program 
(MIDP) (South Africa) 197
Motorola 110
Motorola Brazil 171–5, 225; corporate 
innovation system and knowl-
edge fl ows 173–5, 173; driving 
forces behind locating in Brazil 
171–2; evolution of R&D strat-
egy 172–3; implications of R&D 
activities for Brazil 175
Motorola India 108, 110–15, 222; 
collaboration with Indian uni-
versities 114–15; corporate inno-
vation system and knowledge 
fl ows 113–15, 114; focus areas 
112–13; host country implica-
tions 115; reasons for locating 
R&D in India 111–12




Mytelka, L.K. 36, 55, 257
N
Naledi3d Factory 205–11, 238; back-
ground 205; innovation system 
and knowledge fl ows 208–11, 
209; organizations collaborated 
with 209–10; product range 
and areas of application 205–6; 
R&D projects 206–8; vision 205
Nano car 40, 247–50
Narula, R. 33, 233
NASSCOM (National Association of 
Software and Service Compa-
nies) 8, 39, 83
Nassif, A. 73
Natco Pharma Limited 121–5; back-
ground 121; collaboration with 
Indian research institutes 123; 
contract R&D (outsource) 
service for MNCs 123–4; R&D 
activities 122–3
National Advisory Council on Inno-
vation (NACI) (South Africa) 
102–3
National Association of Software and 
Service Companies see NASS-
COM
National Chemical Laboratories (NCL) 
(India) 81, 218, 222, 237
National Converter Industries (NCI) 
199–200, 201
National Council for Science and Tech-
nology (CCT) (Brazil) 99
National Council for Scientifi c and 
Technological Development 
(CNPq) (Brazil) 94
National Council of State Research 
Agencies (CONFAP) (Brazil) 99
National Council of State Secretaries 
for Science, Technology and 
Innovation (CONSECTI) (Brazil) 
99
National Engineering Research Centers 
(NERCs) (China) 89–90
National Environmental Engineer-
ing Research Institute (NEERI) 
(India) 81
National Institute of Sciences (NIS) 77
National Key Basic Research Program 
(China) 89
National Research and Development 
Corporation (NRDC) (India) 80
national research institutes 227, 233, 
234, 257; Brazil 183–92; India 
77, 80–2, 109, 123, 130–8
National Science Foundation (NSF) 68
national systems of innovation see NSI
natural resources: ability to exploit in 
emerging economies 238
Natural Science Foundation of China 
(NSFC) 87, 88, 89
NCEs (new chemical entities) 12, 84, 
122, 122–3, 231




new chemical entities see NCEs




Nokia 58, 90, 144, 147–8, 216, 243–4
North American Free Trade Area 
(NAFTA) 29
NSI (National systems of innovation) 




offshoring 8, 9–10, 27, 37–40
oligopoly 42
OPTO LINK 192
outsourcing 8–9, 10, 14, 23, 27–8, 32, 
37–40, 74
ownership advantages: and internation-
alization of production 43, 44
P
Paep Innovation Survey 170
Patel, P. 50
Patent Act (1972) (India) 83
patents/patenting activity 15, 213, 223; 
Brazil 97; China 86; number of 
US patents and GDP per capita 
70
Paul Capital Partners’ Royalty Fund 85
Pearce, R.D. 2, 34
Penner-Hahn, J. 213
Penrose, E. 22
Perez, C. 56, 57, 260
Petrella, R. 49
Petrobras 12, 97
pharmaceutical industry 49, 75–6, 169, 
231; Brazil 96–7; China 75–6; 
drug discovery and develop-






Porter, M.E. 29, 33, 56, 239, 258
product life-cycle theory 42–3, 56–7, 
258–9
production: theories of internationaliza-
tion of 41–5, 252
public research institutions (PRIs) 
(South Africa) 106
public research organizations (PROs) 
(China) 86






QuEST Global 115–21, 220; back-
ground 115–16; core industries 
involved in 116–17; corporate 
innovation system and knowl-
edge fl ows 119–20; implications 
of R&D activities for India 
120–1; reasons for locating 
R&D in India 117–18
R
R&D (research and development): 
classifi cation of 35–6; in emerg-
ing economies see emerging 
economies; factors for location 
selection 49; global expenditures 




Rao, Dr. Rama 128, 129
rationalization: of global corporate 
structures 33–6
rationalized product subsidiary 34–5
Reddy, A.S.P. 60
Regional Technology Units see RTUs
Reliance Industries 12
research collaboration agreements 234
research personnel see S&T personnel/
resources
resource-based approach 22, 37
Rhodia 175–80; background and 
management structure 175–6; 
corporate innovation system 
and knowledge fl ows 177–80, 
177; implications of R&D 
activities for Brazil 180; R&D 





RTUs (Regional Technology Units) 51, 
60, 140, 141, 141, 212, 218
Rural Hygiene Project (Uganda) 207
Russian engineers/scientists 8–9, 11
292 Index
S
S&E degrees: Asian countries 71–2
S&T (science and technology) dynamics 
19–21, 67–72
S&T personnel/resources: cost of 
employing chip design engi-
neer 75, 75; decline in students 
studying 20–1, 39; shortages of 
and driving force for location 
of R&D in emerging economies 
5, 20, 35, 38, 39, 48, 51, 53, 
62, 67, 74–5, 118, 139, 140,
214–15, 226, 254–5
Safarian 45
Sai Life Sciences 125–8; background 
125–6; focus areas 126; knowl-
edge fl ows and learning 126–7; 
reasons for companies to out-





Sasol 13, 101, 107
Schakenraad, J. 37
Schwaag-Serger, S. 143, 144
science and technology see S&T
science/technology parks 227, 231; in 
India 85–6
scientifi c publications/articles 68–9, 69,
70, 95
scientists see S&T personnel/resources
Searle and Company, G.D. 129
semiconductor industry 14, 25–7, 26,
253
Shaver, J.M. 213
Siemens (in Brazil) 181–3; background 
and innovation strategy 181; 
corporate innovation system and 
knowledge fl ows 183; implica-
tions of R&D activities for Bra-
zil 183; R&D activities in 181–2




Singapore 36, 68, 70–1
Singh, J. 15, 213
Singh, S. 49
single-chip solution 241–7; and bank-
ing 246; and digital tv 245; and 
mobile phones 241–5; phones 




Society for Innovation and Discovery 
(SID) 135–6, 137
Soete, L. 56, 57
Software Residency 175
South Africa 5, 193–211, 238; and 
apartheid 100, 101, 193; 
automotive industry 193–4, 
197; biotechnology 104–5; 
business sector 107; Cape 
IT Initiative (CITI) 196–7; 
DaimlerChrysler in 197–202; 
exports 193; GEAR strategy 
101; global innovation in 
193–211; government incentive 
mechanisms 194; implications 
of foreign R&D for 201–2; 
innovation environment 100–7; 
as a location for R&D 204–5; 
Naledi3d Factory 205–11, 238; 
and National Advisory Council 
on Innovation (NACI) 102–3; 
national sectors 101–2; public 
research institutions (PRIs) 
106; reasons for falling behind 
peer countries 100; reductions 
in R&D spending 103–4; S&T 
system 100–2, 194; and Sasol 
13, 101, 107; supplying of 
products to other developing 
countries 237; technology mis-
sions 104–5; Tellumut 202–5, 
238; and The Innovation Hub 
(TIH) 194–6; university system 
105–6; and US-based MNCs 
R&D expenditure 71; White 
Paper on Science and Technol-
ogy (1996) 101–2
South African Bureau of Standards 
(SABS) 105
South African companies 202–11
South Korea 68, 72, 260
South-South dimension 236–50
Soviet Union: collapse of 5, 18
Spark Program (China) 88
spillover effects 220–5
Standard & Poor 12
standards setting program (China) 
90–1
Stankiewicz, R. 53–4




subsidiaries 33–4, 46, 47, 213; clas-
sifi cation of foreign 169–70; 
rationalized product 34–5; world 
product mandate 35
subsidiaries with limited relevance 
(SRL) 169–70
Sun 144
supply-related factors: and location of 
R&D abroad 51, 254–5; see also 
S&T personnel/resources
support laboratory (SL) 47
systemic lock-in 233
systems of innovation (SI) 33, 53–6; 
characteristics 55
T
tacit knowledge 27, 38, 239, 260
Taiwan 4, 146, 260
Tata Consultancy Services (TCS) 9, 85
Tata Group 12
Tata Institute of Fundamental Research 
(TIFR) 220
Tata, J.N. 134
Tata Motors India 40, 232, 247–50
Tata, Ratan 247
Tatra Trucks 13
techno-economic paradigm, changes in 
16, 29, 44, 56, 58–9, 60, 234, 
239, 253, 259–60
technological catch-up: and developing 
countries 14
technology cooperation agreements 36–7
Technology Development and Infor-
mation Corporation of India 
(TDICI) 220–1
Technology and Human Resources for 
Industry Programme (THRIP) 
(South Africa) 194
technology systems approach: phases 
of 57–8
Technology Transfer Units see TTUs
technology transfers 220–1
technology-related factors: and location 
of R&D abroad 50, 51
Technopreneur Promotion Program 
(TePP) 82
Teece, D.J. 36
TELEBRAS 187, 188, 189, 190
Telecommunications Act (1962) (Brazil) 
186–7
telecommunications sector 168; Brazil 
186–92
Tellumat 202–5, 238; background 202; 
innovation system and knowledge 
fl ows 204; mission and operations 
202–4
Texas Instruments (TI) (India) 219, 
225, 237, 241–4




Torch Program (China) 89
TOTVS 31
trade barriers: falling of 29
trade, international 13–14
Trade-Related Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) 223, 228
traditional subsidiaries (ST) 169
transactional costs 42
tropicalization 169
Tschang, F.T. 35, 36
Tsinghua University (China) 86, 92, 
154, 158–9, 166
TTUs (Technology Transfer Units) 46, 
51, 52, 60, 61, 63, 139, 140, 
141, 141, 142, 217, 218, 253
Tweensense 211
U
UNESCO: supporter of Naledi3d’s proj-
ects 206, 207, 209; Virtual Multi-
media Academy (VMA) 207–8
Unicamp (University of Campinas) 
(Brazil) 97, 178–9
Unilever 253
United States: fall in proportion of 
foreign R&D 6; as foreign R&D 
destination 6–7; MNCs perform-
ing R&D activities abroad 45–6, 
48; R&D expenditures 68; S&T 
workforce from Asia 72; univer-
sities 79
universities 256; Indian 71, 72, 77, 
78–80, 110; impact of MNC’s 
global R&D on 221–2; linkages 
between MNCs/local companies 
and 221–2; South African 105–6
universities, Brazilian 187–8; collabora-
tion with foreign fi rms 174–5, 
178–80, 183
universities, Chinese 71, 72, 86, 91–3; 
collaboration with Chinese fi rms 
163, 166; collaboration with 
foreign MNCs 92–3, 145, 148, 
154, 158–9










von Zedtwitz, M. 144
W
Wacom 165
Walsh, K. 92, 143, 146, 167
Walsh, S. 161, 162
Wei, X. 161, 162
Wells, L.T. 11
Wen, Ke 146
Western Europe: as foreign R&D desti-
nation 6, 7
White, S. 93
World Links Zimbabwe 208, 210
world market companies 47
world product mandate subsidiary 35
World Trade Organization (WTO) 18, 
29, 223
Wortmann, M. 50
X
Xielin, L. 93
Y
Yeung, H.W.C. 11
Young, S. 47
Z
Zanfei, A. 3
ZTE 86, 87
